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IEditor's Introduction
Leo Groarke
Restructuring and its effects surround us. The driver of the Airways
Transit van on a recent trip from the airport told me that he had, one-
and-a-half years earlier, been the CEO of a publishing company that
employed sixty people. "For fourteen years I gave one hundred and fifty
percent. I put on overalls and helped in the stockroom when they could
not keep up with orders. I knew the families of all my workers."
One day he was told the company was restructuring. He was replaced
by a new CEO who had no experience in publishing and was given three
months' salary as a severance package. During the six months that fol-
lowed he tried to adjust to life without his six-figure salary. In the process,
he lost his house, his wife divorced him, and he searched unsuccessfully
for a new position. His participation in a government retraining plan was
cancelled because of technicalities surrounding his eligibility. After a great
deal of effort on his part the eligibility issue was resolved, but by then the
program had ceased to operate. A year and a half after losing his position,
he drives airport vans for minimum wage and lives in a condo which he
shares with his twenty-two-year-old son—a young man trained in archi-
tectural design who works as a manual labourer in two part-time jobs.
This is a very personal snapshot of the negative side of a new econ-
omy that is characterized by the restructuring of private and public enter-
prise, by the consequences of this restructuring, and by the new eco-
nomic order it creates. Within this new economy, decisions to downsize,
lay-offs, government cutbacks, and the closing or merger of businesses,
hospitals, boards of education, schools, and health care services are the
order of the day. The fundamental changes this implies have been
fuelled by many forces: most obviously, by technological "advances"
which continually reduce the need for human workers, by government
attempts to eliminate their budget deficits and reduce their debt load,
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and by the competitive pressures of a globalized economy. The new
economy which results is characterized by change rather than stability,
by continual restructuring, by ever-increasing competition in the mar-
ketplace, and by a social safety net that is increasingly threadbare.
Despite its human costs, opinions about restructuring and the econ-
omy it produces are divided. Many argue that economic sacrifices are
necessary—if bitter—medicine for an ailing economy that is behind the
times and too frequently characterized by inefficiencies and outmoded
modes of operation. This economy needs, such commentators argue, to
be overhauled in order to create more responsible government, more
competitive private enterprise, and a brighter future with more and bet-
ter jobs. Their opponents answer by decrying restructuring and its
effects, and by arguing that restructuring serves primarily as a way to
widen the gap between the rich and poor.
The radically divergent views of restructuring this debate implies have
sparked many heated exchanges in the popular press but, peculiarly, rel-
atively little discussion among those who study ethics and the ethical
issues that arise in business, health, and education. The present collection
is an attempt to change this, both in the context of short-term questions
about the process of restructuring and in the context of longer-term ques-
tions about the economy it produces. The questions discussed include:
• When is restructuring justified, and when is it not?
• What are the ethical concerns -which characterize the new economy
that restructuring produces?
• What are an employer's obligations to employees during the kinds of
major transformational change that characterize restructuring?
• What can past experience teach us about responsible restructuring,
and how does it affect "the bottom line"?
• How can the negative social consequences of the restructuring econ-
omy be minimized?
• How can the increasingly competitive world economy that restructur-
ing produces be made to promote ethical behaviour in public and pri-
vate enterprise?
• How does restructuring affect local, national and international com-
munities, and what should be done in this regard?
The answers to these questions which are found in the essays that fol-
low are intended for students and academics, for policy makers, for pro-
fessionals and business people who must deal with ethical issues, and
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for everyone affected by restructuring. Though the book is designed to
be easily employable as a textbook or a training manual, its aim is a
much broader understanding and discussion that—like the issues it dis-
cusses—transcends the classroom.
Because this collection is a contribution to applied ethics, it is
important to say something about the vision of applied ethics that
informs it, especially as the collection represents a notable departure
from some traditional conceptions of ethical inquiry. One can better
understand this departure by distinguishing two different kinds of ques-
tions that applied ethicists typically address. On the one hand, they
investigate and discuss questions about the values we should or do
adopt in making particular kinds of policy decisions. In dealing with
concrete ethical issues, they must also address empirical questions about
social, historical, political, and scientific matters that are relevant to the
analysis and assessment of particular ethical issues. In discussing
employment equity, for example, one might address the theoretical
questions it raises about the moral status of discrimination and reverse
discrimination, and/or empirical questions about the extent to which dis-
crimination continues to exist and persist, and is likely to be affected by
particular social policies. A comprehensive account of the issue must
address questions about both "facts" and "values."
This means that applied ethics departs in some significant ways from
traditional ethical inquiry, which has tended to emphasize the value side
of the value-fact equation. In the context of applied ethics, it is impor-
tant to say that it remains a central ethical concern, but also that an
emphasis on concrete ethical issues means that "applied" ethical inquiry
must frequently incorporate a detailed investigation of empirical issues
that must inform conclusions about what is right and wrong, and ques-
tionable or not questionable in some real-life situation. Discussions of
the greenhouse effect and what should or should not be done about it
must, for example, be founded on a proper understanding of the science
of climate change, including an understanding of the controversial issues
of prediction it implies.
While applied ethicists generally agree that empirical considerations
have a role to play in practical moral reasoning, the extent to which they
should play a central role in applied ethics remains a matter of contro-
versy. A number of commentators have questioned ethics' traditional
emphasis on questions of value (see, for example, Hoffmaster 1991,
Groarke and Scholz 1996), but others continue to take it to be the heart
of ethical inquiry. While this is not the place for a detailed discussion of
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this issue, it is important to say that the present book adopts a very broad
view of applied ethics which includes within its compass empirical
inquiries that address key issues that must inform responsible decisions
about practical ethical issues. Among other things, this conception of
applied ethics suggests that it can, in the context of restructuring, useful-
ly include historical, political, and empirical studies, and should not be
narrowly restricted to the study of the moral values that inform restruc-
turing decisions. Moral values do have an important role to play, but they
are not the only grist for the applied ethics mill.
This broad conception of ethical inquiry, and applied ethics in par-
ticular, has been assumed for a variety of reasons: because there are
theoretical reasons why it is difficult, in the realm of ethical inquiry, to
usefully separate moral and empirical questions; because empirical dis-
agreements frequently lie at the heart of conflicting conclusions about
the ethical concerns raised by restructuring and other practical issues;
and because a very broad conception of applied ethics allows a broad-
er variety of stakeholders to state what they themselves take to be the
morally most relevant features of restructuring. The broad conception
of applied ethics that this implies is, it is worth noting, reflected in other
applied ethics anthologies which include selections explicitly designed
to address historical, political, and empirical dimensions of ethical
issues (see, for example, Coward and Hurka 1993, Shaw 1996, and
Cragg and Koggel 1996).
In the context of restructuring and the new economy, the notion that
applied ethics should encompass whatever kinds of considerations are
important to an ethical assessment of concrete issues makes applied
ethics a very interdisciplinary enterprise. In the case of the present book,
it means that contributions have come from fields as disparate as busi-
ness, philosophy, economics, and medicine. The book's interdisciplinary
leanings also incorporate an attempt to discuss, compare, and contrast
(implicitly as well as explicitly) three different sectors of the economy—
business, health, and education. This is useful because the institutions,
corporations, and organizations that work in these different sectors are
in many cases faced with similar restructuring issues. Even when they
are not, comparisons can usefully highlight the differences that charac-
terize different economic sectors.
One final interdisciplinary aspect of this book which merits mention
is found in the attempt to include contributions from those who must
grapple with ethical issues and the consequences of restructuring in the
course of their business and professional lives. It has not been possible
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to include a representative of every relevant group of stakeholders in
one volume, but there has been a concerted attempt to include a vari-
ety of voices which are reflected in a number of articles that serve as
reports from the front line of the new economy.
Inevitably, the mix of interests and perspectives included in a col-
lection like the present one implies very diverse and often conflicting
opinions, interests, and agendas. A number of authors offer critiques of
restructuring and the restructuring economy. No one defends the ethics
of "slash and burn" downsizing (because it is very difficult to justify from
an ethical point of view), but a number of authors do argue that restruc-
turing can be a positive experience, provides a useful opportunity to
change a flawed status quo, or is an unavoidable economic reality that
must be accepted. A variety of authors suggest that attention to the eth-
ical concerns raised by restructuring can create better corporations, gov-
ernments, educational institutions, etc., from both a moral and an eco-
nomic point of view. By including articles that promote responsible
restructuring along with others that more universally reject restructuring,
the book tries to present an informed account of different sides of the
restructuring debate.
Whatever one's attitude to restructuring and the new economy, the
ethical issues that they raise cannot be avoided, if only because financial
circumstances and/or government policies often force restructuring,
requiring that one choose between different restructuring options. In
many cases, the result is managers and administrators who are not sym-
pathetic to restructuring, but must nevertheless direct it. To do so respon-
sibly, they must question how restructuring can—even when it is unwel-
come—be conducted in as fair a way as possible. Once one takes this
question seriously, it becomes clear that different approaches to restruc-
turing and the new economy are not equal from an ethical (or an eco-
nomic) point of view. This will be obvious if one considers the matter,
for one cannot equate fair and unfair severance packages, outplacement
services and a lack of concern about the welfare of laid-off workers, the
necessary use of contract workers and policies that exploit them to the
fullest, more efficient operations and corporate "anorexia," and so on.
The articles in the book have been arranged so that they discuss these
kinds of distinctions from both a theoretical and a practical point of view.
Though the distinction is not hard and fast, articles are more general and
more theoretical in the earlier sections of the book. The discussion begins
with this introduction, and with two articles designed to prepare the way
for other contributions to the book. Subsequent sections present:
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• the case against the restructuring economy;
• discussions of the distinction between responsible and irresponsible
restructuring;
• accounts of alternative methods of restructuring;
• perspectives on the obligations created by the process of restructuring;
• examples of the pitfalls of restructuring;
• analyses of the ethical issues raised by the consequences of a restruc-
turing economy;
• case studies of particular restructuring experiences; and
• a final overview and conclusion.
It goes without saying that the divisions between the different parts of the
book are necessarily imprecise, and that most articles are usually relevant
to issues discussed in a number of sections in the book. It is especially
notable that articles which address general issues often do so on the basis
of a detailed look at particular cases of restructuring or its consequences.
In the two articles included in the first section of the book, A. Scott
Carson and Barry Hoffmaster set the stage for a detailed ethical investi-
gation of restructuring. In "What Are the University's Obligations in the
New Economy?" Carson argues that universities and their faculty have an
obligation to address the issues that restructuring and the new economy
raises. His article places the discussion which follows within the context
of a view of university education that welcomes rather than derides an
engagement with practical affairs, and stresses its importance both to the
well being of the university, and to the society it serves. All the contri-
butions to the present volume are very much in keeping with this view
of university education.
In his article, Hoffmaster introduces a discussion of the ethics of
restructuring, underscoring the substantial moral issues that it raises. In
the process, he emphasizes the importance of a broader view of ethics
and corporate responsibility which recognizes restructuring as a moral
and not merely an economic issue. Having established this context, he
compares the theory and practice of restructuring, especially in the guise
of management philosophies like Total Quality Management (TQM).
Taking health care as an example, he emphasizes the danger that restruc-
turing may in practice mean that broad moral values are replaced by nar-
row economic ones which make economic measures the sole arbiter of
institutional behaviour. Looked at from this perspective, restructuring is a
fundamental challenge to the attempt to place more rather than less
emphasis on ethics in the pursuit of business, health, and education.
2What Are the University's
Obligations in the
New Economy?
A Scott Carson
No one in Canada should be surprised to hear that the economy is in
transition. Knowledge-based industries are growing rapidly and manu-
facturing sectors that emphasize manual rather than technological skills
are in decline. Characteristic of this economic transition is the restructur-
ing of the public and private sectors. In the public sector, restructuring is
driven by the goals of debt reduction and fiscal austerity. In the private
sector, the changes encompass not only businesses but whole industries.
Many of these changes— a greater use of technology, the dislocation of
labour, the "flattening" of the institutional hierarchy, and so on—are dis-
cussed in the papers in this volume.
In this article, I want to consider the implications of restructuring for
Canadian universities. Not for their budgets or their fiscal plans, but for
their teaching and their research goals and aspirations. One might put
my topic as a question: To what extent are universities obliged to dis-
cuss, debate, and teach about restructuring, and to what extent are they
obligated to prepare students vocationally for the new, restructured
economy? I will note in passing that this is a more fundamental question
than the question bow universities might go about fulfilling such an
obligation.
It is from the outset important to note that the question whether uni-
versities should prepare students vocationally for a restructured econo-
my is especially controversial. On the one hand, there is immense and
growing public pressure on universities to prepare students for the new
economic order. Governments in British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba,
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Ontario, and Nova Scotia are pushing for a greater orientation to the
needs of the marketplace. Much has already changed in universities, and
especially in business schools, but there remains a high degree of resis-
tance to changes in the university community overall.
Peter Emberley has, for example, complained that "increasingly uni-
versities are being required to see themselves as 'engines of economic
growth,' 'training centres,' as the 'cutting edge of research and develop-
ment'" (1996, 21-22). Emberley believes that universities should not be
involved in preparing students for the workplace and therefore recom-
mends that professional schools be moved out of academe and into
polytechnics. Universities would "remain places where the culture of
scholarship could proceed undisturbed, and where primary attention
would be paid to frontier research, to cultivating critical reason and
imagination and to fostering political citizenship and public service"
(1996, 262; see also Wolff 1969, 12 and Bloom 1987, 339-340).
Clearly, the vision of a university reflected in the writing of authors
like Emberley is not compatible with the notion that universities
should—in their curriculum and research—place much emphasis on
new social realities like restructuring. In the pages that follow, I exam-
ine the case for and against the notion that the university is obliged to
address concrete economic and political issues like restructuring, both
by preparing students for careers in a restructured economy and, more
broadly, by making a concerted attempt to intellectually address the
issues that it poses. I will argue that restructuring should in this way be
accommodated within academe. One implication of this conclusion is
that books like the present one should be written.
One cannot responsibly address questions about the university's
obligations in the context of restructuring without considering three stan-
dard accounts of the university and its role. The first is the research-based
institution model which is generally credited to the late-eighteenth-
century Germanic conception of the university. Espoused by Humboldt,
and with the University of Berlin as a model, it maintains that the prop-
er role of the university is to pursue truth and advance the knowledge of
society by research. This ideal travelled to North America through the
establishment of universities such as Johns Hopkins and Clarke, which
are substantially research-based. Although major institutions such as
Harvard, Yale, Stanford, McGill, Toronto, Michigan, and Wisconsin are
also centres of research, they corrupt the ideal research model to the
extent that they engage in professional programs, athletic endeavours,
and other non-research functions.
What Are the University's Obligations in the New Economy? I I
A second conception of what a university should be is the classical
college. Cardinal Newman is usually credited with providing the best
account of this conception in The Idea of a University. Newman's uni-
versity was less focused on hard research than on educating students.
Central to this was the intertwining of the intellectual and moral aspects
of human life. The setting, or the educational environment, is an impor-
tant component of this image of education. The ideal college should be
small and removed from the daily affairs of society. It is a place where
dialogue, free enquiry, and the study of classical texts is the means of
tutoring students. Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum would be
ancient models. Oxford and Yale in the early 1880s are later exemplars.
In the ideal, it is teaching, generalist knowledge, and a commitment to
a particular environment that sets this model of the university apart from
the research institution model.
A third model is the scholarly community. This model combines ele-
ments of the other two, but moves beyond the research mission and the
physical learning environment to concentrate on the nature of the schol-
arly life. The scholarly community is self-governed and based on the
essential elements of reading and conversation. To this Emberley adds
that "The purpose of the university is to sustain and enrich the scholarly
culture in particular and the 'wider culture in general" (1996, 262).
The research and college models represent two competing functions
in modern universities. The internal debate is often whether research or
teaching should have primacy. The scholarly culture model seems to
bring them together. It highlights the love of knowledge and truth which
unifies the academic purpose. Importantly, as well, it promotes a form
of education that is compatible with both, namely "liberal education."
The research and college models do place greater weighting on differ-
ent aspects of what we understand to be liberal education, but they both
fit under its umbrella.
I do not have sufficient space to provide a full analysis of liberal
education. But Plato is a useful reference point because of the richness
and breadth of his position on education. He sees education as a way to
guide students toward clarity and truth, as a way to develop in the learn-
er a love for the principles that form the basis of human knowledge, and
as a way to instill a passion for order and symmetry. A student, on
Plato's account, learns how to use reason to impose harmony on desires.
The education of a human personality is, therefore, broadly concerned
with both reason and desire—an integration of the whole self. Plato pro-
poses different educational processes for different stages in the learner's
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development. Most important for us are the later stages when educa-
tional activities are directed toward harnessing the senses, emotions, and
intellectual virtues to develop a sensitivity to the "forms of the good" and
a grasp of the harmony that unites them.
Some of the salient points of Plato's theory are central to our dis-
cussion. First, we can see how very different Plato's conception of "edu-
cation" is from the "skill training." For Plato, what should be learned is
what has inherent value. Though the knowledge an educated person
acquires might turn out to have practical uses, it needs no instrumental
justification. Second, Plato emphasizes not just breadth of knowledge
but depth as well. Education therefore entails some understanding of the
theoretical principles that underlie knowledge and provide coherence
and cohesion. Someone who has at their command disparate facts and
figures without a sense of what makes them come together is, from this
point of view, well informed but not really educated. Finally, Plato
understands an educated person to be someone who possess intellectu-
al virtues such as the desire for clarity, impartiality, etc.
Plato's account of liberal education has, of course, been adapted and
moulded in different ways by various modern commentators. For our
purposes I think we can allow the points made above to stand as a
working set of parameters. Whether breadth is ultimately more impor-
tant than depth, or the intellectual virtues more crucial than the means
by which they are developed, is less important to us than recognizing
that each is a part of what most people would agree is necessary (in
some measure) to the nature of a liberally educated person. So we will
take breadth, depth, underlying principles, consistency and coherence,
rational autonomy, and development of the intellectual virtues as being
key conditions for a liberal education. I leave as an open question the
relationship between such education and knowledge that has inherent
as opposed to instrumental worth (I deal with this question below,
p. 22).
Given this analysis, we can ask how liberal educators should regard
the attempt to address contemporary economic realities like restructur-
ing educationally. Certainly some would say that a concern with such
realities ties the university too closely to the here and now, not allowing
the freedom that is crucial for the theoretical investigation of inherently
valuable knowledge. According to Bloom, vocational training is espe-
cially problematic because it is too directed and does not allow the stu-
dent sufficient freedom to radically question and reevaluate their life and
goals (1987, 370). For Bloom, the very idea that as educators we ought
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to look to the transitory state of the Canadian economy and use this as
a basis for deciding what ought to be taught in a university, would be
anathema.
This, then, is the first argument against the claim that the university
has an obligation to address restructuring both vocationally and more
broadly, and that academics need to address restructuring issues. It claims
that academe is centrally concerned with liberal education and that this
is not compatible with an emphasis on timely social, political and eco-
nomic issues, and is in particular incompatible with professional, careerist
education and with other forms of education which prepare students for
economic life.
A second argument against the attempt to address the issues raised
by restructuring maintains that the university simply cannot meet the
demands this would impose. Emberley, for example, writes that univer-
sities asked to take on too many other non-scholarly tasks—tasks like
attending to the economic needs of society—are unable to cope with the
range of competing and incompatible demands. "The university cannot
simultaneously be an engine of economic growth, a social welfare
agency, a laboratory for a new consciousness, a training centre, and a
home for the scholarly culture. Something has to give" (1996, 258).
Here, then, we have two purported reasons why the universities
should divorce themselves from immediate social, political and eco-
nomic concerns like restructuring and the economy it produces. First,
because to do so would not be in keeping with their mission of liberal
education, and second, because doing so places too many demands on
universities, which are already stretched to the breaking point.
What is to be said in answer to these objections? I think we need to
begin by recognizing another role of the university: its role as social crit-
ic. This is a role that is as established as its role as the purveyor of liber-
al education, and a role which is a crucial part of the university's contri-
bution to the broader community that pays for it. As John Stuart Mill
observed in On Liberty, discussion, criticism and debate are not a nicety,
but a necessary part of society if it is to constructively address problems,
compare alternative solutions, and learn from its mistake. The university
is the institution par excellence for this critical role, for a great many rea-
sons—most importantly, because it has in-depth expertise in most areas
and because its professors have an autonomy which is provided by
tenure and academic freedom.
Looked at from this perspective, it can very plausibly be argued that
academics have a positive duty to take up a critical examination of the
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nature and social impact of restructuring activities in the economy. In
this context, it is important to recognize that universities have always
been concerned with the issues of the day, and that the tranquil image
of the "college" concept—the quiet, remote and communal guild unified
in the common love for scholarly conversation and debate—is histori-
cally misleading.
Ties to "practical" social, political and economic issues is one of the
hallmarks of the modern university. North American universities have
had business schools, medical schools, law schools, and other profes-
sional schools for more than sixty years. Throughout this period they
have flourished. Twenty years ago, Niblett remarked that "the pressure
grows on higher education in almost every country to produce gradu-
ates useful to a society eager for more and more technology and know-
how. This pressure can be seen to have been growing for at least a hun-
dred years" (1974, 2). North American universities have never been a
refuge for research and pure scholarship in a way that disallows any
concern about careers and political and economic concerns.
A similar preoccupation with timely issues is also apparent if we
consider the university's broader role in social and political debate.
During the 1950s universities were preoccupied with the political
oppression of McCarthy ism; in the 1960s there were campus riots in
Paris, Columbia, Berkeley, and elsewhere, and the Kent State shooting.
The 1970s tended to be more tranquil, but gave rise to the political cor-
rectness and gender issues of the 1980s and the aggressive multicultural
and postmodernist politics of the 1990s. In light of these historical
trends, it is hard to envision the reality of academic life as being quiet,
unified, and removed from the issues of the day.
These features of the university are reflected in the fact that univer-
sities have themselves been rife with acrimonious political and ideologi-
cal conflict. It could hardly be otherwise if one accepts the university's
role as social critic, which must include criticism of the university as much
as other aspects of society. This point can easily be illustrated by listing
titles of some of the books most commonly read on campuses over the
past thirty years: Zero Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in Canada's
Universities (1996), Campus Wars: Multiculturalism and the Politics of
Difference (1995), The Imperiled Academy (1993), Illiberal Education: The
Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (1991), Tenured Radicals: How
Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education System (1990), Profscam:
Professors and the Demise of Higher Education (1988), The Closing of the
American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and
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Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (1987), The Divided Academy:
Professors and Politics (1975), Death of the American University (1973),
Confrontation and Counterattack (1971), The Academic Revolution
(1968), and so on and so forth.
Looked at from this point of view, the North American university has
always been a mix of social, political and economic criticism, "pure" the-
oretical reflection and vocational training. As Jencks and Reisman write
of the latter, "purity of motive and single-mindedness of purpose have
never been characteristic of American colleges... the question has always
been how an institution mixed the academic with the vocational, not
whether it did so" (1968, 199).
Just because the ideal of the academic community has not been real-
ized in the recent historical past (and is not likely to materialize anytime
soon) it does not follow that the ideal is without merit. But it is impor-
tant to note that Emberley, Bloom and others are lamenting the passage
of something that does not seem to have existed, or if so, not for very
long. Putting this historical point aside, the deeper issue is whether the
consideration of timely social, political and economic issues should
occupy an important place in the university. Given our earlier account
of the university's goals and mission, this can best be put as the ques-
tion whether this consideration serves the cause of liberal education.
Here we need remind ourselves that the centrepiece of liberal edu-
cation is the development of the rational capacities of the mind at some
reasonable level of breadth, depth and coherence. Underlying this is an
understanding of the principles that support the core subject knowledge
in the discipline being learned. We might add that the way in which edu-
cation must take place cannot be doctrinaire; indeed it should promote
free inquiry and the development of intellectual autonomy. Finally, we
can say that there must be a commitment to intellectual virtues such as
clarity, respect for the facts, relevance, etc. I want to argue that a con-
cern with economic issues like restructuring and its aftermath, and some
corresponding commitment to vocational education is consistent with
the principles of liberal education.
The first requirement of liberal education, breadth, is clearly served
by attention to issues like restructuring, just because they are inherently
many-sided and interdisciplinary. Whether the issues occur in the con-
text of business, education, health services, etc., a discussion of them
presupposes a broad understanding of the nature of the working world
and the overarching human context in which it occurs. In this sense,
breadth of understanding is of crucial importance.
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In order to understand issues that pertain to business, for example,
one will frequently need to understand organizational theory, organiza-
tional behaviour, business ethics, the social and political contexts of busi-
ness, and so on. A further key element will often be an understanding of
the macro- and the micro-economic environments of business. Probably,
the liberal arts provide the ultimate basis of this understanding, which
must be rooted in foundational elements of sociology, psychology, phi-
losophy and history.
Those liberal educators who prefer to emphasize breadth rather than
depth should, therefore, embrace programs that pay attention to timely
social, political, and economic issues, for they consciously require a
broad understanding. In comparison, many other university programs
give students the opportunity to take courses that result in a very nar-
row specialization. An honours physics student, for example, can prob-
ably opt for course selections that barely go beyond physics, mathemat-
ics, and cognate hard sciences. It is difficult to see breadth in this.
This introduces the depth criterion. Here it can be said that timely
issues presented by economic phenomena like restructuring provide an
ideal way to introduce students to an in-depth treatment of the various
disciplines and subject areas. Obviously, a focus on these issues is not
itself tantamount to an in-depth study of the issues that underlie them.
But it can still be said that a full understanding of them requires this kind
of study. To fully understand issues in education, for example, one
needs a foundational course in philosophy of education which analyses
the concepts and principles central to the nature of human learning,
knowledge and understanding. Such courses are pursued with the rigour
and depth we associate with philosophy departments (and are often
taught by philosophy departments). Equally, cognitive psychology in
teacher education, and organizational psychology in business education,
are necessary prerequisites if we want to analyze the structural elements
of human perception, understanding and conduct in depth. And just as
psychology is at the core of issues in education, sociology is a major part
of issues in social work and economics is a major part of issues in busi-
ness. Since these social sciences are firmly entrenched in the liberal arts
it would be odd to think of them losing their bona fide credentials when
they are used as background for the investigation of timely issues.
The coherence principle of liberal education is, ironically, better
served in the educational preparation which concerns itself with issues of
practical import than in its supposed natural home—the arts and science
faculties. The reason is that this kind of education needs to integrate the
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various disciplinary offerings. In the business world, for example, prob-
lems do not arise with labels attached identifying them as best dealt with
by one academic discipline or another. Instead, they are created out of
the complexity of business activities and require those who address them
to be able to determine which forms of knowledge most suitably gener-
ate the principles that can be applied. Because of this the best education
of this sort works hard to develop overall program approaches to curric-
ula which draw together the cognate disciplines in a way that explains
how each can make its contribution to understanding complicated situa-
tions. This is increasingly the goal of professional education.
By contrast, the arts and sciences are still very much characterized
by discipline "silos" in which the departments of, say, history and
English are quite separate from one another. Some universities are
experimenting with multi-disciplinary programs like environmental stud-
ies, but the tendency in most academic institutions is still to maintain the
boundaries. Even within the disciplines there is considerable fragmenta-
tion, as increasingly course offerings reflect the highly specialized
research interests of the professors teaching them rather that an inte-
grated attempt to develop in the student a coherent understanding of the
structure of the discipline.
This suggests that addressing issues like restructuring and the new
economy supports the three fundamental goals of liberal education—
breadth, depth and coherence. What, then, of the other aspects of liber-
al education? What, for example, should we say about liberal education's
commitment to free inquiry and the development of intellectual autono-
my? One might in this regard worry that the inevitable attachments to the
world of economic activities that come with attention to concrete eco-
nomic issues like restructuring may result in doctrinaire teaching that
promotes "received doctrine" which emanates from various professions,
businesses or enterprises; and that this seriously compromises the inde-
pendence that liberal education requires. The "received doctrine" could
take the form of established procedures for performance and codes of
conduct which are not open to criticism in the way that an interpreta-
tion of a sonnet might be.
Professional schools naturally presume the legitimacy (moral and
otherwise) of the work they are preparing students to engage in. A busi-
ness school, for example, presupposes the acceptability of the market
system. In considering the significance of this fact, it is important to
remember that professional issues may be considered from the point of
view of a number of different disciplines. Business concerns may, for
18 The Ethics of the New Economy
example, be considered in a course that resides in sociology, philosophy,
political science or law. Even within a business school, it is important to
remember the foundational nature of many business courses. Since they
are intended to examine the theoretical underpinnings of the relevant
practices, a wide divergence in ideological critiques from students is not
only compatible but encouraged. In business ethics classes, professors
routinely push students to challenge the economic conservatism of the
market economy.
Granted, in functional areas such as finance, it is true that the theo-
retical constructs usually presuppose as a starting point that in a free-
market economy individuals are rational utility maximizers. But it is
important to distinguish between accepting the basic assumption of a
theory in order to test its internal coherence and explanatory power
overall, and accepting the assumption as being itself true or morally
legitimate. If a finance professor demands that students commit them-
selves to the truth or legitimacy of the assumption, rather than requiring
that they use it as a hypothetical starting point, then the professor is
being doctrinaire, hence illiberal. But there is nothing about business
education per se that requires this.
Concern about bias in the treatment of particular issues is to some
extent legitimate, but it is easily exaggerated in the context of econom-
ic issues and professional education. If one looks at the politicization of
the university it should be clear that the risk of doctrinaire teaching and
social criticism is as much a concern with the political left so evident in
the social sciences as with the conservative right in, for example, the
business school. And it is tempting for the former to condemn the latter
because of their political orientation. But the challenge can go both
ways. What is important to realize is that there is nothing that prevents
those in the professional schools from criticizing either the status quo or
the direction that the economy is taking. Indeed, professions such as
social work which typically advocate for the poor and disadvantaged are
likely to do just that.
It is in any case important to remember that every academic field has
its orthodoxies: academic journals, for example, require specific styles for
footnotes, references and so on, and acceptable kinds of methodological
approaches. Doctoral thesis committees have a specified structure in each
university, and their members have prescribed responsibilities. Professors
and students in both cases can always question the rules. But until the
rules are changed, everyone must abide by them. So when graduate stu-
dents in any field are being trained for the academic world, they must
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learn their own set of "received doctrines." But just as they can challenge
these strictures when admitted to the professorate, so can lawyers,
accountants and doctors. In any event, it is only a small part of a student's
overall program that is devoted to the prescribed knowledge.
A positive argument in favour of the non-doctrinaire nature of edu-
cation that focuses on practical issues is that it typically requires consid-
erable use of teaching devices such as case studies and business simu-
lations. Pedagogically, both are a long way from being rigid or doctri-
naire. They are very open-ended in terms of what counts as the right
answer, since usually the solutions available are numerous. Most solu-
tions have some merit, but certain approaches are better than others in
virtue of the desirability of the consequences they bring about. Because
of this, students are encouraged to think for themselves, defend their
judgments and, in the case of simulations, be prepared to live with the
impact of decisions made since they affect the alternative courses of
action that will be available for decisions at later stages of the simula-
tion. Courses like this, therefore, tend to promote the autonomous think-
ing which is a central feature of liberal education.
What, then, of intellectual virtues such as clarity, respect for evi-
dence, the willingness to change one's position in light of compelling
evidence to the contrary (i.e., academic humility) and tolerance of the
opinions of others? They are also crucial to liberal education, especially
as Plato construed it. I explained above that degree programs which
include an element of issues like restructuring may involve liberal arts
courses, professional programs, and courses in functional disciplines. If
all components meet the breadth, depth, and coherence tests as we dis-
cussed, there appears to be little reason why the intellectual virtues
would not be an important educational outcome.
Interestingly, in many applied fields the virtues actually take on an
enhanced importance because of their applications to the working
world. Accuracy and respect for the facts is extremely important in busi-
ness, especially where the consequences of being wrong can be severe.
Correspondingly, having respect for the opinions of others can enable a
business person to make better judgments. A miscalculation by a foreign
exchange trader can result in the loss of a great deal of money, and engi-
neering errors in the planning of physical structures such as bridges or
aircraft can endanger people. A lack of precision by a doctor or dentist
can have, likewise, seriously harmful consequences, and so on. Liberal
educators ought, therefore, to embrace education which engages timely
concrete issues in order to promote the intellectual virtues.
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I think that we can now conclude that liberal education gains
rather than loses by engaging practical concerns. Academics should,
this suggests, study issues like those discussed in this book. It is inter-
esting to compare these conclusions to the opposing views of Wolff,
who writes a generation earlier. He argues that faculty members in pro-
fessional schools, or those who are otherwise concerned with the eco-
nomic world, find themselves torn between academe and the working
world. He writes, "The inclusion of professional schools and programs
within the university [therefore] damages and eventually destroys the
unity of the academic community... [In] countless ways, the activities of
professors and students of the professional schools reach beyond the
university and inevitably loyalties are divided. The professional facul-
ties cannot commit themselves or their energies to the university
unconditionally, as professors in the arts and sciences regularly do"
(1969, 12-13).
What are we to make of this suggestion that faculty concerned with
professional issues will be distracted by their loyalties to their profes-
sions, their business connections, and so on? First, it may be said that all
academics have divided loyalties and responsibilities. A university pro-
fessor must serve on departmental and other university committees, take
on some community responsibilities, play a role in professional associa-
tions, teach, do research, be a parent and spouse or partner, have per-
sonal and political commitments, etc. Frequently one distracts from the
others and gives rise to the need to prioritize. When a professor has both
student term papers to mark and at the same time a deadline for the sub-
mission of a conference paper, the need to set priorities arises. Likewise,
as an officer of a learned society, there may be many demands when
organizing an annual conference that conflict with one's obligation to
review a manuscript for a publisher. None of these situations are signif-
icantly different from that faced by an accounting professor who is also
a member of a professional society.
The suggestion that divided loyalties due to professional and acad-
emic commitments are insurmountable in any case overlooks the many
divided loyalties that already exist on campus. It is in this regard signif-
icant that the image of the "scholarly culture" that invests itself in the
aims and methodologies of a liberal education both in the "research" and
"college" models of the university rests upon a conception of academic
disciplines that sees them as uniform endeavours. Each discipline has
internal to it standards of evidence, verification and argumentation, and
methods of investigation that are agreed upon by those academics who
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practise it. And it is the fact of commitment to these rules even across
the disciplines that constitutes the unity of academe.
But is this so? When looking at the extreme differences in method-
ology between the work of theoretical physicists, empirical sociologists
and historians, for example, it is hard to see the strict unity. Their rules
of evidence, argumentation, and so forth are vastly different. And the
reality on university campuses is that they have very little contact with
one another. Even within disciplines the methodological differences can
be quite disunifying. Political philosophers in the Marxist or Frankfurt
School traditions have had great difficulty communicating academically
with their counterparts in the analytic mode. Behavioural and Freudian
psychologists have fundamental disagreements about method, evidence
and proof. And social scientists and humanities professors who support
the postmodernist critique of multicultural or gender relations seem to
view the role of the academic as being focused on political change rather
than seeking objective truth. In light of this, it is difficult to maintain that
the disciplines are unified except in a very highly generalized way.
Instead of insisting on a romantic notion of unity within the univer-
sity, we will do better to recognize the strength in diversity. In the pre-
sent context, it can be said that there is a symbiotic relationship between
the pure and applied disciplines which provides advantages to both.
Because applied courses and professional schools serve the needs of a
workplace in transition, they can provide a pragmatic anchor for the
humanities and social sciences. To complement this, though, the tradi-
tional liberal arts departments present a constant challenge to the con-
servative tendencies of the professional schools. Although I argued
above that the professional programs enable the students to appraise
critically, and to oppose if they wish, the economic and political assump-
tions that underpin financial and other theories, there is, still, often a
supportive leaning toward the direction that the economic change is tak-
ing. This is to be expected because the thrust of a program that prepares
students to function well in a particular economic order, or one that is
changing in a particular direction, is unlikely at the same time to be
encouraging them to act against it. This is not to say that a well-educat-
ed person would not be willing to stand against wrong-doings or sys-
tematic injustices. It is only that they could reasonably be expected to
incline towards support overall. Partly, this is because learning how to
function well in the new economy involves acquiring effective strategies.
Those strategies presume an acceptance of the conditions that are to be
encountered.
22 The Ethics of the New Economy
On the other hand, professors and students in the humanities and
social sciences are not necessarily so disposed to accept new economic
trends. They may advocate something very different in their role as
social critics. Doing so acts as a check on professional commitments. It
forces academics with such commitments to constantly ask themselves
about the social and moral acceptability of the world for which students
are being prepared. Overall, as a consequence, the applied and pure dis-
ciplines provide balance for each other, even if this is at times achieved
by tension rather than harmony.
So far I have argued that an effort to address issues like restructur-
ing and its consequences is an important element of university educa-
tion and in keeping with, rather than opposed to, the goals of liberal
education. There remains one issue I have not addressed. It is the notion
that liberal education concerns knowledge that has inherent versus
instrumental value. This is the most difficult criterion for the kind of edu-
cation I have been discussing but it seems to me to be the least plausi-
ble criterion. It is not clear why all knowledge that is acquired in a uni-
versity education (in whatever discipline) should be divorced from the
utility it might have in a practical sense. In this I agree with Dewey and
Whitehead. Professional schools can, for example, blend the inherent
and instrumental values of knowledge. The same can be said for other
programs which have an applied focus.
It is important in this regard to emphasize that I am not suggesting
that all university education should have the focus that I have been dis-
cussing. I would argue, on the contrary, that part of the university's man-
date is to address issues that transcend immediate social, political and
economic concerns. I have already argued that an understanding of
these issues naturally requires a broader background of the sort that is
provided by this kind of study.
I will finish by noting that here we find an answer to the second
objection to university education that emphasizes applied issues. Here we
might note a function that such education provides even though it is not
something that it consciously seeks to do. It is a sheltering effect which
protects the non-instrumental aspects of the university curriculum in the
face of public demands for careerism and academic relevance. That is,
when government policy-makers, the media, and others become fixated,
as they are currently, on the idea that universities should do a better job
in preparing students for the new economic realities this criticism is not
usually aimed at any specific part of the university. Usually it is an expres-
sion of frustration with the university as a whole. The public sees an
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urgent need for graduates who have different competencies and are look-
ing to the university to improve its programs accordingly. Because the
applied areas of the university, especially the business school, are best
able to respond to this call, they can in some sense draw the fire away
from the disciplines that are both less capable and less disposed to do so
(in part, they can do this by providing the students necessary to sustain
a program—most professional students take 30 to 50 percent of their pro-
gram directly in the liberal arts, for example). This provides shelter for
disciplines that manifestly should not be addressing economic skill
requirements. It is, quite frankly, abhorrent to think that the study of
poetry or art history ought to serve economic ends or need instrumental
legitimacy in order to survive in academe in the face of funding cuts.
Economic and business restructuring is a reality of the late twentieth
century, and the pace of change is unlikely to abate. Technological
development is accelerating and with it comes the transformation of
work; it eliminates the need for particular functions and creates others.
The old functional jobs are rapidly giving way to new roles and report-
ing structures. The technology is highly sophisticated, so different levels
of understanding are required not only to utilize it but to manage in the
new environment. This goes well beyond the learning of routinized
skills. It requires an understanding of more complex -work environments
and the ability to make judgments within them. Many thousands of
Canadian university graduates enter this work world every year. It would
be wrong to think that each course and program within the university
ought to direct its efforts at preparing students for it. That would tragi-
cally ignore the contribution of the arts and sciences to the development
of a civilized society and the advancement of human knowledge. By the
same token, the education of students who want to prepare themselves
for the new economy should not be denied them by the university.
Professional and applied programs can both meet the test of liberal edu-
cation and achieve the economic objectives. They deserve a place in the
university and they benefit the university. Should universities and acad-
emics (and their books) strive to address the issues presented by the
new economy? The answer, I submit, is yes.
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3The Ethics of Restructuring1
Barry Hoffmaster
Few individuals and few institutions will be unscathed by the pervasive
"restructuring" of the public and private domains of society. The "down-
sizing" it encompasses is, for the most part, portrayed in bald economic
terms. The need to restructure is attributed to indefensible and unsus-
tainable budget deficits, to the rampant "globalization" of information,
capital, currency, and labour, and to the intimidating power of interna-
tional economic organizations. The effects of restructuring are reported in
terms of lay-offs, closures and mergers, bankruptcies, and unemployment
rates. Because economics has, for a long time, been severed from ethics,
the moral dimensions and impacts of restructuring are scarcely recog-
nized, let alone seriously appraised. It is time to reclaim that lost moral
ground and, rather than meekly acceding to what are presented as inex-
orable economic imperatives, begin asking trenchant questions about
•what is happening, why it is happening, and what the likely outcomes
will be. My modest goal is to provide some background and structure for
that kind of moral assessment; my discussion will be rooted in and illus-
trated by developments in health care, but the lessons can, I hope, be
transposed to other fields.
The initial challenge for such an unfamiliar moral inquiry is to sketch
its content and its limits. The first step in meeting that challenge is to say
something about the nature of morality, but even if I thought I could sat-
isfactorily articulate all the different understandings of morality that exist,
I could not do so here. I nevertheless want to repudiate a popular but
flawed notion of what morality is, a notion that Rick Salutin calls "the
privatization of ethics" (1996, Cl).
Notes to this chapter are on pp. 303-304.
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There are two aspects of that "privatization." One is the adoption of
"buy-and-sell as our moral model," that is, the reduction of ethics to the
injunctions and restrictions imposed on market exchanges (on fraud, for
example). The other is the narrowing of "the ambit of ethics to a whol-
ly personal plane, while exempting the public and social levels." This
"ethical eclipse of the social dimension" occurs in Salutin's own profes-
sion when the media scrutinize people in public life but restrict that
scrutiny to private aspects of their behaviour. Ethics, as Salutin rightly
points out, needs to recover its concern with larger contexts and the
state of society as a whole, to move beyond its current preoccupation
with individual moral quandaries and character and become genuinely
social and public.
When ethics adopts that grander vision, questions can be asked about
restructuring and the economy it produces. How, to begin, should the fed-
eral and provincial budget deficits, the reduction and eventual elimination
of which have precipitated much restructuring and downsizing, be under-
stood? Are they like the outstanding balance on my VISA card, or are they
more like the mortgage on my house?2 The former impinges on my abili-
ty to control necessary expenses and enjoy life, and should be eliminated
as quickly as possible; the latter is an unavoidable constraint that I strive
to reduce prudently but ultimately must accept. I do not sacrifice other
important values to the goal of burning my mortgage as soon as I can.
Which is a better model for addressing governmental debts?
What, to move to the private sector, are the moral and social respon-
sibilities of corporations and their executives? The chairman and chief
executive of Quaker Oats, in trouble since its acquisition of the "new
age" beverage business Snapple, recently assured Wall Street analysts
that he clearly understands his role as CEO of the company to be a
"value builder for shareholders" (Feder 1996, Cl). Other corporate exec-
utives have gone so far as to apologize publicly for lagging stock prices
(Den Tandt 1996, Bl). The chief executive of Horsham Corporation, for
instance, conceded to shareholders: "We have failed in the most funda-
mental responsibility that a public company has toward its shareholders
and that's really the delivery of value to you" (Waldie 1996, B9).
What has led to such a circumscribed understanding of corporate
responsibility? Blaming greedy CEOs is too quick and too glib. Although
corporate executives undoubtedly prize and are motivated by the enor-
mous financial compensation they receive, they also respond in rational
and predictable ways to social forces that impinge upon them.
Defending companies against "the ongoing demonization of corporate
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America by some of... [the] most prominent politicians and news organi-
zations," Robert J. Eaton, the chief executive of the Chrysler Corporation,
traces those forces to uncomfortable roots:
Corporations are under pressure from shareholders who are taking an
increasingly active role in company business. Rather than selling the
stock of companies whose managers they disagree with...the investors
pressure the company to change, even ousting a number of chief exec-
utives in the process. And standing behind those institutional investors
are American workers who have sunk their retirement savings into mutu-
al stock funds and are fighting to be sure they get the best returns pos-
sible. Those are some of the same workers who in turn have been laid
off as their employers struggle to please investors. (Meredith 1996, C5)
Mr. Eaton presses on: "So if we don't like the kind of pressure these
funds put on our companies, we can't point fingers.... 'Them' is us."
The same point, to be sure, applies in this country. Robert Bertram,
the senior vice-president of investments for the Ontario Teachers' Pension
Plan, which owns twelve billion dollars worth of Canadian company
shares, has an equally blinkered view about the function of companies:
"Companies are not put together to create jobs. The number one priori-
ty is creating shareholder wealth" (Ip 1996, Bl). Bertram reports that the
200,000 active and retired teachers in the largest pension plan in the
country "want high investment returns so they can get the best possible
pensions at the least cost" (Lindgren 1996b, D6), and he believes that
boards of directors have a duty to maximize share value for his teachers
(Ip 1996, Bl). Moreover, in response to the importuning of institutional
shareholders, the compensation of senior executives and members of
boards of directors can be tied to share price and profit performance
(Ip 1996, Bl).3 Given that incentive, management's fixation with maxi-
mizing share prices should be no surprise. But is such a fixation even
economically defensible? Is the short-term interest of the market consis-
tent with the long-term interest of the economy? And if maximizing share-
holder value makes economic sense, is it morally defensible? Do corpo-
rations not also have obligations to their employees, their customers, and
their communities?
The rationale for restructuring, of course, is that it is a necessary evil,
that businesses need to become smaller and more efficient simply to sur-
vive, let alone prosper, in an increasingly competitive and unforgiving
economic environment. Jobs will disappear, but the jobs that remain will,
it is claimed, be more secure. Mr. Eaton is of this opinion: "Downsizing
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and lay-offs are part of the price of becoming more competitive.... The
price for not doing it...is much higher in both economic and human
terms" (McFarland 1996, B8). Critics dispute that rationale, however. They
contend that downsizing does not guarantee that a company will become
either more efficient or more profitable;4 that a demoralized and anxious
workforce leads to decreased productivity, though increased shareholder
value depends upon increased productivity; and that unemployed work-
ers are unable, and anxious workers are unwilling, to spend the money
that would generate profits and stimulate the economy. What corpora-
tions need to remember, in short, is that "their profits are deeply inte-
grated in the economic health of our communities" (Hebb and
McCracken 1996, B2).
Disagreement about the need for restructuring is as intramural as it
is extramural. In a survey conducted by the Canadian Institute of
Management, 64 percent of the respondents, mostly middle managers,
agreed that companies have a duty to create jobs (Globe and Mail,
19/08/96, B3). The respondents were almost equally divided about
whether downsizing is still necessary: 48 percent believed it is, while 49
percent said it has gone too far. And although 54 percent of the respon-
dents thought downsizing is essential for Canadian companies to com-
pete internationally, 42 percent felt it is destroying the consumer confi-
dence and individual purchasing power that generate a strong economy.
Amidst this division and uncertainty, people who lose their jobs and
their businesses suffer real and certain harms, harms that are particular-
ly grave for older individuals. Other negative consequences attributed to
restructuring are more speculative. Wealth, it is reported, is becoming
more concentrated in the hands of the rich (Bradsher 1996, 17), and gaps
between the incomes of the rich and the poor are widening (Crossette
1996, A3). White-collar crime, it is alleged, is increasing in Canada
because unscrupulous employees are trying to pad their bank accounts
before they are fired and because downsized police forces no longer
have the resources to undertake the expensive investigations required to
discover this corruption (Bender 1996, D10).
The recondite nature of the forces that allegedly compel restructur-
ing and the impossibility of comprehending even its short-term impacts
make it hard to know whether imposing so many harms on so many
people really is justified. When the human stakes are as high as they
are here, though, when the interests of so many individuals are being
sacrificed so that others can prosper, the question must be pressed. The
self-assured, but self-serving, accounts of corporate executives who
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authorize restructuring, and of the consultants they hire to legitimate
and implement it,5 must be scrutinized. Because such an inquiry cannot
be conducted in the abstract, we shall turn to what is happening in
health care.
Two pressures, independent in theory, have impelled the restruc-
turing of health care in Canada: the need to cope with substantial reduc-
tions in funding on the part of both federal and provincial governments,
and the desire to improve the quality of services by eliminating waste
and inefficiencies. Reactions to funding cuts include eliminating hospital
beds by amalgamating or even closing hospitals, shortening the length
of patient stays in hospitals, and providing more services on an outpa-
tient, or ambulatory care, basis. At the same time, efforts to improve the
quality of health care services have led to the adoption of comprehen-
sive programs such as Total Quality Management (TQM) or Continuous
Quality Improvement (CQI). The Ontario Ministry of Health has advo-
cated these quality improvement initiatives, and the Canadian Council of
Health Facilities Accreditation is incorporating such standards into its
periodic accreditation reviews of hospitals (Armstrong et al. 1996, 3).
Hospital CEOs estimate that 25 to 30 percent of what is done in hospi-
tals is wasteful or inefficient (Hassen 1993, 62). One confidently asserts:
"I am damn sure that out of our $260 million budget, there's probably
seventy-five to eighty million dollars that should be dropping out of that
budget without any compromise to quality of care" (Hassen 1993, 190).
Even in prosperous times improving quality by eliminating waste is an
eminently sensible, albeit less pressing, goal.
Restructuring need not be in the service of quality improvement,
however. The CEO of one Ontario hospital acknowledges that there are
some "throughout the province who are downsizing because of the
almighty buck, and not with any aspect of quality or for purposes of
what they're trying to achieve. It has nothing to do with increasing pro-
ductivity or becoming more efficient (Hassen 1993, 181)."
The attraction of TQM, according to Philip Hassen, the CEO of
St. Joseph's Health Centre in London, Ontario, and one of its most fer-
vent promoters, is not only that it directs restructuring at the goals of
achieving "the highest quality of service and patient care" and making
"the best use of available health care system resources" (Hassen 1993, 3),
but also that it saves money:
[T]he achievement of quality most often leads to lower costs—a point
missed by many businesses and public institutions which, with no clear
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goal in mind, are frantically chopping away at their high excess costs
through mass layoffs and drastic service or production cuts. They are
not viewing the situation from a quality perspective. (14)
But because TQM holds out the prospect of reducing costs, it is dogged,
as Hassen acknowledges, by the perception that it is aimed primarily at
cost containment (Hassen 1993, 12-13). Along with other advocates of
TQM, Hassen is concerned to dispel that impression: "I repeatedly stress
to those in health care professions that total quality management is not
primarily intended as a cost-cutting strategy but rather focuses on qual-
ity of care in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and patient satisfaction"
(Hassen 1993, 55, my emphasis). Keeping those two goals separate and
distinct is, however, not always easy. Before looking at the problems cre-
ated by their confusion, what TQM is, and how it functions in hospitals
need to be briefly reviewed.
A management focus on quality was instigated within the manufac-
turing industry in the United States by the introduction of high-quality,
low-cost products from Japan during the 1970s (Sahney and Warden,
1996). The considerable loss of market share that resulted prompted
large corporations such as Ford Motor Company, Motorola, Xerox, IBM,
and 3M to adopt an approach to improving the quality of their products
predicated on the ideas of W. Edwards Deming. Deming believes that
preventing defects is better than inspecting for defects and that defects
can be prevented by improving the processes used to manufacture prod-
ucts. Processes can be improved by recognizing the variability within
them and reducing that variability. For Deming, the ultimate touchstone
of quality is whether the customer is satisfied with a product.
Advocates of TQM argue that it is as applicable to the processes of
health care delivery as it is to the processes of manufacturing. Admitting
a patient to hospital or administering medication in hospital is, after all,
a process that can be analyzed, redesigned, and tested by the criterion
of customer satisfaction. The approach will, to be sure, have to be "cus-
tomized" to accommodate distinctive features of hospitals, but there is in
principle no reason why it cannot be adapted to health care.
In hospitals that have implemented TQM, processes are studied "sci-
entifically" to discover where variations create waste and where ineffi-
ciencies exist. Employees are "shadowed" to see, for example, when and
where they must repeat a task or how much time they spend idly "wait-
ing. Processes and their outcomes are "benchmarked" against those of
hospitals regarded as leaders with respect to efficiency and quality.6
Employees are actively involved in the assessment and redesign of
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processes because those -who do the work know best where the defects
are, and are most likely to come up with ideas for improving their work.
When more responsibility is given to employees, there is no need for an
extensive hierarchy of middle managers and senior executives. Not only
does the role of management shift to that of "coaching" employees, but
the organization becomes flatter and less bureaucratic. To accommodate
the new ways of doing work, traditional departmental structures are jet-
tisoned and replaced by cross-functional, interdisciplinary teams and
new management positions with names such as "Profession Leader" and
"Discipline Chair." Members of these teams have to be flexible and
adaptable, so, in •what is known as "multi-skilling," they are trained to
perform a variety of tasks.
The goal of this fundamental transformation of how work is done
and managed within hospitals is to provide better service to customers.
A "customer" is defined as "anyone who receives the product of a health
care organization's labour" (Hassen 1993, 44). A hospital's customers can
be external or internal. External customers are "people outside the hos-
pital who use its services—patients, their families, universities and com-
munity colleges, government, and community physicians" (Hassen 1993,
44). Internal customers are the "people inside hospitals who rely upon
each other's services—nurses, laboratory personnel, researchers, clerical
workers, kitchen staff, physicians, and so forth" (Hassen 1993, 45). The
measure of the quality of a hospital's services is the satisfaction of those
customers.
That, briefly, is the theory behind TQM, and the theory is attractive
to both hospital executives and workers. Hassen, for example, recognizes
that the business terms are foreign and uncongenial to health care work-
ers, but he argues that underneath the "initial strangeness of the lan-
guage" is a fundamental congruence of values (Hassen 1993, 63). Health
care workers are devoted to providing quality care, are used to working
together in teams, are committed to evaluating and improving what they
do, and are familiar with using scientific methods in that ongoing assess-
ment, so it is not surprising that workers in hospitals in which TQM was
introduced were initially enthusiastic about it (Armstrong et al., 6-8).
They realized that change was necessary, and they were excited about an
approach that promised to take their ideas seriously and give them more
responsibility for and control over their work.
What has happened in practice? Although there have been isolated
improvements and successes, it is too early for a comprehensive evalu-
ation. Proponents of TQM are quick to emphasize that it is not a "quick
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fix," that the sweeping transformation it aims to effect requires patience
and, in particular, an abiding, enthusiastic commitment on the part of
senior management. For it to succeed, the entire culture of an institution
has to be changed, and that is an imposing long-term challenge.
Appreciating those challenges, two advocates of TQM in a hospital sys-
tem in the United States concede that "in the majority of the institutions,
TQM will fail" (Sahney and Warden 1996, 17).
For some Canadian health care workers, though, TQM has already
failed.7 The prospect of more worker control and responsibility never
materialized. Employees were not offered a choice about whether TQM
should be implemented in their institutions and were not involved in
decisions about who gets appointed to key committees. Power remains
firmly entrenched in senior management. The middle managers who
directly supervise employees were not committed to restructuring
because it is their jobs that would disappear from a flatter organization-
al structure. Training sessions utilized materials that are not appropriate
for health care and involved games that employees see as a waste of
time. Long, frequent meetings intended to teach the concepts of TQM
and change the culture of the institution did not seem productive.
"Teamwork" now means that helping fellow employees is obligatory
rather than discretionary and is perceived as increasing opportunities for
surveillance by other team members. And the increased workloads that
resulted from smaller labour forces and the reluctance to replace
employees on sick leave have been compounded by the forms and
reports that need to be submitted.
An ethical evaluation of health care restructuring is complicated by
this gap between theory and practice. These complaints could be the
result of botched attempts to implement TQM, in particular to a disre-
gard of all the cautions about how carefully and extensively TQM must
be introduced and how long it takes to accomplish its goals.
Alternatively, TQM could have been corrupted by allowing the goal of
cost containment to overtake the goal of quality improvement. The lat-
ter, indeed, is the gist of the workers' complaints: "[M]ost workers under-
stood TQM as mainly a cost cutting measure, one focused on making
them work harder" (Armstrong et al. 1996, 19). That was particularly evi-
dent to them with respect to multi-skilling. The multi-skilling or cross-
training of workers, which in theory "is intended to reduce waste by
avoiding any time required to switch from one worker to another,"
became in practice multi-tasking, "asking people untrained for the job to
do the work" (Armstrong et al. 1996, 26). A newspaper report of what is
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happening in Quebec begins, for instance, with the story of a woman
who, after handling files for twenty-one years in the archives department
of a hospital, got two days of training and is now feeding, bathing, and
changing elderly patients on a palliative care floor (Thanh Ha 1996, A9).
Another manifestation of this "down skilling" is the replacement of
registered nurses (RNs), who have a college diploma or university
degree and study nursing for several years, with registered practical
nurses (RPNs), who receive their training in high school or in certificate
programs in community colleges.8 Toronto Hospital, for instance, is
replacing RNs in every department, including emergency, intensive care,
and operating rooms. The hospital's director of public affairs estimates
that one hundred to three hundred RNs will lose their jobs. The RNs who
remain, he explains, will supervise the RPNs and "will have more chal-
lenging work" (Coutts 1996, Al). Nurses and administrators naturally dis-
agree about the impact of this shift on the quality of patient care
(Baumann and Silverman discuss de-professionalization in their contri-
bution to this book). RNs contend that RPNs lack both the training and
the judgment seasoned by experience that are necessary to deal with the
situations that will confront them.9 Administrators are confident that
RPNs will be able to recognize their limits and work within them. Both
views, of course, could be said to be tainted by self-interest.
In addition, TQM's principal goal of improving quality can easily be
lost because the innovative approaches it seeks sometimes require that
money be spent. One hospital, for example, as part of its move towards
increased "patient-centred care" (the rosy description invariably given to
health care restructuring) is renovating two operating rooms, creating a
new one, and building a nine-bed day surgery unit for surgical outpa-
tients and cardiac catheter patients.10 These improvements will reduce
overcrowding, provide quieter and more friendly surroundings, permit
families to visit, and afford patients and their families more privacy. The
expected cost is one million dollars. Not all hospitals seem to have that
kind of money, though, because employees disenchanted by TQM
report that limited resources frequently restrict innovation: "To improve
quality you have to spend money.... And they're not willing to do
that.... All of this is to save money" (Armstrong et al. 1996, 19).
Inherent in this ambivalence about whether the real goal of health
care restructuring is quality improvement or cost containment is a fun-
damental moral question for all varieties of restructuring: What limits are
there to the pursuit of efficiency? My productivity and my efficiency as
a university teacher could be increased if I taught larger classes and if I
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taught more hours per week and more weeks per year. Were that to hap-
pen across the University of Western Ontario, we could "process" more
and more students per classroom hour and become, in the eyes of the
business-minded, more successful.11 At what point, however, does my
effectiveness as a university teacher diminish? When does the quality of
the education my students receive begin to suffer? And when are that
reduced effectiveness and compromised quality no longer justified by
offsetting gains in productivity and efficiency? The central moral issue
here is an old one about trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness,
quantity and quality (see, for example, Wright 1996, 36).
Making those trade-offs is difficult for many reasons, but principally
because it is hard to decide, in any area, what quality is and who is enti-
tled to determine it. When asked to define "quality" in health care, one
CEO committed to TQM replied that it is the "provision of effective ser-
vices on a timely basis in a fashion that's satisfying to the patients, at a
cost that society can afford" (Hassen 1993, 176). Another, looking at qual-
ity "more from an ethical point of view," said it is "when we really just
give people what they request for a certain outcome and don't continue
to perpetuate the need for ourselves" (Hassen 1993, 177, original empha-
sis). Those two proposals disagree about how much say the patient has
in determining quality. In the former, it is the manner in which services
are provided, not the services themselves, that must meet the test of
patient satisfaction. In the latter, patients receive only services intended
to produce outcomes they desire.
Framed in this way, the debate about what counts as quality in
health care recapitulates the debate about physician paternalism and
patient autonomy that has been the centrepiece of contemporary
bioethics. Although customer satisfaction is said to be the touchstone of
quality for TQM, that doctrine is quickly qualified when TQM meets
health care. Even Hassen backs off on this point, defining "quality" as
"providing the best possible care through continuously improving hos-
pital services to meet the needs and expectations of patients, the physi-
cians, the hospital staff, and the communities served by the hospital"
(Hassen 1993, 15). Quality is a function of satisfying multiple customers,
not just patients, and with respect to patients, it is not only their expec-
tations but their needs that count as well. While patients might be the
sole arbiters of their expectations they will not be the sole arbiters of
their needs. Moreover, there is disagreement about whether quality
should be determined by patient expectations. According to one hospi-
tal CEO, because patients can have "unrealistic" expectations, health
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care providers should strive to satisfy only "legitimate customer expec-
tations" (Hassen 1993, 176). But another CEO, apparently more attuned
to the spirit of patient autonomy, is not sure that "the public have unre-
alistic expectations" (ibid.).
Health care workers are also suspicious of defining quality in terms of
patient satisfaction. They wonder whether patients are sufficiently knowl-
edgeable about their conditions and the care they require and whether
their decision-making capacities are compromised by their illnesses. Taking
patient opinions at face value, they point out, leads to a complaint-driven,
rather than quality-driven, process that can limit the rights of workers.
Moreover, aspects of care that cannot be readily measured or incorporated
into a patient satisfaction questionnaire can be regarded as inefficient or
wasteful. These workers see serious dangers and limitations in thinking that
the quality of patient care can be measured "like the assessment of soap
preferences" (Armstrong et al. 1996, 32).
Implicit in the CEOs' two accounts of quality is another difficulty.
One of those definitions invokes the notion of "effective" services, and
the other appeals to bringing about desired "outcomes." Both presup-
pose that the outcomes of health care procedures and services have
been widely studied and assessed. Although such "outcomes" research
is becoming more prevalent, very little has actually been done, particu-
larly in Canada. It is popularly accepted within health care that only 15
to 20 percent of medical practice has ever been proved effective (Hassen
1993, 80).12 A pertinent exception is a study from Manitoba that looked
at whether earlier discharge of patients with four selected conditions was
associated with increased hospital admission rates or more frequent
physician visits subsequently. The conclusion of this study is that
"increased efficiency did not result in more adverse outcomes" (Harrison
et al. 1995, 750), but these patients were followed for only thirty days
after their discharges.
A principal reason for this unsatisfactory situation is the dearth of
resources—conceptual, technical, and economic—for outcomes
research. A hospital CEO, for example, observes: "[W]hen resources
were adequate for all of our activities, there wasn't the need to measure
the outcomes of many of the things we do. Now, when we need to do
so, we haven't the tools or appropriate techniques" (Hassen 1993, 179).
Perhaps the most commonly used evaluative term in health care is
"appropriate." Health care professionals focus their decisions on what
care is "appropriate," and efforts to reduce the costs of health care con-
centrate on eliminating "inappropriate" care. But how are "appropriate"
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and "inappropriate" to be understood in health care (Lavis and Anderson
1996)? And were satisfactory criteria for "appropriateness" to be devised,
what valid and reliable instruments could be constructed to measure it?
Most important of all, how would this research be funded? The hospi-
tal CEO who recognizes the challenges for outcomes research continues:
Now we are beginning to ask the question, "Does the result warrant
the resources that went into the process?" However, studies like these
are extraordinarily complex, expensive, and time-consuming. If you
want to assess the outcome of a common surgical procedure, you prob-
ably need a several-year follow-up of a large group of patients in order
to see whether in fact the intervention has significantly improved the
quality of life. (Hassen 1993, 179)
Where would the money or the people to evaluate all the new proce-
dures and technologies being introduced into health care, let alone all
the unproved interventions -currently being utilized, be found?
Despite the difficulties facing outcomes research, pressure for it is
mounting. Managed care plans in the United States, for example, tout
themselves as "No. 1 in customer satisfaction" or "Rated No. 1 in overall
member satisfaction." Not impressed by this advertising, large companies,
government health programs, and consumer organizations are now press-
ing the awkward question whether, despite these claims about customer
satisfaction and quality care, patients are actually getting better
(Freudenheim 1996, Al). Health care plans currently report on what their
doctors and nurses do—how many women between fifty-two and sixty-
four have mammograms every two years or how many of their diabetes
patients have regular eye exams, for instance—and what percentage of
their enrollees say they are satisfied. But they do not use the results of lab
tests to disclose, for example, whether patients' cholesterol levels are well
managed or their blood sugar levels are well controlled. Despite their
protests about the unfairness and the cost of collecting and reporting such
outcomes measures, these companies could be forced to do so. A health
care analyst with a stock brokerage firm observes, in language that pel-
lucidly illustrates the extent to which health care has become a con-
sumer good in the United States: "The challenge for health plans is to
re-engineer the business so the product they are selling can be evaluated
on a quality basis as opposed to a price basis" (Freudenheim 1996, C2).
The lack of solid evidence about outcomes also raises doubts about
some current aspects of hospital restructuring, in particular the replace-
ment of RNs with RPNs. In defence of this substitution, it is said that "as
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long as RPNs are working within their guidelines—that is, assigned to
patients with 'a predictable outcome'—they are entirely capable of
doing the job" (Coutts 1996, A8). But how can anyone be confident that
outcomes are predictable when the research is not there to support that
judgment, and particularly when, as beds are closed, the patients who
remain in hospital are more acutely ill? Does an KPN, for instance, pos-
sess the training and the experience needed to recognize the subtle
changes that indicate that a coronary patient is starting to "go sour"?
How much can health care actually be standardized, and to what extent
are health care providers genetically substitutable?
Another fundamental moral question is whether restructuring health
care in terms of a business model is antithetical to the practice and core
values of health care. A principal aim of TQM, as we have seen, is elim-
inating variation from work processes. But is the kind of standardization
that results, and that might increase efficiency and productivity in a fac-
tory, appropriate for providing care to patients? Health care workers who
have experienced TQM see the "formulas" that have been introduced
(for example, "formulas prescribing the amount of soap" housekeepers
may use) as impairing the quality of their work and as insensitive to "the
enormous variations in workload caused by the variations in patients
and by the nature of health care work" (Armstrong et al. 1996, 33).
Hassen acknowledges that "[p]atients, unlike photocopiers or cars, are
human beings with enormous individual differences in their treatment
needs and health outcomes" (1993, 14). But how, then, can an approach
that is explicitly designed to uncover and eliminate variation be com-
patible with the provision of health care?
This standardization and the accompanying "scientific" analyses of
hospital work also represent a regression with respect to our notion of
•what health is. Over the years the definition of health has broadened
from a narrow understanding of health as simply the absence of disease
or illness to a broad, holistic notion of health that recognizes the emo-
tional, psychological, and spiritual dimensions and needs of persons. But
quantifying and standardizing health care processes are powerful incen-
tives for and reinforcers of a return to a narrowly biological and reduc-
tionistic understanding of health. All the rhetoric about becoming more
"patient-centred" is, in this respect, disingenuous if not deceptive.
What would make health care more truly patient-centred—attending
to the individual values and emotional, psychological, and spiritual
needs of patients—is precisely what fewer and less well trained health
care workers have neither the time nor the skills to do. This kind of care
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would, moreover, escape the quantitative analyses and the standardized
work processes of TQM and thus be deemed wasteful and inefficient.
Indeed, housekeeping staff under the yoke of TQM report that they no
longer have the time or the incentive to converse with patients or get
them water, small courtesies that patients undoubtedly regard as con-
tributing to the quality of their care. Many, to their credit, nevertheless
give that attention to patients. A "scientific" business approach to health
care work is most compatible with regarding patients as cases and col-
lections of organ systems. Designing more efficient processes to manage
cases or organ systems leaves out much that is now recognized to be
vital to the health and healing of full persons.
What many also find disconcerting about TQM in health care is the lan-
guage it imports, especially the practice of referring to patients as cus-
tomers. While proponents of TQM see this as a minor, superficial obstacle,
others are worried that the impact will be insidious and invidious. Even
advocates of TQM are not, as we have seen, completely faithful here
because they shy away from customer satisfaction as the sole test of the
quality of health care. Yet if the customer is always right, what else is there?
The more general mistake of TQM proponents is thinking of lan-
guage in purely technical terms—as a neutral instrument—and ignoring
the profound symbolic, metaphorical, and emotional power of language.
Language is not simply a tool, but a shaper of ideas and values. Once
that power is recognized, the fear of health care workers that trans-
forming patients into customers will substitute a commercial relationship
for a caring relationship becomes more credible (Armstrong et al. 1994,
29). The worry about the power of language extends beyond the nar-
row ambit of the health care provider-patient relationship, however, and
encompasses all of health care. One hospital, it is reported, not only
looks after clients or customers now, but has converted its departments
into "Small Business Units" (Robinson 1996, A18). From that base, it is
suggested, it is a short slide to talk about "consumers" of health services
and the notion that those "consumers" should pay for what they con-
sume. Converting health care into a commodity—taking away its "spe-
cial" status13—would open the door to more extensive privatization of
the health care system. The persuasive power of talk about "customers,"
"clients," and "consumers" can only soften all of us up for that change.
There are, to conclude, two fundamentally disparate understandings
of health care restructuring. One accepts the realities of the new nation-
al and international economies and welcomes help from business in
maintaining the viability of health care. A hospital CEO says, in this vein:
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The driving force to me is the survival of my institution, not in the com-
petitive sense of the US, but in the desire to continue to provide those
things we have an obligation to provide. Our funding is decreasing. We
have to reduce or eliminate some of the things we currently do, and if
we don't make the decisions more intelligently, we'll end up with illog-
ical across-the-board cuts that run the danger of removing some of the
things that are good for our patients, as well as some things that aren't.
(Hassen 1993, 185-186)14
The other view of restructuring in health care is deeply suspicious of
economic forces alleged to be ineluctable as well as the business model
invoked to deal with them. To these critics the rhetoric of restructuring
is a way of smuggling foreign and incompatible fiscal agendas and val-
ues into health care. "Decentralizing" health care is, in their view, a code
word for dumping patients, and receiving health care "closer to home"
really means home alone. Passions are high because the stakes are high.
There is much in health care restructuring that needs to be scruti-
nized, but to make ethics truly social, that scrutiny must engage funda-
mental questions of justice. Norman Daniels, in the Preface to his book,
Just Health Care, remarks that he began working on the topic of justice
in the design of a health care system in the mid 1960s, when there was
a public perception in the United States that "justice required improved
access to health care" (Daniels 1985, x). But subsequently, he reports,
the focus of public discussion in the US began to shift. Constraining
rapidly rising health-care costs became the main item on the health-
care agenda, and though issues of equity still arise in this context, there
is little pretext that the just redesign of a health-care system is a current
national objective. (Daniels 1985, xi)
The egalitarianism embedded in the five principles of the Canada
Health Act is becoming progressively more tenuous because issues of
equity have been similarly displaced by the objective of controlling
health care costs.
The deep ethical issues in health care restructuring remain issues of
equity. At the heart of those issues are the fundamental questions
Daniels asks: "What kind of a social good is health care? What are its
functions and do these make it different from other commodities?"
(Daniels 1985, ix). Is health care a basic need that should be distributed
on egalitarian terms? Or is it a commodity, the distribution of which is
allowed to be widely inegalitarian? Answers to these bedrock questions
will determine what we think of "privatizing" health care by shifting it
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out of hospitals into homes and thereby imposing the explicit and
implicit costs of providing that care on families and friends. These
answers, in other words, delimit the social obligation to provide health
care and establish how much responsibility for health care individuals
and their families and friends may reasonably be expected to assume.
They will also determine what we think of the desirability of using busi-
ness models to manage health care. When health care professionals ask,
"Are we health care people in business, or are we business people in
health care?" they are asking the right question, but they need to pursue
that question to its moral conclusions.
The same lesson applies in other areas. What kinds of social goods
are education, food, clothing, shelter, and day care? Answers to those
questions will determine whether we strive to reduce inequalities in the
distribution of these goods, or whether we allow inequalities in their dis-
tribution to proliferate as they are assimilated to the inegalitarian distri-
butions of commodities. They will also determine whether the restruc-
turing that occurs, in these areas as in health care, is driven principally
by economic concerns or by concerns about needs, community respon-
sibility, and equity.
It is not surprising that the privatization of ethics is weaning us from
a commitment to equity.15 But unless that commitment remains robust,
the privatization of much else is sure to follow.
PART II
The Case Against Restructuring
While no one would deny that we can distinguish between restructuring that
is better and worse from an ethical point of view, the extent to which restruc-
turing is changing (and has changed) public and private enterprise raises more
fundamental concerns about what some have called "the restructuring craze."
One might put these concerns as the general question whether restructuring
and the restructuring economy are the product of a genuine economic crisis,
or are, in reality, a political agenda motivated by vested interests which seek to
radically alter our understanding of society and its obligations to workers, the
dispossessed and the least advantaged. Because any informed discussion of
restructuring must recognize this fundamental challenge to restructuring, the
present section outlines such concerns. Ken Hanly thus argues that restruc-
turing is an unjustified pretext for dismantling the gains that labour and the dis-
advantaged have made within Western industrial states. Looked at from this
point of view, restructuring is a way to dismantle the welfare state and make
it "leaner, meaner and inequitable." Echoes of Hanly's critique—and opposing
approaches to the ethics of restructuring—are a significant underlying theme
in many later chapters of this book.
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4Restructuring the Welfare State:
Leaner, Meaner, and Inequitable
Ken Hanly
The term "restructuring" refers to an array of processes including down-
sizing, deregulation, privatization, and the reorganization of companies or
government services to reduce debt and to increase their competitiveness
or efficiency. In this paper I examine two key aspects of economic
restructuring within the government rather than the private sector: debt
management and privatization. I argue that restructuring erodes welfare
and workers' rights and makes further social reforms more difficult. I use
the term "social reform" in the older sense to refer to changes in society
and the marketplace that advance the welfare of the general public and
particularly the less advantaged, although in the present age of Newspeak
it often refers to cuts in welfare programs or reductions in the quality of
public services.
My analyses are influenced by writers who study social structures of
wealth accumulation (see Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994) and reg-
ulation theory (see Aglietta 1979 and Lipietz 1987). I share the view com-
mon to both theories that some key social structures may further the
capitalist accumulation of wealth at one time yet block it at another.
Economic restructuring is, in my view, an attempt to replace older struc-
tures that are now retarding further accumulation with newer structures
that will advance it. Among the results of this process are the decline of
social reform (Teeple 1995) and the loss of public benefits in such areas
as health care, education, employment, recreation, and pensions.
Accessibility to services and benefits in all areas are more dependent on
income.
We can better understand this account of restructuring by beginning
with the era that stretches from the end of the Second World War to the
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mid-sixties—sometimes called "The Golden Age of Capitalism." It was
characterized by a huge growth in state expenditure. In all advanced
capitalist countries, welfare programs grew. Elementary and secondary
education were free, and in many countries college as well. Except for
the United States, most advanced capitalist countries had some type of
universal medicare system.
Of course, not all state expenditure was for social programs. The
Cold War demanded huge military expenditures that in turn were the
lifeblood of many manufacturers. Often the state rescued ailing private
enterprises. This process was dubbed "hospitalization." The state took
enterprises into the public sector, invested money in them to turn them
around, and then sold them back to the private sector. This happened
with Jaguar in Great Britain, which is, ironically, often cited as an exam-
ple of the benefits of privatization (Hardin 1989, 1).
Increases in state expenditures on welfare, the military, and corpora-
tions during the Golden Age led to increased state debt and high taxes
that were unpopular with both corporations and individuals. These expen-
ditures produced a debt crisis which those opposed to social programs
saw not as a problem, but as an opportunity. As Gideon Rosenbluth notes,
deficit phobia allows politicians to use the deficit as a convenient excuse
for cutting social spending (Rosenbluth 1992, 74), thus destroying or
weakening the welfare state institutions of the Golden Age of capitalism.
I examine now the role of debt management in economic restructuring.
The Debt Crisis
States use tax revenues from individuals and corporations to pay off
debt. As global competition increases, however, capital tends to shift
from high-tax to lower-tax countries. This poses a problem for countries
wishing to attract and retain capital while raising sufficient revenue to
pay off debt. A partial solution is to restructure the tax burden: lower the
tax rates on corporations and increase it on individuals. This is precise-
ly what has been taking place (Teeple 1995, 94). Strong opposition to
further tax increases on individual incomes forces governments to adopt
many new, and often regressive, alternative modes of taxation and rev-
enue collection. In Canada, for example, federal and provincial govern-
ments have introduced sales taxes. These are regressive since the poor
are likely to pay a greater percentage of their income in sales taxes than
the well-off, who typically spend a lesser percentage of their total
income on taxable goods. Tax refunds or exemption of basic goods may
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counteract this regressive aspect of sales taxes. Governments have also
used state lotteries and VLTs (video lottery terminals) to generate rev-
enue but this has increased social problems associated with gambling.
Restructured tax systems favour not only corporations but better-off
individuals as well. Some critics have suggested that a flat tax should
replace the progressive income tax. In the United States, tax cuts for the
rich are promoted as encouraging investment and initiative. George
Gilder even argues that regressive taxes help the poor (Gilder 1981, 188)
by motivating them to do better and increase their income so that they
can get into a better tax bracket! Although news commentators and
politicians emphasize the need to reduce the deficit, they also often
argue for the necessity of lower corporate taxation and tax cuts for indi-
viduals to spur investment.
The layperson might be nonplussed that some economists argue that
reducing taxes can help reduce the deficit. As Galbraith points out, when
new and unpalatable policies are required, economists can always be
found to promote them (Galbraith 1992, 78). Enter Arthur Laffer and his
Laffer Curve. Laffer starts with two incontrovertible facts: if taxes are
zero, government revenues are zero; if all income is taxed away, no
incomes will be generated and no tax revenue. In each extreme, gov-
ernment income from taxation is zero. What happens between these two
extremes? At first, increases in tax rates mean increases in government
revenues, but at a certain optimal stage any increase in tax rates will
cause an actual decrease in revenues. Laffer claims that the US tax rate
has gone beyond the optimum. Illustrating this hypothesis on a graph is
easy, but proving it empirically is more difficult. One would need to
experiment: to reduce tax rates and see if government revenues increase
as Laffer predicts. Ronald Reagan began this experiment in 1981.
The results did not confirm the theory (Gordon 1987, 456). Some
defenders of the theory have claimed that Reagan caused these negative
results by cutting some of his business incentives in 1982 and by increas-
ing government spending. This may or may not be the case. Whatever is
to be said, the average after tax income of the top 20 percent of income
earners in Reagan's America increased from $73,700 in 1981 to $92,000 in
1990 (Galbraith 1992, 105). In Canada, such policies would produce an
even greater increase in the after-tax income of higher income earners,
given that Canadians pay higher tax rates than Americans.
As the US experience illustrates, changes in tax structure and tax cuts
alone will not solve the debt crisis. The tax system became less progres-
sive, the income gap between rich and poor widened, yet government
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debt grew. Since attempts to increase revenues did not solve the debt
problem, cutting spending was suggested as an obvious alternative. Once
again the crisis served as an opportunity for reorganization of social struc-
tures in a manner that favoured capital accumulation. The rhetoric was
predictable. Governments should be downsized and the welfare state
diminished if not abolished. Only drastic restructuring of the size and role
of government could reduce the debt and, as the politicians put it, save
essential social programs. From a capitalist point of view, an added
advantage of reductions to unemployment and welfare benefits is that
they give incentives for workers to take low-paying jobs with poor work-
ing conditions.
But even low-paying jobs require payment of a minimum wage in
many jurisdictions. To widen the area for exploitation even further, such
standard protections as the minimum wage needed to be weakened or
eliminated. Capital could call upon economists to tell us that minimum
wages are actually no benefit at all and even produce unemployment for
the worst off. In a typical microeconomics textbook, the minimum wage
becomes a theoretical problem titled "The Effect of Minimum Wage Laws."
The textbook asks students to predict the effects of instituting a minimum
wage in a competitive market. The correct answer is that institution of a
minimum wage will reduce employment or diminish benefits and that
unskilled labour will be most affected, particularly teenagers and most
notably black teenagers (Mansfield 1988, 396). But this is an exercise in
pure deduction; it does not ask students to confirm the result empirically.
A recent book by David Card and Alan Krueger, Myth and
Measurement, does look at the empirical data concerning the effects of
the minimum wage. Their studies refute rather than confirm the conclu-
sions of the deductive model used in many textbooks, most showing
that higher minimum wages have no effect on employment. Some actu-
ally show a rise in employment. Rather than harming minorities and
teenagers, increases in the minimum wage had the opposite effect (Card
and Krueger 1995, 1-4).
The government regulatory system is another favourite target of cost
cutters. They argue that regulations and standards have multiplied beyond
necessity and that many produce more costs than benefits. Increased gov-
ernment regulation has created a bloated bureaucracy whose interests lie
in promotion of more regulations, not in advancing the general welfare.
Cuts in the budgets of regulators, cuts in the number of inspectors, dereg-
ulation, and self-regulation are the order of the day whenever possible.
Though it is true that many government regulations could be simplified
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and red tape reduced, it is clear a great deal of deregulation primarily
serves corporate capital rather than the public interest. Government regu-
lation is often necessary to protect the public from negative consequences
caused by corporate pursuit of profit. In many cases, restructuring through
deregulation therefore increases risks of harm to the public.
As with restructuring in the tax system, new regulatory policies that
aid capital tend to be adopted even if the policies force an increase in
government expenditure and contribute to the debt crisis. This shows
that the driving force behind economic restructuring is frequently other
than that suggested by its defenders. Consider, for example, the passing
of Bill C91 in February 1993- This bill both extends the life span of
patents to twenty years and eliminates compulsory licensing during the
period of patent protection. It applies retroactively to any patent grant-
ed after December 20, 1991. Compulsory licensing not only encouraged
the development of a generic drug industry in Canada, it produced
annual savings of $200 to $420 million (Rachlis and Kushner 1994, 146).
To further their interests, multinational drug companies launched a mas-
sive and expensive lobbying campaign in support of the bill. Many in
the university and medical communities were easily won over in spite of
the obvious increases in drug costs that the bill would cause. The
retroactive clause saved Merck Frosst $700 million on one drug. Some
called the bill the Merck Bill (Rachlis and Kushner 1994, 148).
During the debate on Bill C91, it was made clear that its negative
effects would be felt across Canada. Provincial health ministers indicat-
ed some costs of the bill to medicare in their jurisdictions. The British
Columbia minister claimed that extending patent protection for just two
drugs would cost $145 million. Saskatchewan's health minister said the
bill would cost that province between three million and ten million dol-
lars per year. The Ontario minister claimed the bill would cost the
province one billion dollars over the next decade. Yet groups such as
the Canadian Federation of Biological Societies and individual academics
lobbied in support of the bill. Why did they not jump on the debt reduc-
tion bandwagon and cry out that this bill would add significant costs to
our public medicare system? In the end, academics, who should have
been promoting the widest spread of knowledge at the lowest cost and
for the greatest public benefit, supported extended monopoly property
rights for multinational for-profit giants.
Before the debt crisis, universities flourished, and were supported
by large government grants in addition to tuition income. Income from
corporations was a minor supplemental element. With the debt crisis, and
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the demand for cutbacks in government spending, the universities were
forced either to find new sources of income or cut services back or
increase their cost. Universities must now turn to corporations to replace
the lost government funding. This changes the educational role of the
university (one might compare and contrast the way in which it changes
the role of primary and secondary school education, discussed by J.L.
Kachur and Derek Briton in this volume). A liberal vision of the univer-
sity dominated an earlier era. Universities aimed at universal access. They
emphasized choice and diversity, but gave a certain priority to the liber-
al arts, especially when they viewed themselves as havens for scholars
(Newson and Buchbinder 1988). This vision could flourish only as long
as universities received the funds necessary to implement it.
When the debt crisis hit, universities had to cut programs or find
new sources of funding. While corporate funds might replace public
funds, the price to be paid was abandoning the liberal agenda and
adopting the corporate agenda. This new relationship is articulated in
Partnership for Growth by Maxwell and Currie (1984), who argue that to
solve the financial squeeze, universities should collaborate with key
industries. This transformation forces universities to abandon their cher-
ished traditions of academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
Academics and universities pipe the corporate tunes because corpora-
tions pay the piper and call the tune. Bill C91 is again a case in point.
The dean of the Faculty of Health Professions at Dalhousie wrote a let-
ter supporting the bill. When the media attempted to link this letter to a
$1.3 million research grant, the dean pointed out that she wrote the let-
ter after the grant had been made, although she admitted that drug com-
panies had sometimes made contracts conditional on support (Rachlis
and Kushner 1994, 148). Even in the absence of written agreements, our
modern academics are loath to bite the hand that feeds them.
In spite of the blatant contradictions between actual policy and the
goal of debt reduction, the overwhelming majority of commentators
insist on stressing the debt crisis, "the debt wall," and the need to cut
back spending on social programs. In February 1993 Eric Mailing hosted
a documentary on the deficit that featured, among other things, a baby
hippopotamus that was shot because a zoo had no money to raise it. This
inspired the title of Linda McQuaig's critique of deficit reduction, Shooting
the Hippo (1995). The documentary portrays cutting social programs as
part of a crusade to save the economy rather than turning the clock to an
era of minimal welfare rights. We have been living beyond our means
and now must face the consequences (McQuaig 1995, 11).
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Repeat the message that there is a debt crisis often enough, and
masses of people will come to believe it. As pollster Donna Dasko
remarks, the repetition lodges the message in our heads until it becomes
"a dull background noise, a kind of invisible and yet inescapable fact of
life" (McQuaig 1995, 13). In this environment of deficit phobia, it is
impossible to recommend perfectly sane programs such as universal
denticare without seeming to be on the radical fringe and not a serious
participant in debate on social policy. At the same time, politicians and
analysts may seriously suggest that we need to spend billions on new
helicopters and increase medical costs by billions to encourage invest-
ment by pharmaceutical companies. In the former instance the politi-
cians' own rhetoric about the necessity to reduce debt came back to
haunt them: the proposed helicopter purchase produced such an outcry
that the deal fell through with the defeat of the Conservative govern-
ment, but the pharmaceutical lobby was successful. Bill C91 remains
untouched under the Liberals.
Eric Mailing and others use New Zealand as a prime example of a
country forced to adopt neoliberal policies to solve its debt crisis.
Mailing talks of a debt wall in which New Zealand's credit simply ran
out, demanding cuts in social programs and the sale of government
assets to restore its credit rating. He claims that this produced a country
that is lean, fit and globally competitive. The facts are rather different
than Mailing claims, as authors such as McQuaig (1995) and Kelsey
(1995) have shown.
New Zealand did have a short-term currency crisis, but resolved it
when a newly elected government devalued the currency (McQuaig
1995, 13). New Zealand's credit rating has never dropped below Aa3,
a low-risk range shared by only twenty-four countries worldwide. So
much for its supposed debt wall. The prediction that the changes would
stimulate economic growth was, for the most part, also incorrect.
Richardson (1996, 14) points out that between 1986 and 1992, the
economies of the OECD countries grew 20 percent but the New
Zealand economy shrank by 1 percent. McQuaig's figures show the
same trend. Between 1985 and 1990 New Zealand's GNP fell by 0.7 per-
cent. This is the worst record of any industrialized country. Over this
period, the unemployment rate nearly doubled, yet this is the model
held up as a guide for future policy. The GNP began to grow only in
1993, but this growth has now stalled. Strong medicine apparently takes
a long time to work, and when its effect wears off, the solution is
stronger medicine still.
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John McMurtry
The philosopher John McMurtry (1995) uses different imagery, calling the
growth of global restructuring the "cancer stage" of capitalism. He likens
the benefits of the welfare state to the defences against disease developed
by the immune system. As Karl Polanyi has shown in The Great
Transformation (1944), society has always generated defences against
the harmful effects of markets. During the Golden Age of Capitalism
these defences were an essential part of the social structures of accumu-
lation. We now have attacks upon these defences and their replacement
by neoliberal structures of accumulation. For McMurtry, these attacks,
including slashing government spending on social programs, have effects
upon the health of the social body much like that of cancer upon the
individual physical body. For him, the welfare state was not merely a
contingent aspect of a certain stage of capitalist development but essen-
tial if the capitalist system was to remain healthy and provide a minimal-
ly decent standard of living for all citizens. The cancer is the capitalist
elite that appropriates resources for its luxurious lifestyle and for further
growth, at the expense of the health of society as a whole.
The defence of workers' rights and the welfare state, on McMurtry's
view, are analogous to the immune system's attempt to protect a body
against invasion by disease. In the cancerous stage of capitalism the
immune response is regarded as the disease, and so the immune system
is destroyed, leaving no defence against the growth of capitalism. He is
certainly right to suggest that those campaigning for increased welfare
and labour rights are often portrayed as the enemy of good government
and as special interests opposed to the general good, but he goes too
far when he says that they are called terrorists or subversives.
In the course of his discussion, McMurtry makes the important
observation that restructuring has meant turning more and more services
into commodities. Because these are increasingly available only in a
competitive market, and not as a right, continuity of income becomes
essential for what he calls vital life sustenance. Restructuring that does
away with the welfare state removes this continuity while at the same
time increases the gap between rich and poor. He points out (McCurty
1995, 9) that wages in the United States declined overall by 15 percent,
and even more, 20 percent, for non-supervisory staff, between 1973 and
1992. In contrast, the real income of the top 1 percent of Americans
increased by 60 percent between 1977 and 1992. This top 1 percent now
earns more than the bottom 90 percent.
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McMurtry uses the results of restructuring in New Zealand as an
illustration of the manner in which cancerous capitalism creates an
unhealthy community. From 1990 through 1992, New Zealand reduced
or eliminated programs for public sector employment, income security,
and health care. The New Zealand Department of Statistics recorded a
40 percent increase in poverty, a doubling of youth suicide (making the
New Zealand rate the highest in the world), a 50 percent increase in vio-
lence against women, and a 40 percent increase in violence against chil-
dren. At the same time, taxes on the wealthy were cut by half and the
government deficit went from twenty-two billion dollars to forty-six bil-
lion even though public assets were privatized to the tune of sixteen bil-
lion. In Canada the erosion of our social safety net is not as extreme, but
it is alarming. Between 1981 and 1991 the poverty rate for working
households rose by 30 percent, for unattached individuals 57 percent,
and for children by at least 34 percent (McMurtry 1995, 11).
McMurtry claims that society does not recognize or respond effec-
tively to cancerous capitalist growth. According to him, messages con-
tradicting the prevailing message that the neoliberal austerity program is
necessary do not register within the community. He exaggerates here.
The public does not always accept neoliberal policies with resignation,
and sometimes dissenters are heard. McQuaig's book on the deficit
became a bestseller. Even the politicians have been forced to talk about
jobs as well as the deficit and, on occasion, temper the severity of their
cuts. Premier Klein of Alberta, who has used the architect of the New
Zealand program (Sir Roger Douglas) as his adviser, chose to pull back
when confronted by striking health care workers.
McMurtry's cure is rather Utopian, given his own assessment of the
power of cancerous capitalism. What we need is regulation! "On the
macro level of carcinogenic invasion, effective response now minimally
requires global regulatory assertion to subordinate lethal, uncontrolled
growth and metastasis" (McMurtry 1995, 22). Unfortunately, McMurtry
gives no hint of what social forces could produce this regulation. Given
that he holds that opinions contrary to the neoliberal restructuring model
do not register on the public mind, how does he think opponents are to
generate an effective demand for regulation?
As I see it, McMurtry is suggesting a return to the welfare orienta-
tion of the Golden Age augmented by regulations necessary to protect
the environment and resources. This overlooks the cause of the attack
on welfare structures, which are being destroyed because they no longer
aid capital accumulation.
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Consider, for example, social programs. They are commonly seen as
a prime cause of increased deficits and consequently are priority targets
when government cuts spending. Other areas of government spending
that contribute considerably to the growth of deficits have not been cut
at all, and are even receiving more money. Cuts in welfare programs
may contribute to crime and thus cause an increase in expenditures on
policing, jails, and crime prevention. Critics of government spending
almost never complain about these expenditure increases. A study by
statisticians H. Mimoto and P. Cross in 1991 demonstrated clearly that it
was not an explosive growth in spending on social programs that caused
the present deficit. Unemployment insurance is responsible for only
1 percent of deficit growth from 1975 to 1990. Welfare programs account
for 4.5 percent, and pensions 6 percent. Completely ignored by com-
mentators is growth in expenditures to protect persons and property, a
category that represents 8 percent of deficit growth. Indeed, this infor-
mation was left out of the published version of Mimoto's work and was
obtained only through the Access to Information Act, which allowed
reporters to see earlier drafts (McQuaig 1995, 59)-
Privatization
One common mode of debt management is the sale of government
enterprises and the privatization of public services. Publicly owned
enterprises such as telephone, hydro, and gas utilities, and airlines, rail-
ways, airports, and even jails can be put on the auction block to be sold
to private interests. The returns can be used to reduce the deficit with-
out raising taxes, a definite political plus. Politicians can thus sell priva-
tization as a painless means of deficit reduction.
Although privatization is related to debt reduction, it is also often jus-
tified as increasing competition and efficiency. Before restructuring, pub-
lic ownership was often used to reduce costs to the private sector that
would result from unprofitable infrastructure developments. States owned
railways, harbours, airports, canals, road systems, and even various utili-
ties that supplied industry and public alike with power, water, and elec-
tricity, often at cheap, subsidized rates. The growth of public debt put the
brake on any further increase in public ownership. For advanced capital-
ist countries, the deficits of central governments grew from 0.2 percent of
GDP in 1960-1973 to 2.4 percent in 1974-1979, and then 3.4 percent in
1980-1989. In Canada, the deficit for all levels of government averaged
4.6 percent of GDP in the 1980s (Barber 1992, 101). By the early eighties,
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many advanced capitalist states were spending more than a third of their
gross national expenditure in the public sector while growth in the private
sector slowed (Teeple 1995, 90). Public ownership became a fetter on fur-
ther growth in the developing era of global capitalism.
Privatization is a part of the new social structure of accumulation
and is common worldwide. The World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund often demand privatization and other neoliberal policies
in return for capital needed for economic development. Some countries,
such as Haiti, may have privatization more or less thrust upon them, but
others, such as New Zealand, Great Britain, and Canada, have adopted
it voluntarily. Even so-called communist states, such as China, have
encouraged privatization. To understand privatization, we must recog-
nize that it serves a variety of purposes that aid capital accumulation.
First, privatization opens up new areas for capital investment. If the
public sector runs campgrounds, extended care homes, hospitals, etc.,
then capital does not gain the profits these services might generate if
they were privately owned. As governments spend less, private compa-
nies may offer the services cut by government. Suppliers of inputs still
have an outlet for their products while the provision of services now
generates profit for the companies offering their services.
Sometimes, privatization is simply the contracting out of services
paid for by the government, for example, in home health care in
Manitoba. One argument in favour of the policy is that the private sec-
tor can give better service at lower cost. This is assumed, not substanti-
ated, despite ample evidence showing that in at least some areas, such
as health insurance, a public monopoly is more cost-efficient. Why? In
part, because public monopoly insurers can take advantage of
economies of scale. As large purchasers, they can demand better prices
from healthcare providers than smaller insurers (Rachlis and Kushner
1994, 23).
The prevailing view is that government provision means bloated
bureaucracies with huge administrative costs. But, in the case of health
insurance, it is the private sector that is less efficient. In the United States,
where private insurance predominates, administrative costs are six times
higher than in Canada (Woolhandler and Himmelstein 1991). Private com-
panies must also spend large sums to market their products in competi-
tion with other insurers, whereas the public insurer need spend only that
amount necessary to inform the public about services and regulations.
In the comparison of private and public provision of services, it is
often forgotten that a private company needs to make a profit. This, in
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itself, means that, ceterisparibus (as economists like to say), public pro-
vision must be cheaper, since it only needs to break even. This simple
fact has nonetheless been all but expunged from the collective mind.
A further difficulty with private insurance is the problem of creaming.
Insurers will wish to cover those who have the fewest health problems
and those who can pay high premiums. Insurers will not cover those with
severe health problems and those who cannot pay high premiums. In the
United States, despite its extensive system of private health insurance, the
healthcare costs for this latter group are, therefore, paid by government!
Public monopoly insurance covers everyone equally, regardless of income.
In a market system, coverage will depend largely upon income.
Countries such as the UK have already developed a two-tier system
that features an underfunded public sector with long waiting lists and
poorly paid doctors, and a private system with superior care and short
waiting lists or none at all, and well-paid doctors. Those better off ben-
efit most from this two-tier system. Public pressure may eventually cause
the Canadian government to allow such a system in the provinces if it
does not adequately fund our universal, one-tier system.
A second way in which privatization serves the accumulation of cap-
ital is by making the state even more dependent on finance capital. Loss
of assets may increase the costs of borrowing, and the associated loss of
revenue increase the need for borrowing. If privatization involves for-
eign investors, decisions will be made that advance their profit even
though this may not be best for the country that privatizes. Capital flows
wherever return is greatest. Reinvestment is not guaranteed in the coun-
try that privatized. To retain capital, countries will be forced to create
conditions more favourable to investment than other countries compet-
ing for capital. This may mean further reduction in corporate taxes, fur-
ther cuts to social programs, and removal of any remaining barriers to
foreign investment. The New Zealand experiment illustrates the necessi-
ty for further cuts in social programs and removal of remaining barriers
to foreign investment to ensure capital reinvestment once firms are sold
to foreign interests.
A third function of privatization is the generation of revenues for
particular groups. Just as regulations are the staff of life for a certain
group of bureaucrats, so privatization nourishes and enriches a certain
group of consultants, stockbrokers, lawyers, and underwriters.
According to Hardin (1989, 72), privatizations around the world in 1986
were predicted to generate about four hundred million dollars per year
in fees. Consultancy fees tied to the selling of just one firm, British
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Telecom, were twenty-five million dollars. And consultancy fees are only
one aspect of the expense of restructuring public companies.
Public companies must often be restructured to make them mar-
ketable. This, too, can be costly, not only in fees to consultants but in
money spent upgrading equipment, paying down debt, or on severance
packages associated with downsizing.
A fourth function of privatization is weaning the public from the
idea that the state should have an extensive role in providing services.
Since the free market is supposed to be superior to government as a pro-
ducer of goods and services, we should privatize whenever we can. The
policy of privatization has become so pervasive and so accepted that vir-
tually no one debates the general principle, only specific cases and the
areas that may be privatized. In the United States, privatization has
extended even to segments of the prison system, and private policing is
becoming a growth service industry.
A fifth function of privatization is the weakening of the trade union
movement. When government services are contracted out it is often to
nonunion companies that give fewer benefits and pay lower wages. An
example is home care services in Manitoba. The largely successful strug-
gle to unionize public sector workers can be defeated by privatization,
which governments justify in the name of efficiency.
Allegedly, privatization increases efficiency by lowering wages and
benefits for the same work. Supporters of privatization will claim that the
public will benefit through lower costs without diminution in the quality
of service. But the difference in cost may simply be absorbed by the com-
pany as profit, and contracting out can increase the costs of monitoring to
ensure quality work. In some cases contracting out to private companies
has increased costs and reduced quality to such a degree that the process
has been reversed even in these pressing times. Bilik, for example, cites
New York and Phoenix as cities that contracted out services in the eight-
ies, only to bring them back in-house in the nineties (Bilik 1992, 339).
Privatization is possible because people view ownership of public
property and private property differently. No one would suggest selling
one's car as a painless way of paying off a car loan or selling a house
as a painless way of solving high mortgage payments. Even more
strangely, privatization is often justified as a means by which individuals
can gain ownership in a company even though publicly owned compa-
nies are already owned collectively by citizens. Governments may go to
great trouble and expense to tout the virtues of individual ownership
through privatization over collective ownership. The British Columbia
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Resources and Investment Corporation (BCRIC), the vehicle for privati-
zation used by Bill Bennett in BC in 1979, is a good case study.
The privatization of BCRIC allowed every eligible man, woman and
child in BC to receive five shares in this company. The company was
formed from three publicly owned forestry companies and various other
publicly owned shares (Hardin 1989, 86). As one would expect, repre-
sentatives of several securities firms advised Bennett and promoted the
scheme. Shares were priced at a discount to their book value, to encour-
age people to purchase further shares. Critics pointed out that the peo-
ple owned these corporations before the share issue, but the government
responded that the shares represented individual ownership as opposed
to big government ownership. People were so alienated from their own
government and the idea of collective ownership that this argument had
some force for the public. Bennett's great leap forward into people's cap-
italism quickly bogged down as directors of the company made expen-
sive and questionable acquisitions. Soon shares were trading at the three-
dollar level, down from a high of more than nine dollars.
Each person who applied received five shares worth six dollars each.
The cost to the government in administration was four dollars per person,
and total overhead costs were estimated at forty million dollars (Hardin
1989, 88). In spite of all the claims and hoopla about shareholder democ-
racy, only shareholders with more than one hundred shares had voting
rights. This was an enterprise which could not be compared to a cooper-
ative, in which each shareholder gets one vote, or even garden variety cor-
porations, where voting stock gives one vote per share. A promise that no
one could own more than 1 percent of stock was broken within three
years. Later, the ban on foreign ownership was given up as well.
Privatization is obviously one of the prime new structures of accu-
mulation touted by capital as the cure for debt, supposedly because it
makes services cheaper through competition. As we have seen, there are
good reasons for thinking that these positive results may not occur, and
for thinking that negative consequences are usually overlooked.
Considered in the context of debt reduction, privatization does not bode
well for the future common good.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated that the new structures created to manage debt, and
the policy of privatization, have had quite negative consequences for
most citizens. Some policies, such as changes in patent legislation and
Restructuring the Welfare State 57
tax cuts for the well-off, exacerbate debt problems rather than con-
tributing to their solution. While such policies may promote capital accu-
mulation, by deepening the debt crisis they may force further cuts in
welfare programs.
It is not an exaggeration to say that under the new structures of
accumulation, life in capitalist societies is decreasing in quality for many
citizens while capital triumphantly spreads across the globe. I do not
share McMurtry's view that decrease in quality of life will force regula-
tion that will bring back an earlier era in which the welfare state finances
a substantial social safety net protecting the public from the harms of
market capitalism. Minimal environmental regulation and a minimal wel-
fare state may be all that is accepted in the interests of social peace and
future development.
Nor do I agree that the present stage of capitalism is cancerous. The
technological revolution in communications and other offshoots of
advanced capitalism are a potential boon to humanity as a whole and
are not analogous to cancer cells destroying the body politic. To stem
the tide of neoliberalism, labour and other progressive groups will need
to organize on a transnational and global, rather than just a national,
scale. Some progress has been made in this regard and has resulted in
the incorporation of minimal environmental protection and labour and
social rights as part of free trade agreements. But, for now, capital is
much stronger than labour at the international level. Nevertheless, as
long as cutbacks meet strenuous resistance at the local and national
level, capital can press only so far in restructuring. At a certain point,
capital will realize that to avoid serious social unrest that may be costly
to contain, it must not cut social programs further.
Workers should press for greater rather than less public and coop-
erative ownership, and for more equitable taxation rather than reduced
taxes. Unions could invest their huge pension funds in worker-owned
and -run companies, rather than in large private corporations. The pub-
lic and cooperative sectors must accumulate their own capital. These
pools of capital will allow for some production that serves social aims
rather than simply maximizing profits.
Nonetheless, within the capitalist system I see no lasting solution to
the decline in the overall quality of community life caused by the new
social structures of accumulation. The productive forces generated with-
in global capitalism will serve humanity as a whole and equitably only
if we socialize the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and
increase democratic control over economic decision making. I believe
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that production should be based upon need, not profit, and that markets
should play a small role in the production and distribution of goods and
services. I recognize that this all sounds hopelessly out of date in an era
when even analytical Marxists are enamoured of neoclassical econom-
ics, but then who would have thought that anyone would ever listen to
Friedrich Hayek, a founder of neoliberalism, a few decades ago when
John Maynard Keynes held sway and Hayek was regarded as a rather
clever dinosaur who had strangely survived into the new age of gov-
ernment intervention and the welfare state?
PART III
Responsible and Irresponsible
Restructuring
Hanly argues against the standard justifications of the restructuring economy.
This is one way to address the ethical issues that it raises. Restructuring is, he
suggests, founded on an agenda which illegitimately serves particular interests
and is not consistent with our obligations to the disadvantaged or the rights
of labour. Other attempts to morally assess restructuring are less radical.
Rather than raise doubts about restructuring in general, they distinguish
between responsible and irresponsible restructuring. In the process, they elab-
orate ways to avoid or combat the most ethically objectionable aspects of rad-
ical restructuring. The two articles in this section suggest some of the differ-
ences that characterize responsible and irresponsible restructuring and ways
to promote the former. In "Responsible Restructuring in the Private Sector;"
Wayne Cascio makes a fundamental distinction between downsizing and
responsible restructuring. Paying close attention to the empirical evidence on
the effects of restructuring in the private sector, he argues that the latter is
preferable from both an ethical and a business point of view. In the article that
follows, Todd J. Hostager, David T. Bastien, and Henry H. Miles explain an
approach to business they have developed to combat irresponsible restruc-
turing. Like its martial arts analogue, "corporate judo" allows firms to earn a
competitive advantage over careless competitors, in this case by exploiting the
weaknesses they themselves create by ill-considered restructuring initiatives.
This approach to business provides an important free-market mechanism
which can combat such restructures, and so penalize that restructuring which
is most objectionable from an ethical point of view.
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5Responsible Restructuring
in the Private Sector
Wayne F. Cascio
How safe is my job? For many people, this is the issue of today. This is
true whether one's job is in the private or the public sector, in business,
health or education. Restructuring and downsizing affect all areas and
the economy. In this paper, I will nevertheless focus on issues raised by
the restructuring of business, for this is what I have studied. It should be
clear that many of the lessons we can learn from this exercise can be
applied to other sectors of the economy, including the public sector.
The importance of a better understanding of downsizing and
restructuring in business is highlighted by general economic trends,
which make it increasingly clear that corporate cutbacks were not an
oddity of the 1980s and are likely to persist. Involuntary lay-offs are
never pleasant, and responsible management policies which potentially
involve them must consider their impacts on those who leave, on those
who stay, on the local community, and on the company in question.
Termination is a traumatic experience. Egos are shattered, and
employees who remain may be bitter and angry. Family problems may
occur because of the added emotional and financial strain.
Outplacement programs that help laid-off employees deal with the psy-
chological stages of career transition (anger, grief, depression, family
stress), assess individual strengths and weaknesses, and develop sup-
port networks which can be beneficial. Within broader communities,
lay-offs have had significant impacts on local economies and social ser-
vice agencies.
For those who remain, it is important to take steps to ensure that
they retain the highest level of loyalty, trust, teamwork, motivation, and
productivity possible. This doesn't just happen and unless there is a
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good deal of face-to-face, candid, open communication between senior
management and "survivors," it probably won't.
The downside of downsizing has been well documented (see Leana
1996; for a specific case, see Collins in this volume). Downsizing may
carry some very high costs—psychological, social, and financial.
Executives should, therefore, consider carefully whether such costs are
justified by the presumed benefits of any downsizing of their workforce.
Let us begin this account of responsible restructuring by putting down-
sizing in perspective.
Downsizing is the planned elimination of positions or jobs. It has
had, and will continue to have, profound effects on many organizations,
managers at all levels, employees, labour markets, customers, and share-
holders. In the United States, more than nine million permanent lay-offs
have been announced since 1987. Downsizing continues as a result of
fundamental, structural changes in economies and markets, in the nature
of international competition, in deregulation (e.g., with respect to health
care reform), and in domestic competition (e.g., from low-cost airlines
or small, high-technology firms). Firms downsize in order to make the
best possible use of their resources: human, capital, and physical.
Although they may do this in a number of ways—by reducing the num-
ber of employees, by investing in new technology, by changing the way
work is done, and so on—cutting headcount has been an especially
popular strategy. Why? What is the lure of downsizing?
The "menu" of potential strategies to become more efficient and
more productive is a long one, but a reduction in headcount is includ-
ed on almost every executive's list. There are really only two ways for
companies to become more profitable: either by increasing revenues or
cutting costs. Because most observers would agree that future costs are
more predictable than future revenues, and because human resources
represent costs, to become more profitable it seems logical to reduce
those costs by decreasing a corporation's number of employees. The
theory may be logical, but in practice it is very problematic.
Recently, finance professor James Morris, marketing professor Clifford
Young and I collaborated on a large-scale research project to examine the
long-term financial consequences of downsizing. We examined the
employment levels and financial performance of the five hundred largest
firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange (Standard & Poor's 500)
over a fifteen-year period (1980-1994). We compared downsizers to sta-
ble-employment firms in the same industry that did not downsize. We
found that, at the end of the year of downsizing and in the subsequent
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two years, downsizers were never better off in terms of productivity,
expenses, profitability, or total return on common stock (Cascio, Young,
and Morris 1996). Stock prices do tend to spike upwards on the day the
downsizing is announced, but over time such gains do not persist.
Despite such evidence, many of the same executives who tout peo-
ple as "our greatest assets" nevertheless see those assets as ripe oppor-
tunities for cutting costs. At Scott Paper Company, chief executive offi-
cer Albert Dunlap cut 11,200 jobs before selling the company to
Kimberly Clark. He walked away with one hundred million dollars
(Petzinger 1996). At American Telephone and Telegraph, on the day that
CEO Robert Allen announced forty thousand lay-offs his own AT&T
stock rose two million dollars in value. AT&T, once known warmly as
Ma Bell, has become vilified as an icon of American corporate greed.
The public flailing has been broad-based, from the Secretary of Labor, to
Newsweek, to politicians (Keller 1996). Are there exceptions to this
behaviour? To see that there are, we need to distinguish two different
philosophies, downsizing and restructuring.
Downsizing asks, what is the irreducible core number of people we
need to run our business?
Restructuring asks, how can we change the way we do business so
that we can use the people we have most effectively?
I believe that a change in orientation from downsizing to restructur-
ing can pay handsome dividends over the long term. To illustrate this
point I offer the following four examples, which present some restruc-
turing strategies that executives have developed to cut costs without cut-
ting people. They, and others like them, are described more fully in the
Guide to Responsible Restructuring, published by the US Department of
Labor in 1995.
Example I: De-layering Without Downsizing Employees
Ford Motor Co. is a world leader in the automotive industry, selling
vehicles in more than 200 markets, and employing more than 322,000
people in plants, laboratories, and offices around the world. Although
sales topped $128 billion in 1994, and profits were up 110 percent over
1993, Ford realized it had an emerging problem: product development.
It simply couldn't design new cars and trucks as quickly as competitors
like Toyota. Concerned about Ford's ability to compete in the twenty-
first century, Chairman and CEO Alex Trotman launched a bold restruc-
turing effort designed to change the company's business processes and
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organizational structure to function more efficiently on a global basis.
Increasingly, Trotman believed, the evolution from regional to world-
wide processes and systems in product development, manufacturing,
supply, and sales activities will be based on the use of high-technology,
data, and communications systems (Trotman 1994, Sedgwick 1994, Ford
Motor Co. 1994, Business Week, 6/03/95, 101).
Still, there is that nagging question: Why now? Ed Hagenlocker,
president of Ford Automotive Operations, described the company's
rationale in an August, 1994 speech:
We want to do it when times are good...not in a crisis mode when
times are bad. We want to do it at a pace that we determine, where
we can evaluate and make the decisions when we want. We want to
be able to communicate our actions throughout the company and
have the understanding and buy-in of our employees. We don't want
to be communicating change during times of economic uncertainty.
And we are going about it very deliberately and methodically.
(Hagenlocker 1994, 4)
The company's restructuring, dubbed "Ford 2000," was accom-
plished without the threat of recession or corporate raiders, and without
mass lay-offs, divestitures, or wrenching disruptions (Suris 1994). Here
are some of the changes as of January 1, 1995:
• The company combined Ford Automotive Operations, North
American Automotive Operations, and Automotive Components
Group into a single unit.
• The company established five Vehicle Program Centers, each with
worldwide responsibility for the design, development, and engineer-
ing of the vehicles assigned to it. Europe's product team is responsi-
ble for designing small cars, while the other four product teams locat-
ed in Dearborn, Michigan are responsible for mid-sized cars, luxury
cars, personal trucks, and commercial trucks.
• As part of its matrix organization structure, Ford formed "core"
groups that specialize in manufacturing, engineering, and marketing.
The core groups loan specialists to each vehicle team on a project or
"as needed" basis.
• Ford's white-collar automotive workforce of some eighty thousand has
been reshuffled into half as many organization-chart boxes as before;
• more than three hundred senior and middle managers have accept-
ed early retirement offers to leave; and
• nearly all of Ford's four thousand-plus high-level managers are learn-
ing new responsibilities.
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What's the payoff from all of this? According to Chairman and CEO
Trotman, Ford expects to save two to three billion dollars per year by
the end of the decade. "That assures a better return for stockholders,
a more certain future for Ford employees, and a broader array of high-
quality vehicles in more parts of the world for our customers" (Ford
Motor Co. 1994, 3).
Ford's experience provides four key lessons for other firms strug-
gling to reinvent themselves for the twenty-first century:
• Get the whole company involved. After spending months studying
other restructurings, CEO Alex Trotman concluded that a common
mistake is that restructuring often is ordered by top management,
but implemented by subordinates who understand the objectives
poorly. Although much of Ford's reorganization planning was con-
ducted by 150 executives working at headquarters, the company
included hundreds of others in the process. The principle is simple:
Get the people who will have to live with changes involved in making
changes. (Suris 1994)
• Reorganize in the open. Ford's internal public relations machine
rivals anything the company has ever used to launch a new-car
model. It published a weekly faxed newspaper ("The Grapevine"),
ran an electronic bulletin board, broadcast a weekly in-house TV
show, and convened four meetings attended by nearly two thousand
employees to keep them up to date on developments. Said one
group vice-president: "The communication has been consistent, con-
stant, and outstanding." (Suris 1994)
• Punch the fast-forward button. Because the CEO believed that it was
important to move quickly, and not allow time for barriers resulting
from uncertainty to arise, he set an eight-month schedule for revamp-
ing an organization that took ninety years to build. The idea has been
to put all the decision makers in one place and force them to hash
out decisions on the spot, rather than waste months passing around
memos and binders of data in the old Ford fashion. Managers of the
task force were expected to reassign their other duties and concen-
trate solely on the reorganization.
• Expect confusion and manage it. Ford acknowledged that hundreds of
careers are disrupted as organization charts are ripped up, job tides are
redefined, and reporting relationships are altered. To ease the fears,
team members made presentations, fielded questions, and learned
how to present early-retirement offers to emphasize that nobody was
being forced out. Despite all these efforts, Ford executives know that
the model won't be complete the day it is rolled out. But their careful
planning and execution show how the process ought to work.
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Example 2: Providing Employment Security
Through Redeployment
Redeployment, that is, providing other opportunities within a corporation
for employees affected by restructuring, is an option for some large cor-
porations, which can either grow the business into new areas or build on
existing product lines or services. Intel, the company that invented the
microchip (and whose average product life cycle is just 2.5 years) has, for
example, avoided major lay-offs through a strong in-house redeployment
policy. Every employee receives a brochure entitled "Owning Your Own
Employability," and is afforded tools and resources to take advantage of
the redeployment option. A redeployment event occurs when there is a
business downturn or lack of a need for a particular skill. It does not
replace performance management, as Intel's Marile Robinson, corporate
manager of redeployment, points out: "It's not meant to shift around peo-
ple with poor skills, poor performers, or those with behavioural prob-
lems" (Stuller 1993, 40). To qualify, a full-time employee must have two
consecutive years of performance reviews that "meet requirements."
Should an employee become eligible for redeployment, he or she is
given options, tools, and resources. The company has five employee
development centres offering self-assessment tools, career counselling,
educational opportunities, and job listings within Intel. Job skills have
been redefined to encourage people to find new places within the com-
pany, and temporary assignments (as many as two assignments for a
total of twelve months) and up to eight thousand dollars of training are
provided to prepare them for new positions. Funds are also available for
relocation. The entire process is managed through a system that provides
centralized tracking and reporting of all redeployment activity.
The ranks of Intel employees are filled with those who have made
successful transitions from shop floor to sales and public-relations posi-
tions, or from obsolete technology divisions to high-margin technology
centres within the corporation. If none of this works, the company pays
for outplacement assistance for affected employees. Redeployment is a
continuing challenge at Intel because the company's competitive strate-
gy is to stay ahead of its rivals by making its products obsolete.
Between 1989 and 1991, Intel closed plants employing two thousand
people, and redeployed approximately 80 percent of the affected work-
ers. From 1991 to 1994, redeployment events impacted 3,409 employees.
The company placed 90 percent of them internally, and in 1994 there was
zero litigation as a result of plant closures (Robinson 1995).
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As part of a major restructuring, New Orleans-based Chevron USA
offered all affected employees the opportunity to participate in a rede-
ployment process that featured retraining and a chance for placement at
Chevron subsidiaries. The company's cost-reduction measures affected a
broad spectrum of employees: geologists, engineers, technicians, pilots,
secretaries, information systems specialists, offshore oil platform work-
ers, and others (Vitiello 1994). One aspect of the training focused on
developing computer-based competencies. Chevron hired Manpower,
Inc., a provider of temporary help and employment services, to conduct
on-site classes in four software programs: WordPerfect, Windows, Lotus,
and dBase III Plus. Over a six-week period, more than two hundred
computer training sessions were conducted at Chevron's career centre.
Most trainees took all four courses, and approximately 85 percent of
them found jobs subsequently. Other company-sponsored programs
include outplacement services (interviewing, resume writing, network-
ing), a 75 percent reimbursement of the cost of tuition and books for
employees who wished to attend local universities, and a Chevron-spon-
sored program that helps professionals in the sciences earn their teach-
ing certificates at an accelerated pace. While it was not possible to rede-
ploy all affected workers within Chevron, even as the company reduced
its workforce by several thousand employees in 1992, it redeployed
about nine hundred of them, thereby saving more than twenty-five mil-
lion dollars in severance costs alone (Stuller 1993). The company's over-
all approach reflects a genuine concern with helping employees to
maintain employment security (i.e., marketable skills), and is a fine
example of responsible restructuring.
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. can serve as a final exam-
ple of a large company that actively promotes redeployment of surplus
workers. When business lags at one of its forty-nine divisions, excess
workers are found similar work at another division. Over the past decade,
3M has reassigned about 3,500 workers this way, failing to place only a
"handful," according to Richard Lidstad, vice-president of human
resources. "Our employees are corporate assets, not assets of a given
business. It's like production machinery. In a downturn, you don't just
throw it out" (Business Week, 7/12/92, 101). How has 3M done? In 1994
sales and profits were both up over 1993 levels, and the company earned
a 19-6 percent return on common equity (Business Week, 6/03/95, 109).
Lynn Williams, the international president of the United
Steelworkers of America, has captured the very essence of the employ-
ment concerns that make redeployment such a productive option.
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Whether they belong to a union or not, whether -white collar, blue col-
lar, or pink collar, "we cannot expect American workers to contribute all
their good ideas and all the things they understand about the work-
place. . .if the result of doing so is that they get laid off as a result of [pro-
ductivity] improvements" (Williams 1993, 8). Redeployment policies like
those adopted at Intel, Chevron, and 3M address the issue of employ-
ment security head-on and assuage the concerns of workers.
Example 3: Providing Employment Security Through
Voluntary Leaves of Absence
Voluntary leave of absence (LOA) plans, with or without pay, can be
win-win strategies for both employers and workers. Such plans help
employers to retain the loyalty, commitment, and competencies of a
trained workforce, while at the same time allowing workers to keep their
jobs. Reflexite of Avon, Connecticut, is an example of a company that
has developed a creative LOA plan. It produces retro-reflective materials
that reflect light back to its source. To produce such materials, it uses a
patented method of moulding thousands of microscopic prisms onto
every square inch of a plastic sheet. Examples of products that use retro-
reflective materials are street signs, barricades, fire fighting equipment,
life preservers, and reflective clothing. Reflexite is an employee-owned
company, with 42 percent of company stock held by the ESOP (Employee
Stock Ownership Plan) and an additional 25 percent held by over ninety
other employees, who purchased company stock outside of the ESOP.
Though Reflexite was not losing customers or market share, the
company faced a 40 percent decline in sales in 1991, a result of the eco-
nomic recession. In the face of these economic pressures, it went to
great lengths to avoid employee lay-offs. Cecil Ursprung, chief executive
officer, defied the advice of his managers to lay employees off, and
instead instituted a two-part plan to cut costs. First, everyone took a cut
in pay. Top management took a 10 percent cut, middle managers a 7
percent cut, lower-level managers a 5 percent cut, and all other employ-
ees took a 5 percent cut in the form of one day off per month without
pay when the plant was closed.
Second, Reflexite developed a voluntary LOA plan in cooperation
with the State of Connecticut. Under the plan, employees could take
voluntary, unpaid leave for from anywhere between two weeks and
five months, while maintaining full benefits and receiving unemploy-
ment compensation from the state. Under an agreement with the local
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unemployment office, the company took responsibility for filing all nec-
essary forms for participating employees. In addition, all participating
employees maintained their seniority and owners' bonus rights, and had
a guaranteed date when they could return to the company.
About ninety employees participated in the voluntary leave-of-
absence program, saving the company over four hundred thousand dol-
lars in payroll costs. The combination of the voluntary leave program
and the salary cuts produced a 17 percent budget savings. Other com-
pany expenses in manufacturing and administration were cut back dra-
matically, and a planned facility expansion was postponed. Finally, all
employees at the employee-owned company received information on
exactly how much money these measures saved. Through these efforts,
Reflexite avoided the lay-off of even a single employee. Business
rebounded after the recession, and the corporation has been profitable
every year since 1991. In 1992, sales hit thirty million dollars. In 1995,
Reflexite was a fifty-million-dollar company (Edgar 1995).
One important feature of Reflexite's operations is its willingness to go
to considerable lengths to disclose operating and strategic business infor-
mation to its employees. One example is its Business Downturn Grid, a
four-stage plan outlining actions to be taken by the company during peri-
ods of slow business. It attempts to provide full disclosure of each stage
and the symptoms that will trigger a particular course of action.
Here is an example.
At Stage II, the following actions will be taken:
• Revise selling, general, and administrative expenditures
• Revise sales forecast
• Solicit ideas to cut costs, improve productivity and efficiency from
employee owners
• Cut overtime
• Cut discretionary spending
• Redeploy the sales force
• Increase cold calls
• Accelerate new product introductions
The expected results?
• Revenue and expenses will be adjusted to meet the new business plan
• Preserve all jobs and the expected future of the company's stock
Lay-offs occur at the fourth and final stage, and are a last resort to
save the company. To date, Reflexite's creative approach to managing its
employees has made this step unnecessary. In recognition of the value
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that Reflexite places on employee involvement, all of the company's
employee-owners were presented with Inc. magazine's Entrepreneur of
the Year award in 1992.
Example 4: Training and Education For Survivors,
While Downsizing Without Involuntary Lay-offs
NYNEX Corporation, the regional telephone company serving New York
and New England, negotiated a new contract with the Communications
Workers of America (CWA) nearly two years before the old one was to
expire. The new contract was negotiated in response to the company's
need to eliminate eight thousand of the company's thirty-five thousand
hourly positions (about 23 percent) as part of an overall cutback of
16,500 jobs.
To a large extent, such massive downsizing became necessary as a
result of changes in four areas: process re-engineering (the goal of which
is to eliminate activities that do not add value to the company), tech-
nology (only half as many employees are required when working with
digital switching using fibre-optic cable), computers (today's powerful
PCs can match traditional mainframes), and customers (who now have a
choice of providers as a result of deregulation) (Dowdall and Bahr
1994).
The overall intent of the new agreement is to allow the company to
become "lean" without being "mean." That is, the company will elimi-
nate jobs without involuntary lay-offs, transfers, or downgrades (barring
external events of a significant size, such as the loss of a major customer
or a defined level of market share). Under the agreement, NYNEX will
take the following steps in order to make involuntary downsizing unnec-
essary (Dowdall and Bahr 1994):
1. Offer early retirement incentives to pension-eligible employees (in a
specific area) that allow extra credit for age and years of service, sup-
plemental pension benefits until age sixty-two, and retention of full
health-care coverage. These "sweeteners" will boost pension payouts
by 20 percent to 25 percent.
2. If Step One proves insufficient, contiguous or adjacent areas will
receive the same offer.
3. If this proves insufficient, the early retirement offer will be broadened
to include an entire work group in an area.
4. Ask employees (regardless of their eligibility for a pension) in the
affected area to accept a voluntary severance arrangement.
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5. Offer voluntary severance to all employees in the work group.
6. Institute job sharing as a way of preserving jobs.
7. Have all work that had been contracted out performed in-house.
8. Close out temporary employees.
For the remaining NYNEX workers, the new contract established a
two-year associate degree in applied science, under a cooperative agree-
ment with the State University of New York. Employees who elect to par-
ticipate will work for four days a week, go to school on the fifth day, and
will receive five days' pay while they are enrolled in class. Under this
agreement, completion of the degree will require approximately four
years. Upon completion of their degrees, new graduates will receive a
"super tech" wage differential above the base wage rates specified in the
contract. By effectively creating a four-day work week for much of its
workforce, NYNEX also will slow the pace of job cuts, retaining enough
extra people to cover the 20 percent reduction in the work week.
CWA members who have been with NYNEX at least five years and
who want to go on to earn a four-year college degree can take a two-
year educational leave of absence. The leave is unpaid, but employees
retain all benefits and seniority, and will have a guaranteed job when
they return. NYNEX will pay as much as ten thousand dollars a year in
educational assistance.
In an industry constantly redefining itself, the long-term goal of com-
pany and CWA negotiators is to act in the best interests of both parties.
A prime example of this is the effort to upgrade workers' educational lev-
els while providing them with employment security. Why would NYNEX
agree to such an expensive program? "Because we can never have
enough technically educable people; they provide versatility.... We see
the employee as a resource—we'll grow everything in-house" (Dowdall
and Bahr 1994).
Conclusion
After the first atomic reaction in 1942, Albert Einstein remarked,
"Everything has changed, except our way of thinking and thus we drift
toward...disaster" (quoted from Williams 1993, 2). The firms described
in these four examples have changed their way of thinking. For those
who share their commitments, and want to move from commitment into
action, the following can serve as guidelines for responsible restructur-
ing. In essence, they make the point that restructuring is responsible to
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the extent that it acknowledges the concerns, expectations, and inputs
of all stakeholders who will be affected by it.
1. Articulate a vision of what you want your organization to achieve.
2. Establish a corporate culture that views people as assets to be
developed rather than as costs to be cut.
3. Be clear about your short- and long-range objectives, e.g., to cut
costs (short-range) and to improve customer service and share-
holder value through more effective use of assets (long-range).
4. Establish an alternative menu of options for reaching the short- and
long-range objectives.
5. Ensure that the people who will have to live with the changes are
involved in making them; provide opportunities for input at all levels.
6. Communicate, communicate, communicate! Share as much infor-
mation as possible about prospective changes with those who will
be affected by them.
7. Recognize that employees are unlikely to contribute creative, inge-
nious ways to cut costs if they think their own employment securi-
ty will be jeopardized as a result.
8. If cutting costs by cutting people is inevitable, establish a set of pri-
orities for doing so (e.g., outside contractors and temporaries go
first) and stick to it. Show by word and deed that full-time, value-
adding employees will be the last to go.
9. If employees must be laid off, provide as much advance notice as
possible, treat them with dignity and respect, and provide assis-
tance (financial, counselling) to help them find new jobs.
10. Consider redeploying surplus workers, retraining them to make bet-
ter use of existing human assets and to promote employment secu-
rity and self-reliance.
11. Give surviving employees a reason to stay. Explain what new
opportunities will be available to them.
12. View restructuring as part of a process of continual improvement—
with sub-goals and measurable check points over time—rather than
as a one-time event.
The companies described earlier, and the restructuring strategies
they used, represent considered choices among alternative courses of
action. The interests of all parties were clarified, and the risks and gains
were evaluated openly and mutually. These kinds of actions define eth-
ical choices (Mirvis and Seashore 1979).
The traditional view of the firm says that corporations have many con-
stituencies: the stockholders or shareowners, the customers, the employ-
ees, and the community (or communities) in which they do business.
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These groups are "stakeholders"—people who have a stake in the firm.
Chief executive officers such as Albeit Dunlap, formerly of Scott Paper
Company, deride this view as "total rubbish. It's the shareholders who
own the company" (Leana 1996, 16). However true this may be, it is the
employees and suppliers who make the company function, and it is the
communities they reside in which support the firm by providing the infra-
structure that allows it to operate (e.g., roads, bridges, railways, schools,
hospitals, police and fire protection). Isn't it therefore reasonable to con-
sider the interests of these parties in any decision to downsize?
One of the unfortunate myths about downsizing is that it occurs in
desperate situations, where the very survival of the firm is at stake. In fact,
the data indicate that for many companies, downsizing is a first resort.
Right Associates, an outplacement firm headquartered in Philadelphia,
reports that before downsizing, only 6 percent of companies tried to
reduce costs by cutting pay, 9 percent tried unpaid holidays, 9 percent
tried reduced work weeks, and 14 percent tried job sharing (Right
Associates 1992). A survey by the American Management Association sug-
gests that 81 percent of those firms that downsized in 1994 were profitable
in that year (American Management Association 1994).
Responsible restructuring requires that firms consider carefully the
interests of all stakeholders, not just stockholders, before laying workers
off. The data on the financial performance of downsizing companies do
not support the long-term benefits of this strategy. Is there a lesson here?
Indeed there is, for the firms that showed the best results in the fifteen-
year study of the S&P 500 described earlier were those that were increas-
ing assets and adding employees. Growing the business is a much more
viable long-term strategy than simply cutting workers. In short, a firm
can't save its way into prosperity. The real key is new products, new ser-
vices and new markets.
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Layoffs are intended to reduce costs and promote an efficient, lean, and
mean organization. However, what tends to result is a sad and angry
organization, populated by depressed survivors. The basic bind is that
the process of reducing staff to achieve increased efficiency and pro-
ductivity often creates conditions that lead to the opposite result—an
organization that is risk averse and less productive. (Noer 1993, 6)
Ask any employee in a recently restructured company and they will tell
you what David Noer is talking about. Recent studies support the view
from the front line: restructuring often damages organizations and their
customer relations, resulting in lower productivity, morale, market share,
and revenues (see Cascio 1993, De Meuse et al. 1994, Downs 1995, Noer
1993, and Stambaug 1992; on mergers and acquisitions see Bastien 1987,
Boyle and Jaynes 1972, Marks and Mirvis 1985, and Zweig et al. 1995).
The view from the boardroom and Wall Street is a different matter. Many
executives and investors still see restructuring as an effective way to cut
costs, enhance performance, improve the bottom line, and better serve
the interests of stockholders (see Jones 1996, Dunlap 1996, and Pickens
1988). Which view is correct? Is restructuring good or bad?
The truth of the matter is not so simple or so clear cut. Restructurings
come in many different forms, including downsizings, mergers, acquisi-
tions, divestitures, turnarounds, hostile takeovers, friendly takeovers,
leveraged buyouts, and employee stock ownership plans.16 Some restruc-
turings are voluntary and some are involuntary. Some are driven by the
selfish motives of raiders and empire-builders and some are designed to
Notes to this chapter are on p. 304.
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defend firms against these attacks. Some are driven by a concern for quar-
terly profits and some are necessary to insure the very survival of the firm.
Different restructurings vary in their impacts on employees, cus-
tomers, communities, and other stakeholders. While no form of change
is painless, some restructurings inflict less stakeholder damage than oth-
ers (see Cascio 1995, Hitt et al. 1994, Hendricks 1992, and Lieber 1995).
As we enter the increasingly turbulent, complex, and interdependent
world of the twenty-first century, one of our key challenges is to identi-
fy the most effective ways to deter restructuring which is harmful.
How do we discourage change that damages stakeholders? Current
responses to this challenge fall into one of two categories: education, and
government intervention. Cascio 1995, Hitt et al. 1994 and other advocates
of rightsizing and responsible restructuring see education as a key to min-
imizing stakeholder damage. According to this view, part of the problem
stems from a fundamental ignorance of (1) why restructurings should be
done and (2) how to properly implement them. The solution is to study
the principles and practices that underlie the least harmful and most ben-
eficial instances of restructuring. Those who believe that governments
should intervene suggest laws regulating plant closures, advanced notice
and severance packages, and that governments play a role in labour-man-
agement negotiations, and employee and public buyouts.
But are education and government intervention the only weapons
in the war against harmful restructuring driven by ignorance and/or
unchecked greed? Our research suggests otherwise. Ironically, a pow-
erful new weapon has emerged from the market itself. This weapon—
corporate judo—has a number of unique features that make it effective
as a selective deterrent against harmful restructuring.
We begin the present paper by describing the process through
which we discovered and developed corporate judo. We then provide
an overview of the corporate judo framework. We describe the underly-
ing philosophy of judo, generic waves of opportunities to "judo" a
restructured firm, and the role that competitive intelligence plays in judo.
We then identify four generic approaches to restructuring: the "What, me
worry?" approach, education, government intervention, and corporate
judo. We compare the relative merits of these responses as methods for
discouraging harmful restructuring practices. Among other things, we
show that corporate judo and corporate raiding are opposites, and that
judo can be used to punish harmful attacks by raiders and empire-
builders. We conclude by noting some ways of combining corporate
judo with education and government action.
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The Discovery and Development of Corporate Judo
The story of corporate judo is a mixture of empirical observation, prac-
tical insight, and theory. It all began during a lunchtime conversation
about the market for consulting in merger and acquisition (M&A) imple-
mentation. We wondered why so many executives believed that they
could manage a merger on their own, without the benefit of learning
from the past mistakes and successes of others.17 One of us had recent-
ly completed a study of the damage that a merged firm unleashed upon
itself and the resulting exodus of employees and customers to compet-
ing firms. The light bulb of practical insight flashed at this point—if the
executives in charge of merged or acquired firms don't want to learn
about the problems and pitfalls of their restructuring, why not sell that
information to their competitors!
This makes good sense, for detailed knowledge of the fallout from
the restructuring of one firm can help competing firms gain valuable cus-
tomers and talented employees at its expense. This is the essence of cor-
porate judo. Like its analogue in the martial arts, it derives its power
from an opponent's own actions, exploiting the forces they unleash and
the weaknesses they expose during the heat of competition (see Domini
1977, Seabourne and Herndon 1983, and Sun Tzu 1963). But corporate
judo is more than just another tactic on the competitive battlefield. We
believed that the threat of "getting nailed by a competitor" which it
poses might create a compelling incentive for executives to seriously
consider (1) whether or not a restructuring is warranted in the first place,
and (2) how to plan and implement a restructuring so that benefits are
maximized and the damage minimized.
Armed with these basic insights, we tackled the task of developing
a systematic approach to corporate judo. We looked for relevant
research findings, useful theoretical concepts, and examples of judo in
practice. The most difficult part of the task was finding real-world exam-
ples. In one case, we learned that a community bank had doubled or
tripled its rate of growth in net income, loans, and deposits by exploit-
ing the fallout at a recently acquired rival bank. Dave Knopick, the pres-
ident of the bank, acknowledged that he had stumbled onto the idea of
corporate judo and that a systematic approach would have helped the
bank more thoroughly exploit it (see Bastien et al. 1996).
Telephone interviews yielded several additional examples of corpo-
rate judo in the financial services sector. Through these contacts, we
learned that it was difficult to confirm cases of judo-in-use precisely
because it is an effective tactic and corporations may not wish to share
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it with others, especially their competitors, and especially as identifying
its use may draw attention to one's firm and result in retaliation by oppo-
nents now or in the future. On the other hand, we found that judo was
being practised without a thorough understanding of the full range of
available opportunities and tactics. In view of this, our next step was to
incorporate relevant theory, research, and practice into a systematic cor-
porate judo framework.
Overview of the Corporate Judo Framework
We wanted to develop a corporate judo framework for two reasons: (1)
to help firms exploit the competitive opportunities that opponents pre-
sent when they over-restructure, and (2) to put corporate raiders, exec-
utives and investors on notice that they might suffer retaliation if they
engage in harmful restructuring practices. The framework we developed
includes a statement of the basic judo philosophy, a review of the
opportunities presented by restructuring, a list of tactics for exploiting
these opportunities, and a discussion of the power behind the approach.
The Corporate Judo Philosophy
Judo is "an art of weaponless self-defence developed in China and Japan
that uses throws, holds, and blows, and derives added power from the
attacker's own weight and strength." (American Heritage Dictionary)
This definition of the martial art called judo points to three key compo-
nents of the corporate judo approach. First and foremost, judo is a
defensive reaction to moves initiated by an attacker. Viewed in this con-
text, all forms of restructuring—downsizings, mergers, acquisitions,
takeovers, etc.—are offensive moves that aim to improve a firm's per-
formance and, thereby, its position vis-a-vis their competitors. It is only
natural that these competitors look for ways to defend their own posi-
tions: any weaknesses exposed by an attacker during a restructuring are,
in the name of self-defence, fair game.
The second component is a focus on the opportunities that lie
beneath the surface of an attack. Like a well-trained martial artist, prac-
titioners of the art of corporate judo pay close attention to their oppo-
nent's moves, looking for signs of weakness and for opportunities to
gain leverage by using the force and momentum of the attacker's own
moves. In the case of a restructuring, this means that competing firms
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should study the situation for evidence of obvious and not-so-obvious
weaknesses. For example, a restructured firm's new streamlined and
consolidated order processing system may actually cause more harm
than good in the short term. Savvy judo practitioners will probe to find
and exploit these types of hidden opportunities.
The third component of corporate judo is an interactive view of
competition that disciplines the self and the opponent. Like traditional
judo, corporate judo relies on the ability to see actions and their conse-
quences in a truly interactive context. The strength or weakness of one
party's action depends on how the other party perceives it and responds
to it. If one firm implements a merger and a competitor perceives this
action in the stereotypical way, the merger will be viewed as a strength
and a threat. If, in contrast, the competitor closely studies its opponent,
it may find a way to see the merger as a weakness and an opportunity
which allows a very different set of responses.
Through judo, we learn to carefully study an opponent's actions for
hidden weaknesses and the corresponding opportunities. On another
level, skill in scrutinizing opponents can help us to see how our oppo-
nents might scrutinize our own actions. In this way, judo refines our abil-
ity to think and act in a strategic manner, using a move-countermove
mentality.
Judo disciplines the self by forcing us to consider how other parties
may perceive our actions and what they may do in response. Judo dis-
ciplines the opponent whenever competitors are aware that we are scru-
tinizing their actions and are looking to take advantage of hidden weak-
nesses and opportunities. In a competitive context, the result is pressure
to minimize the weaknesses and the opportunities that you expose to
your opponents. Judo discipline thus impacts what actions you and your
opponents take.
Generic Opportunities to "Judo" a Restructured Firm
Corporate judo is possible whenever an opponent disrupts its own flow
of goods and services by engaging in a restructuring effort. The key for
judo practitioners is to learn as much as possible about the nature and
timing of this disruption and the opportunities it presents to their own
firm. Two sources are especially helpful in this regard: (1) social scientif-
ic research, which provides generic insights into change-based disrup-
tion, and (2) competitive intelligence, which yields situation-specific infor-
mation about the exact pattern of disruption caused by an opponent's
80 The Ethics of the New Economy
action and the location and timing of each window of judo opportunity.
In the remainder of this section we will focus on the generic insights
afforded by existing social scientific research.
We adopt a generic stakeholder "shock wave" model that represents
the cascading waves of damage which often result from a restructuring.
At the core of this model is the belief that a firm and its actions should
not be viewed in a vacuum; a firm and its actions should be conscious-
ly and explicitly located within the broader context of its relationships
with customers, suppliers, communities, and investors. To do otherwise
implies poor ethics and poor business (see Bastien 1994).
The "First Wave" of Judo Opportunities
The decision to restructure lies at the centre of the storm that it creates.
News of an impending restructuring sends the first wave of uncertainty
rippling outward through the organization to customers, suppliers, local
communities, and investors. Among other things, news of a restructur-
ing signals the end of the psychological contract of unwritten agree-
ments between the firm and its stakeholders (see Cascio 1987, Rousseau
1995, Rousseau 1996, Rousseau and Tijoriwala 1996, and Drinkwalter in
this volume). This initial stakeholder shock wave presents competitors
with the first window of opportunity to profit from the damage that a
restructured firm has inflicted upon itself and its stakeholders.
Rumours often provide the first news of a restructuring. News trav-
els fast within the firm, the local business community, the industry, and
the investment community. The official announcement of a restructur-
ing adds momentum to the propagating stakeholder shock wave. While
the announcement may reduce some areas of uncertainty—who will
receive a pink slip, which facilities will close, etc.—it typically generates
additional uncertainties and increased fear and anxiety (see Bastien
1987, Brockner et al. 1987, and Noer 1993). Soon-to-be-ex-employees
worry about their futures. Retained employees wonder how secure their
job really is. Uncertainty, fear, and anxiety detract from performance and
productivity, further feeding the wave of stakeholder damage.
The mere news of a restructuring can have a great impact because it
calls into question the fundamental nature of a firm's relationships with its
employees, customers, suppliers, communities and investors. Employees
\vonder if they will still have a job and, if so, how long they can count on
it before the next round of pink slips is issued. Customers wonder if they
will continue to receive goods and services in the manner to which they
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have become accustomed, including price, quality, quantity, delivery,
and service. Suppliers wonder if they will continue to be able to count
on the same volume of orders and ability to pay in a timely fashion.
Communities wonder if the restructuring will lead to pink slips or shut-
downs, resulting in a smaller tax base, a greater strain on social services,
and a damaged sense of pride in the community and its local economy.
Investors may wonder if they should pay attention to the dismal track
record of returns on restructuring and sell their interests, or take a gam-
ble and hold or even buy.
The damage would be bad enough even if it were restricted to
stakeholder uncertainty. But this is not the case. Research shows that
stakeholders will divert substantial time, energy, and resources from
their regular activities to reduce their uncertainty. One study found that
employees spent up to 20 percent of their time seeking and discussing
information that would help them to make sense of the situation
(Bastien et al. 1995). Employees also spend time looking for other jobs.
These activities divert precious resources away from the conduct of
daily business, leading to delays, errors, etc. Turnover and absenteeism
escalate, further eroding the ability of the firm to deliver its goods and
services in a timely, acceptable manner. Customer dissatisfaction
mounts, making customers consider a switch to an alternative vendor
(Bastien 1994).
The generic "first wave" opportunities for knowledgeable competi-
tors are clear: Pay close attention to an opponent's employees and cus-
tomers when it announces a restructuring. Soliciting dissatisfied employ-
ees and customers can be a quick and easy route to new talent and an
increase in profits.
The "Second Wave" of Judo Opportunities
A second stakeholder shock wave is set in motion when the opponent
begins to implement the restructuring. Change begets additional uncer-
tainty as remaining employees wonder if they are next in line for a pink
slip. Change also means overload as employees scramble to accomplish
their regular tasks and the work of departed colleagues. Valuable time
and effort is also diverted to doing the "job" of implementing changes
dictated by the restructuring. New tasks, procedures, and systems
impose significant learning requirements, leading to further declines in
performance and productivity. The result is costly for the employees and
the restructured organization—increased stress, illness, absenteeism,
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turnover, inefficiency, and errors (see Bastien 1987, Leana and Feldman
1992, Mirvis and Marks 1992, and Noer 1993).
To make matters worse, the added work, costs, and uncertainties
quickly spill over the firm's boundary, damaging relationships with cus-
tomers, suppliers, and communities. Customers suffer from the uncer-
tainty, mistakes, delays, and decreased quality that often accompany a
restructuring (Bastien 1994). Dissatisfied customers mean fewer sales
and greater uncertainty in demand. Suppliers become dissatisfied, in
turn, when they receive smaller and less predictable orders from the
restructured firm. The bottom line for communities is no different—the
cascade of disrupted work and dissatisfied employees, customers, and
suppliers spills over into the broader community-at-large, leading to an
eroded tax base, a drain in government services, damaged civic pride,
etc. (Downs 1995, Leana and Feldman 1992).
Like the first wave, the second wave provides savvy competitors
with significant opportunities to gain talented employees and increased
profits at the expense of a self-disrupted opponent. Unlike the first
wave, the broad scope of second-wave stakeholder damage means that
competitors can also take advantage of the harm that suppliers, com-
munities, and investors have suffered at the hand of an opponent's
restructuring. The same "switching" phenomenon that occurs with
employees and customers may also occur with suppliers, communities,
and investors. Competitors might be able to gain new suppliers and
investors when they begin to profit from an opponent's restructuring
effort. Furthermore, communities may be willing to shift their support
from firms that are restructuring to firms that are not restructuring. As a
result, competitors that demonstrate their opposition to harmful restruc-
turing practices may receive packages that include property tax relief
and incentives for new and expanded facilities.
The "Third Wave" of Judo Opportunities
The first two waves originated at the centre of it all—the decision to
restructure. First came the rumour, then the announcement, then the
implementation. A third wave may originate from competing firms.
Competitors that exploit an opponent's self-disruption by soliciting
unhappy employees and customers send another shock wave back
toward the centre. Losing employees and customers to competitors
means larger workloads and fewer resources which, in turn, results in
further cutbacks and other cost-saving measures that damage the firm's
Corporate Judo 83
ability to deliver quality products and services in a timely and affordable
manner. This creates a "ripple effect" of waves and counter-waves
fuelled by escalating causal effects that provides new opportunities for
competitors (see Maruyama 1963, Masuch 1985, and Weick 1979). And
so on, and so on....
Waves and Counter-waves of Stakeholder Damage
One benefit of the shock-wave model is that it can be used to track the
spread of stakeholder damage across time. Knowing which stakeholders
become dissatisfied at what times has obvious value for competitors who
wish to take full advantage of a restructured opponent. The model can
also be used to track inwardly, propagating counter-waves of stake-
holder damage. This phenomenon occurs whenever a stakeholder
responds to the damage they have received by returning the harm to the
offending firm. The most obvious example is when employees leave to
find another job at a competing firm. Another example is customers
switching to a competing vendor. In either case, when stakeholders exit
the field, they remove themselves from the damage and set a third wave
of damage back toward the restructured firm.
In response to the loss of revenue and market share, executives in
charge of the restructured firm may decide to lay additional employees
off as a cost-cutting measure which, in turn, may lead to further task
overload, declines in productivity, errors, decreased quality, etc. The
response by executives thus initiates another outwardly propagating
wave of stakeholder damage which invariably leads to increased cus-
tomer dissatisfaction and which, in turn, leads to an additional loss of
revenue and market share. The shock-wave model graphically demon-
strates the futility of responding to damage with damage.
Firms that fail to locate themselves and their actions within the
broad context of stakeholder relations will find it harder to see how
damage set in motion by restructuring can come back to haunt them.
The stakeholder shock-wave model can help them see these effects. As
such, it is a graphic reminder of the need to locate the firm and its
actions within the broad context of its consequences. Despite these ben-
efits, competitors who wish to practise corporate judo must go beyond
the shock-wave model by using competitive intelligence to fill in the
details of their specific situation. By so doing, they will be able to most
precisely and effectively take advantage of the damage that a restruc-
tured opponent has inflicted upon itself and its stakeholders.
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The Role of Competitive Intelligence in Corporate Judo
When viewed from the perspective of corporate judo, successive waves
of stakeholder damage present a restructured firm's competitors with
opportunities to make significant gains in talent, sales, and profits, and
to substantially improve its standing with suppliers, communities, and
investors. The key to effective corporate judo is to augment the generic
information provided by social science with situation-specific informa-
tion obtained through competitive intelligence. For example, the shock-
wave model identifies generic signs of weakness and probable
sequences of events as the processes of self-disruption propagate
throughout a restructuring firm and its web of stakeholders. Competitive
intelligence is the next necessary step in order to determine exactly what
is happening, and how and where and when and why, in your specific
situation.
Competitive intelligence is a growing field of practice and inquiry
(see Sutton 1988, Vella and McGonagle 1987). In the restructuring con-
text, good competitive intelligence is important because it helps firms to
see the complete range of available opportunities and to determine pre-
cisely how and where and when to "judo" a restructured opponent.
Competitive intelligence is available from a variety of different sources,
including (1) public sources such as government documents and articles
in regional, national, and international newspapers and periodicals, and
(2) field sources such as dissatisfied employees and customers, the sales
and service representatives of the restructurer, suppliers to the restruc-
turer, networking via professional and trade associations, and advertis-
ing agencies (see Porter 1980, Coombs and Moorhead 1992, McGonagle
and Vella 1990). Good competitive intelligence helps competitors effec-
tively target their moves to "judo" a restructured opponent.
Corporate Judo as a Response to Harmful Restructuring
Opportunities to "judo" a recently restructured opponent are real and
substantial. By executing a few basic moves, Dave Knopick was able to
attract enough dissatisfied employees and customers away from an
opponent that he more than doubled his own bank's growth in net
income, loans, and deposits (Bastein et al. 1996). The ability to make
such gains by rescuing dissatisfied stakeholders from the throes of
uncertainty, task overload, poor performance and error characterizes the
corporate judo response to restructuring. In this section we will explore
some additional benefits that occur when it becomes a tactical response
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and a deterrent to harmful restructuring. We begin by examining three
alternatives to corporate judo.
What, Me Worry?
Alfred E. Neuman's infamous question best captures the spirit and prac-
tice of the status quo—business as usual. Despite the mountain of evi-
dence to the contrary, executives and investors still embrace restructur-
ing as a means to quick and easy profits (see Jones 1996, Dunlap 1996,
Pickens 1988). Albert Dunlap, Robert Eaton, and others wonder what all
the fuss is about; after all, they are performing a valuable service to
stockholders and society by saving firms from their downfall. According
to this "mad" view, we shouldn't worry when thousands lose their jobs,
since tens of thousands of jobs were saved in the process. In a nutshell,
the default response is that no response to harmful restructuring is need-
ed, since the harm would be far greater if we disallowed or severely lim-
ited existing restructuring practices.
The main problem with the "What, me worry?" response is its
assumption that the invisible hand of the free market is sufficient as a
moral arbiter and a safeguard against unwarranted, harmful restructur-
ing. If the market allows it to be done, it must be proper, at least accord-
ing to the moral metric of capitalistic ideology as realized in the free
market system. But this view mistakenly equates the morality of actions
with mechanisms that allow them to occur. But allowing an action to
occur does not automatically sanction it or attest to its moral status.
If the invisible hand of the free market provides no guarantee
against harmful restructuring practices what, then, can we do in order to
deter such practices? Cascio, Hitt, and others have suggested that we
learn how to minimize damage and maximize benefits by studying the
best practices of rightsizing and responsible restructuring. Hanly, Reich,
and others suggest that we go beyond education by involving the gov-
ernment as a means of regulating against harmful restructuring practices.
We have developed a third alternative that does not rely on appeals to
learned self-restraint or intervention by a governmental agency: corpo-
rate judo. In the remainder of this section, we will examine the com-
parative strengths and weaknesses of education, government interven-
tion and corporate judo as responses to harmful restructuring practices.
Education
Education is the heart of the rightsizing and responsible restructuring
movement. According to this approach, we can discourage the harm and
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encourage the benefits by studying how restructuring should and should
not be done. Systematic, scientific studies of best and worst cases in
restructuring have begun to yield fruit in this regard (see Bruton et al.
1996, Cameron et al. 1991, Cascio 1993 and 1995, and Hitt et al. 1994).
Education does have several clear benefits as a response to restructuring.
It provides specific information about proper and improper restructuring
practices (prescriptions and proscriptions). Education is consistent with
the free market ideology, hence it does not suffer from the same criticisms
as government intervention. Moreover, education can be an efficient or
cost-effective response when delivered in the form of articles and books.
Despite these benefits, education suffers from two major weakness-
es that prevent it from being sufficient as a "stand-alone" response to
restructuring. First of all, learning how to right-size or to responsibly
restructure can help us to become increasingly moral in how we plan
and execute a decision to do a restructuring. Current education is
designed to help us formulate and implement restructurings that yield
minimal stakeholder damage and maximal stakeholder benefits. But it
does not teach us how to determine whether or not a restructuring is
warranted in the first place.
Education in its present form is at best a partial deterrent to harm-
ful restructuring, a response that addresses harm that results from poor
planning and execution. But even the best planned and executed
restructurings may be ill-advised from the very beginning. Restructurings
undertaken primarily for selfish, short-term financial gain may damage
the firm beyond repair and fatally harm its ability to compete in the free
market. Ironically, the education movement may actually help to keep
corporate raiders and empire-builders in business. The bottom line is
that while the education response is selective in discriminating between
good and bad ways to plan and execute restructurings, it is not selective
in discriminating between good and bad restructuring decisions.
A second weakness of the education response is that it overesti-
mates the impact of rational appeals in the print medium on executive
decision-making and planning. The crux of this critique is contained in
one crucial question: What really motivates or compels executives to "do
the right thing" with regard to restructuring decisions, plans, and imple-
mentations? Do rational appeals, including explicit prescriptions and
proscriptions, make an appreciable impact on executive decisions and
organizational practices? A valid answer to this question is not possible
without looking at the historical record. For example, decades of pub-
lished research on the do's and don'ts of mergers and acquisitions have
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failed to make a demonstrable dent in the number of M&As undertaken
and the rates of success and failure (see Herman and Lowenstein 1988,
Hogarty 1970, Zweig et al. 1995).
What do executives really pay attention to? Their peers, pocket-
books, stockholders, and competitors. One of the key benefits of cor-
porate judo is that it hits executives where it counts in each of these
regards. Judo is a compelling deterrent to harmful restructuring because
it poses a serious threat to the gains executives have promised them-
selves and their stockholders. The source of this threat—competing
firms directed by peer executives—carries more weight than rational
appeals by academics in the print medium to "do the right thing."
In summary, education is at best a partial response to harmful
restructuring. The real strengths of education lie in its ability to provide
us with detailed prescriptions and proscriptions in a manner that is effi-
cient and consistent with free market ideology. Education in its present
form falls short of the mark in helping us to discriminate between good
and bad restructuring decisions and in its ability to compel executives to
make, plan, and execute restructuring decisions that yield minimal dam-
age and maximal benefits across stakeholders. Table 1 summarizes these
points and provides an explicit comparison of education, government
intervention, and corporate judo as responses to harmful restructuring.
This table summarizes the substantive points that underlie our remain-
ing discussions of government intervention and corporate judo.
Government /ntervent/on
While one government is currently involved in the business of writing
prescriptions for responsible restructuring (Cascio 1995), the main thrust
of proposed government interventions is prescriptive in nature.
Government interventionists feel that the writing is already on the wall:
to date, education and free market mechanisms have failed to make a
demonstrable impact on the number of restructurings, the rate of failed
restructurings, and the stakeholder fallout that often results from restruc-
turing (Herman and Lowenstein 1988, Zweig et al. 1995). According to
this view, the next logical step is to allow the government to intervene
on the behalf of aggrieved stakeholders by enacting policies, rules, and
regulations that curtail and, where possible, prevent the damage. US
Secretary of Labor Reich, for instance, has recently broached the issue of
tax incentives for firms that restructure in a responsible manner.18
The problem is that the weaknesses of this approach are substantial
and that some of its alleged strengths are more apparent than real.
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Table I
A Comparison of Three Responses to Harmful Restructuring
RESPONSE
Education
Government
Intervention
Corporate
Judo
PROPONENTS
Cascio(l995)
Hitt et al.
(1994)
Han ly( 1992)
Reich (1996)
Bastien,
Hostager and
Miles (1996)
Six Generic Criteria for Comparing Responses to Restructuring
Prescriptive?
Yes
Yes
No
Prescriptive?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Selective?
Yes
&No
No
Yes
Efficient?
Yes
No
Yes
Free Market
Ideology?
Yes
No
Yes
Compelling?
No
No
Yes
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Government intervention is notoriously inefficient and costly. Policing
corporate behaviour and enforcing new laws requires additional time,
effort, personnel, and resources, all of which are scarce commodities in
an era of budget cutbacks and retrenchment. A more pressing issue
underlies the concern for cost and efficiency, however: government
intervention is not the most compelling way to change the decisions and
actions of executives in corporate America. The response by private
industry to new rules and regulations has often been one of grudging
acceptance with "behind-the-scenes" activity to find ways to minimize
the costs associated with compliance.
On a deeper level, however, government intervention suffers from
the fact that it runs counter to the free market ideology that undergirds
so many of our decisions and actions. Government interventionists mis-
takenly assume that we have identified and exhausted all viable free
market responses to restructuring. To be sure, the track record shows
that corporate raiding is not a terribly effective and selective means of
disciplining executive decisions, plans, and actions. Recent case evi-
dence, however, suggests that corporate judo is a viable free market
response to harmful restructuring driven by selfish gain at the expense
of employees, customers, and other stakeholders (Bastien et al. 1996).
Corporate Judo
Dave Knopick and others have stumbled onto a sorely needed check-
and-balance against harmful restructuring. Corporate judo is entirely
consistent with the ideology of the free market and the competitive
premise that only the fittest will survive. For example, if corporate
raiders are indeed sincere in the claim that they serve a necessary pur-
pose by culling the weak from the herd and trimming the fat down to
lean and mean competitive muscle, why not give the raiders (and the
empire-builders, for that matter) a dose of their own medicine? Why not
through corporate judo, to use the damage they have unleashed through
their self-interested restructuring efforts against them? All the regulations
and rational appeals in the world will not stop a smart, self-interested
executive who is acting in the professed interest of stockholders.
A key challenge, then, is to find a way to motivate executives to
make restructuring decisions and plans that reflect the best interests of
all stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, communi-
ties, and investors. Corporate judo does this in a compelling and con-
vincing manner. Judo is not an abstract rational appeal by academics in
an educational mode. Judo is not a series of government sanctions on
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corporate behaviour. Judo is something much more immediate and
forceful—it is a real, emerging free market phenomenon that poses a
direct threat to the profits that self-interested raiders, empire-builders,
executives, and investors have come to expect when they do a restruc-
turing. What better incentive to "do the right thing" than knowing that
peer executives can direct their own firms to "rescue" your dissatisfied
employees and customers if you open windows of opportunity by doing
an ill-advised or ill-planned restructuring?
Although judo may sound like raiding—and both are forms of mar-
ket discipline on corporate behaviour—judo is in fact the polar oppo-
site. Unlike corporate raiding, which derives its power from the value
that a firm has accumulated over the years, corporate judo derives its
power from the destruction of value that often results from restructuring
(see Campbell et al. 1995, M.E. Porter 1987).
Judo thrives in direct proportion to the amount of damage and dis-
ruption that an opponent unleashes upon itself and its stakeholders.
Higher levels of stakeholder damage (uncertainty, dissatisfaction, etc.)
mean more opportunities for knowledgable competitors to "judo" the
restructured opponent. Moving in the other direction, the power of judo
diminishes in direct proportion to decreases in stakeholder damage.
Indeed, a key advantage of corporate judo is that the amount of stake-
holder damage places a natural upper limit on the force of the judo
response; corporate judo is the only free market response that punishes
a harmful restructuring in direct proportion to the harm it unleashes.
More importantly, however, a damage-based approach like judo
enables us to avoid the thorny, complex, time-consuming and often
impossible matters of (1) trying to discern the real intentions behind a
restructuring and (2) trying to predict the eventual success or failure of
a current restructuring effort. Competitors, educators, researchers, con-
sultants, and government employees could expend significant amounts
of time, effort, and resources attempting to determine the real inten-
tions—good or bad—behind a restructuring. They could do the same
for outcomes, as well, trying to determine whether or not the restruc-
turing will ultimately succeed or fail.
Corporate judo provides us with a far more efficient and tractable
alternative: focus on the damage and forget about intentions and possi-
ble outcomes. If the intentions behind a restructuring are indeed good,
then executives need to carry through on these intentions by ensuring
that the restructuring is properly planned and implemented, with mini-
mal damage to stakeholders. Knowing that competitors can dash one's
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good intentions is a compelling incentive to take the proper steps to
ensure that the firm is heading into the change with more than just good
intentions. To do otherwise is not only objectionable on moral
grounds—unnecessary harm incurred by employees, customers, and
other stakeholders—it is equally objectionable on economic grounds as
bad business. What the firm needs is good intentions and a thorough
plan based on input from all stakeholders.
While we would like to know the outcome of a restructuring in
advance, this is neither practically nor theoretically possible in most
cases. At best, we can use the existing literatures to make educated
guesses as to which restructurings are more and less likely to succeed.
Corporate judo suggests that we instead devote our time and energies to
take advantage of the damage that results from restructuring, the corpo-
rate equivalent of punishing behaviour instead of trying to ascribe inten-
tionality and read minds. We prefer to work with what is observable
and actionable. Indeed, research has shown that "good postmerger inte-
gration rarely makes a really bad deal work, but bad execution almost
always wrecks one that might have had a shot" (Zweig et al. 1995, 124).
Corporate judo is a powerful incentive for executives to do a good job
in choosing, planning, and executing restructurings. To do otherwise is
to ruin your shot at success and increase your chances of getting "nailed"
by a savvy competitor -who will be only too happy to come in and "res-
cue" your dissatisfied employees and customers.
But no approach is without its limitations. The primary weakness of
corporate judo lies in the area of prescriptions and proscriptions for
restructures—it does not, and does not intend to furnish explicit, sys-
tematic advice on the do's and don'ts of restructuring. Restructurers can,
however, still glean some valuable advice regarding the types of damage
that they should avoid at what times. The stakeholder shock-wave
model may, for example, help restructurers to plan and implement
change in a way that yields minimal stakeholder damage.
Conclusion
Corporate judo is a newly emerging free market phenomenon that has
several important advantages over education and government interven-
tion as a response to harmful restructuring. Corporate judo is an effi-
cient, selective, and proportionate response, and it offers a compelling
incentive to executives to (1) seriously consider whether a restructuring
is really warranted, once the potential for damage has been fully
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explored and (2) plan and implement the restructuring in a responsible
manner, with minimal stakeholder damage. We look forward to a day in
which the practice of corporate judo becomes obsolete while the idea
of corporate judo remains in force as a deterrent to harmful restructur-
ing—a day in which all restructuring is done for the right reasons and
with minimum damage and maximum benefits to stakeholders. Until that
day, we must continue to spread the word about judo. This means, of
course, that a marriage of corporate judo and education responses could
be mutually beneficial.
We envision a series of seminars, workshops, books, and videos
aimed at promoting the idea and practice of corporate judo. Indeed, the
inaugural corporate judo workshop has already been held at the
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. Partnerships with government are
not out of the question. Government-sponsored town meetings, consor-
tiums, seminars, workshops, pamphlets, books, etc., may also help to
educate the general public. The growing number of corporate judo cases
suggests that this is an idea whose time has come. Our job is to describe
the phenomenon, develop it as a usable practice, and spread the word.
PART IV
Methods of Restructuring
Wayne Cascio's article has already made the important point that we can dis-
tinguish between different kinds of restructuring and their ethical implications.
One might extend this basic insight to an account of different methods of
restructuring, for they raise different ethical issues. Even in cases where this is
not the case, a close look at a particular form of restructuring can shed a great
deal of light on the issues raised by restructuring in general. In view of such
considerations, the four articles in this section discuss four different forms of
restructuring: cause-related marketing (CRN), amalgamation (merger), region-
alization, and employee ownership.
Cause-related marketing means the corporate sponsorship of not-for-
profit organizations in return for marketing rights and privileges. It provides an
important new avenue for the funding of such organizations at a time when
public funds are increasingly difficult to obtain. But it creates many important
ethical issues in conjunction with the opportunities it provides; they are dis-
cussed by Peggy Cunningham and Pamela Gushing in the first article in this
section. In the article that follows, Leo Groarke investigates the ethical issues
that are raised by amalgamation (merger) when it is adopted as a restructur-
ing strategy. He reviews the benefits and the pitfalls of amalgamation with spe-
cial reference to the controversy that surrounded the amalgamation of the six
municipalities that now make up metropolitan Toronto. He argues that one of
the prime issues raised by restructuring and especially amalgamation is conflict
of interest, and that a professional obligation to avoid conflicts of interest
implies that large-scale restructuring decisions should not be made by the nor-
mal decision makers in restructuring institutions.
Michael Yeo, John R. Williams, and Wayne Hooper examine the ethical
issues raised by regionalization in health care and social services.The basis of
their analysis is a detailed study of the formation of the Queens Region Board
in Prince Edward Island which highlights the way in which ethical values may
properly inform the kinds of decisions which the process of regionalization
requires—decisions which often raise ethical issues which are not raised (or
at least not raised so clearly) by the structure of social services before region-
alization.
In the last article included in this section, Vincent Di Norcia examines the
ethical issues which are raised by corporate restructuring. Like Cascio, he argues
that there are ways to restructure which are ethically preferable. In particular
he advocates employee ownership as a form of corporate ownership that can
better address the pressures that create the need for restructuring and the eth-
ical challenges it presents.
7Cause-Related Marketing:
A Restructuring Alternative?
Peggy Cunningham and Pamela J. Cashing
The superintendent of a medium-sized school board located in eastern
Ontario is trying to balance the budget for the upcoming school year in
the face of a 30 percent reduction in government funding. As the trade-
offs about cutting staff, programs, or maintenance race through her head,
a fax arrives from a local sporting goods chain outlining a proposal to help
the school board out of its dilemma. In return for every pair of shoes, item
of warm-up clothing, and T-shirt bought by students or faculty during the
period September through December, the retailer promises to donate 2
percent of the purchase price of the goods as well as a lump sum pay-
ment of five thousand dollars. The board can allocate these funds to the
athletic programs of their choice. In return for this sponsorship, the retail-
er wants to place advertisements in locker rooms of every school in the
district, and to be endorsed as the "board approved" supplier of athletic
equipment. Given the pressing fiscal circumstances the Board is facing,
the superintendent wonders if she should accept this offer.
As government restructuring makes public funding more difficult to
obtain, many not-for-profit organizations are considering partnerships
like the fictional one outlined above. While these partnerships present
an alternative avenue to generate much-needed funds, they can also be
described as an ethical minefield. Since such partnerships are a relative-
ly new phenomenon, neither business nor their non-profit partners have
much experience in developing or managing these associations. When
partnerships are formed on an ad hoc basis, managers give little con-
sideration to potential pitfalls and the fiscal pressures caused by restruc-
turing may lead to ethical compromises. The drive for survival can result
in the misguided thinking that the ends justify the means.
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There are other concerns. Only popular programs or attractive caus-
es may attract corporate funding, and the stakeholders of both the non-
profit and the corporation may view these associations as inappropriate.
Many educators and parents, for example, don't think business has any
place in the school, and some corporate shareholders don't think sup-
porting causes is an appropriate use of business funds. Even in the best-
case scenario, these alliances bring together partners with distinctly dif-
ferent goals and agendas. The goals of the more powerful partner may
be stressed to the detriment of those of the weaker member of the
alliance, and the partners may have totally different perspectives on
what constitutes ethical behaviour or what contributes to social welfare.
The ethical issues associated with the fictional case described at the
outset may represent only the tip of the iceberg. This paper is written,
therefore, with two purposes in mind. The first is to explore the ethical
questions associated with business and not-for-profit partnerships
brought about by restructuring. The second is to present information that
will help non-profit organizations understand the nature of corporate
sponsorship so that many of the potential ethical pitfalls can be avoided.
As a result of competitive and economic pressures, corporations
themselves are restructuring and looking for concrete returns from their
donations. Many can no longer regard their sponsorships as pure philan-
thropy; they are increasingly treating donations as an investment. In other
words, "no strings attached" support is often a thing of the past and con-
siderable corporate funding for non-profits is funnelled through the firm's
marketing department. Businesses align themselves with not-for-profit
organizations in order to break through the clutter of traditional adver-
tising, to enhance their ability to reach specific audiences, and to attempt
to add distinctiveness and value to their offerings. The result is a prac-
tice labelled cause-related marketing (CRM), a form of marketing rela-
tionship that involves the affiliation of corporate "for-profit" marketing
activities with the fund-raising requirements of "not-for-profit" organiza-
tions, a process which involves the co-alignment of marketing strategy
and corporate philanthropy (Varadarajan and Menon 1988).
Examples of CRM are common in the area of health care and med-
ical research. The Juvenile Diabetes Foundation of Canada's association
with Bell Mobility's charity golf tournament, the Celebrity Classic, is one
example. Both partners benefit, since the Diabetes Foundation received
$240,000 in additional funding over a three-year period while Bell
Mobility enhanced its ability to target potential cellular telephone users,
a large number of whom are golfers. Another corporation which uses
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CRM is Avon. It enlists its extensive network of sales representatives to
sell pins for breast cancer research in conjunction with its traditional
product line. To date, the program has raised twenty-five million dollars
for breast cancer research. A third example is Molson Breweries, which
has an ongoing program which donates a percentage of its sales of des-
ignated brands during specific time periods to support AIDS research.
Four million dollars have been raised to date.
Outside the health sector, educators are also beginning to see the ben-
efits of CRM. The Toronto Board of Education recently entered into a part-
nership with Pepsi. The firm promised to donate $1.14 million in return for
exclusive distributorship rights in Toronto schools. At the University of
British Columbia, "Coke is it," and benefits from the partnership are expect-
ed to generate annual returns of one hundred thousand dollars per year
for the university. Such associations may also generate benefits beyond dol-
lar support. In the United States, the KFC Corporation works with high
school students, allowing them to run their own Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurant to enhance their classroom studies in the fields of management,
marketing and entrepreneurship. The information services division of
Westinghouse provides Burlington, Ontario, students with work experience
and awards an annual Co-op Student of the Year award (Pollock 1995).
Corporations have also sponsored the creation of P.E. TV, which is aired
weekly to enhance the teaching of Physical Education. Although the
twelve-minute videos are commercial free, corporate logos for companies
such as Reebok appear at the beginning of the programming.
While such evidence indicates that many of these associations are
undeniably beneficial, they are also often fraught with controversy.
There is no question that CRM is ripe for ethical examination. Sometimes
it is argued that such practices undermine traditional philanthropy, that
partnerships with business exploit causes and their constituents, that
CRM programs turn the needy into commodities, and that they subvert
charitable missions of not-for-profit organizations for commercial pur-
poses (see Cunningham forthcoming). In spite of such concerns, little
has been done to systematically explore the ethical issues inherent in
CRM or to develop ethical standards that can be used to explore, assess,
and understand these concerns.
The Evolution of Cause-Related Marketing
The name "cause-related marketing" was coined in 1983, when American
Express copyrighted the term in connection with its Statue of Liberty
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restoration campaign. The first academic study of the concept, Varadarajan
and Menon's Journal of Marketing paper, was published in 1988.
CRM can be understood as a response to the era of change which
has accompanied the restructuring of corporations, institutions, and gov-
ernments. It reflects a change in the paradigms of not-for-profit organi-
zations, consumers, and corporate managers. Instead of relying on tra-
ditional funding sources (personal and corporate philanthropy, and gov-
ernment grants), not-for-profit organizations have adopted and adapted
many of the marketing techniques that were once the sole domain of
for-profit organizations. Corporations have a heightened awareness that
consumers are increasingly considering issues of corporate social
responsibility when making purchase decisions. In an era of mature,
highly competitive, homogeneous product-markets, business managers
are finding it increasingly difficult to differentiate their products and
develop sustainable sources of competitive advantage. They are turning
to affiliations with not-for-profits to demonstrate their social concerns
while leveraging their marketing platforms.
These tandem forces have fostered the formation of strategic, mutu-
ally beneficial alignments between corporations and social causes.
Marketing practitioners believe that these alignments have many bene-
fits. Among other things, they have led to pioneering advantages, have
driven sales, have broken through the clutter of fragmented media, have
added value to their products and services, have improved corporate
image among a variety of constituents, have increased corporate and
product visibility, have motivated employees, and have made tax savings
possible. Directors of non-profits see these associations as equally
advantageous because they provide a means of expanding the funding
base, increasing cash flow and donations, better serving clientele, and
acquiring marketing expertise and fiscal management skills.
Sponsorships also present an opportunity to speak to a wider audience,
which includes people working within the sponsoring corporation.
Barnes (1991) surveyed executives of marketing departments and
charities and found 83 percent of business people and 86 percent of the
non-profit managers felt both partners benefited from the use of CRM,
and that 90 percent of the respondents believed that it was profitable.
The increasing importance of CRM is reflected in its phenomenal growth.
One billion dollars was allocated to CRM programs in 1993 alone, an
increase of 24 percent over 1992 expenditures (Smith and Stodghill
1994). Despite this growth, there remains little empirical research on the
topic.
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Clarifying the Domain
Since many of the ethical criticisms lobbed at CRM have resulted from a
faulty understanding of the goals and the definition of the practice, it is
essential to understand how CRM differs from both philanthropy and
social marketing. Many writers have used terms such as "strategic phil-
anthropy," "strategic giving," "mission marketing," "social marketing," and
"cause-related marketing" interchangeably (Duncan 1995, Smith 1994).
But CRM should not be confused with philanthropy since the programs
are not altruistic in nature. A specific return is expected from a CRM pro-
gram. In contrast, a donation or philanthropic gift is given without an
expectation of return. While the for-profit partner in a CRM relationship
may have the intention of doing good while pursuing profit, the primary
purpose for undertaking a CRM campaign is the accomplishment of busi-
ness objectives. Johnson & Johnson's Shelter Aid program was, for exam-
ple, designed to promote its Personal Products division. While the cause
campaign undeniably addressed an important social issue, its primary
purpose was promotion that would increase product sales.
Similarly, CRM should not be confused -with social marketing, since
the primary purpose of the two types of marketing is distinctly different.
The primary purpose of a social marketing campaign is an increase in
social welfare arising from a change in attitudes, beliefs, or behaviour,
as in campaigns to encourage people to quit smoking or practise safe
sex (Andreasen 1994). The primary purpose of CRM, by contrast, is the
achievement of some economic benefit for the sponsoring firm (e.g.,
positioning a product or driving sales). Inducing social change is an
important, but secondary purpose of these programs. The following def-
inition makes the marketing objectives associated with CRM clear:
Cause-related marketing is the process of formulating and implement-
ing marketing activities that are characterized by an offer from the firm
to contribute a specified amount to a designated cause when customers
engage in revenue-providing exchanges that satisfy organizational and
individual objectives. (Varadarajan and Menon 1988, 60)
CRM programs can be either strategic or tactical. Strategic efforts are
those that are tied into the accomplishment of the long-term objectives
and positioning strategy of the non-profit and its corporate partner. An
example is the Body Shop's Cultural Survival program. The Body Shop
uses the social cause as a focal point in positioning certain products in
the minds of their target consumers. Tactical programs are shorter in
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duration and often have the objective of driving short-term product
sales. Many CRM programs that promise to make donations based on the
number of coupons redeemed during a specific period are representa-
tive of these tactical programs.
While some CRM associations have resulted in significant benefits
for all parties, others have failed. Research in the business-to-business
alliance field indicates that 60 percent of these ventures fail. While
almost no research exists which examines business and not-for-profit
alliances, failure rates may be even higher in profit/non-profit alliances
given that the goals, cultures, management styles, and operating
domains of for-profit and not-for-profit partners are even less alike.
Many industry practitioners describe the relationships between busi-
ness and not-for-profit organizations in terms of a love affair. While some
move from infatuation to courtship to devotion and marriage, others
flounder. Infatuation may turn into disrespect, the partners may cheat on
each other, and promiscuity rather than monogamy may reign. While the
dissolution of these relationships may be the result of multiple factors,
a failure to consider the perspectives of the numerous stakeholder
groups involved in any CRM program, and a parallel failure to consider
the ethical issues associated with these partnerships can contribute to
acrimony and "divorce."
Ethics in Relationship Marketing: An Essential
Ingredient for CRM Success
The joining of a business with a not-for-profit to form an alliance implies
that both parties will benefit from the partnership. Alliances are defined
in Merrian-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, tenth ed. as, "Association[s] to
further the common interests of the members." This definition speaks of
three critical aspects of the coming together of a business organization
with a not-for-profit entity: the presence of at least one mutual goal, the
ability of each partner to contribute something of value to the associa-
tion, and the creation of mutual benefits. While the partners may have
certain distinct objectives, they must share some common ground and
co-operatively work toward achieving a common purpose and a
win-win outcome for both partners. Table 1 illustrates the mutual ben-
efits that can be associated with a CRM program.
The second criterion, that each partner must bring something of
value into the association, is often overlooked by the non-profit partner.
Rather than approaching prospective partners "hat in hand," non-profits
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Table I
Benefits of Cause-Related Marketing Programs
have many assets that they can contribute. The first is their ability to
attract a specific audience. Causes attract specific target audiences by
their very nature. In other words, they are relevant to narrow, well-
defined groups. Second, non-profit managers understand the complexi-
ties of the social issue and can educate their business partner on these
issues. They know the other organizations working to resolve the issue
and they can provide a bridge to these organizations. Finally, non-profits
have considerable experience working with volunteer workers. Learning
how to motivate people without having to compensate them is an asset
many corporations highly value.
An examination of the definitions of CRM and alliances also helps
ascertain whether CRM meets, or can meet, with standards of ethical
behaviour. Such an examination requires both a deontological and a tele-
ological perspective (Hunt and Vitell 1991). Deontology is a principle-
based approach to morality which focuses on the intentions associated
with a particular behaviour (Ferrell and Fraedrich 1991); the word is
derived from the Greek for obligation or duty. On this view, individuals
or organizations ought to perform right actions, not because they pro-
duce good results, but because it is their moral duty to do so—because
it is their duty to practise care, justice, non-exploitation, and so on.
Deontology is an especially important benchmark, since its focus is on
relationships and the obligations borne by the parties -within the associa-
tion. The second perspective, teleology, is named from the Greek word
"telos" meaning goal or end. This approach to morality suggests that all
actions must be judged exclusively by their consequences or outcomes.
Firm
• Increases sales and profits
• Differentiates itself from competitors
• Improves its image, visibility, and
reputation
• Learns about key issues associated
with an important social issue, and
how to energize employees
• Increases the power of its advertising
• Enhances employee motivation
N on- Profit
• Expands funding base
• Enhances its credibility and reputation
• Increases its visibility
• Learns new skills (marketing,
information processing and data base
management)
• Provides access to new audiences
• Generates favourable publicity
• Enhances ability to accomplish mission
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An act is considered morally right if it produces a desirable result—for
example, the maximization of social welfare while minimizing harm to
any party or constituency.
Combining the two perspectives derived from moral philosophy, we
can define ethical CRMpartnerships as those in which the partners enter
the association with the intention of creating beneficial outcomes that
are greater than those that could be achieved by either party operating
independently, while being cognizant of the duties of care, justice, non-
exploitation, and benefice.
At the centre of any CRM is the relationship between a for-profit firm
and a non-profit entity. The relationship marketing literature suggests
that one factor is essential to successful relationships or alliances: trust
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). It depends on the presence of shared values,
and the absence of opportunistic behaviour (i.e., the absence of self-
interest—seeking behaviour accompanied by guile). From these central
variables flow other relationship-enhancing characteristics: communica-
tion, defined as constructive dialogue and timely information exchange;
mutual commitment, in that the relationship is seen as important enough
that maximum effort will be exerted to maintain it; cooperation to
achieve goals; and the overcoming of conflicts in a constructive, rela-
tionship-strengthening manner. When these factors characterize a rela-
tionship, they work to counterbalance other adverse factors that tend to
undermine the relationship—for example, conflict and competitive pres-
sures (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).
Trust cannot be fostered without ethical behaviour on the part of
both partners in the relationship. The importance of ethics and integrity
in marketing relationships is noted by Moorman, Deshpande, and
Zaltman, who state that, "perceived integrity is an...unwillingness to sac-
rifice ethical standards to achieve individual or organizational objectives"
(1993, 84). In the case of business/not-for-profit alliances, ethics and trust
are especially important given the relative power of the two parties
involved often differs enormously. Many CRM programs involve the asso-
ciation of a David and Goliath. The not-for-profit often has fewer
resources, a smaller constituency, and less direct access to regulators or
the press than its behemoth business partner. It is not surprising that fears
of exploitation of causes by businesses run rampant. However, the not-
for-profit is not the only party in a vulnerable position. The corporation
must share its strategic plans with its not-for-profit partner if they are to
work together. If the association with a cause fails, the corporation's rep-
utation and image may be tarnished, and it may lose credibility in the
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eyes of a key audience. Without ethical behaviour, trust, and integrity, the
mutual vulnerability of the partners cannot be managed successfully.
Ethical Issues Throughout the Relationship Life Cycle
As the "love affair" metaphor used earlier in this paper suggests, rela-
tionships progress through stages. The building of trust and commitment
evolves over time. Trust can be fostered and many ethical issues avoid-
ed if each stage of the relationship is managed wisely and ethically. It is
proposed that for-profit-not-for-profit relationships evolve through four
stages: initiation, negotiation, implementation, and redesign/termination.
Distinct ethical issues may arise at each of these four stages. Table 2 out-
lines the key steps in partnership formation and the ethical issues com-
mon to these stages.
I. Initiation—Envisioning the Possibilities
The initiation of a relationship must be approached judiciously so that
ethical criticisms can be avoided or better understood. Relationships
between business and non-profits can be triggered by either party. While
corporations are frequently approached by charities seeking funding, cor-
porate sponsors may also seek out a not-for-profit ally. Before any rela-
tionship is initiated, both parties should clearly articulate their mission,
goals, and the benefits or positive consequences that can arise from the
partnership. Regardless of which organization initiates the discussion,
both parties need to be aware of the potential at this stage for glossing
over true intentions, needs, and organizational objectives. Neither party
should "massage" their data or downplay their motives for entering into
the alliance. Open and honest communication is essential in order to
establish the trust demonstrated to be critical to joint venture success.
While it is unquestionable that the two parties will have different pri-
mary goals, it is imperative that they share some common ground: that
of furthering or improving social welfare. The clarification of goals will
forestall the criticism that charitable organizations are changing their
objectives or their mandate to meet the needs of sponsoring corpora-
tions (Gurin 1987).
The outcome arising from the relationship should be greater than that
which could have been accomplished by either party alone. When both
parties add value to the association and create a whole greater than the
two independent parts, the synergy will forestall many criticisms—for
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Table 2
Key Tasks in CRN Development and Ethical Issue Mitigation
Stage
Initiation
Negotiation
Implementation
Revision
Key Tasks
• establish mission and
objectives for partnership
• establish selection criteria for
partner
• establish terms of agreement
including total resources
committed, allocation of
resources, and time frame of
program
• clarify value each partner
brings to alliance
• stipulate outcomes,
accountability, and
measurement criteria
• assign management team and
commit resources
• monitor progress and take
timely remedial action
• share decision-making
authority and discuss
conflicts in a non-adversarial
fashion
• evaluate outcomes from
perspective of both partners
• assess appropriateness of
measures
• provide feedback
• negotiate revisions
• provide maximum lead time if
partnership is to be
terminated
Actions to Mitigate
Ethical Concerns
• establish how partnership will
facilitate achievement of
objectives
• clarify values and ethical
principles to guide association
• consult with all stakeholders
• avoid jargon; stress clear; open
and honest communication
• establish rules of association:
willingness to learn from each
other; mutual respect
• assure stakeholder buy-in
• assign competent and
committed managers
• avoid conflicts of interest
• fulfil promises
• use referent and legitimate
power versus coercive power
• be sure that measures of
success are not distorting
mission and objectives
• facilitate open and honest
feedback from partners and
constituents
• revise to enhance
effectiveness
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example, the suggestions that the not for-profit has sold its soul to busi-
ness, or that the corporate sponsor is manipulating or exploiting the cause.
No matter which party makes the first move, both should do their
homework and learn about each other. Potential business sponsors must
understand what the non-profit is trying to accomplish and what social
institutions are working to resolve the social issue. Critics of CRM often
accuse corporations of meddling in issues they don't understand. Both
potential partners should think carefully about criteria for selecting a
suitable partner in order to avoid ethical problems. Corporate sponsors
are particularly interested in not-for-profits whose stakeholders match
the target market for the firm's products or whose cause draws attention
from their target group, and those that can be leveraged on a national
or international basis.
Since the proposed association involves a transfer of symbols and
attitudes, caution should be used. Much attention has been paid to the
image benefits business firms accrue from being associated with "good"
causes. Far less concern has been paid to the contention that corporate
symbols are also transferred to the non-profit. While the non-profit can
benefit from increased legitimacy and credibility as a result of being asso-
ciated with a major corporation, it can also be branded by the transfer of
less savoury images. One frequently heard criticism is that causes accept
funding from "undesirable" sources (from "sin" industries such as tobac-
co and spirit companies, for example, or from chemical companies with
poor environmental records, or import firms with questionable employ-
ment practices—see Gurin 1987). The screening of potential sponsors
can be facilitated by a service like EthicScan, which ranks firms by indus-
try according to their performance on a wide variety of ethical criteria.
Before a marriage is conceived, non-profits must consult their stake-
holders and beneficiaries to ensure that they view the union in a posi-
tive light. Non-profits should not see their constituents as a means to an
end. If they do, they may be accused of acting in a paternalistic manner
and deciding what is "good" for their constituents, or they may be
accused of exploiting their constituents (Gurin 1987). The non-profit
must not fall into the ethical trap of thinking that the ends justify the
means. The author heard one non-profit manager justify a union with an
ethically questionable corporate sponsor with the statement, "as long as
we get the money...."
One of the most widely accepted models of ethical decision making
in marketing (Hunt and Vitell 1991) stresses the importance of consider-
ing the consequences for different stakeholders when making decisions
106 The Ethics of the New Economy
with ethical implications. This requires that one judge the probability of
these consequences occurring and the relative importance of the stake-
holders groups. Since alliances between for-profits and non-profits
involve so many stakeholders, this can be an extremely demanding task.
Consider one case mentioned earlier: the Pepsi sponsorship of the
Toronto Board of Education. Stakeholders include board members,
teachers, school administrators, students, parents, other school boards
competing for sponsorship funds, corporate marketing and donations
staff, corporate customers and suppliers, the corporation's competitors,
reporters and media representatives, government regulators, and com-
munity members as well as social critics. Understanding and ordering the
interests of stakeholders will help avoid future ethical conflicts as well
as the temptation to exploit stakeholders.
Other accusations of exploitation and invasion of privacy have
occurred when not-for-profits make their membership lists available to
businesses for direct marketing campaigns without the permission of
these constituents. CRM programs are inherently controversial. With an
increasingly vigilant press and certain members of the public convinced
for-profit/not-for-profit associations are inherently unethical, managers
planning CRM campaigns must be prepared to defend their decision to
enter into such a partnership. The Arthritis Foundation, for example,
believes that it was advance planning in this regard that prevented eth-
ical criticisms of their program from escalating into a public-relations
nightmare. They aligned themselves with a manufacturer of a generic
pain reliever. By clearly establishing how the partnership better enabled
them to accomplish their mission through the ability to put information
about arthritis in the packages of the product, they could demonstrate
the benefits of the program were greater than what the foundation could
have achieved on its own.
2. Negotiation—Writing the Rules
During the negotiation stage, the partners work out the terms of their
relationship. Since partners are often from different worlds, a lack of a
common language can lead to misunderstandings. Both partners must be
learning organizations that take the time to understand the mandate of
their partner while striving to communicate in terms the other can
understand so that intentions are clear and obligations understood. Such
understandings prevent later accusations that promises were broken or
misleading.
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This is a stage in which it is crucial that partners avoid oppor-
tunism. Those who reject CRM have noted opportunistic practices by
both parties to the relationship. Causes have been accused of misrep-
resenting themselves to businesses by, for example, over-stating their
ability to solve a social problem or the size of a target audience they
can involve with a firm's products. Business firms have been damned
for promising support that never materializes, and for unfairly limiting
the size of the donation or the time frame over which the cause cam-
paign runs.
Clearly articulating who is and is not a part of the relationship is
also important if partners are to avoid ethical infractions on both sides.
Establishing who will act as the prime sponsor and their level of com-
mitment versus those who will play secondary roles can be difficult.
Corporations usually demand that competitors be excluded from any
particular campaign. This often causes concerns on the part of non-
profits, since it may limit the donation base or sponsorship for the non-
profit, giving rise to the criticism that social welfare is being compro-
mised. Causes must be careful to abide by the intent of the partnership
agreement and avoid behaviour which might not violate specific rules
when approaching a partner's competitors. Arranging sponsorship with
a competitor for a similar sponsorship drive, especially one aimed at
the same target audience, is ethically questionable.
The responsibilities of each party must be carefully articulated.
Fulfilling duties and responsibilities lie at the heart of ethical partner-
ships. When negotiating responsibilities, both parties must be aware of
how they use their individual power and the types of power they use
to resolve conflicts. Power imbalances enhance the potential for con-
flict, and the potential that the powerful partner will exploit the weak-
er member. To diminish this dependency, the weaker partner may
attempt to enter additional agreements with the partner's competitors
as an offsetting measure, in the process diminishing the position of the
partner in the eyes of its constituents, and failing to employ all the
resources promised in the sponsorship agreement (Bucklin and
Sengupta 1993). Many of these actions can lead to charges of unethi-
cal behaviour. To overcome these problems, each partner must treat
the other with respect and value the inherent worth of their partner's
organization. While the use of referent power may be an ethical means
of resolving conflict (e.g., "my expertise in this area gives me more say
in resolution of this issue"), the use of coercion should be frowned
upon (i.e., "I will withdraw my support unless...").
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3. Implementation—Walking the Talk
The implementation of the relationship strategy is critical to the future
success of a partnership. Implementation means translating plans into
actions. From an ethical point of view, the process of achieving the
ends is just as important as the ends themselves. The ability to suc-
cessfully implement a strategy often depends on (1) the ability of the
managers assigned to managing the project from both the sponsoring
corporation and from the non-profit, and (2) the resources devoted to
making the relationship a success. When either partner fails to assign
adequate management talent or resources to the project, the result is
often accusations that one party has failed to pull its load or has bro-
ken its promises (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993)- Conflict can also arise
because control of the project must be shared between the two part-
ners. The question of who controls a particular stage is, therefore, of
paramount importance. The ability to share control and meld the core
competencies of both parties at this stage can help avoid ethical pitfalls.
For example, while the corporation may be the expert in terms of mar-
keting and cost control, the non-profit may better understand how to
deliver a concrete benefit to the needy or how to bring about the solu-
tion of a social problem.
The marketing-mix elements (product, promotion, price and distrib-
ution) used to bring the sponsorship to life often prove to be a mine-
field. The type of product that must be purchased in order to initiate a
donation to the cause has raised ethical questions. The promise to sup-
port a cause if a consumer visits a specific distribution location where
they are exposed to a high pressure sales pitch raises similar concerns.
The price the consumer must pay for a cause-associated good should
not be above that of competitive offerings or accusations of exploitation
will be the result.
Questions of how advertising materials are used to promote the rela-
tionship are particularly troublesome. Stereotyping the needy or dehu-
manizing them in any way raises legitimate criticism. Using advertising
"hype" that suggests simplistic solutions to complex social issues also
raises ethical concerns. Promises such as "for one dollar you can end
world hunger" are highly misleading and objectionable. Avoiding mis-
leading claims about the benefit of the cause association is also of criti-
cal importance. CRM campaigns which disguise the fact that there is a
ceiling to the amount the corporation will donate, or the time period over
which the program will run, have been condemned. Finally, corporations
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must be careful to balance the resources they devote to promoting the
cause association with the amount that is actually provided to support the
cause (Gurin 1987).
4. Revision/Termination—Reality Check
No matter how carefully a relationship is initiated and designed, feed-
back from constituents of both partners will result in demands for revi-
sion and redesign of the partnership. The same care used to develop the
original goals for the partnership must be exercised when they are mod-
ified. While a willingness to be flexible and adaptable to the needs of
the other partner is important in any long-term association, the founding
mission of the association must not be forgotten. As partnerships evolve,
the focus may, however, shift to maintenance issues rather than high-
lighting the original mission of the relationship.
Knowing when to end an association may prove to be one of the
thorniest issues of all. As conditions in the environment of both the non-
profit and the corporation continue to evolve, one or both partners may
desire to withdraw from the association. If one party has become over-
ly dependent on the other for support, ethical concerns about abandon-
ment may be raised. It is important, therefore, to give ample notice when
a party has decided to end a relationship. Having agreed upon points at
which to reevaluate the partnership and make continue/drop decisions
helps both parties understand that the relationship is always subject to
revision.
Conclusion
Cause-related marketing campaigns can be highly successful and effective
forms of marketing for both non-profit and for-profit organizations. In
times characterized by the economic realities of restructuring and the new
economy and the limited funds they make available for not-for-profit
goals, they provide a much-needed alternative source of revenue for many
worthy causes. This being said, CRM must be approached with caution,
for we have seen that it raises a myriad of ethical issues that must be dealt
with carefully. This caution being noted, an understanding of the ethical
issues that are embedded in these associations can help to bring about the
trust, cooperation, and commitment that make such partnerships work.
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8Realism, Restructuring, and
Amalgamation: What Can We Learn
from the Mega-mess in Toronto?
Leo Groarke
One of the most popular forms of restructuring is amalgamation (or
"merger")- It joins two organizations or institutions in an effort to create
new efficiencies and strengths. In practice it often has disastrous conse-
quences which stem from the bitter internal conflict that may arise as
those in the affected institutions struggle to ensure that their interests are
protected in the major structural changes that inevitably ensue. In this
paper I want to address three questions in this context: (1) What are the
obligations of decision makers in the context of restructuring? (2) What
concerns do these obligations raise in the context of amalgamation? and
(3) What kind of theoretical perspective can help us better understand
restructuring, and amalgamation in particular?
In attempting to answer these three questions I shall frequently dis-
cuss the Ontario government's amalgamation of the six municipalities that
make up Metropolitan Toronto—an amalgamation which was the subject
of intense media coverage and heated political debate. Though I offer
some conclusions about the Toronto case, and criticize some of the
actions taken by both municipal leaders (who opposed amalgamation)
and the provincial government (which directed it), the Toronto case is
not my principal concern. It serves only as an illustration which can, I
hope, help me elaborate one way of understanding both the dynamics of
restructuring and the ethical responsibilities that it imposes on those who
run restructuring institutions, especially in the context of amalgamation.
Note to this chapter is on p. 304.
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Throughout my discussion I will adopt a "realist" theoretical per-
spective. It is founded on the conviction that many (and perhaps most)
human actions are best understood as attempts to further economic
interests. Though I hope to demonstrate that such a perspective can
shed light on restructuring and amalgamation in particular, a philosoph-
ical defence of realism is beyond the scope of the present paper. In its
place, it must suffice to say that realism is a familiar theoretical per-
spective in political, philosophical, and ethical analysis. It is especially
notable that it plays a prominent role in the thought of thinkers like
Hobbes, Marx, and Nietzsche, and in "political realism" (the view that
nation states act in ways that further their own self interest). I do not
propose realism because I hold that economic interests rather than moral
principles should govern human action, but because it is important to
recognize the role that vested interest frequently plays in political and
moral debate, and because a recognition of such interests is an impor-
tant prelude to ethical assessment, even when policies and actions are
justified and defended on moral grounds (see Groarke 1989).
In debates about restructuring, realism implicitly informs the views
of commentators who portray it as a smoke screen for fundamental eco-
nomic changes which serve vested interests and the political agendas
they give rise to. In the present book, such views are an important
theme in essays by Hanly, Baumann and Silverman, Reed, and Kachur
and Briton. I believe that such analyses are important, but also that they
sometimes overlook the possibility that opposition to restructuring may
be rooted in vested interest and the political agendas it gives rise to.
I want to illustrate this point in the context of amalgamation, but it is
important to recognize that one might use it to explain opposition to
restructuring in many other cases.
One means of restructuring in health care is, for example, deprofes-
sionalization. It cuts costs by assigning tasks which have been tradition-
ally performed by one profession to another. The most radical forms of
deprofessionalization would see many of the functions now performed
by general practitioners assigned to midwives and nurse practitioners,
who could function as much less costly front-line medical consultants.
Such changes have sometimes been proposed—on medical as well as
economic grounds—but have been opposed by doctors and doctors'
groups on the grounds that they would seriously decrease the quality of
health care. Others have taken issue with the latter claim. In the present
context, the important point is that one might easily interpret doctors'
opposition to deprofessionalization of this sort in a realist way, as an
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attempt to defend their economic interests in the face of other profes-
sions which threaten to usurp them. This analysis may be mistaken, but
realism demands that -we treat it seriously in attempting to understand
the dynamics of deprofessionalization and the restructuring that it
implies (it goes without saying that it also demands that we recognize
the role that the vested interests of midwives and nurse practitioners may
play in such restructuring).
Looked at from the point of view of realism, opposition to restruc-
turing functions as a means of defending a prevailing status quo. Such
opposition serves the economic interests of those who benefit from this
status quo and we must, therefore, take seriously the possibility that it
may be predicated on these interests. Professions, institutions, and indi-
viduals naturally emphasize their own interests and perspective, and the
bias this implies may easily be implicit and unconscious. In such cases,
such bias needs to be uncovered by determining whose interests are
served by particular measures, and by asking whether they have exert-
ed undue influence on policy decisions (something which will not, in
every instance, be the case).
The significance of realism for restructuring can be illustrated in the
context of amalgamation. Its proponents typically suggest four ways in
which it can minimize the negative aspects of restructuring and thus
benefit institutions and their stakeholders. These "benefits of amalgama-
tion" might be summarized as follows:
• amalgamation eliminates duplication;
• amalgamation allows economies of scale;
• amalgamation promotes administrative efficiency by downsizing
management;
• amalgamation provides an opportunity to constructively change the
operations of an institution.
An example which illustrates the potential benefits of amalgamation
is the Thunder Bay Regional Hospital, which was formed by amalga-
mating three local hospitals. Its most notable accomplishment is the sav-
ings it made possible by dramatically reducing the number of adminis-
trative and management positions in the hospital.
The end result.. .has been a reduction in senior and middle management
for the new corporation from 78 to 38 positions, with an accompanying
saving in salaries and benefits of approximately $2.2 million. Since this
is a permanent reduction in management costs, the new corporation will
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continue to save this $2.2 million every year. The $2.5 million cost of
severance packages for this reduction, on the other hand, was borne
only once and was absorbed by the accumulated surpluses. (Levac
1996, 3D
It is important to recognize that savings of this sort allow an amalga-
mated institution to minimize the "front line" job losses which would
otherwise accompany restructuring. In the case of a hospital, this means
that more administrators will go, but that fewer nurses, therapists, and
support staff will lose their jobs. Because the administrative positions
which are eliminated are much more costly than front-line jobs, amalga-
mation can in this way minimize the number of job losses associated
with restructuring. This is an important point to which I shall return.
Other ways in which amalgamation seeks to increase efficiency
extend beyond administrative structure. Educational institutions which
serve the same or a similar market will, for example, perform many of
the same tasks, often in competition with each other. Two universities in
the same city will spend large sums of money attempting to attract stu-
dents through advertising, community and secondary school liaison, and
promotional events. The same universities are likely to fund competing
intervarsity athletic teams, to house libraries with overlapping collections
of books and journals (even when they are seldom used), to support
independent public relations departments, and so on. In all these cases,
amalgamation can, if it is accomplished well, create a new institution
that can significantly reduce costs by eliminating duplication.
The potential benefits of amalgamation do not, of course, mean that
it is always appropriate or successful. Good amalgamation requires that
two institutions fit together well (culturally as well as operationally) and
the process of amalgamation is a complex and difficult undertaking.
A superficial amalgamation may actually compound rather than reduce
duplication (by preserving old bureaucracies and merely adding inter-
mediaries), and may bring inefficiencies rather than efficiencies of scale.
The potential benefits of amalgamation are nonetheless real, and one
might reasonably expect a history of amalgamation to be a positive
account of the gains and benefits which it has allowed. Instead, a look
at real amalgamations suggests a propensity to produce internal diffi-
culties and ill will. The history of corporate mergers and acquisitions is,
in particular, characterized by battles between amalgamation partners,
by "hostile" takeovers, by vehement public criticism and debate, and by
bitter conflicts between competing managers, and between managers
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and shareholders (see Jensen 1993, Newton 1993, and the many refer-
ences in the Hostager et al. contribution to this volume).
Looked at from a realist perspective, the conflict that characterizes
many attempts at amalgamation comes as no surprise, for amalgamation
creates and exacerbates internal strife between different vested interests
which may undermine any gains that it theoretically makes possible. The
same problems often arise in other kinds of restructuring, for they
inevitably create winners and losers who lose their livelihood and their
careers in the worst scenario. Given these high stakes, the process of
restructuring often creates a situation in which potential losers will do
their utmost to ensure that the negative fallout of restructuring is borne
by someone else. In the case of amalgamation, the problems this "jock-
eying for position" creates are exacerbated, for the potential losers
include high-level decision makers who have a great deal of power and
influence which they can wield in an attempt to thwart amalgamation
plans. Even if they do not intentionally do so, it is difficult for them to
make decisions about amalgamation which are not affected by conscious
or unconscious attempts to protect their own self-interest.
These dynamics—and the standard arguments for and against amal-
gamation—are well illustrated by the incidents that surround the Ontario
government's merging of the six municipalities that make up
Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, East
York, and York). Noting that they are serviced by seven road depart-
ments, seven parks departments, seven planning departments, and six
fire departments (each with its own administration, training, and com-
munications), Municipal Affairs Minister Al Leach first proposed amalga-
mation on the grounds that it would leave behind "overlap and duplica-
tion, escalating costs, confused priorities and conflicting mandates"
(DeMara and Walker 1997, A7). Looked at from this point of view, amal-
gamation can be seen as a logical expansion of the Metro Toronto
Council, which already governs Metro-wide transit, policing, ambulances,
and social services. The advantages of such expansion are detailed in a
study by the accounting firm KPMG (commissioned by the provincial
government), which concluded that it would allow $685 million savings
in the first three years, and three hundred million dollars each year after-
ward. It is significant that these savings were, in part, to be achieved by
reducing the number of municipal government leaders from seven to
one, and the number of municipal councillors from 106 to forty-five.
The critics of Toronto amalgamation rejected it on a variety of
grounds. Many claimed it threatened local communities, which would
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lose their unique identities as they were swallowed up in a Toronto
"megacity." Frequently it was said that the amalgamation process was
rushed and anti-democratic. The latter criticism singled out the role of an
unelected government transition team which was appointed to oversee
the transition to the new city. Opponents of amalgamation enlisted the
support of a number of experts who argue that smaller cities are more
innovative and responsive to human needs (DeMara and Walker 1997,
A7). In particular, they argued that wages and services in an amalgamat-
ed city inevitably rise to the highest level found in the pre-amalgamation
partners, raising rather than lowering the costs of providing services (it is
ironic that no one pointed out that this implies that labour had, in some
cases, something to gain from amalgamation plans). The provincial gov-
ernment replied that such concerns would not, in this instance, override
the benefits of amalgamation.
The vehemence of opposition to amalgamation was manifest in a
series of manoeuvres designed to thwart the provincial government's
merger plans. After noisy protests, denunciations, and a great deal of
media coverage, mayors and municipal councils in the six affected
municipalities organized referenda asking voters if they supported the
megacity proposal. On March 3, voters in all six municipalities over-
whelmingly rejected it (Toronto Star 1997b, Al). In the wake of the
results, the provincial government dropped controversial plans to down-
load welfare funding to the new amalgamated city, but continued with
its planned amalgamation.
In an attempt to stop or at least stall the provincial legislation which
would establish the new Toronto, provincial opposition parties intro-
duced more than thirteen thousand amendments to the amalgamation
bill. For nine days, the legislative assembly met around the clock.
Tempers flared on both sides, but the overriding mood was one of colos-
sal boredom. The only excitement came from government attempts to
speed up the process, from opposition attempts to slow it down, and
from an NDP amendment that accidentally slipped through, giving the
residents of a tiny Etobicoke street—Cafon Court—the power to call fur-
ther hearings on provincial plans. Their moment of fame faded when the
government decided to avoid the issue by scrapping the relevant sec-
tions of the bill.
When the provincial opposition's stall-by-endless-amendment tac-
tics—like the earlier municipal referenda—failed to stop amalgamation,
five of the six affected municipalities launched a court challenge, argu-
ing that the provincial government's actions violated the Canadian
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Charter of Rights (DeMara and Moloney 1997, A8). North York did not
contribute to legal costs on the grounds that there was no chance of win-
ning (DeMara and Wright 1997, A7). On July 24, Justice Stephen Borins
dismissed the case. Though this essentially ended the amalgamation bat-
tle, its reverberations were not over. In the months that followed, some
bitter municipal councils (in a move in some ways reminiscent of cor-
porate attempts to sell "crown jewels" before a merger) "raided" reserve
accounts in order to ensure that they were spent before they could be
transferred to the new amalgamated city (Toronto Star 1997c, A14). And
in the fall of 1997, labour threatened a province-wide strike to protest
Bill 136—provincial legislation designed to ease the process of amalga-
mation in Toronto and elsewhere in the province.
Taken as a case study, Toronto poses some important questions
about restructuring and amalgamation. In particular, one might ask how
one should understand such vehement opposition to amalgamation.
Those who led this opposition clearly saw their battle as a battle for
democratic principles. John Sewell, a former mayor of Toronto, helped
spearhead protests by forming a group called Citizens for Local
Democracy. The other major leaders were politicians in the affected
municipalities, who took the success of their referenda as proof of
renewed democracy in Toronto. Many Toronto journalists agreed.
According to Michelle Landsberg, "Something powerful is stirring in the
citizenry" and "I have never before seen such a ferment of civic activism
and protest" (Landsberg 1997, A2). The day after the referenda, John
Barber of the Globe and Mail hailed them in an interview on CBC Radio,
calling them "something exciting" which contained the "first glimmer of
direct democracy." In anticipation of the provincial government's
impending decision to proceed with amalgamation anyway, Dalton
McGuinty, the leader of the provincial opposition, accused the govern-
ment of "an affront to the people of Toronto" which showed "a complete
and wanton disregard for the fundamental principles of democracy"
(Girard 1997, A7).
These sentiments notwithstanding, events in Toronto are open to a
very different reading. Looked at from a realist point of view, it seems
no coincidence that mayors and councillors threatened with the loss of
their jobs were found at the forefront of the anti-amalgamation move-
ment. It would be naive to ignore the possibility that their vested inter-
ests played a central role in their decision to launch a bitter fight against
provincial plans, especially as the affected mayors were in favour of
restructuring and denounced it only when it became clear that it was
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their jobs which were in jeopardy. As an editorial in the Toronto Star put
it, "the mayors, who themselves recommended one level of local gov-
ernment in Metro and an end to duplication, resorted to prophecies of
doom and gloom once it became clear that the level of government fac-
ing the axe would be their own" (1997a, B2).
It is difficult to believe that a concern for democratic fair play was
the driving force behind opposition to amalgamation given that the prin-
ciples this implies were continually violated by anti-amalgamation forces
in the municipal referenda. Democratic principles require that one
scrupulously ensure that the democratic process be neutral and unbi-
ased, and encourage the informed debate that makes democracy work.
It is hard to reconcile this with what happened in Toronto given that:
• Municipal councils distributed anti- (but not pro-) amalgamation lit-
erature with referendum ballots.
• Municipal politicians spent millions of dollars of public money, not
only to launch referenda and a debatable court challenge, but to
openly support the anti-amalgamation campaign. In North York, city
staff were given paid leave to organize anti-amalgamation activities.
In Toronto, each councillor was given an anti-amalgamation slush
fund to support anti-amalgamation activities in their own ward.
• The tone of the campaign against amalgamation was one of heavy-
handed intimidation. Despite his opposition to provincial plans, North
York mayor Mel Lastman lamented an undemocratic mood which
made people committed to amalgamation afraid to attend public meet-
ings "for fear of the abuse they might face" and because they would
not be "able to express themselves without worrying about fending off
catcalls, jeering and insults" (Levy 1997, A4). Phoning in to register for
the referendum in Mr. Lastman's own municipality nonetheless
required that one dial "2-VOTE-NO" (if one persisted and tried to vote
"Yes" a voice, said to be that of the mayor, asked, "Are you sure?").
• The referenda were characterized by ballot irregularities. The ballot-
ing process did not ensure ballot secrecy (though many people felt
intimidated) and a week before the vote Canada Post reported that
huge numbers of ballots were being returned because they were
improperly addressed. People complained of "ballots being delivered
to dead people, ballots being delivered to people who no longer live
there, ballots being delivered to people who don't seem to exist" (Van
Rijn 1997, A4). Hundreds of ballots piled up in apartment lobbies
where they could easily be picked up and used illegitimately. Toronto
Star columnist David Lewis Stein, who was given ten North York bal-
lots and could have voted ten times in a city in which he doesn't live,
wrote, "I am told that some anti-amalgamation enthusiasts in North
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York have been gathering up unused ballots in apartment houses and
phoning in No votes. I couldn't discover yesterday whether this was
true, but I did find out it would have been easy enough for someone
to do." (Stein 1997, A8; cf. Toronto Star 1997a, B2).
Michael Marzolini, the president of the polling company Polara, well
summed up these problems when he suggested that the mayors and
councillors who argued that the results of the referenda should deter-
mine the future of Toronto should ask themselves if they would be will-
ing to run for re-election in a similar kind of vote (Rusk 1997, A3).
Not surprisingly given this background, the challenges to amalga-
mation were characterized by a widespread lack of informed debate.
More frequently, opposition meant noisy confrontation, confused issues
and hyperbole (like John Sewell's repeated claim that the proposed
amalgamation transition team would steal reserve funds from the City
of Toronto and send them to the provincial treasury). Instead of being
clear about the amalgamation issue, the opposition continually conflat-
ed it with a variety of other issues and a general disenchantment with
the Harris government's performance on other matters. Especially com-
mon was a failure to separate the question whether Toronto should be
amalgamated and the question whether the government should down-
load new taxes to the city. A North York leaflet read, "Amalgamation
and downloading are two separate issues.... Both issues combined give
me a very compelling reason to vote 'No' [in the amalgamation refer-
endum]" (Stein 1997, A8). North York Councillor Howard Moscoe
declared that Premier Mike Harris "had better pay attention" to the
results of the referenda, because "I think this is more of a vote against
the Harris government than it is against amalgamation" (Lakey 1997,
A9), and Christie Blatchford of the Toronto Sun spoke of the accurate
information that allowed citizens to see the issues clearly but went on
to claim that "Al Leach saw it coming.. .when he said about 10 days ago
that the debate wasn't about amalgamation anymore."
The extent to which such confusion may have affected the results of
Toronto voting was evident in a Toronto Star poll two days before the
referenda. It found that the majority of voters opposed amalgamation
only because they associated it with property tax increases (significantly,
the majority of respondents agreed that Toronto municipal government
should be streamlined—Spears 1997, Al). As the Star put it, the megac-
ity referendum had turned "into something larger: a mid-term protest vote
against the Mike Harris government" (Toronto Star 1997a, B2).
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The many issues raised by the way in which the anti-amalgamation
campaign was conducted provided the proponents of amalgamation
with ready ammunition in a counterattack against its credibility. As
Andrew Coyne put it:
After weeks of unrelenting front-page coverage, in which the entire
urban area was said to face imminent destruction, to be condemned to
spiralling taxes, crime and poverty by a provincial government vari-
ously described as totalitarian, the enemy of the people and worse,
with the help of postal, telephone, and mail voting, not to mention lim-
itless potential for determined opponents of the proposal to fill in mul-
tiple ballots, enraged local citizens rushed to the polls to save their
cities, pushing voter turnout across Metropolitan Toronto to...26 per-
cent.... They've had a grand time, feeding the media's addiction to
emotional displays.... The "democracy" that opponents of the [amalga-
mation] bill hanker for appears to include shouting down your oppo-
nents, issuing a torrent of alarmist assertions, and vague threats....
Maybe the province should have put it to a vote itself. But the
cities were not actually forced to stuff anti-amalgamation propaganda
in the same envelopes as the ballots, or provide funding only to groups
for the No, or phrase the question using the loaded term "megacity."
(Coyne 1997, A27; cf. Wanagas 1997)
Looked at from a broader point of view, it is regrettable that many of the
most important issues raised by the Toronto amalgamation were lost in
the bitterness, politicking, and confusion that surrounded it.
Considered from a realist point of view, the Toronto case well illus-
trates the nature of amalgamation, and an important aspect of restruc-
turing. One cannot attribute all the opposition to the Toronto plan to
vested interest, but the evidence does support the suggestion that oppo-
sition was at least fuelled by municipalities and municipal officials
whose status and interests were threatened. Like most people who stand
to lose something of paramount importance to them, they seemed will-
ing to thwart amalgamation with tactics that were at best questionable
and at worst patently unfair. When the CEO of the Bank of Montreal
warns of the dangers that will ensue if banks are regulated, we all
invoke a healthy scepticism. When city officials say that the sky will fall
if amalgamation and restructuring eliminate their own positions, we
should do the same.
And something more can be said in this regard. Professionals have
an obligation to avoid conflicts of interest and it is in view of this that
one might easily argue that Toronto municipal officials (both politicians
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and non-elected officials) violated an important ethical constraint which
should have governed their conduct. This will be clearer if we consider
a standard case of conflict of interest. It hardly need be said that it would
not be appropriate for me to oversee a hiring competition in a public
institution (or a publicly owned corporation) in circumstances in which
my spouse is a candidate for the position. Because I have a great deal
to gain by hiring her and there would, in such a case, be reasonable
grounds for doubting whether I can act impartially. As an officer of the
institution, I have a duty to avoid the consequent conflict of interest,
even if I believe that I can act without bias, for bias may be subtle and
unconscious, and because the process in which I am engaged must be
unbiased and be seen to be unbiased.
It has not been widely recognized that this basic account of conflict
of interest raises thorny questions in the context of restructuring and
amalgamation (in dealing with mergers, for example, Werhane 1993 and
Newton 1993 do not take these questions seriously). This is because
those who are frequently called upon to make restructuring decisions—
i.e., normal decision makers in restructuring institutions—have a great
deal to gain or lose from the adoption of particular restructuring plans.
Especially in the context of amalgamation, for one of the principal ways
in which it attempts to cut costs is by eliminating the positions of many
of these decision makers. When they personally have so much to lose,
it is difficult to see how they can act impartially. Indeed, it is arguable
that this conflict of interest is much more blatant than the one in the
standard example I have already outlined, for this is a case where a deci-
sion maker's own livelihood and career is on the line.
The conflict of interest that characterizes decision making in the con-
text of amalgamation and restructuring is compounded by an aspect of
restructuring which was ignored in the course of the Toronto debate.
Given that massive restructuring undertaken to very significantly reduce
costs (as in Toronto) will inevitably produce some losers, a choice
between different restructuring options is a choice which determines who
these losers will be. Because decision makers themselves are potential
losers, their decision for or against particular options is a decision
whether they or other employees will be most adversely affected by
restructuring. This is especially true in the case of amalgamation, for it
minimizes lower-end job losses by eliminating higher-end positions. This
means that decision makers choosing for or against amalgamation are
choosing the extent to which they or lower-end employees will suffer the
costs of restructuring. It is difficult to see how the conflict of interest this
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implies can be made consistent with their professional obligation to treat
lower-end employees fairly and equitably.
Putting aside ethical concerns, conflicts of interest of this sort help
explain why normal methods of decision making are frequently not pro-
ductive in the context of amalgamation and restructuring more generally.
As Barry Hoffmaster has put it, "You can't ask people to sit around a table
and decide by consensus whose legs will be cut off."19 Instead, such deci-
sion making produces just what one finds in many amalgamations, i.e.,
employees' desperate attempts to use any and all means to avoid disas-
trous consequences for themselves and their closest colleagues. If ought
implies can, and these dynamics mean that reasonable restructuring deci-
sions can't be made in this way, then this is yet another reason why a
concern for ethical considerations leads to the conclusion that restructur-
ing should employ extra ordinary means of decision making.
Some of the problems this implies are reflected in the conclusions of
Gaston Levac, the CEO of the Thunder Bay Regional Hospital. Contrasting
its successful amalgamation with the strife, ill will and political manoeu-
vring which characterized attempted hospital amalgamation in Sudbury,
he points to a Sudbury decision to restrict membership on the restructur-
ing committee to representatives of the hospitals. "If your entire scope of
responsibility is as the representative of an institution, that's what you pro-
mote and that's what you defend" (Courts 1995, A8). In marked contrast,
Thunder Bay was not hamstrung by institutional allegiances and was able
to successfully achieve amalgamation because it put people from outside
the hospital community on the reorganization committee—"people who
could see the big picture without particular loyalties." In the present con-
text, the important point is that loyalties become more entrenched and
more difficult when they coincide with vested interest.
The conclusion that a duty to avoid conflicts of interest implies that
normal decision makers should not be the ones to choose between
amalgamation and other restructuring options obviously leaves us with
the question "Who should choose?" I shall not try to answer this ques-
tion in any detailed manner, especially as different arrangements may be
appropriate in different kinds of cases. This said, some general remarks
are called for.
To begin with, it is important to distinguish a decision for or against
restructuring, and a decision for or against particular restructuring
options. Consider again the Toronto case. Here it is plausible to claim
that a reasonable decision to restructure had been made, for the provin-
cial government could fairly claim that it was duly elected on a platform
Realism, Restructuring, and Amalgamation I 23
(the so-called Common Sense Revolution) that made no bones about its
commitment to massive restructuring. Whether or not one likes this com-
mitment, this democratic mandate is a reasonable basis for a decision to
restructure municipal government in Toronto. All the more so given that
Toronto municipal governments agreed that the status quo was not an
option, and that municipal affairs would have to be streamlined to sig-
nificantly reduce costs.
But the decision to restructure is distinct from the decision how one
will restructure. Once one commits oneself to restructuring, there will be
different options which are possible. In Toronto, one might have restruc-
tured by retaining the present municipal governments and eliminating
Metro Council (a strategy favoured by the municipalities which opposed
amalgamation). One might have decided to leave municipal government
as it is and achieve substantial savings through cutbacks in service or
through other internal changes. It is in deciding between these options
that it will be necessary to carefully consider the internal operations of
an institution, and it is in this process that conflicts of interest are most
likely to arise. I have already suggested that concerns about conflicts of
interest favour the conclusion that such decisions should not be made in
the normal way, but by decision makers who operate at arm's length
from the normal workings of an institution. The "restructuring boards"
that this implies must be composed of individuals who have both cred-
ibility and no direct vested interest in the outcome of their decisions.
Such boards have a responsibility to listen to the concerns of all stake-
holders who will be affected by restructuring—including, of course,
those who oppose amalgamation as an option. To some extent this has
been the model adopted in restructuring Ontario health care, for provin-
cial restructuring has been orchestrated by a Health Services
Restructuring Commission, which receives input from all stakeholders
and then makes decisions on the closing, amalgamation and restructur-
ing of hospitals in the province.
It must in this regard be said that matters are more complex in the
case of Metro Toronto, for this is a case where one is restructuring a
democratically elected government and one might therefore argue that
this restructuring has an obligation to respect the exercise of this demo-
cratic right. It is here that there may be an important grain of truth in the
arguments of those who opposed the provincial government's amalga-
mation plans. It must suffice to say that the questions of jurisdiction that
this raises are complex ones that would require more discussion than is
possible here. In lieu of such discussion, the important point is that
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municipal leaders are not appropriate decision makers even if one
accepts that the making of restructuring decisions must include a demo-
cratic element. Their conflicts of interest remain, and it is therefore more
appropriate to include a democratic element in decision making in some
other way. Most obviously, this could be accomplished by having a
restructuring board clearly demarcate restructuring options and by hav-
ing various electorates choose between them (or, alternatively, by allow-
ing some democratic process to determine or at least influence board
membership). Obviously, the details of such decision making would
have to be worked out. The important point is that these details need
not alter the conclusion that independent restructuring boards should
make restructuring decisions.
It may be replied that the proposed restructuring boards make the
restructuring process a more complex undertaking. To some extent this
may be true, though its more scrupulous concern for fair decision mak-
ing is likely to reduce the kind of politicking that make so many restruc-
turings so difficult (it would be naive to suppose that it can be entirely
eliminated). Beyond this, it must be said that restructuring on the scale
we have been discussing implies massive changes that have enormous
human costs, and that this imposes a strong obligation to restructure
properly, with due respect for the ethical concerns that restructuring rais-
es. If one is not willing to introduce a restructuring process that fulfills
this obligation by invoking an arm's length decision-making process,
then one has no business undertaking a process which will have the
enormous consequences which restructuring typically implies.
The analysis I have proposed suggests that officials in the six munic-
ipalities affected by Toronto amalgamation failed to recognize and avoid
significant conflicts of interests that characterize restructuring situations.
I have argued that a duty to avoid these conflicts of interest implies, in
the case of large-scale restructuring, that restructuring decisions should
not be made by an institution's normal decision makers. Arm's length
restructuring "boards" can provide a general framework for such deci-
sions, though I would emphasize that much remains to be said about
their composition and their operation. Much that is relevant will apply
only to particular contexts. Finally, and most importantly, I hope to have
demonstrated that realism has something to offer as a theoretical per-
spective in the context of restructuring.
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Restructuring is occurring in virtually every sector of society. In this
paper, our topic is restructuring by "regionalization" in the health sector.
Our particular focus is the experience of one regional health board and
its approach to the ethical issues it faced as a consequence of restructur-
ing. At the most general level, restructuring means revisiting how some
organization or system has been organized with a view to structuring it
differently in light of new objectives and constraints. In this broad sense,
regionalization can be understood as one kind of restructuring.
In one respect, health care has always been regionalized in Canada.
In the division of powers specified in the British North America Act
(1867), health care was assigned to the provinces. Although the federal
government became heavily involved in the financing of health care
after World War II, and particularly with the establishment of a national
health insurance plan (medicare) in the 1960s, the delivery of health care
has always been a provincial (and more recently, a territorial) responsi-
bility. When we speak about regionalization in this paper, we refer to
the restructuring of health care delivery within provinces and territories.
In this restricted sense, the idea of regionalization in health care can
be traced as far back as 1920. Recently, it appeared on the policy agen-
da in several federal reports in the 1960s, and was subsequently advo-
cated in a number of provincial reports in the early 1970s. By 1974, the
idea of regionalization was pervasive enough that the federal govern-
ment felt the need to publish a survey of regionalization developments
(Department of National Health and Welfare 1974).
Notes to this chapter are on pp. 304-305.
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But strong support for regionalization in reports and position papers
is one thing; policy and political changes to implement it are another.
Although regional health authorities now exist in most Canadian
provinces, the move from regionalization in idea to regionalization in
practice only began in earnest in the 1990s. This coincides approxi-
mately with the broader movement toward restructuring that developed
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It seems reasonable to suppose that
common factors and determinants brought each of these movements
into prominence at this time.
Any account of regionalization demands a definition of the term.
One definition glibly describes it as "the centralization or decentraliza-
tion of something" (Sutherland and Fulton 1992). This is accurate as far
as it goes, but hardly advances our understanding of the idea. Another
account suggests that "[rjegionalization of health care generally can be
described as the transfer of power and authority from one group (e.g.,
government) to a newly established or a pre-existing organization with
jurisdiction over specified units or responsibilities" (CMA 1993, 10). This
is more helpful, but does not address a number of important issues.
Exactly what power and authority get transferred? From whom, and to
whom, do they get transferred? How is the regional body constituted,
and on what grounds does it make decisions?
Answers to these questions vary from province to province, and to
some extent between regional bodies within a single province, but sev-
eral common features inform virtually all regionalization initiatives. In
the first place, one finds common themes in the rationale for regional-
ization as this is elaborated in reports, mission statements, and other offi-
cial documents. One recurrent and prominent rationale is to bring deci-
sion making "closer to home." Regionalization is thus valued as a way
of allowing communities and those most affected greater input into and
control over decision making. In theory, at least, it increases account-
ability and ensures greater sensitivity to local needs and values by con-
necting decision makers (i.e., the regional boards) to those affected by
their decisions.
When the rationale for regionalization is conceived in these terms it
is primarily regionalization as decentralization that is intended. But
regionalization may also be a centralizing movement. The creation of a
common board for a number of hospitals and agencies in a community
where each previously had its own board—a common regionalization
scenario—may move decision making not closer but further away from
home.
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In such cases, a common rationale for regionalization is to integrate
and coordinate services and programs (a common theme in restructur-
ing). Bringing diverse programs and services under a single authority
facilitates greater information sharing and coordination of goals and
objectives among them. The expectation is that this will result both in
better care and in more efficient delivery systems.
Of course, the reasons extolling regionalization may not coincide
with the causes that have propelled regionalization to the top of the
health care policy agenda. Whatever the rationale proclaimed, there can
be no doubt that financial concerns have been a major driving force
behind regionalization across Canada. It is no accident that regionaliza-
tion (which is not a new idea) has come into vogue at a time when every
Canadian province is grappling with reduced funding for health care and
greater demands on public money.
Ethics at the Level of the Regional Authority
At the most general level of health policy, the fundamental ethical issue
is whether regionalization is a good or desirable policy option. The
answer to this question will depend on how regionalization measures up
in light of the values or ends to be promoted. There may be some con-
tention about what those values are, but most will identify "meeting
health needs," "choice," "fairness or equity," and "fiscal responsibility" as
important. How these and other values should be weighed and balanced
when in conflict is more controversial.
In assessing regionalization in value terms, the weight given to eco-
nomic and political considerations matters a great deal. Regionalization
can be a smoke screen obscuring or obfuscating the unpleasant realities
of fiscal restraint. It can also be a way of displacing the negative feelings
restraint engenders by shifting the responsibility for unpopular decisions
from one group (the federal or provincial government) onto another
(i.e., regional boards). Fiscal prudence is an important public policy
value, but it is not the only value that must be brought to bear on an
ethical evaluation of regionalization.
However, our concern in this paper is not the ethics of regionaliza-
tion as such, but rather the ethical issues that arise once regionalization
has been adopted as a policy option. In many jurisdictions, the decision
to regionalize has been taken, for good or ill, and complex ethical issues
have emerged in the context of restructuring. The loci for these issues are
the newly constituted regional health authorities or boards. The mandate
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of these new boards, especially in an environment of shrinking resources
and increasing demands, poses profound ethical issues involving cher-
ished but contentious values such as autonomy, accountability, and justice
in resource allocation. These values concern both the fairness of the pro-
cedures used for decision making (the extent to which they involve stake-
holders, etc.) and the substantive issues which must be grappled with.
The need for ethical expertise in policy formation and application
has been recognized for some time now at the macro (federal and
provincial) and micro (individual patient) levels. Many national govern-
ments have established ethics committees and commissions to provide
advice on thorny ethical issues, such as the new reproductive technolo-
gies, procurement of organs for transplantation, and euthanasia. At the
micro level, most educational programs for health professionals provide
training in ethical decision making to prepare future practitioners to rec-
ognize and deal with ethical problems in their encounters with patients,
clients, and populations. All research establishments and many health
care institutions have ethics committees to educate their constituents
about the ethical aspects of research and therapy. The one large group
of health care decision makers for whom such training opportunities are
lacking is the body of appointed and elected members of regional and
institutional boards.
How then should regional boards manage the ethical issues with
which they are confronted? In this paper we will explore this question
in light of the experience of the Queens Region Board21 in Prince
Edward Island, with which all three authors22 have had direct involve-
ment. We begin by describing the Queens Region Board and putting its
ethical challenges in social and historical context. We proceed from there
to outline how it went about the task of managing the ethical issues with
which it was faced. In the final part of the paper we extrapolate from
the Queens Region Board experience to questions, issues, and potential
solutions relevant to other regional boards.
The Queens Region Board
Prince Edward Island embraced regionalization with a vengeance in the
early 1990s. In response to the report of the PEI Health Task Force
(1992), the minister of Health and Social Services established a Health
Transition Team to recommend a plan for implementation of the Task
Force's recommendations. The Health Transition Team (1993) recom-
mended a restructured system of health and community services with
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four levels of authority: a regional system of governance that would inte-
grate, coordinate, and deliver services at the local level; a Health and
Community Services Agency that would provide overall responsibility
for leadership, coordination, and management of health services;
a provincial Health Policy Council that would monitor how well the sys-
tem was doing at improving health and advise the minister regarding the
overall direction of the health system; and the Department of Health and
Social Services of the provincial government.
The government responded by establishing five regional boards on
the Island. Board members—made up of interested community mem-
bers, many of whom had a limited knowledge of the systems for which
they were now responsible—were appointed by the minister of Health
and Social Services during the summer of 1993- Staff were hired shortly
afterwards.
The Queens Region Board has the largest catchment on the island.
It provides services to approximately sixty-five thousand Islanders, and
many secondary and tertiary services for the whole province. Its scope
encompasses not only acute health care services, but also long-term
care, home care, mental health, dental, pharmacare, and other social ser-
vices, such as welfare, housing, and corrections. The establishment of
the Board represents a remarkable departure from the preceding struc-
tures in the province—semi-autonomous hospital, addictions, and hous-
ing boards as well as Provincial Department of Health Divisions—which
had much narrower mandates.
Early in its mandate, the Board spent a great deal of time orienting
itself to the nature and scope of services for which it was now respon-
sible. Staff from the various services made numerous presentations to the
Board members, who varied considerably in their knowledge of the sys-
tem and its parts. It became evident to the Board very early on that the
level of complexity they were dealing with was tremendous. The more
they learned about the new reality, the more complex things appeared.
The health reform philosophy adopted by the province had moved
the focus of the governing body away from institutions to the individu-
als and populations to be served. In the new system, increased empha-
sis was placed upon how individuals interacted with the system as a
•whole, not just its parts. The intent of this new approach was to address
such complex problems as those posed by the addictions client who was
also involved with mental health and welfare services, the mental health
patient at the psychiatric hospital also being served by the ambulatory
service at the acute hospital and community mental health clinics, and
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the indigent population which, although small, had contact at various
times with almost all parts of the Region.
Thousands of staff and a budget in excess of one hundred million
dollars quickly brought the Board to the realization that it would be
impossible to become sufficiently "expert" in all of these areas to make
informed decisions at the day-to-day level. Establishing a governance
model was therefore identified as a priority for the Board, which hired
an expert in board leadership theory to help with this task. The model
chosen distinguishes sharply between ends or aims, which are the pre-
rogative of the Board, and the means to achieve these ends or aims,
which are the prerogative of the staff (Queens Region Health and
Community Services 1994).
This policy governance model was designed to allow the Board to
concentrate its efforts on what the organization should accomplish and
to ensure that it did so in a way that allowed management, within the
limits of the set policy, to determine how that would be done. Under tra-
ditional management/board models, the CEO typically provides endless
financial reports and analyses to the Board, detailing expenses, vari-
ances, transfers ad nauseam, and spending many precious hours of
Board time explaining the past. Under this new model, the policy "Don't
spend more than you have without Board approval!" left the CEO and
the management team to manage how that would be done within the
confines of the Board's policies.
Having decided on a governance model and philosophy, the Board
began to develop and implement a strategic planning process. This
included five components: a vision, mission, and values statement;
regional priorities; planning around client/patient/population needs; the
identification of specific goals and objectives for meeting the needs for
service and program areas; and the development of an implementation
plan. In keeping with its commitment to accountability, the Board pub-
lished a brochure outlining the strategic planning process (Queens
Region Health and Community Services 1995) and commissioned a con-
sultation process to help it determine the needs and priorities of the
community (Queens Region 1995).
As it advanced along the way of strategic planning, issues became
more and more complex. The community needs assessment identified a
broad range of issues and concerns. These included maintaining exist-
ing services and supports, additional help for catastrophic physical, emo-
tional or financial events, and interestingly, the need to look beyond the
symptoms to the root causes of a variety of problems: unemployment,
Ethics and Regional Health Boards 1 3 1
pesticide use, low use of bicycle helmets, to name a few. Many identi-
fied needs were being met; others were not. In addition, gaping incon-
sistencies in the direction and focus of different programs became evi-
dent. For example, a young man turned up at the regional office seek-
ing assistance -with the purchase of medicine he had been prescribed,
which cost several thousand dollars per year. Unfortunately, he had to
be told that the system was unable to help him until he had exhausted
his own resources, thereby qualifying for welfare. This contrasted with
the universal program in place to assist people with diabetes, regardless
of their means, to purchase insulin.
Such issues were exacerbated by the economic constraints on the
system. Dramatic changes were taking place in a system that had been
accustomed to growing at rates well above inflation for decades. The
province's current financial situation was very serious. There had been
no increase in funding for several years. Reductions had been made in
a number of areas, and more were expected.
As it developed its draft vision, mission, and values statement, the
Board began to consider how to establish priorities for allocating its
increasingly scarce resources. There was very little room to move. In
addition to the pressures from existing programs, there were also
demands to find resources that would give life to a number of health
reform objectives, including such things as community health centres
and increased health promotion and disease prevention. In general,
there were increasing demands for resources but less total resources to
work with. Given that not all needs within the Region could be met,
which needs (and whose needs) should receive priority? How could the
interests of the various stakeholders be balanced? What were the Board's
ultimate goals?
The Board realized that these were not just management issues but
also ethical issues. To be sure, they were not new. However, in the past,
with the continued growth in available resources and the institutional
"stove pipe" approach to service delivery, these issues had not been
made explicit and addressed in a principled way. Vested-interest groups,
squeaky wheels, back-room politics, and expediency had often driven
such decisions. In the new climate of increased accountability and
demands for greater transparency, decision making along these lines
was not an option.
Having recognized the centrality of ethics to its task, the Board
decided this was a prime area in which it needed education and advice,
and arranged a full-day ethics workshop to help it with these issues.
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Two ethicists were contracted, and after extensive discussions with the
CEO, agreement was reached about goals and methods for the workshop.
The workshop was divided into four main parts, each focusing on a
different task, issue or problem. The two morning sessions were devot-
ed to educating the Board about ethics and resource allocation and to
an attempt to establish the main values of importance to the Board and
the community. The values enumerated can be summarized as follows.
Justice (fairness, equality): Ensure that individuals, families, and
communities receive a fair share of resources, recognizing that some
have greater needs than others. Equality is a main element of justice.
It requires that equal needs be given equal consideration, and that
unequal needs be given an unequal allocation of resources.
Maximizing Benefits: Achieve as much good or benefit as possible
with the resources available. Options should be compared in terms of
how much benefit each yields per unit or resources or per dollar ("bang
for the buck").
Beneficence: Promote the good of others and at the very least avoid
doing others harm. Historically this is interpreted as doing good for
those who are especially needy. There is, so to speak, a "preferential
option" for the sick, the poor, and the needy.
Autonomy: Promote self-determination and allow individuals, fami-
lies, and communities as much choice as possible in decision making.
Self-Reliance-. Nurture and strengthen the sometime latent powers
that reside in individuals, families, and communities, and avoid fostering
dependencies. Self-reliance—whether that of individuals, families or
entire communities—means realizing one's powers and drawing from
such resources as one has available to set and accomplish one's goals.
The afternoon sessions of the ethics workshop took the form of facil-
itated discussion and deliberation about the Board's policy-development
tasks, especially the formulation of end statements establishing allocation
priorities. During the final session, Board members proposed various end
statements reflecting the dominant values identified earlier in the day.
Following the workshop, the ethicists reworked these statements and
proposed several options for organizing and setting priorities among
them. The Board was to choose among these options at its subsequent
meetings.
In their report, the ethicists also organized various ethical issues that
arose from the workshop under themes like the following:
a) Balance between prevention/health promotion and meeting imme-
diate needs: There was Board consensus that more emphasis should be
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placed on addressing broad determinants of health within the region.
However, some members were very apprehensive about moving in this
direction to the extent that doing so would mean redirecting resources
away from the sickness care system, which was already under strain.
b) Gap between expert and community view: Initial consultation had
turned up some evidence of a gap between the views of "experts" and
the public with respect to values and priorities, or between what experts
might think the public needs and what the public wants, or even what
it can afford. The Board thought that this gap could be narrowed con-
siderably through thoughtful public education, with particular care taken
to communicate the logic of opportunity costs.
c) Community involvement/consultation-. The Board was committed
to the principle that it must be guided in its work by the values and prin-
ciples of the community or ownership. The Board understood that such
consultation as had been done to date was not sufficient to gage the val-
ues of the community with any great degree of confidence, and that it
needed to explore other ways of determining the community's values.
d) Evolution or revolution: The Board understood that it did not
have a mandate from the public to make sweeping changes, and there-
fore initially should proceed in an evolutionary way, constantly tracking
and monitoring the values of the public.
The workshop and the report that followed helped the Board under-
stand more clearly its priority-setting task and the ethical principles rel-
evant to this task. Even so, the Board felt that it needed to focus its com-
mitments yet more sharply. In particular, the Board wanted to explore
the feasibility of organizing the values and principles it had identified
into some kind of decision framework or procedure that could be used
to guide its deliberations. The Board therefore decided to hold a second
ethics workshop to address its needs.
The second workshop took place several months after the first one.
It was devoted to issues concerning the choice of a framework, such as
how directive the framework should be, what values it should incorpo-
rate, and whether and how these values should be prioritized. Four sam-
ple frameworks ranging along a continuum from minimally to maximal-
ly directive were presented and discussed. These included a generic
framework (Table 1) and others that gave prominence to a particular
value or theoretical approach to ethical decision making. This enabled
the Board to gain a good sense of the strengths and limitations of dif-
ferent frameworks and of the issues involved in developing and choos-
ing a framework.
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Table I
A Non-directive Framework for Ethical Decision Making
(R-E-S-P-E-C-T)
1. Recognize moral dimension of task or problem.
2. Enumerate guiding and evaluative principles and policies.
3. Specify stakeholders and their principles.
4. Plot various action alternatives.
5. Evaluate alternatives in light of principles, policies, and stakeholders.
6. Consult or involve stakeholders as appropriate.
7.Take decision that, all things considered, is best.
In the afternoon session, the Board divided into two facilitated dis-
cussion groups. These groups tested one of the frameworks (centred on
the value of achieving as much benefit as possible given resource limi-
tations) with reference to several representative cases. This exercise
helped the Board clarify the things they thought it important to include
in a framework, and what things they wanted to avoid. On the basis of
this discussion, staff were directed to draft a framework incorporating
the main points upon which the Board agreed at the meeting (Table 2).
This was approved by the Board at a subsequent meeting.
The next steps now seemed clear. Some type of public dialogue on
the framework was needed. The particular methodology used for this
dialogue would need to be carefully considered: focus groups with
selected community leaders, surveys based on case studies, or public
meetings? There needed to be similar discussions with staff. Public
apprehension about the future of the system, staff frustration, exhaustion
with changes that had been made, and turnover at both the Board and
staff level would further complicate an already difficult task.
Analysis
For the most part, the ethical issues with which regional boards must
contend are not new. How should the competing needs, interests,
wants, and values of various stakeholders to a decision be balanced?
Who ought to have input into such decisions, and how much influence
should they have over the decision? Construed in these broad terms,
policy-making in health care and social services has always been a
matter of setting priorities and balancing competing interests, rights,
and goods.
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Table 2
The Queens Region Decision Framework
1. Describe the need for the decision or the problem to be solved. What is the
problem we are trying to address or why do we need to make a choice?
2. Gather data as necessary to understand the problem. What general
information do we need to understand the problem? What are the main issues
to be considered in making the decision? Describe the values to be considered
and outline any potential conflicts between values.
3. Identify relevant stakeholders, how they may be affected, and consult with them.
4. Develop alternatives and impacts. What are the alternatives to be considered?
Project the consequences and opportunity costs of each alternative, both short
and long term. Identify the value conflicts inherent in the various alternatives.
5. Apply criteria for decision making and evaluate alternatives or options.
1I) Apply the value of achieving as much benefit or good as possible for the
community with the resources available. Benefit or good could be measured
objectively in years of life gained and qualrty-of-life years maintained or
improved. Information on these indicators may fall under one of three
categories: there is clear and definitive information about the benefits, good or
harm; there is unclear or conflicting information; there is no evidence. Clearly
documented information is required for further review in the next steps.
(2) Review the alternatives in light of existing policies, laws, principles of
primary health care, and increased community involvement. How do our
options fit with that direction?
(3) Evaluate the relative costs, actual verified short-, medium- and long-term
savings and compare to each other Include the opportunity costs, e.g., the
cost of doing this and not doing that.
(4) Evaluate the options in light of relevant values, projecting how each
alternative will impinge on values.
(5) Choose the option that on balance provides the most benefit (good) to
the most people for the best cost unless it:
a) Impinges inappropriately upon the autonomy of individuals or groups
of individuals within the community.
b) Impinges inappropriately upon the access to service or support of
individuals or groups of individuals within the community.
c) Impinges inappropriately upon emergency service or support (threat
to life—financial, physical, psychological).
d) Impinges inappropriately on self-reliance of individuals or communities.
6. Make decision. Based on the information and decisions from your most-benefit-
or-good and health-reform analysis, and considering that, on balance, key values
as defined have not been violated,the best decision is....
7. Educate, inform, and evaluate decision.
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But several factors complicate the task and challenge of ethical deci-
sion making at the level of regional authority. In the first place, region-
al boards are coming into existence under very dire economic condi-
tions. The acute economic constraints within which they operate neces-
sitate hard choices. In Prince Edward Island, as in other provinces, deci-
sion makers were able to avoid hard choices in the past because new
money was continually coming into the system. Those days are gone.
In the second place, regional boards will be subject to much greater
scrutiny than their antecedents. In part, this is due to economic con-
straints. It will be necessary for boards to say "no" more frequently to
those individuals, groups, and agencies vying for resources under con-
ditions of increasing scarcity. Those affected—particularly those unsuc-
cessful in their petitions—will monitor and review board decisions very
closely.
Moreover, the governance philosophy that informs most regional-
ization initiatives across the country mandates that boards be open to
public scrutiny. This philosophy places a premium on accountability,
explicitness, and transparency in decision making. Whereas in the past
decision making took place out of public view, under regionalization
decision makers must proceed in the knowledge that their decisions will
be more carefully studied. They will be held to higher standards of jus-
tification.
Finally, most boards (as in PEI) include individuals with a broad
range of talents and perspectives. Some of these people will have no
experience in the health care field. Even those who do will normally be
limited in their experience and expertise to but one or a few parts of the
field. It is unlikely that any board members will have experience man-
aging ethical issues so diverse, interdisciplinary, and interprofessional.
One option for managing ethical issues at the regional level would
be not to explicitly address issues in any systematic way but rather to
deal with them on an ad hoc basis as they arise. For the most part, that
is how ethical issues were managed before regional boards were
implemented. This does not mean that decision making in the previ-
ous system took place upon no grounds whatsoever. To be sure, it is
difficult to determine what rules or principles guided decision making
in the past, since there was no requirement to be explicit about these
things. Nonetheless, "insiders" can identify a number of operative
realpolitik principles, including the "that's how we've always done it"
principle, the principle of "the squeaky wheel," and the "who you
know" principle.
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Decision making along these lines is not a live option for regional
boards. The ethical issues they must face are so acute it is not possible
to keep them buried or out of sight. The issues will be brought forward
in the communities of concern. If public expectations regarding account-
ability, explicitness, and transparency are to be met, a publicly defensi-
ble means of managing these issues will be required. As soon as the
realpolitik principles identified above have been brought to light it is
apparent that they will not survive scrutiny, which is to say that they can
flourish only in a climate of non-disclosure.
A guiding principles approach involves the board in deciding upon
a set of guiding principles and applying these principles or otherwise
bringing them to bear upon decisions at hand. As unassailable as this
approach may be in idea, in practice it poses a number of difficulties.
One difficulty has to do with identifying the principles that are to count.
The Queens Region Board looked to several sources for this, including
a comprehensive regional needs assessment and an ethics workshop
that used a variety of examples and scenarios to elicit the values of
Board members.
The legitimacy of any principles thus identified will depend on sev-
eral factors. Obviously it matters a great deal how well the principles
match or organize the data. It also matters how comprehensive or inclu-
sive the data are to begin with. Further consultation with the communi-
ty, which is planned in PEI, is an important means of testing the princi-
ples thus arrived at.
However, even if the set of principles identified does capture the
range of values held in the community of concern, issues remain regard-
ing how these principles are supposed to "apply to" or "guide" decision
making. Because such principles are general, and the particular circum-
stances for which guidance is sought tend to be complex and rich in
detail, their application may be a matter of some contention. When
Queens Board members analyzed one of the cases presented for discus-
sion in light of the values and principles identified, they came up with
contrary conclusions about what should be done. Even when the appli-
cation of a given principle is clear enough to yield a determinate decision,
some other principle may also be relevant to the situation, and may guide
it toward a contrary conclusion. When moral principles conflict—and such
conflict is likely when a set of principles is drawn from a diverse popula-
tion—questions thus arise about which principle should take precedence.
Furthermore, in virtue of their generality, principles also lend them-
selves to use after the fact to rationalize decisions. If one is clever
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enough, and the situation is sufficiently ambiguous, it may be easy to
justify whatever decision one takes (or wishes to take) by appealing to
principles that, in truth, may have had nothing to do with the decision.
In this event, the principles do not guide the decision maker toward a
decision, but come later, justifying or rationalizing it.
How serious these limitations are will depend on what is desired or
expected from an approach to managing ethical issues. If the primary
reason for adopting a principled approach is to enable Board members
to achieve greater clarity about ethical issues and to help frame and facil-
itate dialogue, these limitations will not be great cause for concern. To
accomplish this much is certainly an advance over having no explicit
principles.
If greater direction is desired, it will be necessary to further specify
the guiding values or principles and to provide some basis for weight-
ing them, or to adopt a higher-level decision rule identifying which prin-
ciple should take precedence when two or more conflict. An extreme
possibility along these lines would be a decision framework or proce-
dure so directive that any two people using it would arrive at the same
conclusion. This could be in the form of a complex flow chart with
branches covering a wide range of contingencies, and branches upon
branches upon branches. But it need not be terribly complex. For exam-
ple, one ethical theory, utilitarianism, reduces to a single decision-mak-
ing directive, namely, "accomplish the most good or health care possi-
ble with the resources available."
Thus it is possible to distinguish different approaches or procedures
for ethical decision making according to how neutral or directive they
are with respect to decision outcomes. Merely listing a set of principles
to be considered without ordering them in priority may be useful for
facilitating discussion, but beyond that provides very little direction. At
the other extreme, a procedure approximating an algorithm may be
extremely directive in its guidance, but at the price of being contestable
for that reason.
The Queens Region Board was, at minimum, committed to a princi-
pled approach to ethical decision making. This much was required to
meet its standards of accountability. However, the Board found that the
ethical principles identified and structured in a coherent taxonomy did
not provide sufficient direction. Deciding what principles to adopt was
one thing; deciding what the region should be doing, and in what order
of priority, was another. The Board understood that, as long as these lat-
ter decisions remained to be made, the status quo would continue with
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a powerful inertia. In effect, not to decide was to decide for the status
quo, which was not acceptable to the Board. The status quo was neither
sustainable, efficient, nor fair. One of the exciting things about regional-
ization—and this is true about restructuring in general—is that it creates
a climate in which new ideas and new approaches can be put in place.
The Board felt that, even within the difficult fiscal constraints within
which it had to manoeuvre, regionalization opened a field of exciting
opportunity.
Changing the system was likened to turning the Queen Mary
around. Like the Queen Mary, the system the Queens Board inherited
was moving with a powerful inertia, and would continue on its default,
rudderless course unless or until the Board gave forceful and explicit
direction to the contrary.
Although the Board was convinced that major changes in the system
were necessary and desirable, it did not have a clear vision of what
should be put in place of the status quo. The second ethics workshop
mentioned earlier was convened to explore more directive approaches
that the Board might use to guide it in its decision making. At this work-
shop, the Board was presented with various options and issues as con-
cerns choosing a framework for decision making.
Ultimately, the Board decided on an option that incorporated some of
the benefits of a maximally directive decision procedure, but without the
disadvantage of being so value-loaded that it would not be acceptable.
The framework it chose begins with the principle of utility, which coun-
sels the decision maker to produce as much good as possible with the
resources available. With respect to setting priorities among various health
services, for example, this -would mean comparing them in terms of how
much benefit each would yield per unit of cost. Utility was a prominent
value emerging from initial consultations, and moreover was consistent
with the emphasis on disease prevention and health promotion so central
to the health reform philosophy adopted in PEL However, it was chosen
as the beginning guiding principle not because it was deemed more
important than other values or principles, but rather because it provides
the decision maker with clear direction. This directiveness was thought
necessary in order to help the Board win control of the "Queen Mary."
Thus the principle of utility is set at the beginning of this framework
to get things moving, so to speak, and not in terms of importance. With
respect to importance, the framework is neutral between various values
and principles of relevance. It incorporates these other values as con-
siderations in the form of a constraint on utility-based decision making.
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More precisely, the procedure instructs that the principle of utility is to
be the guide, unless the guidance it gives is seriously inconsistent with
one of the other values of concern.
Conclusion
To discharge their mandates in an ethically responsible way and to be
morally accountable to the communities they serve, regional boards will
need to develop some facility in ethical analysis and evaluation and clar-
ify the values and principles guiding their decision making. These val-
ues and principles must be open to public scrutiny and integrated
throughout the various institutions and agencies under their jurisdiction,
ideally in the context of an ongoing ethics program.
Different boards may very well approach the challenge of ethical
decision making differently in light of local circumstances, culture, and
traditions. Some boards may deal with this need by establishing an ethics
committee; others may hire a staff person or consultant with ethics
expertise; still others may form a network to share ethics resources.
The type of ethics advice required by a regional board will in part
depend on its mandate. In PEI, regional authorities were assigned
responsibility for both health and social services. In establishing priori-
ties, boards need to determine and then compare the relative benefits
and harms for many types of public services, from specialized hospital
services (e.g., bone marrow transplantation) to rehabilitation programs
for convicted criminals to job creation (arguably the best form of pover-
ty relief). Early in its mandate, the Queens Region Board decided on a
morally principled approach for establishing criteria for choosing one
program over another and for ensuring that the process used to deter-
mine and implement these criteria is fair and open.
Another ethical task for regional boards is the development of codes
of conduct for themselves and their staff. The Queens Region workshops
did not deal with this task, but it was clear that the Board members are
not exempt from the pressures facing all public servants, appointees and
politicians. The projected move from appointed to elected Board mem-
bers will exacerbate these problems, as individuals face conflicts between
their accountability to specific groups of electors and to the community
at large. Provincial conflict-of-interest officials may be able to assist in the
development of guidelines for both Board members and staff.
The Queens Region Board adopted a framework for ethical decision
making that was quite directive. Because this framework incorporates
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certain normative assumptions, they recognized that it was important to
consult with the community and with various stakeholders in the system.
It is too soon to tell how useful this framework will prove to be in prac-
tice, but at the very least it has helped the Board to focus the issues with
which it is faced and to better understand its task.
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Downsizing, Change,
and Ownership
Vincent Di Norda
"Knock, knock."
"Who's there?"
"Not you anymore."
"Dilbert's world." (Newsweek, 12/08/96)
The Dilbert cartoon reflects the spirit of the downsizing trend at the end
of the millenium. But second thoughts about corporate cost-cutting and
the associated "jobless recovery" are now emerging. In Part I of this
essay, I question the view that downsizing is management's only option
in reaction to massive social and technological change and the view that
it improves business performance. Rather, reactive downsizing seems to
be a new version of older tensions between capital and labour. In Part
II, I suggest an ethical approach to enhancing productivity and corpo-
rate governance. In it management would canvass the options and then
prune waste with care for employee welfare and share productivity gains
equitably with them. To ensure equity, I argue, corporate ownership and
governance systems should include employees in their councils.
Part l:When in Doubt, Downsize
Since 1979, forty-three million jobs have been eliminated in the US econ-
omy, while only twenty-seven million have been created (Rifkin 1995,
Ch. 1; Bragg et al. 1996). Canadian and European unemployment rates
have hovered around 10 percent or more for years. Large corporations
have cut their workforce, typically around 20 percent. Such cuts extend
beyond industrial jobs to secretaries, cashiers, middle managers, and pro-
fessionals (Norman 1995). Part-time work now constitutes about one-third
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of all jobs. Wages have been stagnant, work time is lengthening, and work
is being deskilled, creating new class divisions in the economy, between
owners and executives on the one hand and salaried employees, includ-
ing managers, on the other, with a growing underclass of unskilled, low-
paid labour (Sloan 1996, Downs 1996). Even in the most advanced
economies, job insecurity has reached levels not seen since the
Depression of the 1930s.
"What companies do to make themselves secure," The New York
Times observed (March 3, 1996), "is precisely what makes their workers
feel insecure." Indeed executive compensation, the Wall Street Journal
reports, is reaching new highs, growing far faster than corporate profits
(April 11, 1996). From an average of less than three hundred thousand
dollars in 1965 and one million dollars in 1985, it has now reached five
million dollars. Similar patterns are found in Canada's top firms (Lindgren
1996a, Ip 1996). In 1995, for example, "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap, CEO of
Scott Paper, merged Scott with Kimberly Clark and cut the workforce by
35 percent, or eleven thousand employees, including middle managers
(Sloan 1996). After similar job-slashing by Robert Allen, AT&T's chairman,
"the wits at AT&T quip that the chairman would soon fire everyone but
himself, and AT&T would stand for [CEO Robert] Allen and Two Temps."
Both Allen and Dunlap saw their compensation and the share price
increase. Indeed, workforce downsizing is typically rationalized in terms
of what is best for the shareholders and executives. When, for example,
US employment figures improved dramatically on March 8, 1996 the
New York stock market plummeted 171 points (3 percent), in perverse
response to the good news (Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1996). Bay
Street repeated the performance a few weeks later (Globe and Mail,
March 9 and April 5, 1996). As a result of such stakeholder tensions, cor-
porate capitalism is once more in question. Peter Cook, a Globe and
Mail business columnist, wondered whether Wall Street agreed with Karl
Marx that capitalist prosperity develops on the backs of the workers
(Cook 1996). John Manley, the minister for Industry Canada, was moved
to ask whether business would not just pay dividends to shareholders
but also "reinvest a good portion of its earnings into expansion, growth,
and the creation of jobs" (Globe and Mail, March 23, 1996), but the
Chretien regime has not acted on his concerns.
Reactive Downsizing
An unthinking reaction to change, many feel, is a key factor in the
downsizing trend. Since labour is only a cost, technological innovations
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and related productivity gains lead to workforce cuts (Greenhalgh et al.
1988, Israelson 1996). Such notions reflect an old, adversarial "Theory X"
approach to management-employee relations (McGregor I960).
Certainly, technological innovations in computers and telecommunica-
tions have increased productivity and reduced labour costs, in the office
as well as on the shop floor. No wonder employees, and mid-level man-
agers, too, see technological change as threatening.
Unfortunately, many managers see decision making in essentially
conservative technical or accounting terms. They treat employees like
numbers and demand constant, high productivity increases. Their
quantitative, technical bias gives all too much credence to the myth of
uncontrollable technological change (Di Norcia 1994). Reactive down-
sizing is in addition often driven by management fads such as corpo-
rate restructuring, total quality management, and re-engineering
(Shapiro 1995). The resultant gains, however, are often not just
ephemeral—they are non-existent. Less than half of the more than
three hundred large US firms which followed the re-engineering fad
and cut their workforce (by three hundred employees on average)
improved their market share (The Economist, July 2, 1994; see Cascio
in this volume).
In 1993, moreover, Chase Manhattan Bank began a corporate "vision
quest" process, whose aim was to stress "customer focus, respect for
each other, teamwork, quality, and professionalism," and of course to
improve the stock price (New York Times, March 3, 1996, A26—29). Chase
then merged with the Chemical Bank. By 1995, it had cut its workforce
by 28 percent, while "corporate assets" grew by 38 percent. Chase
Manhattan/Chemical Bank managers termed laid-off employees "saves,"
i.e., savings to the company. One manager who was proud of the fact
that he had laid off hundreds with no lawsuits even boasted, "That
record counts in my favour." Remaining Chase employees, on the other
hand, are overworked, undervalued, and insecure. They sense their dis-
pensability. Office staff feel industrial, punching in at nine and out at
five: "It's 'Pay me, don't play with me.'" The company has become
Hobbesian, with individuals, competing to keep their jobs. Many have
learned to cynically spot the safest jobs and retrain to get them. There
are signs of survivor guilt among remaining staff; as one said, "I ran into
B today. He wasn't offered a job and is devastated. Any sense of joy I
felt I had at being on the 'Schindlers list' of employees who've got jobs
with our new parent corporation has been wiped out by experiences
like this" (Ibid., A29).
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Downsizing Costs
Doubts about the benefits of downsizing are growing fast. Not only does
it worsen employee morale, it also results in productivity declines, loss
of competitiveness and other costs (O'Neill et al. 1995). Nor does cost-
cutting itself improve sales or increase market share. Lay-offs have costs
too: severance payouts, the loss of employees with valuable corporate
knowledge, poor morale, and lower productivity. A US chemical com-
pany, for instance, laid off an engineer who alone knew the design
specs of a certain compressor, but could not later relocate him to hire
him back (Globe and Mail, August 15, 1995).
Senior executives at Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance company
reacted to lagging sales and profits (not losses, note) by soliciting vol-
untary resignations from employees to help cut costs (The Economist,
April 3, 1993). They expected only 475 employees to choose their gen-
erous buy-out offer. Instead, 1,650 did. The executives then found them-
selves fighting a rearguard action to persuade valued, knowledgeable
employees to stay. Ultimately, 890 left, including 220 whom manage-
ment did not want to lose. Uncertainty about the future was one of the
main reasons for the employee rush to leave, not the generous buy-out.
In sum, reactive downsizing represents a pathological management
syndrome. As The Economist warned, excessive cuts and lay-offs pro-
duce "the anorexic corporation," a company so overworked and stressed
out that it cannot respond to future market upturns (February 10, 1996).
Being lean, mean and reactive is not the same as careful cost-control.
Part II: Downsize with Care
To the extent that managers rationalize downsizing merely as a reaction
to inevitable change, they evade their responsibility as decision makers.
Instead of downsizing reactively, management should act proactively. Cuts
should be part of an overall, flexible strategic response to change. Careful
downsizing involves foresight, responsible pruning, equity, and inclusion.
Proactive Planning
Executives who reactively replace people with hardware may be happy
to take responsibility for the resultant productivity increases and profits,
but they remain reluctant to accept responsibility for losses. Those are
instead blamed on uncontrollable socio-economic forces—or on subor-
dinates (Jackall 1988). If you're responsible for the gain, you're respon-
sible for the pain. To take responsibility in either case is to take it in
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both. Executives should therefore explore all the options and mobilize
all their resources when facing tough choices in response to external
forces and changes. As in medicine, drastic surgery should be consid-
ered only as a last resort. Foresight and care are needed.
Change then represents an ethical challenge, one which calls for an
intelligent and even creative response (Toynbee 1962). Responsible,
proactive executives do not perceive change only as a threat. Instead,
they not only track socio-economic and technological trends, they also
try to foresee how business and work are changing. They look for new
business and market opportunities and adapt as necessary. Instead of
unthinkingly reacting to technological change, responsible management
assesses innovations in terms of a wide range of capital investment
norms, including consideration of their impact on stakeholder welfare
(Di Norcia 1994). In the face of change, companies may have to redeploy
their resources more productively and retrain staff (see Chrominska, this
volume). In adapting to an ever shifting future, one should care for the
welfare of the whole company and minimize the risk of harming the busi-
ness. One must preserve the core strengths of the company. Good man-
agement, then, responds to technological change by nurturing the firm's
strengths—that includes productive, knowledgeable employees.
Careful Pruning
On this reading, responsible cost-cutting is more like careful pruning
than clear-cut logging. One should prune a healthy, overgrown tree, not
uproot it. Even healthy firms need pruning now and then, like any grow-
ing organism. The only elements that should be cut are those that are
excessively wasteful, such as unproductive costs, excess debt, poor
investments, risky derivatives, excess capacity, inefficient plants, and
unproductive divisions. Cuts should be designed to yield more value to
the company than is lost. Significant downsizing tends to be required in
older economic sectors and lower-performing, unproductive and
bureaucratic firms, companies beset by low margins, old technologies,
declining sales, excessive paperwork, etc.
Pruning means carefully reducing excess costs as part of an ongoing
effort to maintain overall business performance and to enable corporate
renewal (Brooks 1996). These are rich notions. They extend well beyond
financial measures like profits and share prices, to sales, market share,
growth and stability, productivity, customer and employee satisfaction,
technology development, and environmental protection (Norman 1995).
Pruning should in addition be combined with enhancing returns through
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increased sales, revenue, productivity, and growth. Pruning should be
done with an eye to the overall welfare of the company and its stake-
holders as a community of interests.
Many large companies might follow the lead of Hewlett Packard,
a company which treats its skilled employees as core assets. Lay-offs
therefore should be considered only as a last resort, after all other options
have been canvassed and prioritized. Even then they should be mini-
mized and handled with care. There are many alternatives to lay-offs: cut-
ting overtime, reducing/rearranging the work week, reducing benefits
and wages, days off without pay, redeploying and retraining employees.
Where personnel cuts are necessary, they should be distributed equitably
across the organization, beginning in the executive suite and moving
down, not the other way around. Where employees must be let go, attri-
tion is preferable to lay-offs or resignations as a means of workforce
reduction. Even then they should be minimized (Nitkin 1991, Perry 1986).
People—that is, one's employees—should come first, in practice
and not just incision statements. In 1985, for example, Stroh's had to
close its Detroit Brewery, and eliminate 1,159 jobs (Perkins 1987). Peter
Stroh, the president, felt that Stroh's should do all it could to help them.
Management, working with the union, announced the closure four
months in advance. A liberal severance package was developed with
union support, including an extensive outplacement program and tran-
sition centres for both salaried and hourly employees. There was an
intensive job search that generated 1,400 job offers. Seventy percent of
workers used the programs; the rest chose to retire. The result was that
all salaried employees and 98 percent of hourly workers found new jobs.
The program cost Stroh's US $1.5 million, plus six hundred thousand
dollars in state government support, or about two thousand dollars for
each worker. Peter Stroh personally monitored the program and wrote
and called to help former employees.
Shore the Gains, not Just the Pains
Equity, Lester Thurow has argued, is as fundamental to a market econo-
my as efficiency (Thurow 1980, 194, 206). The human fallout of the recent
restructuring and downsizing trends makes his words ring even truer
today. The productivity gains from technological innovation and reactive
downsizing seem to have been stockpiled by senior executives and share-
holders, while they pass the burden of costs and risks onto line managers
and employees. But productive pruning requires equity as well as effi-
ciency. Equity can help prevent the promise of technological change from
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turning into a threat. Gains as well as costs should be shared equitably
across the organization. The promise of technological progress always was
that society would benefit from increased productivity, in the form of
higher wages and shorter work weeks. The time has come for executives
to realize that promise by sharing/the productivity gains of technological
innovation with administrative managers and line employees. This would
also make the organization more of a community of interests.
Some enlightened companies have shown that downsizing can be
done without lay-offs, e.g., by sharing costs. One way of combining pro-
ductivity and equity is to maintain jobs when technological change leads
to improved productivity and decreased labour time. In the 1970s,
a decline in orders led Hewlett Packard executives to consider a 10 per-
cent cut in output and payroll, but they were determined to avoid lay-
offs (Packard 1995, 1320. After discussing the problem with employees,
it 'was decided to distribute the cuts evenly across the organization. In
their "nine-day fortnight" strategy, everyone from the president to the
lowest employee took every second Friday off, and they all took a 10 per-
cent cut in pay. No one was laid off. Later, when times got better, they
returned to full-time work. HP's approach not only preserved the com-
pany's stock of productive employee knowledge without overworking
people, it also saved severance, buy-out and termination costs, and main-
tained employee morale and productivity.
Time is a central issue. Wherever possible, companies should try to
reduce overall work time rather than lay workers off. Employees would
likely prefer salary and work-time reductions to losing their jobs. This is
not a new idea. In 1932, during the Great Depression, the AFL called on
the US government to institute a thirty-hour work week. Large firms like
Kellogg's, Sears-Roebuck, Standard Oil, and Hudson Motors voluntarily
complied with calls for reducing the work week, so as to keep people
working (Rifkin 1995, Ch. 2). W.K. Kellogg himself decreed a six-hour
shift, which gave work to three hundred more families in the communi-
ty of Battle Creek, Michigan. He also raised the minimum wage and
increased hourly wages by 12.5 percent, to offset the loss of two hours
each day. His view was that the goal of increased productivity should
not only be greater profits for his company but also increased leisure
time for his workers. As he said at the time,
This isn't just a theory with us. We have proved it with five years actu-
al experience. We have found that with the shorter working day, the
efficiency and morale of our employees is so increased, the accident
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and insurance rates are so improved and the unit cost of production so
lowered that we can afford to pay as much for six hours as we formerly
paid for eight. (Rifkin 1995, 27)
Today, the move to a four-day week has begun. Ending overtime
has long been supported by the Canadian labour movement (in Craig
and Solomon 1996, 175). Bell Canada reduced the work week to thirty-
six hours from thirty-eight through discussions with its union, prevent-
ing lay-offs among 13,500 installers and technicians.
Part III: Inclusive Governance
In setting shareholders against bureaucratic (i.e., middle) management, the
merger and takeover battles of the 1980s reinforced the power of the cor-
poration's core owner/executive group, to the exclusion of other organi-
zational stakeholders. The result is a structurally "constricted, private-cor-
porate ownership system that systematically excludes employees from any
say in governance decisions. It not only reflects a Theory X, adversarial
management—labour model of the firm, it also facilitates the inequitable
distribution of costs and benefits throughout the organization. The inabil-
ity of employees and line managers to resist the forced inequitable impo-
sition of costs and risks on their shoulders explains the ease with which
reactive downsizing has spread through the business world. The distribu-
tion of rewards and risks, cost and benefits throughout the firm parallels
the distribution of decision making and corporate governance powers.
As long as the nineteenth-century legal anachronism of a private
property right in the corporation is maintained, one may not rely on the
good will of those at the top. For its employee-excluding governance sys-
tem allows owners and executives to ignore employee concerns. Nor
may one rely merely on the personal probity of senior people or hope
for a Sylvia Chrominska or David Packard, for the system is structured to
select those who fit its values. Indeed, talk of the inevitability of techno-
logical change and of downsizing responses might be read as a code
phrase for the view that what cannot be allowed to change is the rigidly
restrictive, stakeholder-excluding ownership and governance structures.
Today, however, the times may at least be ripe for change. One of
the most obvious changes in modern societies is their unprecedented size
and scale. Neo-classical economics and private property presupposed the
small nineteenth-century, primarily domestic, joint-stock company, in
which owners might do as they will, without inflicting too much harm on
others. Today, however, the reality is one of huge markets of hundreds
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of millions of people, served by corporations with tens of thousands of
employees, shareholders, and associated suppliers and retailers, orga-
nized into complex production, control, and communications networks.
Even small firms do business in several nations. Instead of numerous
individual shareholders, investors are more and more grouped into large
organizations like pension and mutual funds.
Given their size and complexity, businesses are professionally man-
aged, regardless of shareholder rights mythology. Large firms are run by
large management groups, often involving thousands of administrative
managers, and a small senior executive team, working closely with the
board of directors. The feedback required from the fingertips of the orga-
nization in today's changing environment cannot be achieved as long as
the old stakeholder-excluding ownership and governance structures are
preserved. Without employee inclusion in the governance councils of the
firm, those councils will not be responsive to its stakeholders' concerns
or even to the changing socio-economic environment, and able to take
them into account when making decisions, e.g., about cost-cutting and
downsizing. Such an environmentally unresponsive system makes it
unnecessarily difficult for the core governing group to determine and
secure the common good of the organization and ensure its survival in
turbulent times. It increases the risk of bad decisions, as evidenced in the
high financial and organizational costs of reactive downsizing.
A business today, then, is a complex socio-economic network of inter-
acting stakeholder interests, both inside and outside the organization. It is
no exaggeration to say that the welfare of millions hangs on corporate
decisions. It is rigidly unresponsive, therefore, to insist on preserving and
maintaining a nineteenth-century system of corporate governance suited
to small firms operating in small, local markets. Instead, corporate owner-
ship, governance, and cost-benefit distribution systems must be restruc-
tured to reflect their increased size, by recognizing the interests of key
stakeholders, like employees. Restructuring corporate ownership and gov-
ernance along more inclusive lines is needed if firms are to respond to
technological change and become more socially accountable. As we move
into a "post-capitalist" society, the responsibility structure of the organiza-
tion, Peter Drucker has argued, must become more socially accountable:
"We now have to redefine the role, power, and function of both capital
and ownership.. .we have to rethink the governance of the corporation."
(Drucker 1993, 67) True, but this won't happen unless there are significant
structural reforms, such as increased stakeholder involvement in corporate
ownership and governance.
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Accordingly, my proposal is that corporations should abandon the
old private-ownership and restrictive-governance systems and move
towards a more inclusive, common, truly corporate property system,
supported by more participatory decision making. Since such a system
welcomes employee input, it would consider their welfare when mak-
ing decisions about technological change, cost-cutting, productivity,
restructuring, etc. Given that salaried employees, including middle man-
agement, are most at risk from reactive downsizing, they have an over-
riding right to inclusion in corporate governance. It will indeed facilitate
the equitable distribution of the costs/risks and gains of such decisions
among all stakeholders. Stakeholder inclusion both provides needed
feedback in decision making to both management and employees, and
helps the organization become more responsive to change.
This argument rests on a stakeholder model of the organization. It
not only recognizes the extent of risk to stakeholder interests in corpo-
rate decisions, it also calls for the informed consent of stakeholders like
employees and managers to corporate decisions that affect their inter-
ests. Employees who face imminent job loss due to downsizing are
exposed to risk equally as much as, if not more than, investors, owners,
and executives. Given that risk exposure, they have a solid claim to par-
ticipate in making the relevant decisions, up to and including ownership
decisions, and a right to membership in the highest councils of the firm,
the board of directors. Indeed, corporate ownership is already becom-
ing more inclusive, inasmuch as owners work with management on an
ongoing basis, and widespread share holding is institutionalized through
mutual funds and pension funds.
Employee inclusion means a range of things, such as participation
in the various councils from the bottom to the top of the organization,
in both advisory and decision making capacities. Cadet Cleaners gives its
drivers shares in the company, and treats them as owners of their distri-
bution routes (Globe and Mail, March 6, 1996). The result is enhanced
employee loyalty and productivity, high sales, and a strong customer
base. Canadian Tire's employee management committees, with fourteen
elected employee representatives and four senior management repre-
sentatives, meet monthly to discuss a wide variety of issues that affect
employees and the company (Nightingale 1982, 217f; Globe and Mail,
June 1, 1992; Crane 1995). The committee operates on a consensus basis,
without votes. Lincoln Electric of Canada, a subsidiary of the Ohio com-
pany, has a similar employee-management advisory council, composed
of eight elected employee representatives, one for each division, and the
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company president. In Germany, employees are involved in both board
and executive policy making in the highest councils of the corporation
(Crispo 1978). Worker representatives sit on company supervisory
boards, and on management-worker councils throughout the organiza-
tion. They discuss company problems that affect employee welfare, such
as production problems, workplace design, shift work, design and pro-
duction links.
Unfortunately, in North America employee ownership is usually
considered only as a last resort to enable the firm to survive, as in the
1992 five hundred million dollar employee buy-out of Algoma Steel of
Sault Ste Marie. It is the largest employee ownership experiment in North
America to date. The Algoma buy-out was well thought out beforehand,
due to a cooperative partnership between the previous owner, Dofasco,
the steelworkers' union, and the New Democratic (NDP) Ontario gov-
ernment at the time. Algoma has been well managed since, by an inde-
pendent management group, which has invested $442 million in tech-
nological modernization. It saved the company from imminent bank-
ruptcy. As Jack Ostroski, president of the United Steelworkers Local at
Algoma Steel, said, "There's no blueprint. A lot of this is ad hoc, and the
first two years are critical.... We've shaken up Bay Street, and now we'll
be under a microscope for a while."
Today, Algoma employees have a 60 percent controlling ownership
of the company (Globe and Mail, June 1, 1992, February 29, 1992, and
August 2, 1991). They elect five directors. There is a joint labour-man-
agement corporate steering committee, consisting of four union repre-
sentatives, the CEO, three senior executives, and a representative of
non-union employees. Their mandate is to discuss workplace issues,
retraining, restructuring, and worker participation. Joint manage-
ment—worker task forces were created, on cost reductions and work-
place redesign and technology. The employees have the power to
approve a board decision to sell the company, to invest outside the
steel industry or the local community, and to issue shares that would
dilute their holdings below 50 percent.
The Algoma experiment seems to be working. The company has
become the most profitable steel company in North America. Employees
recently agreed to invest capital in technological modernization. In 1994,
sales increased by 23 percent. Net income was up, to $127 million, while
bank debt was down to sixty-seven million from $103 million. Capital
expenditures have more than doubled. A new, simpler, high-quality steel
strip mill is being developed. Steel shipments are up 5.6 percent. Algoma
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has become a low-cost, innovative, market-oriented, high-quality contin-
uous improvement steel producer. Algoma was the third such buy-out
under the Ontario NDP regime. The aim in each was to prevent share-
holders from closing a still-healthy operation merely because their returns
were unsatisfactory, to keep people working, help local communities sur-
vive, lower the related public welfare expenditures, and invest in the
future. This cooperative partnership between business, government, and
labour set employee inclusion within a broader stakeholder-inclusive
model of common corporate ownership and governance (also see Van
Deusen 1996). The overall message of employee inclusion, then, goes
well beyond Algoma, as Leo Gerard, the Ontario director of the
Steelworkers commented:
My dad believed workers had made the wrong trade-off when indus-
trial unions were created in the '20s and '30s. We needed to have influ-
ence on the methods of production, but we traded off our entitlement
to a share of the control of the workplace to management.... It's not
enough to say you don't trust management.... How can we make the
economy stronger and improve the lives of workers? That's the chal-
lenge. (In Craig and Solomon 1996, 6)
Conclusion
In review, much downsizing has been reactive, and imposed serious costs
on firms. It reflects an outdated, fundamentally adversarial corporate own-
ership and governance system. Social change requires a more responsible,
strategic management response. It should involve an equitable distribution
of risks and benefits among the organization's employees (and other
stakeholders, too, but there is no room to develop this theme here). Much
socio-economic and technological change reflects fundamental structural
shifts in the business environment. They require equally structural adap-
tation from the corporation, notably greater responsiveness, equity, and
inclusiveness. Employee-inclusive, truly corporate ownership and gover-
nance structures were suggested as part of the organization's response to
change. If, as I suspect, the reactive downsizing trend has peaked, and
restrictive corporate governance is in question, then the expectation is that
there will be many more moves of all manner and scale to a more equi-
table and inclusive form of business organization.
PARTY
The Process of Restructuring
Restructuring implies radical changes that dramatically affect the stakeholders
of a restructuring institution. Though its relationship to the public which it
serves is sometimes altered in drastic ways, the human costs of restructuring
are especially evident in its consequences for employees, who may lose their
livelihood and their careers and are in any case subjected to difficult periods
of uncertainty and adjustment. Especially in view of the latter; the process of
restructuring raises difficult ethical issues. In discussing methods of restructur-
ing, a number of authors have already addressed the. general question how
restructuring decisions can be made fairly and reasonably (Groarke, for exam-
ple, argued for arm's length restructuring boards in cases of large-scale
restructuring).The three articles in this section continue this discussion, direct-
ly addressing the questions "How should the restructuring process be con-
ducted?" And "How can it ensure that the different stakeholders it affects are
treated fairly and equitably?"
In a short account of EBDM (Evidence-Based Decision Making), Sharon
Dewey and Leo Groarke argue that the principles which are the root of
EBDM in the medical arena can be transplanted to the context of restructur-
ing and can in this way be the basis of a fair and reasonable restructuring
process. Above all else, the process which results emphasizes that restructur-
ing institutions have an obligation to rise above the politics and vested inter-
est that can characterize decisions in this context, and must instead employ
empirical evidence in an attempt to ensure a fair assessment of alternative
restructuring strategies. Dewey and Groarke illustrate their four basic points
with a number of references to other studies in the present book.
In the article that follows, David Drinkwalter provides a general overview
of the responsibilities which should guide managers in their relations to
employees during periods of major organizational change within a corporation
or an institution. His account of these responsibilities stresses the existence of
an implicit "unwritten" contract between employer and employee which needs
to be recognized as a starting point when one attempts to understand the
obligations created by restructuring. Good restructuring will recognize this
contract and broaden it to adapt to new realities, recognizing the implicit
obligations to those employees who retain their positions and to those who
lose them.
Because equity policies are a central issue in ethical management, and
because they can be very adversely affected by restructuring, the third article
in this section discusses equity initiatives in the context of restructuring. In
arguing for "fair change," Norma MacRae argues that the formation and imple-
mentation of equity policies provides a useful precedent for restructuring, that
restructuring should be informed by the same kinds of concerns for excel-
lence, and that the principles of equity need to be protected in the course of
a restructuring.
II
What Restructuring Can
Learn from EBDM
Sharon Dewey and Leo Groarke
What is EBDM and what can it contribute to debates about restructur-
ing? One might answer that evidence-based decision making (EBDM) is
simple common sense, but that common sense can take one a long way
when one attempts to sort through the thorny issues raised by the
process of restructuring. Formally, EBDM has been promoted as a new
approach to medicine, but we shall argue that the principles it is found-
ed on can be used (perhaps in an admittedly unexpected way) to pro-
vide a useful account of fair and reasonable restructuring processes in
business, health, and education.
Research on EBDM takes one to "cutting edge" articles and editori-
als in medical journals, and to the heated responses they have generat-
ed, usually in the form of letters to the editor. These articles, editorials,
and letters to the editor highlight three important features of EBDM as it
has been advocated in the medical community: (1) it is rooted in med-
ical practice, (2) interest in EBDM has expanded rapidly, and (3) EBDM
has generated a great deal of debate and conflict.
Sackett et al. define "evidence-based medicine" as "the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions
about the care of individual patients" (1994). The Evidence-Based
Medicine Working Group illustrates the approach that this implies with a
hypothetical example. Imagine a junior medical resident at a teaching hos-
pital who is evaluating the condition of a forty-three-year-old "previously
well man who experienced a grand mal seizure." Alcohol and any recent
head trauma were ruled out as factors and drugs were administered in
Notes to this chapter are on p. 305.
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order to stabilize the patient's condition. Using the Grateful Med program,
the resident "proceeds to the library and...conducts a computerized liter-
ature search." She finds a "directly relevant" paper, "reviews the paper,
finds that it meets criteria she has previously learned for a valid investiga-
tion of prognosis, and determines that the results are applicable to her
patient." Equipped with this information, she returns to her patient, con-
veys the risks of recurrence, and makes recommendations for improving
the patient's chances of avoiding future seizures (Evidence-Based
Medicine Working Group 1988, 2420).
Extended to the context of restructuring, EBDM suggests that
restructuring decisions should be founded on the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of relevant evidence. More deeply, it sug-
gests that institutions should be restructured in a way that facilitates an
EBDM approach to the decisions they must make. This sounds like
common sense, but it is common sense that frequently gets lost in the
difficult battles and debates that characterize many cases of restructur-
ing. This is to some extent inevitable, given that restructuring has
enormous consequences for those that it involves. It produces winners,
survivors, and losers who lose a great deal (in the worst scenario, their
livelihoods). In circumstances like these, the process of restructuring
very frequently becomes a process of political manoeuvring in which
political clout, aggressive rhetoric, battles between different stakehold-
ers, and the attempt to protect one's territory and vested interest—not
a judicious weighing of the evidence—determine the decisions that are
made.
In the medical community, evidence-based decision making has
been controversial because some medical practitioners and researchers
see it as the imposition of one group's "evidence" on that of another—
i.e., as favouring empirical research over clinical practice (Smith 1995).23
We would answer that EBDM must be carried out in a way that respects
different kinds of evidence, but also that one of the benefits of EBDM
can be the way in which it forces a re-examination of existing clinical
practice. Something similar can be said of EBDM restructuring, which
forces a reconsideration of existing ways of doing business. Yeo et al.
have something similar in mind when they write that "[o]ne of the excit-
ing things...about restructuring...is that it creates a climate in which new
ideas and new approaches can be put in place" (Yeo et al., 139).
That said, we accept some of the concerns that have been raised
about evidence-based decision making in the medical community. We
would argue that a fully adequate model of EBDM cannot restrict itself
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to rigorous scientific evidence, which implies an unduly narrow basis for
decisions about patients' health. Instead, EBDM must make some room
for clinical and work experience when it canvasses the relevant "evi-
dence." This is even more important in the context of the organization-
al decisions restructuring implies, where evidence will rarely conform to
rigorous scientific standards. Considered from this point of view, cases
in which clinical or work experience conflicts with other kinds of evi-
dence do not prompt the question "Should we proceed on the basis of
a review and consideration of the evidence?" but rather "What kind of
evidence should have more weight in our deliberations?" or, more gen-
erally, "How shall we resolve the differences between conflicting bod-
ies of evidence?" These are important questions, but the important point
is that they are questions which can be addressed without rejecting an
evidence-based model of decision making.
In the present overview of what an EBDM approach can mean for
the restructuring process, we want to emphasize four aspects of the evi-
dence based approach which can usefully guide restructuring.
I. Evidence-Based Decision Making Implies a
Formal Process of Evidence Collection
The crux of EBDM is an explicit process that collects and reviews evi-
dence, and makes decisions on this basis. If a university engaged in
restructuring decides to pursue certain kinds of programs in order to
increase its revenue, then EBDM suggests that it should have collected
and reviewed relatively hard evidence that suggests that this will be the
result. If a corporation decides to downsize, it should be on the basis of
good evidence that doing so in the way proposed will have the intend-
ed short- and long-term effects. The evidence collected and reviewed in
such a case may include a look at other cases of corporate downsizing
and restructuring, the corporation's internal strengths, the situation of its
competitors, and developmental research. This will inevitably include a
consideration of the kinds of cases that Cascio and Hostager et al. dis-
cuss in their contributions to this volume.
In the best situation, an EBDM approach may amount to little more
than the formal articulation of a process that is already occurring. In such
cases, EBDM probably means the "tightening up" of existing processes
in a number of ways. Evidence may, for example, be guiding a decision,
but in a more or less haphazard fashion. In such a case, evidence-based
decision making seeks to focus and articulate the process of decision
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making in order to allow the decision makers greater facility in making
and defending their decisions.
In other cases, evidence-based decision making requires more dras-
tic changes to a decision-making process which is fundamentally wrong-
headed. In this scenario, decision making is frequently informed by per-
sonal biases, political pandering, emotional appeals, and slanted argu-
ments that favour this or that vested interest. Consider, for example, Yeo
et al.'s account of the methods of decision making which are available
to newly formed regional health boards that have been created in the
context of restructuring:
One option for managing ethical issues at the regional level would be not
to explicitly address issues in any systematic way but rather to deal with
them on an ad hoc basis as they arise. For the most part, that is how eth-
ical issues were managed before regional boards were implemented. This
does not mean that decision making in the previous system took place
upon no grounds whatsoever. To be sure, it is difficult to determine what
rules or principles guided decision making in the past, since there was
no requirement to be explicit about these things. Nonetheless, "insiders"
can identify a number of operative realpolitik principles, including the
"that's how we've always done it" principle, "the principle of 'the squeaky
wheel,'" and the "who you know" principle. (Yeo et al., 136)
Sometimes such forces manifest themselves under the guise of "evi-
dence" itself. Here the "evidence" that is invoked in making a decision
is heavily massaged or manipulated, or fails to be considered in light of
other relevant evidence or constraints (community needs, budgetary
realities, and so on). In many such cases, vested interests protect them-
selves with the presumption that evidence-based decision making is
already occurring under an attitude of "Why of course—how else are
decisions made?!" In all cases of EBDM, it is important to remember that
the assertion of the values it enshrines does not prove that its principles
have actually been invoked.
2. Evidence-Based Decision Making Is Teleological
Evidence-based decision making is by definition a "goal-oriented
approach." By this we mean that it requires a clear articulation of desired
ends and a system of checks and balances which is instituted to ensure
that these established goals remain paramount. EBDM has a limited abil-
ity to challenge the ends it serves, which may be established on the basis
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of a variety of intangibles which transcend evidential measures. A college
may, for example, decide to restructure in a way that makes its mandate
a good liberal arts education because this is what it believes in, because
this is its tradition, and so on. It is of course possible to ask for evidence
that demonstrates that this is what it believes in (by polling its faculty,
alumni, etc.) or that this is its history (by reviewing the historical record),
but EBDM is in such circumstances predicated on a commitment to tra-
dition and what the college believes in. EBDM cannot be used to prove
that these commitments are correct. In this way, EBDM is subservient to
the ends it serves. Once they have been established, it can then be insti-
tuted in deciding how one should restructure in a way that achieves these
ends. In such a context it may do so by looking for evidence that this can
best be accomplished by teaching in this way, by targeting this popula-
tion, by saving money in this way, and so on.
It is important to see that EBDM does in this way make room for
intangible values which must figure into an evaluation of any institu-
tion's operations. This is an important point, as the careless use of EBDM
may allow it to be used in a way which squeezes out all intrinsic values
which do not fit neatly into a category of "evidence." To do so is to lose
sight of the distinction between the ends that an EBDM restructuring
aims for and the means by which it attempts to attain them. It is primarily
in the discussion of the latter that we propose the evidence-based mode
of decision making.
All of this being said, there will be circumstances in which EBDM's
emphasis on evidence may force a reconsideration of goals which are
not viable. In attempting to downsize a particular social program, for
example, evidence may emerge that demonstrates that the initial man-
date was untenable. In such cases, EBDM demands a reconsideration of
the initial mandate. Given the financial imperatives that drive most
restructurings, it must nonetheless be said that in most cases, evidence-
based decision making can only result in making restructuring transitions
as effective and painless as possible. This focus highlights both a
strength and a limitation of evidence-based decision making which
underscore the need to use EBDM in combination with other critical
processes which examine, challenge, and force a careful consideration
of the goals adopted by those who make restructuring decisions.
Because evidence-based decision making must be directed toward
some end or other, the first step in invoking it must be an attempt to
make the goal of decision making explicit. It may be general or specific
as the case requires: a new mission, a streamlined system of production,
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a new emphasis in an institution's operations, or simply as effective a
continuation of previous goals as is possible in the wake of new fiscal
realities. These initial goals may have to revised or amended during the
process of restructuring in light of the evidence that surfaces. If the avail-
able evidence suggests that the initial goal is unrealistic, unattainable or
unreasonable, then the goal must be reconsidered and replaced with
some alternative objective.
The need for EBDM to operate within the context of some goal does
not mean that a commitment to EBDM cannot have substantial conse-
quences. Consider, to take a specific example, treatment and prevention
models of health care. Here the goal is a very general one: meeting the
health care needs of a community. In the context of this goal, one might
easily argue for a restructuring of health care that emphasizes prevention
rather than treatment services. If it is to be convincing, the basis of such
an argument must not be wishful thinking or speculative hypotheses, but
studies that provide empirical evidence for the claim that prevention is a
more effective way to achieve our long-term health goals. Studies of
socio-economic factors that affect health needs in Canada must be pre-
sented alongside analyses of current trends in health services in Canada,
cost-effectiveness studies of prevention-based systems, and an examina-
tion of the results of attempts at prevention in other social infrastructures
(Sehl 1996).
When considered from the point of view of our present system of
health care, where the focus of health care is acute care, arguments of
this sort recommend a radical transformation of the health care system.
Without this transformation, restructuring will probably be implemented
with a "logical," across-the-board reduction of services (or even with
extra cuts for prevention, given the status quo's commitment to a treat-
ment model). Such arguments thus provide an example of the way in
which evidence-based studies can pose a useful challenge to the status
quo and can guide restructuring. Without an explicit and concerted
attempt to engage such evidence, the loudest voices in the status quo
are likely to remain the loudest voices in restructuring, irrespective of the
evidence. In the process, restructuring is likely to marginalize those who
do not enjoy political influence.
3. Evidence-Based Decision Making Assumes an Integrating
and Interactive Model
If it is to attain the best results in the context of restructuring, evidence-
based decision making must function as a way of requiring and facilitating
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interaction between decision makers, researchers, experts, and stake-
holders. Understood in the broad way we have proposed, it is not an
attempt to "empiricize" all decisions to favour particular kinds of evidence
and particular points of view. Instead, it is an attempt to give appropri-
ate weight to various kinds of evidence. In dealing with empirical evi-
dence this "entails three separate but interrelated steps: systematically
examining the trustworthiness of...[a study's] conclusions; assessing
whether its results are important; and considering its applicability to the
local population" (Griffiths and Peters 1995, 1059-1060). In dealing with
other kinds of evidence, EBDM will require a more general assessment
of its reliability and its applicability to the case at hand. Evidence-based
decision making in the context of restructuring thus requires that restruc-
turers attempt to clearly articulate the nature of relevant evidence and its
relative appropriateness. Often it is the clash of different points of view
put forward by different interest groups that can best force this kind of
examination. Because restructuring inevitably involves stakeholders with
diametrically different interests, integrating different kinds of evidence is
an especially important aspect of EBDM in contexts of restructuring.
This feature of EBDM highlights the fact that restructuring is a radical
intervention—and often an abrupt one—in "business as usual." Often, it
results in painful losses for labour and management, and has the poten-
tial to fundamentally alter the way business is done and social services and
education are provided. This probably implies a change in the assump-
tions that are the basis of work and employment—a change which can
rarely be accomplished without dissension, conflict, and debate.
In cases where vested or competing interests make it extremely dif-
ficult to integrate conflicting points of view, it may be best to bring in
outsiders who are more removed from the internal politics, conflicts of
interest, and competition this implies. In restructuring the hospitals in a
city, this might mean the use of a board composed of community mem-
bers as well as managers, and employees in the hospitals (see Groarke,
this volume). These community members are well situated to see past
the internal politics and the vested interests that often play too large a
role in restructuring decisions.
An alternative, though not always feasible, way of maximizing one's
ability to integrate the evidence relevant to restructuring is by following
Ford's example in the restructuring which Cascio (this volume) outlines
in his discussion of responsible restructuring. Ford proceeded by con-
ducting restructuring in a time of prosperity and security instead of wait-
ing for a crisis to emerge. This allowed restructuring "without the threat
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of recession or corporate raiders, and without mass lay-offs, divestitures,
or wrenching disruptions" (Cascio, 64). In such circumstances, the com-
pany was able to get "the whole company involved" and reorganize "in
the open." Significantly, "[a]fter spending months studying other restruc-
turings, CEO Alex Trotman concluded that a common mistake is that
restructuring often is ordered by top management, but implemented by
subordinates who poorly understand the objectives." In order to counter
this, Ford included "hundreds of others in the process" (Cascio, 65).
Whatever the circumstances, this "open" approach to decision making in
times of restructuring has great potential for reducing the influence of
"back-room politics," conflicts of interest, and other non-evidential
sources on the decision-making process.
4. Evidence-Based Decision Making Asks Tough Questions
The fourth feature of EBDM we want to highlight might almost stand as
a motto: EBDM asks tough questions. By this we mean that the strength
of evidence-based decision making is the way in which it demands evi-
dence for opinions, conclusions, and decisions. Among other things, it
follows that EBDM refuses to assume the status quo. Claims to the effect
that "this is how it has always been done," "we are opposed to..." and
"the front office says..." have little market value in the discussion that
EBDM demands. They gain value only to the extent that they are backed
by evidence which can be produced. In the final analysis, EBDM need
not result in a rejection of the status quo or accepted ways of doing
things, but it does not tolerate the complacent presumption that they
should continue. From the point of view of EBDM, any position on the
way in which established goals should be accomplished must be tested
by asking for evidence of one kind or another.
Hanly (this volume) presents a good example that illustrates the need
to ask tough questions in his discussion of minimum wage laws which
are sometimes weakened or eliminated in labour law "reforms" that
accompany government restructuring. The call for such changes is often
backed by claims that minimum wage laws have a damaging effect on
the economy, employment, and especially on the worst off. Hanly cites
a microeconomics textbook in which this conclusion is the end result of
an exercise entitled "The Effect of Minimum Wage Laws." At first glance,
this might appear to constitute evidence in favour of a decision to elimi-
nate such laws, but closer examination shows that such effects are pure-
ly speculative and not backed by any hard evidence. In a situation like
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this, EBDM requires that we ask for evidence that backs such predictions.
If one attempts to find it, one instead finds studies which refute the claim
that the elimination of minimum wage laws has positive consequences
for employment and the disadvantaged (Hanly, 46).
The kinds of broader forces that evidence-based decision making
can combat are illustrated in Cecilia Benoit's study of "Paradigm conflict
in the sociology of service profession: Midwifery as a case study" 1994).
It uses a variety of critical perspectives—the "professional dominance
approach," the "perspective of professional decline," and the "perspec-
tive of patriarchal control"—to challenge standard notions of health care
decision making. We tend to assume that decision making in health care
(and in business and education) is a purely rational process that pro-
ceeds on the basis of a straightforward collection and weighing of the
relevant evidence, but this is a naive view that ignores the many social,
political, and economic agendas that have an impact on decisions in any
institution. By forcing us to place more emphasis on evidence, an EBDM
approach can be used to combat such forces.
The "tough questions" that EBDM requires are especially poignant
in the context of restructuring, for they usually produce conflicting
points of view and conflicting evidence which must be dealt with, one
way or another. Among other things, this questioning requires that one
first ensure that all stakeholders be consulted. If the goal of a health ser-
vice has been redefined with a focus on community-based care, for
example, then the community is quite obviously a major stakeholder and
must be involved in consultations and providing evidence. Especially
when redefinition occurs, one needs to make special efforts to include
new players and stakeholders who have not previously been heard or
have fewer resources and skills for negotiation.
In sorting through conflicting evidence, decision makers should rec-
ognize possible conflicts of interest and the degree to which this is a sig-
nificant liability when one considers the integrity of the evidence. Even
when this is not a problem, one should explicitly consider the veracity of
the evidence—the rigour of the study that produced it, the trustworthiness
of the source, and so on. While a thorough account of the validity of evi-
dence is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that decision makers
must adopt a critical attitude to research methods and should draw on the
expertise of experts as required. In "Users' Guides to the Medical
Literature: VIII. How to Use Clinical Practice Guidelines," for example, one
finds a list of considerations that can be used in measuring the validity of
medical data. The authors begin by describing "formal taxonomies" which
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present "levels of evidence" and "grades of recommendations" and go on
to include as measures of validity "...sample size, recruitment bias, losses
to follow-up, unmasked outcome assessment, atypical patient groups,
unreproducible interventions, practical clinical settings, and other threats
to internal and external validity" (Wilson et al. 1995). Other general bench-
marks could easily be developed for assessing other kinds of evidence.
The significance of restructuring is a result, first and foremost, of its
prevalence. It is no accident that restructuring has been called the "trend
of the decade." In Ontario, it has been placed in high relief by the intro-
duction by Ontario's Harris government of Bill 26, the Savings and
Restructuring Act.24 Similar trends are observable across Canada, ranging
from the Klein agenda in Alberta to the radical restructuring reforms
undertaken by New Brunswick's Premier Frank McKenna (on the latter,
see the case study by Blanchard in this volume).
What can evidence-based decision making teach us in the context of
restructuring? Above all else, it can teach us the importance of (1) an
attempt to marshal evidence that bears on different restructuring alterna-
tives, (2) a critical discussion of this evidence, and (3) an attempt to
ensure that decisions are explicitly made in a way that is founded on such
considerations. Looked at from this point of view, the principles of EBDM
are implicitly at work in many of the proposals and discussion put for-
ward by other authors in their contributions to the present volume.
Our concern has been a general model of the restructuring process
which can be derived from the medical account of EBDM. This model
presumes a set of values that should be served in such processes. It
attempts to ensure that decision making pays attention to the evidence
and is guided by it. This is no small feat, for it requires a fundamental
reorientation of decision making. As Yeo et al. say in their discussion of
regionalized health care, "in the past, with the continued growth in avail-
able resources and the institutional 'stove pipe' approach to service
delivery, these issues had not been made explicit and addressed in a
principled way. Vested interest groups, squeaky wheels, back-room pol-
itics, and expediency had driven these decisions. In the new climate of
increased accountability and demands for greater transparency, decision
making along these lines was not an option" (Yeo et al., 137). We do not
suggest EBDM as a panacea for all restructuring woes, but we do believe
that the values it enshrines can contribute to emerging processes which
place greater value on accountability, responsibility, and integrity in pol-
icy formation.
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Discharging Employer
Responsibilities to Employees
during Major Organizational
Change
David Drinkwalter
During the past decade, the economic environment of domestic organi-
zations has been fundamentally altered. Social, economic, technical, and
political change have been unprecedented in their breadth, depth, and
speed. The Cold War ended, the USSR disintegrated and underdeveloped
countries have made major economic advances. Countries in Eastern
Europe, Asia, Africa and South America have entered the world eco-
nomic system on a scale, and with a rapidity, unimagined in the mid
1980s. Today, goods from South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong
Kong, South Africa, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico are as readily avail-
able as those from France, Germany, Britain, New Zealand, Australia,
Japan, and the United States a mere decade ago. The creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to replace the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—which regulated trade between the "industri-
al" countries from 1946 until 1995—is but one reflection of this change.
The demands for capital from the developing countries have fundamen-
tally altered the world capital markets.
Advances in technology have touched us all in a variety of ways,
both in our employment and in the way we spend our leisure hours.
Today, "surfing the net" is a reality for individuals and organizations
alike, and the "information highway" is expanding at a rate which out-
strips our ability to understand its implications and regulate its sprawl.
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Canadian firms in all sectors, including manufacturing, mining, agri-
cultural, retailing, and services, find themselves facing worldwide com-
petition within their traditional "domestic" market. Educational and
health institutions are also being forced to dramatically alter the way
they conduct their affairs. Many old, familiar and previously stable insti-
tutions have failed to respond in a timely manner and have disappeared;
new organizations, and entire industries, have sprung up to take their
place in the economic landscape.
Most organizations have responded to these economic pressures by
unconsciously proceeding through three clear stages. The first actions are
usually directed at cost reductions which centre on "downsizing" the
employee body—on getting smaller. When it becomes evident that these
actions are insufficient—many downsizing efforts fail to reduce costs—the
organization frequently attempts to improve efficiency by reorganizing or
restructuring and simultaneously empowering its people. Once this proves
inadequate, organizations frequently attempt to become different. This
third step appears to have greater success, although the jury is still out.
Through it all, the employee-employer relationship is altered in dra-
matic ways. This produces substantial internal conflict and is often
described as becoming "lean and mean." It is telling that most managers
I have met feel they are attempting to create an organization which is
"lean and keen." Why this difference in perspective? It appears to arise
from a failure, on the part of both parties, to recognize and appreciate
(1) the responsibilities an organization has to its employees during a
period of significant change, and (2) the limitations on its ability to dis-
charge them.
This conflict arises from the termination of the traditional employ-
ee-employer relationship and the onset of a new relationship which has
significant differences. Frequently, this change occurs through a process
viewed by the employee as unnecessarily harsh and insensitive, and by
the employer as necessary and appropriate. The concerns this raises are
clearly evident in the case of public sector unions, which question gov-
ernment actions to redefine their delivery of services to the population
because of large annual budgetary deficits and huge outstanding finan-
cial debt obligations. The ensuing internal turmoil is frequently accom-
panied by the workers' loss in faith in senior management's ability to dis-
charge their responsibilities. In both the public and the private sector,
a failure to address such conflict and consider the human element dur-
ing these changes can severely affect the effectiveness, and ultimately
the success, of any organization.
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Concerns about employee treatment during these (often seemingly
continuous) reorganizations have driven unions to formalize decisions
on employees whose jobs may be eliminated or re-engineered. As a
result, union leaders now speak of "job ownership" by the incumbent,
and publicly question corporate restructuring in the presence of large,
absolute profits. They adopt a two-pronged approach to such concerns.
First, they attempt to secure a contractual job guarantee for their mem-
bership and attempt to back it with a formal job-search process which
provides for retraining. Secondly, they attempt to establish a process that
guarantees participation and input into decisions which affect the num-
ber and category of their members (the clearest instance of this approach
is discussed by Vince Di Norcia in this volume).
Both of these approaches are reflected in the 1996 agreement
between the Canadian Auto Workers and Chrysler Canada. Within the
agreement, the union has gained a guarantee with respect to the total
number and level of their membership, and a role in the decision
process with respect to out-sourcing. In return, the union has agreed to
ensure the good conduct and satisfactory performance of its members
during the life of the contract.
Managerial action in response to the profound changes in the eco-
nomic environment has fundamentally altered the way business is con-
ducted. This includes changes to the employee-employer relationship.
Both anecdotal experience and empirical evidence indicate that the suc-
cess or failure of repositioning effort turns on the degree of commitment
and dedication exhibited by the organization's body of employees. In
those organizations that have successfully navigated these uncharted,
turbulent transitions, management has recognized and addressed, in a
positive manner, the human impact of the changes.
In responding to changes, managers have two key groups to whom
they have responsibilities: the owners—shareholders of private corpora-
tions, and tax payers for public institutions—and the employees. It is the
discharge of the obligations to the latter group which is the most fre-
quent source of turmoil. The need for corporate change, downsizing,
repositioning or refocusing occurs in the name of corporate survival and
protecting and enhancing shareholder value. The importance of the
desire to improve the working conditions of the employees, recognizing
the value of their ideas, and giving them greater autonomy to discharge
their responsibilities is, unfortunately, too often overlooked. In view of
this I will, in the rest of this paper, outline some key ways in which this
desire can be pursued.
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I. Recognize the Unwritten Contract
Every employee's relationship with their employer is governed by a con-
tract—terms and conditions of engagement—which has moral and eth-
ical, as well as legal, implications. Very few of these contracts are explic-
it and comprehensive. Those which are usually confine themselves to
the legal aspects, which are most often documented in specific contracts
with a union or employee association formed to represent the employ-
ees, or in government legislation.
In contrast, virtually all moral and ethical obligations are implicit and
unwritten, and derive over time from management actions observed
under a variety of circumstances. The clearest and most obvious evi-
dence of their existence and definition is provided by "corporate cul-
ture." It is these unwritten rules of conduct which demonstrate the moral
and ethical obligations which have been assumed by management.
Experience provides a view of the organization's response under a vari-
ety of circumstances and leads the employees to assume, and hence to
expect, certain corporate obligations during a time of significant change.
These expectations on the part of the employees are, when unfulfilled,
at the heart of the greatest internal upheavals during corporate transi-
tions. They have taken on particular relevance in today's circumstances
because so much of the desired change turns on the need for all
employees—from the most senior to the most junior—to undergo
behavioural change. Flattened organizations require different behaviours
from their managers; those driven by quality of performance and cus-
tomer service depend on front-line staff who must change their behav-
iours in equally fundamental ways.
These internal cultural norms are specific to an organization,
although the differences are often greater between industries than
among organizations within the same industry.
In the vast majority of organizations, employees expect job security,
the recognition of their value and contribution, fair access to evolving
opportunities as they arise, and potential development, both personal
and career, in return for a job well done. When change hits and the real-
ization of any of these expectations is threatened, many feel betrayed by
their employer.
For management to successfully lead the renewal of their organiza-
tion and discharge their responsibilities to the employees with harmony,
good faith, and the retention of trust, they must usually adopt an
approach which differs from the norm. The existence of unwritten,
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implicit contracts affecting the moral and ethical foundation of the orga-
nization must from the start be recognized. The degree to which they
have been affected and modified must also be appreciated. To be suc-
cessfully realized, changes must be managed as they would be if they
were explicit, written legal obligations.
To ignore these is to destroy the commitment, dedication, support,
and loyalty of the employees which is so critical for the organization's
ultimate success. Frequently, employees of organizations in transition
feel they have been deceived by their employer and become bitter and
distrustful. Successful transitions require the support of the employee
body—with trust as the corner stone.
Hence, success begins with the understanding of the employees'
expectations in the traditional order. These unwritten obligations will not
disappear, but they will be altered.
2. Broaden Employee Interests
Organizational stress, challenge and success reflect an organization's
respect and treatment of employees—the "corporate culture."
Previously, many, if not most, organizations faced a more stable, pre-
dictable, and comfortable operating environment incorporating the
prospects for a more certain future. In these circumstances, it was per-
haps inevitable that the same degree of certainty and feelings of securi-
ty would be passed to, or developed by, the employees. In the uncer-
tain, unstable, and rapidly changing circumstances encountered by orga-
nizations today, it is similarly inevitable that these feelings will be passed
to the workforce.
In this environment, job security, recognition, opportunity, and
development often assume very different definitions and require differ-
ent approaches if they are to be realized. Where they were previously
defined within the boundaries of an individual organization, they must
now be defined in terms of the employee, who may have several
employers during his or her working life. Where the responsibilities for
their achievement were mostly borne by the employer, they are now
shared, with a major obligation residing with the individual employee.
Awareness of the change in this most fundamental of relationships
within an organization is the starting point for the successful manage-
ment of its transition to a form, structure, and approach geared to sur-
vival and growth. Management must also demonstrate through its actions
that it has accepted these new obligations and responsibilities.
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This will only be achieved, and be perceived to be sincere, if the
organization adheres to the principles of the unwritten contracts. Any
change in the actions necessary to achieve them should, therefore, be
identified to the employees.
In recent years, London Life and Ontario Hydro have both attempt-
ed to discharge the unwritten rules with varying degrees of success. Both
are large and have long histories of successful operation within their
respective industries. In each situation, employees expected to remain
with the company until they, the employees, chose to leave, either to
join a different employer or retire. Each company, for very different rea-
sons, was forced to disrupt this situation by reducing staff numbers in
response to the pressures it faced.
Each demonstrated an awareness of its moral obligations by provid-
ing all employees—those it believed would be departing as well as
those expected to remain—with considerable information and assistance
for a job search in today's environment. All affected employees had the
opportunity to attend seminars relating to the changes the organization
was contemplating, and the reasons why; the preparation of an effective
resume focusing on personal skills and desires, rather than previously
held job titles or positions; and effective procedures to follow in order
to find a new position. More senior individuals, whose skills were less
portable, were given opportunities for training, and some were provid-
ed with individual testing, counselling, and assistance.
While the majority of employees in each case were shaken by the
change, those who remained with their employer at least felt the orga-
nization had made the effort to fulfil the employees' expectations,
albeit in a radically different way. For each employer, the future is
more secure in so far as the employee commitment and dedication is
concerned.
3. Manage the Conflicts of Transition
For new hires these new circumstances are easily implemented—they
do not know, and have not experienced, the previous "culture." For
existing employees, the task is more daunting. They have their memo-
ries, and usually place a substantial value on "the way things were."
Now they face the uncertainty and insecurity they were previously
shielded from, as well as the fear of assuming new roles and responsi-
bilities should they be fortunate enough to remain employed after the
transition.
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In these circumstances, management must have a dual internal
focus: the employees who will remain, and those who are departing.
The treatment of each will do much to set the tone for rebuilding the
support, dedication, loyalty, and trust which are essential for the organi-
zation's future well-being. The treatment of those who leave is as impor-
tant for this rebuilding as the treatment of those who remain: each group
is equally important and influential in the rebuilding exercise.
Managers have two responsibilities to existing employees: building
a foundation for the future and a bridge to it for those employees who
will be retained, and the fulfilment of their expectations as a conse-
quence of the former relationship. While separate, these are intimately
linked: the foundation for the future will be significantly better if those
who remain feel their employer treated their departing colleagues in an
appropriate manner—if, in other words, they believe that the employer
lived up to the traditional expectations and can be trusted to do the
"right thing" in the future with respect to their own job security, the
recognition of their value and contributions, their access to new oppor-
tunities, and their personal and career development.
Job security will be in doubt—immediately, as the restructuring
unfolds, and over time as the organization wrestles with the reality of the
new, more competitive market. These insecurities will be reinforced by
the continuing introduction of new processes and approaches derived
from the relentless march of technological advances. The forces of com-
petition will virtually force an organization to adopt new approaches and
technologies in a timely manner. All will come to realize that the slow,
steady advance of the past has been replaced by the quickening pace of
change in the workplace.
4. Broaden Job Security and Outplacement
In these circumstances, job security must be redefined as financial
security which may be achieved in a variety of ways for those who
leave and those who remain. Departing employees face options which
are more diverse and immediate. For older employees with longer ser-
vice and greater seniority, it may be achieved through appropriate
"early" retirement options. For shorter-term employees, it may mean
having to increase their employability through training or retraining in
order to upgrade and enhance their current skills or acquire new ones.
For others, it may be achieved by means of severance packages,
including the provision of "outplacement" services and techniques
174 The Ethics of the New Economy
which afford adequate time and concrete assistance to secure employ-
ment elsewhere, perhaps to follow their entrepreneurial dream. For
many employees, the appropriate efforts will be directed at their abil-
ity to find and retain employment.
As a result of the experience gained with, and the sheer numbers of,
downsizings since the late 1980s, the techniques, approaches, and ser-
vices available have changed and become more readily available and
acceptable. Training has been broadened to put greater emphasis on
more general abilities through education to supplement the traditional
emphasis on specific skills for specific positions. Hence, educational
assistance and leave packages are more widely available.
Similarly, outplacement services have expanded in scope. Where
they originally were directed at the needs of specific individuals, usual-
ly more senior managers, they are now readily available for large, diver-
sified groups. Greater emphasis is placed on developing an understand-
ing of the individual's strengths and desires. Resumes are now devel-
oped by examining the tasks and assignments people have undertaken,
not the titles of the positions they have held.
An outgrowth of these outplacement activities has been the broad-
ening of management and supervisory training programs to include per-
sonal development. As a result, greater assistance is provided to help in
the selection of an appropriate position, enhance job satisfaction, and
career planning. All of these activities assist both the departing and
remaining employee.
Those who remain in the workforce, either with their current
employer or with another, will most likely achieve financial security
through more specific awareness of the need to participate in ongoing
training and retraining programs (lifelong, continuous learning) in order
to enhance their employability through time. The employer must work
with them to ensure they recognize this need and their new personal
responsibility for its attainment.
This represents a substantial change in the employer-employee rela-
tionship for many organizations—for both parties. A shift to a shared
commitment for personal development benefits the employees by mak-
ing them more flexible in their career options. The employer benefits
from having employees who take ownership of their development
because it often results in better-trained, more highly committed employ-
ees who are more likely to demonstrate a positive attitude towards their
current employment.
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5. Provide Recognition, Fair Access to Opportunities and
Career Development
The other factors, recognition, fair access to opportunities, and changes
for personal and career development, are subject to less dramatic
upheaval. However, they are also subject to redefinition and a change in
emphasis. Their attainment through the period of transition will be
equally challenging.
Recognition can be demonstrated in a number of ways, first and
foremost by giving employees a chance at the remaining positions
where it appears that their skills, abilities, and experience, with or with-
out retraining, are appropriate.
Providing fair and appropriate access to new positions within the
restructured organization is crucial to developing the support, commit-
ment, dedication, and trust of the employees. Time is often the largest
obstacle to the realization of this objective. Management's need to have
the positions filled in a timely manner will be in conflict with the need
to find the best person.
Some organizations have declared virtually all positions in the new
structure to be vacant and invite employees to apply for positions which
appeal to them. This appears at first blush to be a fair, open and demo-
cratic approach to this issue, but severe difficulties can arise.
Immediately, the number of applications overwhelms the system and
those making the selections. Given the uncertainties, most individuals
apply for more than one vacancy in order to maximize their chances of
attaining a position. If, on average, each applies for four vacancies, there
are suddenly four times as many applications as there are people. If the
process is adopted before the downsizing occurs, there will be propor-
tionately more applications.
The pressure to make timely decisions frequently makes it impossi-
ble to conduct a thorough assessment of each application for each posi-
tion. Selections are therefore based on previous, often less relevant
information. Many candidates are selected to fill what at least look like
their former positions. The changes in roles and responsibilities are often
too subtle to be recognized by a wide audience; it therefore appears that
only the title has changed and the incumbent was pre-selected. Many
selections will be based on previous contacts with the applicant, leaving
the impression that the "old boy's network" is alive and well.
As a consequence, what began as a process geared to demonstrat-
ing the new order, gaining converts, and building support, turns out to
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have the opposite result. The majority of employees, including many
who were selected, feel the approach was a sham and they were manip-
ulated. Suspicion and distrust soon follow.
A better approach fills the vacancies in the new structure with peo-
ple who have proven performance records, and equally important,
whose actions have clearly demonstrated the desired corporate values
and approaches. This approach provides a smaller, more manageable list
of candidates and reduces the pressure on management to make hasty
selections. This allows more thoughtful selections. If the criteria for
selection are clearly enunciated and followed, both the selected and
non-selected employees are more likely to be supportive, even if the
support is grudgingly given.
Once the appointments have been made, the non-selected, "redun-
dant" employees should be offered "departure" packages which the
retained employees will view as fair and reasonable.
Taking the time to understand the skills, abilities, and potentials of
the existing workforce is a wise investment. Otherwise, the relief and
euphoria first experienced by those whose employment remained unaf-
fected will soon be replaced by anger and distrust, particularly if they
feel they were passed over for an appropriate and more desirable posi-
tion which was filled by a "favoured" internal candidate, or worse, by an
inappropriate outsider—at this point, all outsiders will be viewed with
hostility.
6. Communicate
Communication is an important ingredient in the transition process, but
its role, significance and limitations are frequently misunderstood. The
vehicles available range from the objective, detached organizational
newsletter and directed memos, and their electronic counterparts,
through town hall, department and section meetings, to one-on-one per-
sonal discussions. Their value ranges from clarity and certainty of facts
to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the basic message. As well,
management staff are as susceptible to these misunderstandings and mis-
interpretations as anyone else. When this happens, it often leads to a
failure to "walk the talk," thereby inadvertently causing further harm—
do as I say, not as I do. The sincerity behind the efforts will be ques-
tioned and distrust will be reinforced, not diminished. The appropriate-
ness of a vehicle will change throughout the transition and should reflect
the requirements of the audience.
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Frequently, too much is expected of the communications process.
In reality, it is a dialogue which will, if properly conducted, achieve
only three objectives. It will raise awareness and understanding of what
is being done and why. It can give comfort: the employees not only
understand what action is being proposed, why and how, but how they
can derive personal satisfaction from these changes and from knowing
that their particular circumstances are understood and considered. In
addition, and perhaps most importantly, the communications program
will legitimize the actions of an employee's supervisor both in assum-
ing new roles and responsibilities and in asking their staff to undertake
equally new and different assignments. If the employee recognizes that
his or her supervisor has the organization's approval for their new
behaviour, it will be easier for him or her to accept the changes being
asked of them. This reinforces the fact that the closer and more per-
sonal the dialogue, the greater the awareness, comfort, and support
instilled in the recipient.
The value of an effective communications program can be
increased, and the possibility of clarity reinforced, if the communications
plan adheres to a cascading process beginning with the most senior staff
and proceeding through the organization's authority structure to the
most junior. These messages can be further enhanced through the use
of a full range of available vehicles.
Conclusions
The breadth, depth and speed of change which has occurred in the
operating environment of domestic organizations has created new and
significantly different requirements on the way business is organized and
conducted.
Changes in the unwritten moral and ethical characteristics of the
employer-employee relationship in the workplace are a major source of
powerful resistance to the successful adjustment of organizations in
response to this new economic environment. This is particularly true for
the vast majority of organizations, in which a major factor in the changes
is based on behavioural modifications.
The recognition and management of these moral and ethical realities
is an important ingredient in the change process. By shortening the tran-
sition period and pursuing the strategies I have outlined, one can devel-
op a high degree of commitment, dedication, and trust on the part of the
workforce. This is not just the right thing to do, it is good business.
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Fair Change: Employment
Equity and Restructuring
NormaJ. MacRae
The fact that the economy is anaemic does not justify a listless response
to discrimination. (Abella 1984, 1)
Background
Employment equity as it has been implemented in Canada refers to a
comprehensive and active planning process used by an employer to
ensure appropriate representation of designated groups within the work-
force. Employment equity not only identifies and eliminates employment
barriers and practices which may be discriminatory, but also applies spe-
cial measures and accommodates differences in order to ensure fair
treatment. At no point in either the federal or in the short-lived Province
of Ontario legislation were there "job quotas." In short, "the Canadian
response to inequality has sought to avoid the controversy and stigma
attached to affirmative action, but more important, it is a much broader
strategy that is designed not only to improve numerical representation
through hiring, but to provide fair employment systems and supportive
organizational culture for women, racial minorities, aboriginal peoples,
and persons with disabilities" (Agocs and Burr 1996, 34).
Clearly, employment equity is concerned with recruitment and hir-
ing, but the essence of equity goes beyond the hiring process. A typical
employment systems review within an organization examines all policies
for recruiting, hiring, retaining, training, promotion, and the determina-
tion of salaries and benefits, thereby identifying which policies, if any,
Note to this chapter is on p. 306.
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are discriminatory in their effect. Such a review also recommends the
introduction of policies which would be supportive to the maintenance
of an equitable work environment for all employees. Examples of such
policies would include flexible work hours, job sharing, harassment poli-
cies, training leaves, etc.
Employment Equity: Common Sense
It is not the purpose of this paper to present a "case" for the existence
of policies and programs whose aim is fairness in the workplace. It is
taken as given that if rights exist under the law of the land, then they
must exist for all citizens, otherwise they are not rights. It is also taken
for granted that history has shown that good intentions are not
enough—there must be effort put forward to ensure people receive
equal treatment in the application of those laws and the access to those
rights, which often means receiving different treatment. If good inten-
tions were enough to ensure fairness, we would not see the lack of pro-
portional representation of various groups within the workforce: "It is
not enough to be able to claim equal rights unless those rights are some-
how enforceable. Unenforceable rights are no more satisfactory than
unavailable ones" (Abella 1984, 10).
The Royal Commission Report also noted that in Canada there are
four groups that share disadvantages disproportionately in regard to
employment: native people, visible minorities, disabled persons, and
women. The continued denial of equal access to employment because
of sex, racial characteristics, and disability has the potential for prevent-
ing economic growth—both national and organizational—because
skilled members of the four designated groups are hindered in their par-
ticipation in the workforce.
Those organizations which have implemented employment equity
successfully are the ones which have recognized that diversity in the
workforce is part of excellence. This has been the case in the private,
public and "broader public" (government-funded) sectors. The need for
a corporation's sales employees to reflect their customer base, the help-
fulness of having people in the public service who mirror the people
whom they serve, the merit of diversity in the providers of education for
the changing society which is Canada—all of these constituency-based
needs are synonymous with employment equity. To put it differently,
service in the broadest sense is to understand and reflect the needs of
those who are served. To amplify the examples further, car dealerships
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have been increasing the number of women in their sales departments
to reflect the growing number of women who buy cars for themselves
and appreciate dealing with a woman. In the public sector, it is acknowl-
edged that the presence of police officers who are themselves members
of visible minorities in a community which has a high population of
members of visible minorities has aided immensely in police-communi-
ty relations. In the broader public sector, it is deemed important in post-
secondary educational institutions to have a variety of perspectives and
skills from which students may choose their career and life paths.
Increasingly, organizations are making the case that employment
equity is not just good in terms of fairness and service but also in terms
of financial planning in relation to human resources. It has been argued
(Lynn 1996) that diversity is part of the "intellectual capital" of the orga-
nization, one of the crucial intangible assets. The difference between an
organization's "bricks and mortar value" in a financial statement versus
the marketplace value of the same corporation, it is argued, is the intel-
lectual capital. It is the people who provide what is excellent about an
institution. For this reason, getting the right people (including a variety of
people) is part of compounding the intellectual assets of an organization.
A case can also be made (Lynn and Bazile-Jones 1996, 2) that a
diverse workforce is essential for "establishing a business environment
that fosters flexibility and innovation." Companies which depend upon
innovative design improvement, such as those in the transportation
industry, have found that a team comprised of a variety of backgrounds
can cut new design development time by up to half (Lynn 1996, 2).
The challenge for those who would make the business case for
employment equity is whether it is a program which can stand up to a
cost-benefit analysis. Certainly there are costs in regard to managerial time
(policy development and review) and front-line time (training and input).
But one must balance these costs with the corresponding benefits:
the payoff or benefit from such an investment shows up in improved
employee morale, which can produce a number of spinoff effects, also
measurable. One of these savings is the potential cost of dysfunctional
turnover, including the learning costs of new employees, the halo effect
of low effort/low performance/high reward on the productivity of the
high performers, and the phenomenon of low productivity and minimal
performance displayed by dissatisfied employees seeking employment
elsewhere. Another identifiable cost saving from reducing turnover is
out-of-pocket hiring costs, such as agency engagement, advertising,
travel costs for recruiters and candidates, and orientation costs. At least
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a portion of potential turnover costs may be saved by developing poli-
cies that train and reward employees equitably and that are geared to
recognize and enhance the individual's unique contribution to the orga-
nization.... A single complaint of inequity or unfair practice, such as an
harassment complaint taken through the courts or the human rights
commission, could cost the organization more than $50,000, not includ-
ing the damage to the organization's good will (i.e., its reputation with
its primary stakeholders). (Lynn and Bazile-Jones 1996, 16)
The Challenge of Restructuring
In recent years, organizations have faced the necessity of internal change
for a variety of reasons. Certainly one which caused (and continues to
cause) major ripples in organizational management is the impact of com-
puter technology. Training (and retraining), departmental reorganization,
revision of job descriptions, renegotiations of collective agreements,
alterations in product design (sometimes a complete change of product)
have been extensive responses to technological change. The changing
financial climate also has provided organizations with a challenge which
may have even more sweeping implications: restructuring.
The restructuring process generally includes, but is not limited to,
the following:
• Consultation with client/customer constituencies regarding products,
needs, and services
• Identification of core organizational values
• A study of the institutional/company human resource demographics
• A review of the organization's mission statement
• Options for optimizing current resources/maintenance of quality plan-
ning
• Development of a plan for change
• Education of employees regarding change
• Implementing changes
• Continuous monitoring to ensure quality of results and meeting of goals
The key in restructuring, as in employment equity, is the skills of the
workforce: "what cannot be copied are people's skills, expertise, expe-
riences, intelligence, and ways of thinking (a primary component of the
organization's intellectual capital) that can be applied in creative, innov-
ative ways to meet the organization's goals and objectives" (Lynn and
Bazile-Jones 1996, 10).
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What is striking about the steps in the restructuring process listed
above is that they are in essence the same as those in the process for
employment equity, including the employment equity census, the
employment systems review, the setting of goals within the context of
institutional values and objectives, education of the employees, and the
monitoring of change. Similarly, it might be argued that organizations
which have developed the capacity to incorporate employment equity
into the workplace have thereby developed the same skill set which is
needed to adapt to other challenges. Both employment equity and
restructuring involve an open-minded and planned institutional
response to change which makes the best use of a diverse institution-
al skills base. It can be argued that organizations which have success-
fully implemented employment equity are those which are in the best
position to face the specific challenge of restructuring precisely
because they have more flexibility through diversity.25 Both restructur-
ing and employment equity require that the organization put aside pre-
conceptions concerning what the workplace structure must be on
account of what it has been traditionally. Some practices now present-
ed as restructuring, such as job-sharing, flex-time, voluntary reduced
hours, first surfaced in many organizations as part of employment equi-
ty initiatives.
The University Case
Universities may face a particularly strong challenge in regard to restruc-
turing because for the most part their traditional way of operation
extends back for decades, sometimes centuries. With the advent of equi-
ty, however, change has found its way into the Ivory Tower. Those who
would have been denied registration in a university one hundred years
ago (such as members of the four designated groups) are now register-
ing as students in increasingly large numbers. This is important because
"[i]f universities are places where we value diversity of thought, places
where we want to encourage creative debate, then they must be places
to which all people with the intellectual capacity and interest have equal
access and in which there is equal opportunity" (Council of Ontario
Universities Status of Women Committee 1995, 1).
Change has been somewhat slower in regard to the employee pro-
file, but even at the level of the professoriate there is movement in the
last decade. Although it varies depending on the university, in the
Ontario system it is reported that "about 10 percent of all full-time
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tenured full professors are women. On the other hand, women make up
about 37 percent of the assistant professor category and 50 percent of
the ranks below assistant professor" (Council of Ontario Universities
Status of Women Committee 1995, 1).
There are a number of ways in which universities must be cognizant
of the impact of restructuring upon equity in the environment. First, as
they downsize through attrition and various early retirement initiatives,
they must monitor their progress toward achieving their equity goals,
just as they would other institutional goals. For example, because most
of the change in the employee profile has taken place in recent years,
early retirement initiatives directed toward long-term faculty will support
diversity more than the alternative policy of "last in, first out." An infor-
mal survey of Ontario universities after the first round of restructuring in
1995—96 showed in fact that the universities which relied heavily on
early retirement incentives came close to maintaining or improving the
diversity in their workplaces while respecting issues of seniority.
Second, there are very practical aspects of restructuring which can
be considered so that actions taken do not have a differential impact on
various groups within the employee profile. A document from the
Council of Ontario Universities made recommendations for restructuring
in accordance with equity principles beyond the issue of the numerical
profile. For instance:
• If staff are expected to take days off without pay, consider closing at
times that coincide with school breaks, so that there is not a differ-
ential impact on people with children. Remember that child care
expenses can't always be reduced on a per diem basis.
• If choices are made involving "tradeoffs" between salary and bene-
fits, the differential impact of these choices on those with and with-
out family responsibilities should be considered.
• Junior faculty are likely to find it especially difficult to do their jobs
in the coming years. Workloads are likely to increase and granting
councils are reducing their level of support. We need to ensure that
junior faculty have equitable access to university resources. (Council
of Ontario Universities Status of Women Committee 1995, 1-2)
Also, in accordance with the equity process, increased training is
recommended: "In this kind of environment we must maintain the com-
mitment to deal with frustration, complaints, and a potential increase in
disruptive behaviour. This commitment includes both personnel and
training. It should be noted that administrative staff (the majority of
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whom are women) are typically on the 'front line' in this regard and that
female faculty report experiencing higher rates of disruptive behaviour
than their male counterparts" (Council of Ontario Universities Status of
Women Committee 1995, 2).
Another recommendation is the maintenance of support for orienta-
tion and mentoring programs since, as universities become leaner, more
care must be taken to ensure the sustaining of morale and productivity
and the avoidance of mistakes. The establishment of a favourable envi-
ronment must remain an ongoing goal. A climate which is positive for
equity groups will be good for everyone, as such equity initiatives such
as the conducting of campus safety audits has shown.
Above all, universities need to adapt a stance which reinforces
employment equity throughout any restructuring process. Indeed, it is
argued that employment equity should in fact have a central role to play
in restructuring: "It is important that these issues form part of the filter
through which decisions are made and judged. At the very least when
two strategies are approximately equal with respect to academic mission
and cost savings, the choice should be made on the basis of least harm
to equity/diversity objectives" (Council of Ontario Universities Status of
Women Committee 1995, 1).
Conclusion
If fair treatment is part of an organization's self-definition in what may
be called "good times," there are no reasons for it to be set aside during
the difficult years. Instead there are, as has been shown, good reasons—
both ethical and business—for the strong maintenance of employment
equity programs during restructuring and beyond. To ask the simple
question "Can we afford to keep practising equality in employment in
these difficult economic times?" is deceptive, for in fact it calls into ques-
tion far more than the application of a human resource policy within a
single organization. It is better to ask who we are and what we believe:
"No exigency, economic or political, can justify the knowing perpetua-
tion of inequality in Canada. If we fail to rectify it, we guarantee its sur-
vival" (Abella 1984, 6).
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PART VI
Pitfalls of Restructuring
Restructuring implies radical changes to the ways in which public and private
enterprise conduct their business. In view of this, it raises serious questions
about the ways in which we should provide health care, conduct private busi-
ness, and run our education system.The two articles that follow address these
issues by considering some of the common pitfalls that can accompany
restructuring when it fails to properly consider the ethical (and economic)
ramifications of the major structural changes it implies.
Conrad Brunk addresses the issues that are raised by a common tenden-
cy to accomplish the cuts that restructuring requires by treating the risk
assessment that is a normal part of product testing and development as a dis-
pensable corporate function. He warns of the dangers of this attitude—dan-
gers which are both ethical and economic—and illustrates his point with a
detailed case study of Dow Corning and the consequences of its failure to fully
recognize and accept its obligations in this regard.
In the article that follows, Andrea Baumann and Barbara Silverman raise
questions about the nature and effects of de-professionalization—the
replacement of professionals with workers without professional training and
qualifications—within the health care system. In the process, they argue that
restructuring in health care has in reality been a process of "destructuring"
designed "to remove millions of dollars from budgets" and chart the effects of
de-professionalization on professional staff and patients.
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Managing Risks in the
Restructured Corporation:
The Case of Dow Corning and
Silicone Breast Implants
Conrad G. Brunk
After several decades of successfully marketing silicone breast implants
to well over a million North American women, the Dow Corning
Corporation announced in 1995 that it was seeking bankruptcy protec-
tion from any further claims being brought against it for damages caused
by the product. The company was hit with unprecedented awards
against it from judges and juries who were convinced by the testimony
of women and their physicians that a whole range of health problems
they suffered were caused by the implants manufactured by Dow
Corning and several of its competitors.
One of the first of these lawsuits had been brought in 1984, when a
California jury awarded Maria Stern $1.7 million in damages for illnesses
it was convinced had been caused by Dow Coming's implants. The court
found Dow Corning guilty of fraud in its handling of information the com-
pany possessed concerning the risks to women from its implants (Stern v.
Dow Corning, 1984). The flood of litigation against Dow Corning did not
really begin, however, until 1991, when a San Francisco jury awarded
Mariann Hopkins $7.3 million because of its finding that Dow Corning
implants were defective and that the company was guilty of fraud.26 After
the Hopkins decision, the US Food and Drug Administration announced a
moratorium on the sale of the implants, reinforcing an avalanche of court
Notes to this chapter are on p. 306.
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suits filed against Dow Corning. By the end of 1994, over 19,000 cases had
reportedly been filed against Dow Corning.
The straw that broke Dow Coming's back came from a class action
suit in which an Alabama judge approved a US $4.5 billion settlement
between several implant manufacturers and women who filed injury
claims with the court, the largest class action settlement in history. Dow
Corning, which manufactured nearly 30 percent of the over two million
implants placed in women's bodies, agreed to pay nearly half of this $4.5
billion. The Alabama settlement was not the end of Dow Coming's lia-
bilities, however, since the court left the door open for claims from addi-
tional women. More claims were forthcoming, including actions on
behalf of an estimated fifty thousand Canadian women, most of whom
had been excluded from the Alabama settlement.27 By 1995, over
440,000 women had registered in the global settlement against Dow
Corning and the other implant manufacturers.
The Dow Corning experience with the silicone implants is a critical
case study in business ethics, full of lessons in an era of business restruc-
turing and a changing legal and regulatory environment. The company's
bankruptcy declaration represented the near demise of a company as a
result of litigation over a product that represented only 1 percent of the
total sales of the company. It produced unprecedented court awards for
alleged damages of which there was, and remains, little reliable scientif-
ic evidence. Despite the scarcity of scientific evidence for many of the
alleged risks, the overwhelming public perception in North America is
that silicone breast implants posed clearly unacceptable risks of a wide
variety of systemic auto-immune and connective tissue diseases, as well
as many other severe disabilities suffered by women. This public per-
ception of the risk undergirded the willingness of juries and judges to
find Dow Corning guilty of "injuring" countless numbers of women and
to impose these high levels of punitive damages. Dow Corning is wide-
ly perceived as a company whose major failure was ethical—in failing
to take seriously the known and unknown health risks of its product and
manage these risks responsibly—though this was a company which,
prior to the implant debacle, was judged to be a model of corporate
ethics in North America.
The story of Dow Corning and its silicone breast implant products
is a story about the critical importance of ethical risk management. The
story is a graphic illustration of what happens when a company does not
commit sufficient resources to the assessment of the risks inherent in its
products, or fails to communicate accurately and candidly what it knows
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about those risks. This story is especially relevant within the current rush
of business enterprises to "restructure" their operations in ways that lead
to greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Risk management and com-
munication are both costly and financially risky. The activities surround-
ing these activities are, consequently, among the most vulnerable to
restructuring and downsizing. They are among the "first to go." When
managers are faced with decisions about whether to hold a product back
from the market for further assessment of its health or environmental
risks, the temptation is to interpret the uncertainties in the existing
assessments in the most favourable light (assume the minimum risk) and
take one's chances in the marketplace.
The downsizing of resources and attention devoted to the manage-
ment of risks inherent in the products produced by business enterprises
is encouraged by a similar dynamic in the public, regulatory sphere.
North American society is in a strong anti-regulatory mood, leading to
the slackening of regulatory standards of acceptable risks to health and
the environment (see Hanly, this volume). With the forces of downsiz-
ing affecting the public sector as much as the private, it is inevitable that
the regulatory resources of government are the first to go, and that the
result is weakening regulatory pressure upon manufacturers to insure
that their products have acceptable limits of risk.
The effect of this restructuring of resources is predictable. If less
attention and care is given to product safety at the production level and
the regulatory level, the slack will inevitably be picked up at the level of
the consumer—through litigation in the courts. If products impose
harms upon customers or other stakeholders, or if they are perceived to
impose these harms, the only recourse is to sue the manufacturer—the
perceived risk producer—in the courts. In this legal forum, the people
who are called upon to judge whether the plaintiff has been subjected
to unacceptable levels of risk are not scientists, nor even persons who
have an elementary understanding of science, to say nothing of the intri-
cacies and nuances of risk assessment science. As a result, the evidence
sufficient to convince judges and juries that a product poses unaccept-
able levels of risk may fall well short of that required to convince expert
risk assessment scientists, and the burden of proof can easily shift from
the plaintiff, who need not prove that he or she has been exposed to
unacceptable risk, to the defendant, who suddenly has the burden of
proving that the company's product does not impose this risk.
The Dow Corning silicone breast implant story illustrates precisely
these dynamics. It also illustrates that the costs of a corporate failure to
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take the management and communication of risk seriously can be
extremely high—indeed, suicidal—for a company. The moral of the
story, and of other similar court settlements in recent history, involving
the Dalkon Shield, asbestos, and Agent Orange, appears to be that
restructuring a manufacturing company in ways that give less attention to
the issues of product safety is not only questionable on evident grounds
of business ethics, but also from the point of view of corporate self-inter-
est, even corporate survival. And the most critical factor in both the pub-
lic perception and the legal adjudication of the safety of the silicone
breast implant is the public image of the company as an ethically respon-
sible steward of the public health, safety, and welfare. In these cases, the
ethics of a company and its self-interest appear to coincide closely.
Science and Public Perception of Breast Implant Safety
Since the wave of litigation against Dow Corning, the scientific commu-
nity has mounted a vigorous defence of the company and the safety of
silicone breast implants. A strong voice in this defence has been the edi-
tor of the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Marcia
Angell. Soon after the controversy broke in 1994, the journal published
the first major epidemiological study of breast implant patients, which
found no significant differences in the incidence of connective tissue and
other diseases among these women than among a non-implant control
group of twice the size (Gabriel et al. 1994). In an accompanying edito-
rial, Angell wrote that the study showed the decision of the US Food and
Drug Administration to remove silicone implants from the market in
1992 to be "overly paternalistic and unnecessarily alarming." She also
claimed that the FDA decision, which was based on the fact that the
manufacturers "had not fulfilled their legal responsibility to collect data
on the question" (not because implants were known to pose a risk), was
construed by the public as an indictment of the implants. Frightening
stories of auto-immune and connective tissue diseases swept through the
public and were, she said, "reified by repetition." "The accumulated
weight of anecdotes was taken by judges and juries as tantamount to
proof of causation" (Angell 1994, 748).
Angell pursued this argument in a 1996 book, Science on Trial, in
which she reported more recent studies strongly corroborating the Mayo
Clinic findings.28 In the book, Angell claims that the breast implant case
is merely one graphic example of the way public risk perceptions are
often manipulated into mass hysteria, which then becomes accepted as
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valid evidence in the courts. The courts had erred by ignoring the sci-
ence, or worse, by allowing "junk science" in the courtroom.
Thus, in the period since the initial, devastating court settlements
against Dow Corning, the science appears more and more to vindicate
the company's insistence that it did not impose unacceptable risks of
systemic disease upon millions of unsuspecting women. As a result of
the growing consensus in the scientific and journalistic community, even
the widespread view among business ethicists that Dow Corning had
acted unethically has undergone revision.29 The company has undertak-
en a vigorous public relations campaign to restore its image, and
appears to be meeting with a great deal of success.
The lawyers and victims' groups have pointed out, however, that
even the most recent studies have failed to rule out the possibility of sig-
nificant risk of the systemic complications they believe are caused by
breast implants. One of the recent major studies did find a slight increase
in reports of connective tissue disease among women with breast
implants. The most recent scientific review of all the epidemiological
studies found that, while none has indicated a greatly increased rate of
well-defined connective tissue disease or breast cancer in women with
silicone breast implants, none has ruled out a moderately increased risk
for these diseases, either. The study concludes that "[i]nformation is
insufficient to adequately advise women who currently have or are seek-
ing to obtain breast implants about the overall risk of these devices"
(Silverman et al. 1996, 756). Thus, the most salient aspect of the science
for these non-scientific groups is not the fact that the risks appear very
low, but that this assessment itself is fraught with significant uncertain-
ty. This, as will be explained later, is one of the critical factors in the find-
ing among these groups that the risk is unacceptable.
The Erosion of Trust in Dow Corning
What explains this wide divergence between the public perception that
the breast implants pose serious health risks to women and the expert
scientific assessment that they pose little significant risk? These diver-
gences between lay and expert risk assessments are not unusual in pub-
lic debates about risk and safety. The experts usually attribute them to
scientific naivete among the public and especially the media, which prof-
it from the mass hysteria created by stories of serious risks imposed upon
unsuspecting victims by greedy and rapacious corporations. This, surely,
was the view that Dow Corning and its scientific supporters took of the
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breast implant perception. But this account of the differences in risk per-
ception is often based upon a misunderstanding of the way non-experts
tend to think about risk and its acceptability, which is often quite differ-
ent from the expert way of thinking of it.
In the case of Dow Coming's silicone implants, it is clear that what
the public and the juries were paying most attention to was not the sci-
entific evidence of the risk, but rather the way the company as the pro-
ducer (and manager) of the risk was handling the safety questions sur-
rounding its product. The judges and juries awarded the high settlements
not so much because they were convinced that the illnesses of the plain-
tiffs were clearly and unambiguously caused by their implants, but
because they were convinced that the company had not acted responsi-
bly in handling the information, uncertain as it was, about the risks of
the product. In effect, Dow Corning was found liable for the illnesses
suffered by the many thousands of its customers because it was found
to have acted unethically towards them.
The trials clearly indicate this. In the early Stern decision, Dow
Corning was found guilty of fraud. The basis for this finding was the fact
that Maria Stern's lawyers had uncovered internal Dow Corning docu-
ments which could be interpreted as showing that the company knew
about the risks posed by the silicone implants and had deliberately cho-
sen to withhold this information from the public, and possibly even from
the regulators. Among the documents were memos from physicians to
the company complaining about defective and ruptured implants, and
detailing the effects of the leaked silicone on the bodies of the •women.
Some claimed there was evidence that the silicone was not biologically
inert, and was causing severe foreign-body reactions in some individu-
als. Letters from surgeons complained about the poor quality of the
implants. In response to the complaint that the implants felt "oily" with
silicone when they were removed from their packages, salesmen were
urged by their managers to wash the samples in washroom sinks imme-
diately before using them in sales demonstrations.
In one memo, a salesmen who had heard many of the complaints
wrote to his Dow Corning boss: "To put a questionable lot of mam-
maries on the market is inexcusable. I don't know who is responsible
for this decision but it has to rank right up there with the Pinto gas tank"
(Bryne 1996, 78). Another memo strongly suggested that a Dow Corning
marketing executive made deliberately misleading assurances to com-
plainants that the company was undertaking studies of the silicone
migration and the contracture problems in response to complaints about
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the product. He wrote, "I assured them, with crossed fingers, that Dow
Corning too had an active 'contracture/gel migration' study underway.
This apparently satisfied them for the moment, but one of these days
they will be asking us for the results of our studies.... In my opinion, the
black clouds are ominous and should be given more attention" (Bryne
1996, 79).
Most damning of the internal Dow Corning documents revealed at
the Stern trial, however, was a report on a study which had been pub-
lished in a medical journal in 1973 (Robertson et al. 1973). It involved
four dogs implanted with small implants and observed for two years.
The published study largely reported the results at the end of the six-
month mark (even though published after the end of the two-year peri-
od), and found only minor inflammation in some of the dogs. The inter-
nal report which had been kept within the company, however, revealed
that at the end of the two-year period, one of the dogs had died, and
the other three had varying degrees of severe chronic inflammation
(Bryne 1996, 103-104).
During the Stern trial, an expert witness called by the plaintiff to
comment on the study, pointed out the discrepancies between the pub-
lished study and the internal reports. The judge compared the internal
documents with those the Dow Corning lawyers brought into court, and
noticed that the identifying numbers on the dogs had been altered on
the documents Dow Corning had given the attorneys. It looked suspi-
ciously like the company had altered the data to make it more difficult
to get at the full two-year results of the study (Bryne 1996, 103-104).
The revelation of these internal documents, especially the allegedly
misreported dog study, was the key reason why the Stern jury found
Dow Corning guilty of fraud and awarded Maria Stern $1.7 million. Dow
Corning, however, appealed the jury's decision, and during the appeal
reached a settlement with Maria Stern for an undisclosed amount of
money and an agreement that all the internal Dow Corning documents
disclosed at the trial would remain confidential. This secrecy agreement
won by the company may have been one of the most important contri-
butions to its later troubles with the courts, for it made much more plau-
sible the later charges that the company had withheld important risk
information from the FDA as well as from its consumers.
In 1988, the FDA reclassified silicone implants as a "Class III" prod-
uct requiring proof of safety to remain on the market, and asked the man-
ufacturers to submit, by July 1991, Pre-Market Approval (PMA) applica-
tions which require the submission of scientific data showing their
196 The Ethics of the New Economy
devices to be safe and effective. Dow Corning submitted 329 studies to
the FDA in July 1991, and by September the FDA told the company that
the studies were not adequate to show that silicone implants were safe
(or harmful), and requested more data.
By this time, public concern for the safety of silicone breast implants
was beginning to emerge in full force, prompted by the appearance in
the media of rumours about risk information allegedly suppressed by the
company. In December 1991, Mariann Hopkins was awarded the $7.3
million settlement against Dow Corning. FDA head David Kessler was
under intense public pressure to do something in response to public
fears. In the month following the Hopkins decision, Kessler received the
information he needed to act. Hopkins' lawyer had won the lawsuit with
the help of the internal memos and studies from the earlier Stern law-
suit, in addition to new studies he subsequently obtained from Dow
Corning. By January these documents, still confidential, turned up in a
package delivered to Kessler. Three days after receiving the package,
Kessler asked the manufacturers to place a voluntary moratorium on the
sale of the silicone implants. The Health Protection Branch of Health and
Welfare Canada placed a similar moratorium on sales in Canada.
The FDA/HPB moratoriums further solidified the public perception,
already well entrenched, that silicone breast implants were unsafe. It
was clearly the widespread perception that Dow Corning had misled its
customers, the FDA, and the public that led the courts to respond so
favourably to plaintiffs claims that they had been subjected to unaccept-
able risks from their breast implants and to impose such heavy awards
against the company. The company had lost a major public relations bat-
tle, due largely to the revelations of its apparent internal mishandling of
the risks. The fact of this perceived disregard for the public welfare was
the primary basis for the juries' judgment, not the actual scientific evi-
dence of damage, which was slight.
Conclusion: Downsizing Risk Management Can Be Hazardous
What can be learned from the Dow Corning story about the ethical man-
agement of product risk? This is essentially a story about what can hap-
pen to a company that fails to manage the risks inherent in its products
in a way that inspires public confidence. In the current atmosphere of
downsizing in both public and private spheres, it is tempting for com-
panies to cut back the resources allocated to this important function in
the expectation that there is less corporate risk involved in paying less
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heed to product risks. After all, if the regulatory bureaucracies devote
less attention to product risks, and if the standards applied to these risks
are less restrictive, why should companies allocate increasing resources
to risk management or impose more restrictive, risk-aversive standards
to their products? Safety costs money, and the higher the safety standards
the higher the costs—and the lower the corporate profits.
But the recent experiences of Dow Corning and other companies
which have run into similar product liability disasters30 strongly suggests
that corporate self-interests, to say nothing of good business ethics, are
best served by spending these extra resources, even under conditions of
restructuring and downsizing. There are three points in the marketing
process where product risk management can be exercised. It can be
exercised by the manufacturer in the design and testing of its own prod-
ucts, where the company determines how extensive its risk assessments
will be and what standards of safety it will adopt. Or, secondly, it can be
exercised by government regulators who set the requirements for testing
and the standards of safety. And, thirdly, it can be exercised much later
by consumers taking their liability claims to the courts. In this third case,
the courts will impose their own standards of risk management upon the
companies. When they do, recent experience shows that they are likely
to set more demanding standards than the regulators, and the costs to
the company are likely to far exceed the costs of much more conserva-
tive and precautionary risk management at earlier stages, especially at
the first stage.
The reasons for this are dramatically illustrated by the Dow Corning
story. In the end, it was the public perception of the acceptability of the
risks inherent in silicone breast implants that determined Dow Coming's
liability. As the company has repeatedly pointed out, this perception of
the risk greatly exceeded that which the science itself seems to support.
The standards applied by the courts and juries were, consequently, far
more strict than are typically applied by public regulatory bureaucracies.
In the breast implant case, even the much criticized USFDA was never
inclined to accept the risk assessments and safety margins ultimately
imposed by the courts.
It is important to understand what lies behind the public perception
of risk, which often differs significantly from scientific assessments. For
only then can it be seen why it is so important for manufacturers to exer-
cise extraordinary care in risk management at the first stage of the
process, even before market approval is sought from the regulators. For
scientists, the most significant factor in the acceptability of a risk is its
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magnitude. If the magnitude of a risk is assessed to be extremely low
(and this is the current judgment of the best science with respect to the
systemic health effects of silicone implants), then there is little reason to
believe that the risk is unacceptable. Even if this magnitude factor is
high, most scientists are inclined to withhold judgment on the risk's
acceptability until other information about such factors as off-setting
benefits are considered.
Non-expert perceptions of risk typically are strongly influenced by
other, more qualitative, aspects of the risk which tend to be ignored, or
considered irrelevant, by scientific experts. Among these are such things
as the perceived voluntariness of the risk. Risks that people believe they
are taking voluntarily are acceptable at far higher levels than risks per-
ceived to be imposed upon them by others. This is a perfectly rational
consideration in a society that highly values personal freedom and self-
determination as well as the right to be secure from harms imposed by
others. For very similar reasons, equally reasonable, lay people general-
ly are much more accepting of risks produced and managed by agents
they trust than by agents they do not trust. Just as people are notoriously
willing to engage in high-risk activities like driving and skiing and sky-div-
ing, because they trust their own ability to manage the risks (often with
little justification), so too are they more willing to accept risks managed
by others whom they trust to look out for their interests. A risk imposed
by an agent whose competence and integrity one does not trust is far less
acceptable than a risk posed by a trustworthy agent. The reason there is
often wide disparity in the evaluation of risks between scientists and the
non-scientific public is not, as is so often alleged, because the latter are
misled by media fear-mongering or by their own scientific naivete, but
because the two are paying attention to two different aspects of the risk.
The former are concerned primarily with its magnitude and the latter with
the integrity and competence of the risk producer/manager.
This is why Dow Corning lost the battle in the courts—because it
lost the battle for public trust and confidence. The evidence presented
in the courts about the way the company had managed the known risks
of local complications posed by its silicone implants undermined public
confidence in the company so severely that it led to the firm and settled
conviction that the other, weakly established, risks of systemic illness
were unacceptable. Indeed, once public trust in a risk producer/manag-
er is seriously undermined in public consciousness, the importance of
the actual magnitude of the risk as established by the science becomes
secondary. Dow Coming's defenders have often complained that the
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court trials turned into "morality plays" in which the juries looked for a
moral villain rather than for a scientifically reliable cause of the plaintiffs'
illnesses. When the internal memos provided the evidence of villainy—
of a company that had failed to inform its customers of the known risks
of silicone implants and had conducted little research to establish that
the systemic risks were insignificant—this was all that juries needed to
conclude that the plaintiffs had been exposed to unacceptable risks of
the latter kind. It mattered little what the best scientific assessment of
these systemic health risks was: they were unacceptable, because those
who were doing the science were untrustworthy. If the company had
proven itself to be untrustworthy in its handling of the known risks, why
should it be trusted in the handling of the unknown (uncertain) ones?
The source of the distrust in Dow Corning lies in several perceived
failures in its own management of the silicone implant risks. The first
appeared to be a deliberate policy to keep information it had about
flaws in the product (silicone bleeding, rupture, capsular contracture,
etc.) "in house." Later, when it did make this risk information available,
it chose to inform only the surgeons, and not the patients who received
the implants. This constituted a second failure—a failure to consider as
stakeholders of the company the ultimate users of its product who bore
the risks of these complications. The third failure involved the compa-
ny's decision not to engage in a vigorous study of the potential risks of
systemic health effects—cancer, auto-immune and connective tissue dis-
eases—which some of its early studies indicated might be a problem.
This clearly was the view of the USFDA, which found that the data the
company submitted in response to the 1988 request was insufficient to
rule out the possibility of significant risks. The fact that subsequent
research has failed to establish significant systemic health risks does not
absolve Dow Corning of this failure. The research should have been
done by Dow Corning before it was forced to do it by the litigation
brought against it. The fact that the company was found to have with-
held parts of its own studies when it published them did not help in the
cause of image building as an ethically responsible company.
What the story shows is that Dow Corning chose to do the mini-
mum in its assessment and management of the risks in its product. It
interpreted the studies and market feedback indicating potential prob-
lems in the light most favourable to the product. It chose to err on the
side of the potential risks in order to keep research and marketing costs
down, rather than to err on the side of overprotecting the health of its
end-users. It chose to put the burden of proof on those who alleged
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unacceptable levels of risk rather than to assume the burden of proof
of safety in its product. And rather than adopt a policy of full disclosure
to the ultimate risk bearers—those fitted with the implants—the com-
pany chose a path of minimum disclosure at best, if not outright sup-
pression at worst.
That is to say, Dow Corning took the path that is most attractive to
the streamlined, downsized, super-efficient corporation. It gave minimal
attention to the management of product risk. It chose to be "bullish" with
respect to the risks rather than "precautionary." Had it followed a "pre-
cautionary" approach, Dow Corning would have shouldered the burden
of proof of safety and used the preliminary indications of possible risk
in its early toxicological studies as a spur to invest in the additional epi-
demiological and other studies that would have strongly established the
safety of the silicone implants with respect to the systemic health risks.
The USFDA would have certainly found this scientific evidence sufficient
to continue the market approval of the implants, and the moratorium on
the product would never have been imposed.
Additionally, if Dow Corning had been candid in informing the pub-
lic, and especially its patients, of the risks of the local complications, of
which it was fully aware, it may have lost some potential customers, but
the fact that knowledge of these risks has not significantly affected
acceptance of the silicone implants in other countries,31 and the fact that
similar risks are posed by the new replacement saline-filled implants
suggest that the silicone implants would have continued to enjoy wide
acceptance. Had Dow Corning taken the "precautionary" approach, it
would have been more costly in the short run for the company, but in
the long run it would have avoided the harsh judgment of the public and
the courts that the risks posed by its product were unacceptable. And it
certainly would have avoided its own ultimate financial undoing—
brought about by a product that represented a mere 1 percent of its total
business. Instead, Dow Corning took a short-term "bullish" approach to
the risks in its product, which left the judgment about the acceptability
of those risks to the regulator, and ultimately to the courts, where the
standards of risk acceptability proved to be far higher, and where the
judgment was based on the largely non-scientific aspects of the risk.
Ironically, Dow Coming's own failure to act with precaution with respect
to the risks became the basis for a moral judgment of the company
which made an otherwise acceptable risk unacceptable.
If adopting a "precautionary" approach to product risk is in the best
long-term interest of a company, then the prudent company will not
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shortchange its commitment to risk management and its willingness to
bear the extra costs of high safety standards. Reduced pressures from
regulatory agencies resulting from public sector downsizing and anti-
regulatory politics will not seduce prudent managers into the fallacy of
thinking that product safety is an expendable option. Another irony of
our time is that a public and a new economy which is currently in a
strong anti-regulatory mood is at the same time becoming even more
risk averse—demanding higher standards of health and environmental
safety. If they do not find producers of risk meeting these standards, or
regulators enforcing them, they will surely impose them in the courts.
Such "third-stage" remedies for harm are much less economically effi-
cient ways of allocating compensation for harm than are "first-" and "sec-
ond-stage" remedies, as the Dow Corning story illustrates. They also
result in the after-the-fact compensation for harms caused by unsafe
products rather than the far preferable prevention of these harms.
Precautionary risk management is also the ethical policy. The Dow
Corning case shows also just how important the image of a company as
an ethical manager of the public safety can be in the ultimate acceptance
the public gives to the company's products.
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De-Professionalization in Health
Care: Flattening the Hierarchy
Andrea Baumann and Barbara Sllverman
The hospital system has been undergoing restructuring at an unparal-
leled rate in the last five years. This process could as easily be called
destructuring, as it is characterized by changes to traditional hierarchies.
Much that has been written on restructuring during the past decade dis-
cusses a variety of activities taken on the part of managers or adminis-
trators to improve hospital efficiency and reduce costs. These include
the downsizing and re-engineering of the working force in the hospital
system. Few analysts of the process have recognized or acknowledged
the impact of changes to professional staff. This paper explores issues
raised by the de-professionalization of health care.
Much of the rhetoric surrounding restructuring supports cost effi-
ciency, cost effectiveness, and improved quality of care. Underlying the
rhetoric is a desperate attempt to remove millions of dollars from budgets
while maintaining a viable service. What have health care organizations
done to meet this fiscal challenge? In the 1980s, strategies included
decreasing or eliminating services, joint ventures or shared services, and
changes to long-standing practices governing length of stay and early dis-
charge (Baumann et al. 1995). Initially, the hospitals achieved savings by
decreasing bed size, changing the delivery of care practices, and improv-
ing general efficiencies in a way that allowed cost reduction. By the
nineties, the magnitude of the savings required had increased to such an
extent that hospitals were forced to undertake more dramatic measures.
There is little precedent for the measures hospital administrators
have had to use to meet their targets. As a result, many salaried staff
have been laid off, redeployed, and underemployed. In June 1996, 5,220
Ontario nurses were collecting Employment Insurance (Canadian Nurses
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Association 1996). Those left—the survivors—include cadres of both
regulated (professional) and unregulated workers.
The Phenomena of De-Professionalization
Different characteristics define different professions, as do the work envi-
ronments many professionals find themselves in. But there is general
agreement that by definition a professional has an identified body of
knowledge, is autonomous, self-directing, self-regulating, and conforms to
standards set by an association. In addition, Freidson (1986, 73) indicates
that "Both public and private methods of professional credentialing assert
as a prerequisite for qualification, successful completion of some formal
training program associated with higher education." This credentialing or
self-regulating function promotes some degree of predictability, uniformi-
ty, and understanding of what can be expected in the area of service to
the public. When we lose professionals, we lose the rich expertise that
experience and knowledge bring to highly complex environments.
The largest number of professional employees giving direct care in
the hospital system are registered nurses, followed by other health care
workers such as physiotherapists and occupational therapists.
Professional practice takes place within a bureaucratic structure. Nurses,
unlike physicians, are not self-employed; therefore, they have been the
largest professional class highly vulnerable to reclassification, redeploy-
ment or unemployment. Within such a structure, professionals who are
initially protected by contracts become vulnerable to displacement or
redeployment. As organizational structures are altered/flattened, the
standard professional hierarchies have been de-professionalized and
"professional" heads of departments have been removed and replaced
by managers without a health care background. We have to ask our-
selves what an organization loses in the process.
What's in a Name?
Another restructuring phenomenon is the process of revising professional
titles. There are twenty-four health care disciplines that are regulated in
the province of Ontario. They have the legal right to call themselves nurs-
es, physicians, midwives, etc. The term "registered nurse" is, for example,
used to denote that someone is part of that cadre of regulated workers.
In the new restructured environment, professional staff have often
been renamed. Registered nurses and physiotherapists are, for example,
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known as "clinical caregivers" (Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation
1996). Their role is explained to patients and families as follows:
Clinical caregivers are formally trained individuals who co-ordinate the
patient care you receive and manage others involved in your care.
Clinical caregivers will be involved in the more complex components
of your treatment and will evaluate those treatments as well as identi-
fy and assess any other health problems you may have. Most clinical
caregivers will be registered nurses, but some may be from other reg-
ulated health professions such as occupational therapy, physiotherapy,
social work, etc. (Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation 1996, 2)
The renaming of a role within an organization redefines the functions
and increases the probability that this new role will be accepted.
However, removing the word "registered" from a title could contribute
to the de-professionalization of the nature of the role. In addition, when
a client accesses health care services, roles and responsibilities can be
obscured when it is not clear who is a regulated health provider.
The Diminishing Role of the Expert in the
Context of Redeployment
Experts display special knowledge or skills derived from education and
experience. "An expert performer no longer relies on an analytic princi-
ple (rule, guideline, maxim) to connect an understanding of the situation
to an appropriate action. The expert with a background of experience
now has an intuitive grasp of each situation and zeros in on the accu-
rate region of the problem without wasteful consideration of a large
range of unfruitful, alternative diagnoses and solutions" (Benner 1984,
31-32). With the diminishing number of professionals, there are fewer
experts. Because of redeployment—defined to include substantive job
redesign and the reallocation of workers to other clinical units due to
factors such as seniority, substitution, retirement, and unit closures—
many experts are carrying out different functions. In reality, this means
a marginalization of expertise, the de-emphasis of explicit clinical knowl-
edge, and a re-emphasis on a generic set of cognitive skills, such as
problem-solving, administrative, and managerial skills.
The practice of moving experts from one area to another is a com-
mon aspect of downsizing. Often, the decision regarding who is dis-
placed is based on seniority. This practice poses a dilemma—the orga-
nization has an employee who is now a novice. Although some knowl-
edge is transferrable (e.g., procedures, policies), rich clinical knowledge
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is lost in the process. Experts have established schemata or patterns
which allow them to assess processes quickly, move intuitively, and see
a clinical pattern which they use as the basis of immediate intervention.
These are critical skills in highly complex and uncertain environments.
After redeployment, experts do not utilize their knowledge, skills, and
experiences to the same extent since there is a new environment and
set of skills and knowledge to be acquired; a professional expert
becomes, in the process, a novice in the new setting.
It has been estimated that 23 percent of the hospital workforce faces
redeployment or displacement (Metropolitan Toronto District Health
Council, 1995). In organizations that are unionized, workers with senior-
ity are moved—more junior workers are laid off. This results in difficult
adjustments, raises insecurity, and disrupts the functioning of the orga-
nization (Lyall 1991).
Little is known about the effects of restructuring on displaced, rede-
ployed or laid-off workers or the morale of remaining workers. Several
articles have documented individual perceptions of the impact of
restructuring on the system as a whole, or individuals (Armstrong et al.
1994; Baumann et al. 1995, 1996; Cameron et al. 1994a, b; Villeneuve et
al. 1995). A survey of nurses from four hospitals which merged into two
suggests that quality of work life, including job satisfaction, are nega-
tively affected by restructuring (Cameron et al. 1994a). Other work life
issues which are negatively impacted include job insecurity, reduced
organizational morale, and lower commitment to the organization. Those
who retain their positions may have their hours of employment altered
in a way that has serious economic implications.
The Phenomenon of Underemployment
In the nineties, one consequence of restructuring that is not acknowl-
edged is underemployment. Nurses who survive downsizing are some-
times required to change their work status, dramatically decreasing their
number of hours of employment (Villeneuve 1996). At the beginning,
the employee may have had the illusion that they are still employed and
yet were changing status from full-time to part-time. This gradual change
produces a workforce with a greater part-time complement. Though
most hospitals have mission statements which include a commitment to
continuity of care (i.e., care provided by the same workers), this cannot
be achieved as the trend toward a high ratio of part-time staff prolifer-
ates throughout the organization.
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Introduction of the Generic Worker
In order to fill the void left by the removal of professional staff, hospi-
tals have introduced unregulated workers. Gill 1996 found numerous
titles used to describe such generic workers: unregulated care provider
(UCP), multi-skilled worker, personal support worker, nursing aide,
nurse extender, and unlicensed assistive personnel. The implementation
of UCPs is often done in conjunction with other organizational changes.
This makes it difficult to assess the impact of introducing this class of
worker.
Though decreased professional staffing ratios provide one way to
cut costs, it is important to recognize the increased costs associated with
the transition of past employees (laid-off and survivor) and the intro-
duction of this new workforce. Before introducing generic workers into
an organization, it should recognize:
• the increased technological support required to account for
decreased professional staff
• the costs of training and retention
• that there are no regulations for UCPs, so patients cannot be assured
of any standard of education or practice in this group of workers
• that continuous supervision of UCPs is needed to avoid large
amounts of unproductive time (Gill 1996)
We need a rigorous study of the outcomes of using UCPs including costs
and quality indicators such as mortality, length of stay, patient accidents,
infection rates, and skin breakdown (Gill 1996).
What Does It All Mean?—Outcome Indicators of
Quality of Patient Care
It is difficult to measure the impact of restructuring on redeployment.
Even at the best of times, the outcome measurement of quality care is
difficult to define. Quantitative outcome measures commonly accepted
are indicators such as mortality, morbidity, and infection rates. The dif-
ficulty is determining cause and effect—do decreased ratios of profes-
sional staff lead to greater mortality and morbidity? Another important
issue is staff morale. Common indicators to measure morale are com-
mitment, absenteeism, retention, and productivity. The impact of a phe-
nomenon such as de-professionalization is complex and the outcomes
are as yet unestablished.
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The Process of Restructuring
How does restructuring take place in health care? Often institutions hire
outside or out-of-country consulting firms to facilitate the complex
process. Employees are asked to work closely with the consultants to
streamline the process. Schneier and colleagues advocate that the hands-
on workers should be the ones asked to restructure the positions, as
they know the work the best (Schneier et al. 1992). How can the orga-
nization on the one hand ask the employee for assistance, while on the
other hand know that some of these same employees will be laid off or
redeployed as a result of their input into the process? Rochon has shown
that restructuring methodologies are not based on any previously stud-
ied determinants of the best processes (Rochon 1995). So much of what
is documented in the literature has been applied from the private sector.
"However, downsizing in the health care sector can have more life
threatening and immediate implications than would be the case in most
industries" (Baumann et al. 1996).
Anticipate the Future—Measure the Present
There is much concern that restructuring processes are not based on
sound, tested methodologies. Instead, organizations are relying on mod-
els, frameworks, and structures that are haphazardly put forth as "today's
method for restructuring." One result has been a dramatic reorganization
of hospitals and the de-professionalization of health care workers.
What are the positives of this restructuring? It is hard to say, as the
research has yet to provide enough evidence to answer this question.
What are the negatives of de-professionalization? There are many anec-
dotal stories, but again, there is a dearth of research or information on this
topic. Change can have positive and negative effects on the health care
system. It is important to discern these strategies—to capitalize on posi-
tive aspects while minimizing the negatives. Changes based solely on fis-
cal restraint run the risk of undermining the purpose of the organization.
What Does the Future Hold?
This paper has reviewed some of the more dramatic effects of hospital
restructuring on professional staff. One might argue that de-profession-
alization will lead to a re-organization that will improve health care—
that is, the new roles will be assumed and more responsibility will be
De-Professionalization in Health Care 209
attained by professional staff. The leadership and management functions
will be emphasized in order to supervise and guide auxiliary workers in
the complex care of patients. There will be an increase in substitutions
of one professional category for another (e.g., nurse practitioners and
midwives will become more common in both high-risk areas and pri-
mary care). This will increase the opportunity for some professional cat-
egories to grow in numbers while providing efficient and effective care.
However, the consumer of health care will need to attain a heightened
awareness of the re-organization of the system and the professional roles
as they evolve for the delivery of care. Organizations will have to pay
close attention to factors such as staff morale and put in place a variety
of incentives to help professionals cope with institutional change.
Mission statements will have to be reviewed and resources put in place
to carry adequate services to meet the prescribed mandate. The account-
ability will go beyond rhetoric in order to ensure a safe and effective
delivery of care. The phenomenon of minimization of expertise should
not be ignored, as it may have repercussions in the future that manifest
themselves in poor quality care.
Conclusion
This paper has provided an overview of some of the issues that arise
when one attempts to re-organize and downsize in the hospital sector.
Organizational change is never easy, but the evaluation of that change
is an imperative when the quality of health care is at stake.
This paper has raised more questions than it has answered.
Restructuring is a process that will not disappear in the future, but it is
important to identify trends that may impact on the productivity of
employees and patient outcomes. Some of these changes are not nega-
tive, but these employees are in the business of providing direct care to
an acutely ill population. Therefore, changes in delivery of health care
services must be assessed closely, as it is not only the employees who
are affected, but all consumers in the health care system.
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PART VII
The Restructuring Economy
It hardly need be said that restructuring and the restructuring economy have
tremendous social consequences.The new economy they are creating is one
that is characterized by a new understanding of work and new social expec-
tations that are in part the product of the widespread cutbacks in public
spending that have been the hallmark of government restructuring.The three
articles which follow discuss the nature of the new restructuring economy and
the ethical issues which it raises, both in the developed world and beyond.
In their account of "Underemployment and the New Economy," Louis
Groarke and Nebojsa Kujundzic discuss the issues raised by an ever-growing
reliance on part-time (contract) workers who do not enjoy the benefits and
the privileges of the full-time workers they replace. While they look specifical-
ly at the situation of part-time instructors within the university, Groarke and
Kujundzic argue that the issues they raise in this context characterize other
sectors of the economy and have become a major bone of contention in col-
lective bargaining.
Like Groarke and Kujundzic, Robert C. Evans examines the ramifications
of the contract economy. He considers it from the perspective of a long-time
professional provider of "outplacement" services to employees who have been
forced to deal with restructuring by ending one career and finding another. He
identifies the loss of a sense of community as a major casualty in restructur-
ing, suggests that this means that corporations no longer fulfil their obligation
to provide one of the essentials of a good life, and ponders what this bodes
for the future.
Darryl Reed ends this section's look at the consequences of restructuring
with a look at the effects of restructuring beyond the first world. He argues
the pressures created by the restructuring economy have greatly limited the
range of viable social policies in developing nations and have undermined eth-
ical social policy by not allowing equal opportunity for political participation.
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Underemployment and
the New Economy
Louis Groarke and Nebojsa Kujundzic
One phenomenon associated with restructuring is an increase in part-
time employment which occurs when corporations attempt to cut their
costs by employing part-time rather than full-time workers. This allows
substantial savings because part-timers are not accorded the benefits,
salaries and privileges of full-time workers. In the present paper, we
look at the issues that this trend raises, looking briefly at the 1997 UPS
strike and then focusing on teaching positions in universities, where the
move to part-time workers is as significant as it is in any other industry.
We argue that this move raises important ethical issues that have not
been satisfactorily addressed. Though we emphasize hiring in the uni-
versity setting, we believe that analogous questions arise when one con-
siders the rise in part-time employment in other sectors of the economy.
Setting the Scene:The UPS Strike
At the centre of the brouhaha over the 1997 United Parcel Service strike
lies the issue of part-time work. Part-timers account for about 60 percent
of union employees at UPS and more than 80 percent of new employees
hired over the past four years (Herbert 1992). Their complaints are
numerous. They are paid less than half the hourly wage of full-time work-
ers (Uchitelle 1997). They receive fewer benefits. They often work full
time (Appelbaum 1997). And they enjoy little job security. Rachel
Howard, a UPS employee, complains: "There are many weeks that I have
worked 60 and 65 hours a week but UPS calls me a part-timer and pays
Notes to this chapter are on p. 307.
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me part-time wages. I only qualify for a half-time pension.... I am now
in my eighth year and still waiting for a full-time job (Lawsky 1997)."
Management representatives downplay the ethical implications of
part-time work, while representatives of labour contend that part-time
labour is the latest form of capitalist exploitation in disguise. A 1997 head-
line in the Wall Street Journal claimed that the "Part-Time Work Issue is
Greatly Overworked" (11/08/97). The article cites some requisite authori-
ties: Lawrence F. Katz, former chief economist at the US Labor
Department, who points out that the percentage of part-timers in the US
workforce has remained stable for the past fifteen years; Eileen
Appelbaum of the "liberal" Economic Policy Institute, who concedes that
about 75 percent of part-timers want to work part-time; economist Alec
Leveson of the Milken Institute for Job and Capital Formation, who confi-
dently asserts that "the part-time bogeyman is just a myth;" and Professor
Rebecca Blank of Northwestern University, who complains, "I don't
understand why there is as much discussion of part-time work as there is."
But many of the economic statistics used to dismiss the significance
of part-time work are suspect. One can contest the way in which such
figures are calculated. Most importantly, economists do not classify tem-
porary work as part-time. An example can illustrate how misleading this
can be. Suppose I work on contract; I spend the year working full time
for five months, am laid off for three months, work full time another two
months, and am again laid off for two months. At the end of the year,
I have worked, on average, twenty hours a week. American officials
consider anyone who works under thirty-five hours per week a part-
timer. Statistics Canada sets the limit at thirty hours per week. I only
averaged twenty hours per week, but I did not, technically, work part
time. I was either fully employed or unemployed, so I will not show up
as a part-timer in the official economic reports.
Workers naturally fall into two classes: those who enjoy full-time
remuneration and benefits and those who do not. Both part-timers and
temporary workers belong in the latter category. Both are, in a salient
sense, underemployed. Surely they should be classified together.
There are further problems with the statistics. Labour economist
Susan Houseman has argued that the official numbers are seriously
flawed, for individuals who hold two part-time jobs and work enough
hours appear in the official count as full-timers. At UPS itself, more than
ten thousand full-time employees are paid part-time rates. These
employees have the same working conditions, pay-rates, and benefits as
part-timers, and should be classified correspondingly.
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If government figures indicate that the proportion of part-timers in the
US workforce has remained stable, the same figures show that temporary
employment, although a smaller phenomenon, has risen 400 percent since
1982 (Jones and Waggoner 1997). Average daily employment at the
National Association of Temporary and Staffing Services jumped 10.2 per-
cent to 2,337,700 workers in the first quarter of 1997 as compared to the
same period in 1996. These growing numbers of the temporarily
employed should, like part-timers, be added to the ranks of the under-
employed.
Exact rates of partial employment are hard to assess, but the num-
bers are significant. Even according to official figures, twenty-three mil-
lion Americans, or 18 to 19 percent of the labour force, work part time.
And a survey of 550 companies conducted by Susan Houseman at the
Upjohn Institute in the summer of 1997 detected an increase in part-time
employment. The situation at UPS in 1997 is instructive: 60 percent of
employees were part-time, up from 54 percent in 1993 and 42 percent
in 1986 (Uchitelle 1997).
One encounters part-time work in other industries as well. Forty
percent of workers at the Bank of America are part time (Marshall 1997).
According to the American Association of University Professors, almost
60 percent of faculty in American universities are part time or temporary
(Westphal 1996, 151). And in the 1997 United Auto Workers strike, "The
union...made the company's growing use of part-time workers the pri-
mary issue in the negotiations" (The Detroit News 16/07/97, B3).
The use of part-time help poses serious ethical issues. In a worst-case
scenario, full-timers may be laid off, then rehired on a part-time basis. But
even part-timers who have always been part-timers and always will be
part-timers deserve fair remuneration, job security, good working condi-
tions and proper benefits. Eileen Appelbaum argues that "part-time work-
ers should not suffer a 'pay penalty' for working fewer hours, especially
•when they are providing the much-needed flexibility that companies
seek" (Appelbaum 1997, 12A). Preston Conner, president of the National
Association of Part-Time and Temporary Employees, claims that the UPS
strike "highlights [a] growing disparity in wages and benefits" (Jones and
Waggoner 1997, IB). Louis Uchitelle complains of growing inequality in
a two-tier job market where "part-timers, temporary workers and contract
workers populate much of the lower tier" (1997, 22). And Professor
Marick Masters comments that "the practice of using part-timer and temps
is creating a two- or three-tiered class of workers that labour is reacting
very strongly against" (Jones and Waggoner, 1997 IB).
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Part-timers at UPS and elsewhere do face serious problems. Despite
repeated claims that most part-timers do not want full-time work,
a union-sponsored study conducted by Kate Bronfenbrenner at Cornell
University found that three-quarters of former UPS employees were not
satisfied with part-time opportunities there. Even those who want to work
part time enjoy little job security. Of 180,000 hired by United Parcel
Service in 1996, only forty thousand are still with the company, for a
turnover rate of 150 percent (Herbert 1997). And they are paid much less.
Considered globally, across the US, the hourly pay of the average
part-time worker is 64 percent of full-time pay. And the disparity increas-
es when it comes to benefits. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports
that part-timers in private industry averaged $1.82 per hour in benefits
last year compared to $5.85 per hour for full-timers. According to CNN
business correspondent Christine Negroni, fewer than one in five part-
timers have employer-sponsored health insurance (Thierry and Negroni
1997). Only 19 percent have paid sick leave, only 42 percent have paid
holidays, only 37 percent have retirement benefits, only 20 percent have
life insurance options, and so on (Marshall 1997). The percentages are
much higher for full-time employees.
Part-time, temporary, causal, "contingent," or limited-term work is an
important and even a necessary part of economic restructuring. But as
with other economic practices, it cannot escape moral scrutiny. In the rest
of this paper, we will examine the ethical ramifications of part-time hir-
ing in Canadian and American universities. We pick this example because
we want to focus on a concrete case, and because this is one with which
we are familiar. We emphasize that analogous questions can be raised
about the treatment of part-timers in other sectors of the economy.
Partial Employment and University Hiring
In its 1995 newsletter, the American Historical Society decries employ-
ment trends in American universities. According to the society, "The
increasing use of part-time, adjunct, and non-tenure-track faculty
throughout colleges and universities in the United States has become a
major crisis that threatens to undercut the entire post-secondary educa-
tional system" (Westphal 1996, 151). In a 1993 study entitled "The Status
of Non-Tenure-Track Faculty," the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) reports that "part-time faculty now hold 38 percent
of faculty appointments, and non-tenure track, full-time faculty hold 20
percent" (Westphal 1996, 151). This suggests that almost 60 percent of
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the teaching in American colleges and universities is being carried out
by individuals who do not enjoy the salaries, benefits, and privileges of
full-time, tenured faculty. A small percentage of part-timers do have
tenure, but these figures do not include large numbers of graduate
teaching assistants who teach at least one course in the process of com-
pleting their doctorates. One could therefore argue then that the num-
ber of part-time teachers is even higher than it appears.
The situation is essentially the same in Canada. As anyone who
works in the university system will realize, Canadian departments regu-
larly staff many of their undergraduate course offerings with non-tenured
part-timers. It is nonetheless difficult to find exact statistics on the num-
ber of part-timer teachers in Canadian universities, for little attention has
been paid to this aspect of academic employment. Though a 1991
Statistics Canada report suggests that almost 30 percent of workers in the
economic sectors of education, health, and welfare hold temporary or
part-time positions (Statistics Canada 1991, 3D, Statistics Canada does
not include figures on the number of part-time university teachers
among its standard "educational indicators." It does, in contrast, keep
figures on the part-time employment of elementary and secondary
school teachers—figures which show a constant rise in the number of
part-timers, from 31,619 in 1990-91 to 41,828 in 1994-95, an increase of
32 percent in five years (Statistics Canada 1996, 176).
For university teachers, underemployment is the result of financial
pressures that have forced universities to limit the hiring of regular pro-
fessors. The result is a growing number of teaching positions which do
not enjoy the tenure or tenure-track status which has traditionally been
the hallmark of permanent university employment. In 1990—91, for exam-
ple, statistics available from the Canadian Association of University
Teachers suggested that almost 50 percent of the faculty in Canadian uni-
versities did not hold a tenured or a tenure-track position (Riseborough
1993, 4). It is difficult to establish the extent to which these non-tenured
faculty are part-timers, but a 1994 Statistics Canada study by Raynald
Lortie concludes that the number of part-timers teaching in universities is
growing, and that twenty-three thousand (in comparison with 37,300 full-
timers) were employed in 1992 (Lortie 1994, 3D. It is especially notable
that women tend to be employed in the part-time category. Lortie's con-
clusions suggest that a substantial and increasing number of university
teachers work part time, and that this situation is a direct result of the
implicit and ongoing changes which have been forced by continuing
budget pressures. From 1981-82 to 1992-93, the number of (full-time
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equivalent) students in Canadian universities increased 41 percent, but
the number of full-time faculty increased only 15 percent. One (though
not the only) way of compensating for this difference has been a steady
increase in the hiring of part-timers.
Traditionally, there has been little concern for the plight of part-time,
non-tenure track teachers in North American universities. Twenty or
thirty years ago, career part-timers were a marginal element in the ranks
of the teaching profession. Most members of the "baby boom" had little
difficulty finding permanent teaching employment. Many, if not most,
found employment before completing their PhDs. Ethicists nonetheless
recognized that employment opportunities raised important ethical
issues and focused their attention on debates about affirmative action
and employment equity. In marked contrast, a vigorous public debate
on the role of part-time, non-tenure track faculty in post-secondary edu-
cation has only just begun.
The changing complexion of debates about the ethics of employ-
ment is seen in newspapers, magazines, professional societies' newslet-
ters, and campus gazettes, which are increasingly punctuated with dis-
cussions or notices about "part-time faculty," "non-tenured faculty,"
"adjunct faculty," "early retirement," and "academic freedom." The May
1996 issue of Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
Association published contributions to a special December 1995 session
devoted to the role of non-tenure track faculty within the academy. In
1995 the journal Teaching Philosophy included a provocative "case
study" on the ethics of part-time teaching (Pence 1995), and papers read
at scholarly meetings increasingly have titles like "A New Model of
Intergenerational Distributive Justice" and "Affirmative Action, Early
Mandatory Retirement, and Intergenerational Justice."
In the present paper, we want to consider the ethical ramifications
of part-time, non-tenure track university hiring. We will argue that how-
ever one analyses the situation, a great injustice is being perpetrated and
that university administrations, professional organizations and all those
involved in university hiring must try to rectify the manifest unfairness
of hiring practices for part-time employees. Additionally, and quite inde-
pendently from the interests of part-time and sessional teachers, we
believe that there is a need to examine the impact of large numbers of
overworked and underpaid part-timers upon students, especially over
the long term, and especially in crucial first-year courses.
Though our detailed discussion looks only at part-time teaching with-
in the university—which has relatively limited economic impact—we
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believe that analogous issues arise when one considers a growing army
of part-time workers who are increasingly employed in other sectors of
the economy. The case of university teaching is, in any event, an espe-
cially interesting one, for it is a case in which those workers who have to
settle for part-time work are relatively accomplished professionals who
have had to successfully complete many years of education. If profes-
sional workers of this sort cannot escape the problems of the part-timer,
then one must wonder what the chances are for those whose work is
inherently less skilled.
Before we can come to any general conclusions, however, we must
try to understand, in some detail, the mechanism of part-time hiring. For
the sake of simplicity, we will limit our discussion to part-time,
non-tenure-track hiring as it occurs in Canada and the US. As PhD grad-
uates, we know, in intimate detail, the deleterious effects such hiring
practices have had on many of our colleagues. Though we will concen-
trate on that which we know best, we would emphasize that there is no
reason to believe that the employment situation in most university depart-
ments—and especially in those in humanities and the social sciences—
is drastically different from that in our own discipline (philosophy).
Defining the Term "Part-Time"
Before discussing university employment practices, we must define the
term "part-time" faculty. This is a complicated issue, for the concept of
part-time work has changed significantly over the years. The first serious
discussion of part-time employment we have come across is found in
economic literature concerning women. In the early sixties, part-time
work was proposed as an ideal solution for the working mother. In
A Woman's Guide To Earning A Good Living we read that "businesses
and industries are coming to recognize the importance of part-time help
and gradually will reorganize their schedules accordingly," and that "the
great reservoir of potential [part-time] workers is among middle-aged
women, most of whom want to work only part of the time, since they
have home responsibilities" (Winter 1961, 53). The authors of A Woman's
Guide propose part-time work as a viable alternative for women who
lack the inclination or are unable (usually because of domestic responsi-
bilities) to work full time.
In a Few Choices: Women, Work and Family one finds a definite
change of tone. Although its authors are still able to say "Women who
work part-time often feel that they have the best of both worlds" (Duffy
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et al. 1989, 74), they also recognize growing numbers of women are
forced to work part-time because they cannot find full-time employment.
They therefore distinguish voluntary and involuntary part-time work;
between those who work part time because it better suits their needs,
and those who work part time because they cannot find full-time work.
If one looks at university hiring, one finds that part-time faculty are, in
the vast majority of cases, engaged in involuntary part-time work.
But even the concept of "involuntary part-time" work does not ade-
quately describe trends in university hiring. To be a part-time employee
is, traditionally, to spend less time working. The standard full-time work
week is forty hours. Statistics Canada then defines "employment as part-
time if the hours worked are less than 120 per lunar month or thirty per
week" (Lin 1995, 9). If one works appreciably less than forty hours, one
is a part-time employee. But in part-time university teaching, the number
of hours worked is not a salient issue. Pence 1995 describes a (fictional?)
encounter between a part-time teacher who is teaching six courses with a
tenured professor who is teaching two. The story illustrates a very com-
mon fact of life in the contemporary university: especially in the case of
teaching, part-time university faculty often work more hours than perma-
nent, tenure-track faculty. They often teach more students and mark more
papers while trying to carry on research activities at the same time. In a
university setting, "part-time" working has become a euphemism. It does
not mean that one spends less time working, but that one is given com-
pensation and benefits that traditionally accrued to part-timers. The term
"part-timer" frequently means full-time work and part-time remuneration.
Traditional stereotypes suggest that part-timers are less qualified than
full-time workers. But this is misleading. In the first place, we use the
term "part-time faculty" to refer to those university teachers with PhD
degrees who have failed to secure either tenure or tenure-track employ-
ment (though many of our remarks apply equally to graduate students
who lecture during their PhD programs, we will not include them as part-
timers). In the second place, generalizing about part-timers' qualifications
in comparison with faculty who hold tenured or tenure-track positions is
simply untenable. Though part-timers tend to be at the beginning of their
careers, individual part-timers can have better publishing records and bet-
ter student evaluations than at least some of their tenured colleagues, for
older colleagues were awarded tenure-track positions in much less trying
circumstances, often before they finished their dissertations. In our expe-
rience, it is difficult to find a department in which all full-time faculty are
better qualified than all part-time faculty.
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If part-time teaching faculty really were substandard, why would
university departments hire them in such large numbers? As Robert
Badillo observes, in his article in Proceedings and Addresses oftbeAPA,
"the quality-control issue...is largely a red herring, a defensive device
used to cover up the more urgent problem found in maintaining a cheap
labour force oriented to performing the more menial tasks of the pro-
fession at deploringly substandard levels of compensation" (Badillo
1996, 153). The real motivating force behind part-time hiring is eco-
nomic. From the administrators' point of view, the advantages to part-
time hiring are tremendous. Ben Fine writes (in a study of women's
work in England), "The demand for part-time labour is dominated by
considerations of cost In short, it is low pay that employers are pur-
suing" (Fine 1992, 154). In a university setting, part-timers are paid much
less (often one third, one quarter or even less in relation to regular fac-
ulty), they do not have and do not expect any fringe benefits, and can
be laid off at any time. In view of substantial cuts to university budgets,
part-time teaching will, in all likelihood, continue to spread across North
American universities. Hiring large numbers of part-timers is, from an
economic point of view, the most efficient and the most economical way
to cope with large numbers of undergraduates.
On the basis of such considerations, we offer the following sketch
of part-time faculty. Part-timers have their PhD. They are not necessari-
ly less qualified than full-time staff and may, in individual cases, be more
qualified. They may or may not work long hours, depending upon the
availability of work. They would like to work full-time, but lack tenured
or tenure-track status. Instead, they are hired piecemeal on a temporary,
course-by-course basis. They do not receive a yearly salary. The univer-
sity and the department they work for do not recognize any long-term
commitment to their employment. In most cases, they are not accorded
priority when tenure-track positions arise. To be a part-timer is, effec-
tively, to exist outside the tenure-track system with perhaps the hope
that one's status will one day change.
The Fate of A and B
We appear to be witnessing a gradual imposition of a two-tiered system
of employment at North American universities, one composed of part-
timers, the other of tenured and tenure-track faculty. Consider a hypo-
thetical example. Imagine that A has just been awarded a tenure-track
position at the University of Opportunity and B has just begun teaching
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sessionals at the same institution. Let us compare the economic and pro-
fessional progress of A and B ten years later.
Consider, first, the financial aspect. We will use the pay scale from
the University of Waterloo for the 1995/96 financial year (University of
Waterloo Gazette 12/06/96, 1). Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that
there are no salary increases due to inflation over this ten-year period.
Minimum salary for an assistant professor is about $39,000 at the
University of Waterloo. After a period of ten years with regular "merit"
increases, the average faculty member will be earning approximately
$62,000. In ten years of teaching, then, A will make approximately
$505,000.
Calculating the amount of money B will make is a more complicat-
ed matter. The sessional rate at Waterloo per course is about four thou-
sand dollars. Assume that B manages to teach an average of four cours-
es a year. Some years he teaches six or seven; some years two or three.
There are no "merit" increases for sessional teachers, regardless of how
well they teach or the quality of their student evaluations. Raises are
almost non-existent. Over a period of ten years teaching, B will have
made approximately $160,000. That is, he will have made $345,000 less
than A. This, it goes without saying, is a substantial difference.
But the differences in A's and B's circumstances are not only mon-
etary. In a five-year period, A will (if all goes well) be granted tenure.
B, even after ten years of devoted teaching, can be laid off at the end of
any semester. A also enjoys fringe benefits—for example, dental and
medical insurance, a basic research budget (a professional allowance of
$7,440 over ten years at the University of Waterloo), access to other
research funds within and outside the university, a sabbatical leave every
seventh year, a private office, extensive secretarial assistance, the possi-
bility of promotions. If B is lucky, he will receive an office (often shared)
and limited secretarial assistance.
A has some choice of the courses he wants to teach and, at the very
least, he will always know beforehand what his teaching assignment is. B
will have to take whatever is available and may have to prepare courses
on extremely short notice. Badillo, who has been a part-timer at several
American universities and colleges, relates his own personal experience:
In all except three institutions, I have never known whether I would be
teaching at all until registration, days before the beginning of the class-
es. Since the only responsible thing to do in such a situation is to pre-
pare as if one were going to teach the course, I would have a syllabus,
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reading material, etc., ready for the first day. In three cases, I was
informed that the class had been cancelled due to low number of reg-
istrants; in another two cases I was asked to teach another course for
which I had not had the opportunity to prepare a syllabus or to select
course texts. (1996, 154)
In terms of numbers of students, it may be that B teaches more than
A. If there is a graduate program in place, A will teach graduate students.
At the very least, he will teach upper-level undergraduates. Typically,
part-timers teach lower-level courses. This usually means that they have
to teach classes with large enrollments, typically taken by non-majors;
they may have more students clamouring for their attention outside
class, and they have much more marking to do.
Consider next the professional success of A and B ten years later. In
North America at least, it is very difficult to carve out a scholarly reputa-
tion as an independent researcher. As Badillo remarks, young scholars
"need to be affiliated with the academic community for the purpose of, at
the very least, keeping their credentials updated" (1996, 154). Status in the
scholarly community depends on things like books, articles, conference
presentations, membership in professional societies, attendance at spe-
cialized symposia, networking, university affiliation. Chances are that over
this ten-year period, A has considerably more opportunities to advance his
prominence in scholarly circles. "Raw ability" is only one factor in this sit-
uation. A has been able to teach at least some courses that are linked to
his research interests. He has enjoyed research funding, secretarial help,
and is welcomed as a peer into the scholarly community. B has had to
pursue research on his own, without outside help, as something largely
separate from his teaching duties. He must pay any costs incurred, dedi-
cate his spare time to an endeavour for which he receives no tangible pro-
fessional recognition (there are no "merit" increases for part-timers), and
confront the unspoken prejudice that his work is substandard.
It is not hard to imagine the contrast between the morale of A and
B. A has every reason to be satisfied with himself. He has a permanent
job; he is respected by society; he has fulfilled his financial obligations to
his family; he has authority at the university and prestige in the scholar-
ly community. B is, in most cases, a bitter soul who continually wonders
whether he should quit. He does not have a steady job; after ten years,
he has not been promoted; he cannot help comparing his own lot to that
of his tenured and tenure-track colleagues, whose paths he crosses in the
university corridors every day. Being a part-timer exacts a heavy toll on
B's morale.
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Ethical Analysis from Various Points of View
We can consider the ethical implications of part-time university hiring
from different points of view. We will consider the practice from the
point of view of notions of fairness, of proportional value, "a living
wage," exploitation, comparable worth, and discrimination.
John Rawls (1971) equates justice with fairness. But the most ele-
mentary notion of fairness tells us that it is quite unjust to treat two peo-
ple who hold similar qualifications and perform generally similar work
in a radically different manner. If, however, part-time hiring is unfair, this
unfairness is not a personal or an individual phenomenon. Rather, it is
political or systemic; it has to do with the way in which society, and in
this case the university environment, is organized.
Consider next the situation of part-time faculty from the viewpoint
of an Aristotelian notion of proportional value. Aristotle identifies just
exchange with proportionality. He also argues (or assumes) that things
have an absolute value. If, for example, a desk is worth six pairs of
shoes, then if I pay you less than six pairs of shoes for the desk, I am
treating you unfairly. In our previous example A and B provide similar
services. A is (on average) paid $11,222 for a course; B is paid four thou-
sand dollars for the same course. If what people are paid for particular
goods and services must be proportional to the value of what they do,
then these arbitrary differences are immoral. One cannot reconcile the
fact that two people doing more or less the same job in the same eco-
nomic environment—indeed, in the very same university department—
should be paid such different rates. Either A is vastly overpaid or B is
vastly underpaid. At the very least, there should be some consistency in
their benefits they earn.
An older edition of Websters' International Dictionary defines a "liv-
ing wage" as "A wage sufficient to live on; that is, generally, to meet fair-
ly well the reasonable mental, moral, and physical needs of a person in
his station in life, or, as stated by some, to maintain a good grade of effi-
ciency in his work." One might argue that part-time hiring is immoral
because it does not, in this traditional sense, provide part-time faculty with
a living wage. Perhaps single students can survive on part-time wages, but
anyone who is married and has children will find it very difficult to sup-
port a reasonable lifestyle for any lengthy period of time, even if both par-
ents work "part-time." Buying a house, paying for life insurance, paying
for your daughter's root canals becomes a very precarious, if not impos-
sible, venture on the wages of most part-time faculty. If there is some
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moral obligation on corporations to pay employees a wage which allows
them to live in reasonable comfort, then it seems clear that part-time uni-
versity hiring is, at least in many cases, seriously immoral.
According to Statistics Canada, the average yearly income for all fam-
ilies was $52,504 in 1992. The average for dual-income families was
$62,663, and the average for single-earner families was $41,838 (Cat. 13-
208). In 1994, the poverty line for a family of one, two, three, and four
persons living in an urban area was, respectively, $16,511, $20,639,
$25,668, $31,072 (Cat. 13-207). A part-timer who teaches six courses a year
at the University of Waterloo will make $24,000. A part-timer who teach-
es four courses a year will make $16,000 a year. For older students with
families, part-time work may mean living at or below the poverty line. It
might easily be argued that universities which tend to envisage themselves
as a progressive force in society contribute to the problem of poverty.
But money is not the only ethical concern. Psychological studies sug-
gest that the two strongest predictors for longevity are (1) job satisfaction
and (2) happiness (see Shaw and Barry 1995, 320). Dissatisfaction at
work may affect not just quality of life but literally, how long you live. To
provide someone with "a living wage" is not to provide them with work
which will make even the morally heroic chronically unhappy and dis-
satisfied. It is to provide benefits and conditions that provide some rea-
sonable probability of happiness. Among part-timers there is, in contrast,
a very high rate of dissatisfaction, bitterness, rage, frustration. They do
not, in other words, receive, in the full sense of the term, a "living wage."
Consider next the possibility that part-time hiring is a form of
exploitation. We might distinguish between three different views of
exploitation: (1) Marxist, (2) Roemerian, and (3) non-technical. Marxists
define exploitation as "the appropriation by a class of non-workers of
the surplus product of a class of workers," where "the surplus product"
is "the quantity of goods produced minus the quantity of goods neces-
sary to sustain that workforce, where this difference is positive"
(Arneson 1991, 203). In simpler language, exploitation is an economic
relationship between non-workers and workers with the non-workers
expropriating the surplus value produced by the work of the workers.
But this is not a good description of part-time hiring. In this case, we do
not have a class of non-workers directly exploiting a class of workers.
What we have are two classes of workers, one advantaged, the other dis-
advantaged by a system (financed by all taxpayers) that is already in
place. The exploitation that takes place is indirect and systemic. If full-
time faculty are to be faulted, it is not so much that they individually take
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advantage of part-timers. If they are to be faulted, it is only that they pas-
sively acquiesce in a system that is patently unfair.
Roemer has suggested an updated definition of exploitation. He
identifies as an exploited agent someone "who expends in production
more hours of labour than are embodied in the goods he can purchase
with his revenues from production" (Roemer 1982, 90). Exploitation, in
this sense, reduces to an unequal economic transaction. The exploited
agent produces goods or services of more value than the goods and ser-
vices he can purchase with his wages. That is, he gives more to society
or the employer than he gets back. Calculating the exact value of part-
time teaching to society as a whole would be a very difficult feat. One
can nonetheless plausibly argue that part-time faculty give much more
to the university than the university gives them in return—i.e., that the
value of the teaching they provide far exceeds the value of the benefits
they receive (if this were not the case, then full-time faculty would have
to be exploiting the university). They are, in this precise sense, exploit-
ed by the university as an institution. What keeps them working is not
adequate remuneration but the hope that they will one day garner a
tenure-track position with all the privileges that such a position entails.
Consider philosophy as an example. According to the yearly publi-
cation Graduate Programs in Philosophy, compiled by the Department
of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba, sixty-one students were
awarded doctorates in philosophy at Canadian universities during the
1995—1996 school year (129 more were awarded MAs). It is reasonable
to assume that most of these graduates will look for work in Canada. To
this number of eligible graduates, one must add the backlog of unsuc-
cessful candidates from years past, those Canadian graduates who
attended university elsewhere, as well as students who attended unlist-
ed universities. All told, the number of PhDs looking for work during the
1995—1996 school year probably numbers in the hundreds. In the same
period of time there were, at last count, five tenure-track jobs in philos-
ophy awarded at Canadian colleges and universities (more jobs were
advertised, but roughly half were cancelled). In such trying circum-
stances, universities can afford to hire recent graduates at unfair wages
with minimum benefits, for these graduates have no choice but to accept
part-time teaching if they want to remain within a university setting.
Given the lack of opportunities outside the academy, this is a situation
\vhere graduates are forced to accept unfair work because they are in a
situation where they have no opportunity to go elsewhere. In this sense,
at least, one could argue that graduates are being exploited.
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Having argued that PhD graduates are being exploited by the uni-
versity system, we need to note that the situation is even worse than
first appears, for it is the universities themselves that are creating this
vast oversupply of PhD graduates. Why? Because PhD students are a
desirable commodity for philosophy programs. They add prestige to
departments, give tenured faculty graduate students to teach, increase
government funding, help with teaching, and so on. Granting that it is
in a department's interest to produce significant numbers of graduate
students, it is not in the individual's interest to be directed into a work-
force for which there is already a huge oversupply of cheap labour.
Philosophy departments must, therefore, accept that they are, with their
uncritical enrolment policies, actively contributing to a situation in
which exploitation may be the inevitable result.
Consider next the notion of "comparable worth." It is difficult to
define, but we can compare part-time and full-time teaching, for this
involves a comparison of kind to kind. Part-time teaching requires
essentially the same education, skills, and experiences as full-time
teaching. It involves similar responsibilities and, at least in particular
instances, a greater workload under poorer working conditions. If, then,
there is any plausibility to notions of comparable worth, part-time hir-
ing, as it is currently practised, is clearly wrong, for part-time teachers
do not receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.32 In
1990-1991, the median salary for university teachers paid on a regular
salary scale was $65,799 (Statistics Canada, Cat. 81-241). Part-timers
must often get by on less than twenty thousand dollars a year.
Finally, let us consider whether part-time hiring can be classified as
a form of discrimination. If there is discrimination in the university
workplace, it is directed towards younger members of the profession—
call it the Generation X phenomenon. The older, already well estab-
lished contingent of university faculty were hired during times of rela-
tive economic prosperity, favourable demographics, and employment
stability. Many had a relatively easy time obtaining positions. Younger
members of the profession have had a much more difficult time finding
adequate employment. They must meet standards of excellence and
scholarship that are much higher and more stringent than those which
were faced by their older colleagues. One could then argue that
younger members of the profession are being discriminated against on
the basis of age. They are being treated in a drastically different man-
ner than their older colleagues simply because they were born into a
different age-bracket.
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According to Statistics Canada, the number of new appointments of
teaching staff in Canadian universities has declined significantly over the
last two decades. Whereas in the year 1970-71 new appointments made
up 17 percent of the teaching force in Canadian universities, in the year
1991—92, they made up less than 7 percent of the teaching force (Cat. 81-
241, 14).33 Observation of the dwindling number of full-time positions
advertised each year suggests that this number has decreased even further.
Given that there are fewer and fewer jobs available for younger
scholars, there has been a progressive ageing of the Canadian professo-
rate. "In 1973-74, the percentage of [full-time] university faculty over 40
was 45 percent; in 1981—1982 this figure rose to 64 percent and in
1991—1992 to 78 percent" (Groarke 1996, 36l). Younger age groups are
under-represented in university teaching, at least when one considers
regular, full-time positions. This is because they are not awarded tenure-
track positions. They are hired on a part-time basis.
If, however, part-time hiring might be thought of as a form of inter-
generational discrimination, it is not discrimination in the traditional
sense of the word. In Moral Issues in Business Shaw and Barry argue that
employment discrimination "depends on three basic facts: (1) whether
the [hiring] decision is a function of an employee's or job applicant's
membership in a certain group, rather than individual merit; (2) whether
[it] is based on the assumption that the group is in some way inferior and
thus deserving of unequal treatment; [and] (3) whether the decision in
some way harms those it's aimed at" (Shaw and Barry 1995, 419). In the
case of part-time hiring, one could plausibly argue that the individual in
question is being "discriminated" against because they belong to a cer-
tain age group (1) and that the decision harms the individual in ques-
tion (3). On the other hand, hiring decisions in these cases do not seem
to be based on the assumption that the group is in some way inferior
and thus deserving of unequal treatment (2). As one part-timer puts it, it
is not that "tenured faculty are conspiring to keep part-timers out of full-
time positions. They simply have a good thing going, and there is no
incentive on their part to change it. In fact there are a lot of disincen-
tives to changing it." It is not that university departments stereotype
younger scholars as inferior; it is that they acquiesce in a tenure-track
system which radically disadvantages them.
In so far as the hiring of part-time faculty involves discrimination,
this discrimination cuts across racial boundaries and gender differences.
It is a Generation X phenomenon. There does seem to be an age com-
ponent that must be recognized. In the contemporary workplace,
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younger employees are often disadvantaged. Union policies, for exam-
ple, typically emphasize the importance of seniority. When employees
are laid off, it is younger employees, those without seniority, who must
go. There seems to be little concern for the unfairness of the situation.
It seems ironic that unions, including faculty unions, which traditionally
portray themselves as the defenders of the disadvantaged, should be
actively contributing to this Generation X phenomenon.
What Should be Done About Tenure?
What is the proposed solution? Many part-timers have a succinct and
forthright answer: "Get rid of tenure."34 We propose a more mitigated
solution which combines revisions to both part-time status and tenure.
The goal of these revisions would not be to eliminate the job security
that tenure provides, but to bridge some of the gap between tenured and
non-tenured faculty.
To begin with, part-timers should not be remunerated on a course-
by-course basis. They should be salaried, at the very least on a yearly
basis and, if at all possible, for two to three years at a time. Furthermore,
they should receive salaries and benefits placed at least close to the
lower end of starting tenure-track levels. They should enjoy some form
of job security.
In conjunction with such moves, part-timers should be granted
access to minor promotions and modest increments in salary, and if
they prove themselves to be capable teachers and scholars, they
should be given priority when competitions for tenure-track positions
arise. The funds for their pay could be made available by a combina-
tion of moderate reductions to tenured faculty salaries and voluntary
retirement.
It is equally important that tenured faculty be subjected to much
more serious peer reviews and reevaluations. As W. Brehaut writes:
"Despite the strong arguments set out by academics in defence of a sys-
tem of tenure...it has on occasion offered refuge to those who have
ceased to meet the high standards of scholarship expected of them by
colleagues and by the public" (Brehaut 1995).35 Defenders of tenure
argue that tenure does not permit a faculty member to flout the rules and
regulations of his institution and that research and teaching records of
tenured faculty are subjected to "rigorous scrutiny." This is not the place
to debate these claims, but it should be said that it is arguable that such
standards are rarely enforced.
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Proponents of tenure usually insist that it is a necessary condition of
academic freedom. According to Jamie Moore, the president of the South
Carolina Council of the American Association of University Professors,
tenure "is a safeguard which society has devised in order to protect its
long-range interest in free critical inquiry from the chilling effects of cen-
sorship of and reprisal against unconventional thoughts and ideas."36 But
the real effect of tenure is economic. Very few professors tout views con-
troversial enough to be genuinely in danger of university censorship.
Tenure may be about free inquiry in theory, but it boils down to job
security in practice. To suggest that there should be no serious tenure
review is to suggest that those who have been admitted to the compa-
ny of tenured professors do not have to be held accountable either from
a teaching or a scholarly point of view.
In North America, intellectual culture has developed around the uni-
versities in way that highly privileges tenured faculty. Opening up the
arena of scholarship to all those who are qualified would help to reju-
venate intellectual debates and restore a sense of purpose to legions of
graduates who have little opportunity to pursue academic work. It may
turn out, as in the debate about the rise of the part-time economy, that
they have something important to say.
The situation with respect to the hiring of part-time, non-tenure
track university instructors represents a microcosm of the new econom-
ic realities that are prevalent today. If there are serious economic chal-
lenges that must be met, justice requires that changes in the marketplace
and in society as a whole be carried out in a conscientious and reflec-
tive manner. The -welfare of those who teach is inextricably linked to the
\velfare of those who are taught. If we want to have high-quality post-
secondary education, we must treat the people who staff our institutions
in an equitable manner. To blindly follow "market forces," to provide the
bare minimum, to supply part-timers with as little as we can get away
with, is in the long term to make victims of us all.
17
Losing Community
Robert C. Evans
This essay is a polemic included in amongst a number of finely
researched articles. I make no apology for that. I wrote it on the pre-
sumption that I, as someone who has worked as an employment con-
sultant for many years, could be a voice from the business community.
I want to begin by turning to the tumultuous years following
Newfoundland's entry into the Canadian Confederation in 1949.
This was a time when Joey Smallwood's government moved to
eliminate many of Newfoundland's 1300 outports. This was in the
interests of efficiency, it was said, but probably it was more in the
interests of supplying cheap rural labour to the industrial and mining
towns. One of the outports was Parsons Harbour, a tiny community
that had clung to the inhospitable southern coast for hundreds of
years. One resident forced to relocate was Theodore Symes. He recalls
his leaving:
When we left the wharf it was thick with fog there. I said to myself in
my mind, I don't want to see it. And in the fog and stuff, I didn't.
Leaving behind your home that you built with your own hands
and your fishing gear that you'd worked with all your life—left behind,
gone. You were coming to another place and you weren't going back
no more. All the years gone by simply hove away.
The recollections of an old outport fisherman are vastly removed in
time and place from the contemporary ethical and governance issues
that generate solemn books like the present one. We need books and
conferences on these topics because we are well down the road to a
calamitous mess. But equally, we need the old fisherman to bring to our
thinking a humanist sensibility that might suggest some better ways to
deal with the wrenching changes now afoot in our economy.
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Theodore the fisherman speaks of his visceral need for a sense of
place, of community, of belonging. He knew in his guts that these things
informed and enriched his life. He knew that these things, in some mag-
ical way, made him a better father, husband, fisherman, and friend. He
knew in his guts that these things gave him the courage to face the sea,
kept his back straight and helped him honour his gods. The spiritual side
of these things is heard in the poetic cadence of the words he uses to
grieve his loss: "...All the years gone by, simply hove away."
In urban, industrialized (and increasingly bloody-minded) Canada,
our sense of community and place, our sense of belonging is all but
dead and gone. Save in Newfoundland and a few other remote places,
"community" is a quaint and largely meaningless word. As we changed
from a rural and agrarian society to an urban and industrial one, com-
munities died, and with this the concept of community. The only tangi-
ble things that took the place of community—to provide that funda-
mental need for belonging—were business and government. The
churches, mosques, synagogues and shamans, locked in ideology and
tradition, were unable or unwilling to be the basis of community in a
changing, troubled, and almost entirely secular world.
And so our business and government organizations became the
basis of community.
In good economic times, which we enjoyed from 1945 to the late
eighties, our myriad public and private sector organizations did a pass-
able job playing the community role. Importantly, they avoided firing
people as best they could. They spent extraordinary sums of money on
assorted benefits and perquisites without much concern about the pay-
off. The rhetoric—"our strength is people," for example—became part
of our mythology. Even at their worst, labour-management relations
seemed a somewhat troubled but essentially stable marital relationship
marred only by an occasional loud obscenity or perhaps a thrown dish.
In the seventies and eighties, the corporate ethic was founded on
Milton Friedman's motto that organizations—mainly profit-making orga-
nizations—have but one duty, and that duty is to maximize sharehold-
er value. This did not make a great deal of difference because growth
was predestined. There was cash in abundance and it was possible to
buy labour peace without putting a visible dent in the bottom line.
Milton Friedman would argue that corporate North America never
intended to become the major contributor to the welfare state that he
abhorred. This may be true. You cannot find this intention written in the
charters of incorporation of many companies. The simple truth is that
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we—workaday Canadians and Americans—demanded their support and
forced organizations to provide it. We did not do this out of a desire to be
taken care of, as the David Frums of this world imagine, but because we
needed and wanted community. We looked to private and public organi-
zations the way we might look to a grumpy but decent parent who can
be cajoled into fulfilling the needs which are the basis of community.
There was a flaw in this. We failed to understand that human orga-
nizations, unlike individuals or families (families being a natural model
for rationalizing human interaction) are not naturally inclined toward
morality. The bigger the organization, the closer it is to complete amoral-
ity. This is neither a good nor a bad thing—it is just reality. This does-
n't mean that you should not work for a big organization and enjoy the
pace, complexity, political interplay, and largely decent people with
whom you live, day to day. But it does mean that one shouldn't buy
well-intentioned rhetoric to the effect that such a corporation is a feel-
ing, caring organization with everyone's best interests at heart. This just
isn't so, and to this extent, Milton Friedman was right.
Toward the end of the long period of prosperity I have already men-
tioned, things began to fall apart. The Soviet Union collapsed, to the
astonishment of almost everyone but the Soviets. The Balkans re-
Balkanised. The world economy was re-engineered and the competitive
playing field began to look and sound like the Donnybrook Fair. The
recession that came with the change persisted like an infected tooth.
In these ambiguous times, both business and government organiza-
tions decided they could no longer afford their relatively gentle and
paternalistic ways—or so they thought. They panicked. Led in too many
instances by gaggles of self-anointed consultants and academics, organi-
zations proceeded to re-organize, restructure, re-engineer, downsize,
right-size, rationalize, rejuvenate, re-align, re-this, and re-that, all of
which amounted, in the final analysis, to letting employees and middle
management go, by the carload.
The problem is that owners, shareholders, and corporate officers do
not share with employees a common understanding of their organiza-
tions. The view from above is that the private sector organization is an
economic engine and the public sector or not-for-profit counterpart is an
administrative engine. The view from the trenches is rather different.
Employees experience their organizations as communities to which they
belong, in which they work at tasks that they frequently enjoy, in return
for which they receive the dollars they need to care for themselves and
their families. For most workers, the organization is the place where they
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find friendship, stimulation, recognition, some identity, and a sense of
purpose as well as a pay cheque.
It is fascinating to realize that both views are correct, and bleakly
amusing to observe that the quasi-profession of human resources man-
agement (human resources, or HR, might aptly be described as person-
nel management with attitude) has yet to discover how to bridge this
perceptual gap. If it does so—and it may—it will finally occupy a
respected place in organizational life. If it does not, it will go the way of
phrenology and other well-intentioned but ill-considered efforts to
understand and influence the human condition.
Given this unbridged perceptual gap separating the two organization-
al solitudes, it is not surprising that many restructuring organizations break
faith with employees by terminating so many of them and by requiring the
"survivors" to work harder. In the process, termination is used as a threat,
and most middle management is terminated on the hopeful assumption
that their role is superfluous and that this will produce organizations capa-
ble of dealing effectively with tomorrow's ambiguities and threats.
Many of those in the consulting/academic world believe that these
Draconian measures actually make sense. But one might instead describe
them as the business answer to Jenny Craig: "Special! This week only!
Lose 300 employees for only $300,000! You too can have the lean, mean,
flexible flattened look! Be the envy of your competitors! Call now!"
But what you get if you go to the businessperson's Jenny Craig is an
organization staffed by a disloyal, dysfunctional, angry workforce. You
get an organization that, because it is lacking the supposedly superflu-
ous middle management group, has no sense of its history, little corpo-
rate wisdom, and no useful sense of right and wrong. Such a corpora-
tion suffers from a truncated communication and problem-solving abili-
ty, and has little capacity for self-renewal because a solid, experienced
middle management bureaucracy provides the framework for the train-
ing and development of future senior managers and leaders. In such an
organization, the executives have no time for dealing with external
publics, no time for planning, and no time for reflecting on their criti-
cally important leadership responsibilities because they have been
sucked into an operational whirlpool and are doing all of the things their
long-departed middle managers used to do. The result is an anorexic
organization in which the heart muscle is atrophied and the electrolytes
are mortally out of balance.
All of this provides the context that informs the steady growth in the
numbers of part-time and contract employees (for a detailed example,
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see the paper by Groarke and Kujundzic in this volume). The eviscer-
ation of organizations is almost over. There is a great deal of hiring
going on. The recruiters I use as my bellwethers report boom times.
And they report that many organizations are looking for contract, part-
time, and short-term employees at every level from the plant floor to
the executive suite. These organizations need help; they need people
who will enthusiastically buy in to what they are doing and put some
sweat in to making it happen. But they are asking for, and conse-
quently hiring, people who do not care about their organization
because the organization clearly does not care about them. The peo-
ple who are hired in such capacities are prepared to work for their
mortgage payments, but they do not expect to be around for long and
do not buy into the organizational environment at any level. They do
not care about the organization's tomorrow, let alone next week. In a
world of increasing complexity and ambiguity in which a corporation
needs to be thinking several years ahead just to break even, this may
not be the best workforce.
My good friend Dr. Carlos Frewin has spent most of his adult life
turning his knowledge of education theory into programs and process-
es that make for better training and development in industry and pro-
duce a more effective, graceful, and civilized workplace. He reports
sourly on a high-technology company that believes it a virtue to have a
40 percent contract and part-time workforce. As he puts it, "There is a
notional sign on the front door that says, 'Salespersons, Pedlars, Servants
and Contract/Part-time Employees Please Use The Rear Entrance'" (per-
sonal communication). He comments on yet another anorexic organiza-
tion much enamoured of its current healthy balance sheet and oblivious
to its dark future. All of the wonderful brainpower it is now able to
access will one day take a walk and will not come back—at any price—
because price is the only reason it is there in the first place.
In my own experience, I am familiar with a little company called the
Osborne Group, founded by two former clients of mine, Don (Osborne)
Wood and John Stewardson. It operates with great success as a merce-
nary clearing house. It is a collection of about thirty experienced man-
agers and executives who hire themselves out as part-timers. They are
not consultants—they are hired guns. They prosper because corporate
and bureaucratic Canada wants and needs their know-how but either
cannot afford it (as is the case with many small- and medium-sized
enterprises) or is gun-shy about commitments that have a time line
greater than three months.
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In this latter situation, corporate Canada has a serious problem. It is
afraid of marriage but wants all of the benefits. The big surprise for
employing organizations is that the employees and managers whose
skills they need increasingly feel the same way. Ten years ago, my
clients—executives and managers between engagements—often made
noises about some form of self-employment, but they did not really
mean it. Today, most of them talk about it seriously and nearly half of
them go this route.
The breach of trust is complete, and the Osborne Group therefore
flourishes. In December 1996, it began expanding into a national orga-
nization. As corporate Canada recites a tedious litany of cost control
aphorisms and then refuses to establish long-term commitments with its
employees, the people it wants to hire have concluded that community,
a sense of belonging, a sense of affiliation and place are not found in
our human organizations as they now comport themselves. People
therefore turn to alternatives that seem to promise what they need.
Humankind's triumph of hope over reason causes us to inquire
whether there might be a positive side to the rise of the part-time econ-
omy. I suspect that this is the wrong question. In the short term, the part-
time employment contract is a given, whether we like it or not. We need
to work sensibly with this reality.
There are many practical, essentially technical things that can be
done that can make the short-term employment contract a better
arrangement for all parties. Given the increasing numbers of part-time
and contract workers, is there not a clever insurance company able to
make a buck by providing a reasonably priced benefits package? If an
insurance company can sort out a way to provide a long-term disability
plan for unemployed people—and at least two of them have—then
they should be able to cover all of the necessary bases.
Could not the federal government improve RRSP opportunities?
Could not the bureaucrats who concern themselves with human rights,
employment equity, and the like produce some guidelines for the draft-
ing of short-term employment contracts? Some excellent employers in this
country are already finding, or at least thinking about, better ways to treat
their non-permanent staff. They are investing in training for these people
and are funding coaching in job search skills. They are making efforts to
keep some of their part-time employees and are quietly promoting their
availability to other employers. These are not altruistic gestures; it is that
they correctly see merit in becoming known as good employers of part-
time and contract people.
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The technical question how we deal responsibly with contract and
part-time—non-permanent—employees is the easy one. The hard ques-
tions arise when we consider where we are going as a society. If we end
up -with an adult population that rejects corporate employment in the
public or private sector as a reasonable option, and opts for some form
of self-employment as so many of my clients are doing, is this not sug-
gesting that we have a grass-roots social change under way, the result
of which we cannot estimate? Doesn't this suggest that the big, mono-
lithic and paternalistic organization that has been our economic corner-
stone may be on the endangered species list?
If I were a corporate or government executive, I would be worried.
As a consultant, I am worried. I thank the eloquent Ervin Duggan of PBS
in the United States who reminded me of a song from the Grateful Dead.
It has to do with a locomotive engineer who stops for a break and leaves
his pet monkey in the cab. While the engineer is gone the monkey takes
control. The chorus of the song goes:
Big locomotive going down the line,
Big locomotive runnin' right on time,
Big locomotive number ninety-nine,
Left an engineer with a worried mind.
I would describe myself as a man with a worried mind. I believe that
the so-called part-time or non-permanent economy is an indicator of
things to come and not a problem in itself. I believe that our human
organizations are not functioning as though the humans are in control,
and that baffles me—who left the monkey in the cab?
There is much that we need to do about the new, no-loyalty, no-
cornrnitment, and no-benefits employment contract. I (like others in this
volume) have suggested some reasonable possibilities. But before we
commence analyzing and tinkering, we must assess any new arrange-
ments in light of whether they answer our basic human need for con-
tact, affiliation, and community. If they do not meet that minimum stan-
dard, they are bankrupt and must be rejected by all of us who desire a
graceful, principled society.
I have spoken of the need to preserve and strengthen our society
and make a better place for those who follow. I hold to no ideological
position save that we all in our own way attend to a moral foundation,
speak with a clear moral voice, and listen to one another in hope that
as the train rolls down the track with the monkey at the controls, we can
view the event with an unworried mind and know what we must do.
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Restructuring beyond
the First World
Darryl Reed
Over the past two decades or more, processes of restructuring have fun-
damentally altered economic, political, and social activity in all countries
around the globe. One of the major concerns surrounding these changes
involves the fact that they have significantly reduced the viable social
policy options available to states. This has important implications for
social policy ethics, especially with respect to the non-First World states
which are most severely affected by these changes. In taking up this
problematic, we will start by offering an account of processes of restruc-
turing and how they have affected social policy in developed nations.
"We will then go on to examine the situation of non-First World nations,
first arguing that restructuring has had an even more restrictive effect on
social policy in these countries and, then, suggesting some of the struc-
tural reforms necessary to allow for an ethical public policy that is finan-
cially viable.
Restructuring is a complex notion that can refer to a range of process-
es. In the present context I use the term to refer to changes that have
occurred in relations of production (see Hanly in his contribution to this
book). One can understand these changes by drawing a distinction
between core and peripheral aspects of the production process.
Increasingly, large firms permanently retain only the core aspects of the
production process (viz., research and development, finance and account-
ing, etc.). More peripheral aspects (e.g., production of component parts,
maintenance, etc.) are contracted out. The basic goal is greater flexibility
in accumulating profit. It results in tremendous efficiency gains for large
firms and increased profits for shareholders, but it has significant disad-
vantages for workers. They are reflected in declining union membership,
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a greater reliance on part-time workers, less job security, downward pres-
sure on wages, and so on.
These changes are not merely the result of technological and orga-
nizational developments. They have also come about because of politi-
cal activity. One might say that there has been a dialectical relationship
between changes in the political and economic realms. On the one
hand, technological and organization developments have increased the
mobility of capital and given capital increased power over states—
power which is exercised by threatening to move investment. On the
other hand, political influences have promoted changes in the relations
of production (e.g., privatization, deregulation) as well as other conces-
sions (e.g., a significant shift in the tax burden from firms to individuals,
investment incentives, etc.). States "willingly" make such concessions in
the context of an increasingly integrated global economy which is itself
in large part the result of processes of restructuring. In this new global
economy, states must compete, not only to sell foreign exports, but also
to attract foreign capital.
Different states have reacted to the pressures of the new global
economy in different ways. Two basic trends characterize developed
countries. A "hyper-liberal" approach (in, for example, the US and the
UK) advocates a clear separation of the state and the economy, and
actively promotes changes in the sphere of production (e.g., privatiza-
tion, deregulation, etc.). It adopts a confrontational attitude to labour
and uses populist appeals to traditional values in its attempt to find a
new basis of legitimacy.
A second trend which has emerged endorses a "state-capitalist"
model of the state (e.g., Germany, Japan) which is characterized by a
consensus-based adjustment to the realities of the emerging new econ-
omy. It still prescribes a strong role for the state in the form of industri-
al planning and as a mediator between the principle social forces of pro-
duction (forces whose participation must play an essential role in the
implementation of industrial policy). International competitiveness is
promoted by exposing sectors of the economy to international compet-
itive pressures, at the same time supplying subsidies and orientation
which support innovation (Cox 1987).
Such developments have important implications for social policy
ethics. A central concern is the way in which restructuring limits the range
of viable social policies available to governments. In the emerging glob-
al economy, individual countries are forced into new accommodations
with investment. The result has been a major shift in the tax burden away
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from firms and towards individual taxpayers, and (as middle classes resist
this shift of the tax burden) a decreased ability to raise tax revenue. The
resulting fiscal problems place increasing pressure on governments to cut
spending. To the extent that this induces fiscal crises, it has the effect of
limiting the range of feasible social policy options. Governments in all
parts of the globe and of all political stripes have therefore been forced
to (1) implement programs of economic liberalization and (2) cut social
programs.
While restructuring in this way decreases state autonomy with
respect to economic and social policy, it has not, in the case of large,
developed states, resulted in the complete elimination of the state's room
for manoeuvre. This is reflected in the social policies of both "hyper-
liberal" and "state-capitalist" forms of state, though they are character-
ized by significant differences.
In hyper-liberal states, there has been a much greater emphasis on
private alternatives (e.g., health care, pensions), coupled with moves to
eliminate universal programs, restrict eligibility for other programs, and
decrease benefit levels (both in terms of payments and length of eligi-
bility). New social control has been exercised by introducing (or con-
templating) a variety of new measures: by placing restrictions on life
style (e.g., man-in-the-house rules), by subjecting welfare recipients to
surveillance (e.g., fingerprinting), by forcing beneficiaries to contribute
in some way for their benefits (e.g., workfare), etc.
State-capitalist states, by contrast, have not tried to cut spending on
social welfare programs to the bone. They have instead attempted to link
the "balancing of the welfare of social groups" to the pursuit of com-
petitiveness. This explains why, while all industrialized countries remain
committed to maintaining key universal programs (e.g., health care),
there are still significant differences between the traditional social wel-
fare states (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland) and other, more
corporatist states (e.g., Germany, Japan) in terms of financing (with dif-
ferent emphases on contribution-based and state-financed schemes) and
the extent of benefits.
Figure 1 illustrates how restructuring has forced states to make
changes to their social policy. Two points are worth emphasizing in this
regard. First, in all cases and in all three aspects of social policy, the
movements are all in the same direction—toward privatization, towards
means-testing, towards social control. Second, there remain significant
differences between social policy regimes which make for substantial
differences in the quality of life of different sectors of given populations.
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Figure I:Shifts in Representative Social Policy Regimes (1970s-1990s)
While there are still significant degrees of difference in developed
states, in non-First World states there is an increasing homogenization
with respect to social policy as state after state has accepted the new
neo-liberal orthodoxy. In Third World states, social policy has never
been extensive. As a result, the effects of the new pressures arising from
processes of restructuring may not be so evident as there was very little
to cut to begin with. Still, restructuring will continue to ensure that noth-
ing beyond the most minimal levels of benefits (necessary for legitima-
cy) is maintained.
The effects of restructuring are perhaps most evident in the former
state-socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the former
republics of the Soviet Union. Because they once had well-developed
social programs, the changes to social policy that restructuring has
brought about are more evident in the situation of the former commu-
nists states. Whereas these states previously had extensive and relative-
ly generous social welfare systems, the switch to a market economy
(a transition itself in large part due to changes in the international econ-
omy) has forced them to make drastic reductions. To some extent, cuts
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were inevitable in the transition to market economies. What is telling is
that these countries, against the tide of internal popular opinion, have
not only had to make cuts, but to implement the more "hyper-liberal"
approach to social policy advocated by multilateral economic institutions
such as the IMF and World Bank. In part this is because debt problems
allow such institutions to exert pressure on the nations in question (see
Hanly in this volume). The recommendations of these institutions reflect
the logic of the new global economic order, which overrides national
preferences. This is why governments which are not ideologically sym-
pathetic to the IMF line (e.g., the socialist-led government in Hungary)
have also adopted it. In the new order, there are no real alternatives.
Such states have correctly seen that the only way to be able to guar-
antee even the most minimal social policy is to have a well-functioning
economy which reduces the demand for social programs. In order to
develop such an economy, it is essential to attract foreign capital. This
in turn requires major concessions (e.g., tax cuts, tax holidays, deregu-
lation, etc.) and, as a result, massive cuts in government spending. This
is a logic which individual states cannot successfully oppose. The effect
of this logic for these countries is to effectively limit all social policy
options to one, viz., an absolute minimum social safety net which
implies that large proportions of the population subsist at levels well
below the poverty line. In the process, pragmatic discourse subsumes all
ethical discourse under its domain.
In dealing with broader ethical concerns, it is essential to recognize
that legitimate social policy implies certain minimal standards must be
met in order to allow for equal opportunity for political participation.
The problem is that restructuring undermines these conditions. The
increased pressures to cut government spending undermines the provi-
sion of basic welfare rights which are necessary to guarantee people the
ability to effectively exercise the right to participate in public discourse.
The increased structural power of capital increases its ability to success-
fully violate the principle of the separation of state and society. With
increased mobility and an absence of effective regional and internation-
al political and regulatory organizations, firms are able to make more
effective use of (the threat of) capital flight to gain concessions from
governments (Strange 1994). In so doing, they can, in effect, hold capi-
tal-starved countries ransom. This is especially true of poorer and small-
er countries which are desperate for foreign capital and have very limit-
ed bargaining power. They are not in a position to offer an educated
workforce, large domestic markets, and so on. As a result, law (and
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social policy) is established not on the basis of public discourse and
democratic procedure, but rather as a bargain between firms and the
state. The increased structural power of capital re-enforces its ability to
dominate public discourse, especially through control over the media
(Chomsky and Herman 1988), and thereby undermines the substance of
the equal right to participate in the political process.
More than fifty years ago, another broad historical process of restruc-
turing was documented by Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944).
He describes how, in the first moment of the Great Transformation, cap-
ital in nineteenth-century England was able to elicit the support of the
state in the construction of a "market society." He goes on to show how,
in a second moment, organizations representing those most afflicted by
the processes of creating a market society were able, through the demo-
cratic process, to impose controls on capital in a process that led to the
development of the modern welfare state. Some contemporary political
economists (see Gill 1994 and Cox 1992) have seen a parallel between
the creation of a market society in nineteenth-century England and pre-
sent processes of restructuring which are creating a "global market soci-
ety." The implicit suggestion is that in this new global society, capital
once again needs to be brought under democratic control.
It should now be evident that the restructuring of the world's econ-
omy works to undermine popular determination of social policy and,
indeed, any meaningful social policy ethic—first, because restructuring
increasingly limits the range of possible social policy options; second,
because the structural power of capital systematically undermines the
possibility for the generation of legitimate law and social policy.
In order for social policy ethics to be meaningful, capital needs to
be brought under democratic control again. In the new, restructured
global economy, this can no longer happen at the level of individual
states, as its increased structural power enables capital to play states off
against each other and, in effect, bid down the costs of doing business.
It is only by working through regional and global political bodies (e.g.,
the European Union, the United Nations) that control (in the form of
social charters, regulatory standards, etc.) can be imposed upon capital
and the conditions for social policy ethics realized. Without such con-
trol, it becomes increasingly meaningless to speak of "ethics" in the con-
text of social policy decisions. Rather, it is more appropriate to speak,
especially in the case of non-First World countries, of "triage."
PART VI11
Case Studies
In keeping with its name,"applied" ethics emphasizes real life situations and the
issues they give rise to. All the articles in this book share this emphasis on the
concrete rather than the abstract, and on real rather than hypothetical situa-
tions. In earlier sections, this is often evident in theoretical analyses which are
founded on an in-depth look at concrete examples of restructuring and the
restructuring economy. The articles in the present section are intended as
shorter "case studies" which can shed additional light on what restructuring
and its effects mean in human, social, political, and economic terms.They have
been selected to reflect different interests and different points of view.
The case studies begin with the Honourable Edmond Blanchard's account
of New Brunswick's restructuring experience, gleaned from his vantage point
as the province's finance minister Mary Sylver then discusses the restructuring
of a small community hospital, J.L Kachur and Derek Briton raise questions
about the restructuring of Alberta schools, Monica Collins looks at the nega-
tive side of Bell Canada's restructuring from its workers' point of view, and
Sylvia Chrominska defends responsible restructuring as an alternative to
downsizing in the context of the dramatic changes which characterize business
in the banking sector
The aim of these case studies is not a definitive treatment of the restruc-
turing they discuss, much less a fully developed theory which incorporates a
comprehensive account of ethics as it applies to the new economy. Rather, the
goal is a more modest collection of "reports from the front line" which can
inform our reflections on the ethical aspects of restructuring, and which need
to be provided by different voices which represent different interests and dif-
ferent points of view.Though they provide many valuable insights into the ways
in which ethical concerns may inform particular restructuring situations, these
reports are intended not as an end in themselves but as substance for further
discussion, debate, and ethical analysis.
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Rebuilding the Province of
New Brunswick37
The Honourable Edmond P. B/onchord, QC
It is difficult to describe succinctly the profound change New Brunswick
has undergone in the past ten years. It is especially difficult because I
think that there are two issues I must focus on in this discussion: the first
is the restructuring of the province itself, while the second is the restruc-
turing of government. Many times you'll find I cross over between the
two, and I think that is how it should be. I think too often people inside
governments get too compartmentalized in their thinking, forgetting that
the goals they are trying to accomplish must be placed inside the con-
cept of the larger whole.
Over the past ten years, we have created twenty-five thousand new
jobs. By pursuing and attracting businesses, we have increased awareness
in the province and have increased the likelihood that people who lived
in the province would also begin to look at the -world in a new light.
Ethically speaking, the decision to do that was made without hesitation,
for we knew that many of the traditional, cyclical industries on which
New Brunswick has relied—forestry, mining, fishing, and agriculture—
would no longer support the workforces they once had. We didn't aban-
don those industries, but we have focused our efforts in those sectors on
creating more value-added products. We knew that high-technology
industries were not areas our population was actively exploring.
No matter how we may feel about the changes to our society—
good, bad or indifferent—it serves no purpose to ignore them or to pine
for the good old days of yore. To suggest that restructuring was not
required—as some in our province would have us believe—or that we
Note to this chapter is on p. 307.
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must continue down the same roads we have always followed simply
because "we always did things that way" is to suggest that we must
delude ourselves into feeling that time will reverse and that the world in
which I grew up could somehow come back.
There were obstacles beyond the poor image our province had both
inside and outside of our borders: our working-age population had a
high percentage of people who were not literate, our drop-out rate from
high school was unacceptable, and for those jobs we did have available,
our colleges and universities were not providing people with the skills
required by growing industries. So we started reworking our education
system from the first day of school to the return of an adult student. We
instituted free, non-compulsory, full-day kindergarten, so that now 95
percent of our five year olds are able to access this important educa-
tional step. This, at a time when other jurisdictions were reducing acces-
sibility to kindergarten.
Then we worked to cut our drop-out rate, so that where over 2,300
students left school before graduating in 1991, fewer than two thousand
left early in 1995. And we're working even harder to cut that number yet
again, because we know how important education is in today's world.
The most important efforts we've made are in the work we've done to
promote literacy. In 1996 we harmonized our provincial sales tax to the
federal Goods and Services Tax, a decision we were only able to make
when we reached an agreement with Ottawa not to tax books in our
jurisdiction. We were able to convince our federal counterparts to set up
a 100 percent rebate on book purchases by our libraries, so that every
cent they spend buying books goes to pay for the reading materials.
That commitment is just another part of our plan to improve litera-
cy, something we've been working to do since 1987. In that time peri-
od, we have set up over 650 Community Academic Standards Programs
across the province. Those programs involve volunteers, supported by
the province and by the business community, working to help those
who cannot read or write to learn those basic, fundamental skills.
We have restructured our school system by eliminating the boards
that had governed our districts and by replacing them with two boards—
one English, one French—which are now in charge of our education
system. In place of the old boards, we have set up school-parent com-
mittees which give parents more input into the concerns they have
about their schools by giving them an advisory role to the principal.
For the sake of our future generations, we have ensured that New
Brunswick students have access to computers so that they may all take
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their first steps down the information highway while they attend school
in New Brunswick. Microsoft was so impressed by New Brunswick's
experience in developing and delivering education electronically, it
chose us as the kindergarten to grade 12 content development and cer-
tification site for its new world-wide on-line institute.
We have recently announced, through my department, a rebate pro-
gram for computers purchased for home use, where the province
rebates the provincial sales tax spent on home computer purchases up
to $250, provided the computer has the capability to access the World
Wide Web. We did this to ensure that our province remains at the fore-
front of new developments in computer technology in the world, so that
generations yet to come are not prevented from reaching their highest
potential because "we didn't see the need at the time."
To those who call our investment a waste of money, I ask them only
this: what would you have us do? Stick our heads in the sand and pray
the future doesn't happen? We have learned that it is not ethical to pre-
tend there are easy solutions to these questions. We believe that, as a
government, we have responded to the changes society has presented
us, because we know that to not do so would leave our population lag-
ging behind at a key moment in history.
We believe that we have helped our citizens get the retraining they
need if they find themselves unable to return to the workforce after a
lay-off or an unexpected change in their circumstances. Programs
offered through the New Brunswick community college system have
been phenomenally successful at getting people back on their feet, and
programs such as the NB Jobs Corps Program, NB Works, and NB First
Start are helping New Brunswickers join or rejoin the workforce by help-
ing them get the experience they need.
Through the community college system, we are able to respond to
employer's needs more quickly than in the past, by working with them
and discussing what sorts of training they require. That flexibility has
been a big help in the telecommunications industry, where constant
improvements make flexible training essential. We have recognized that
New Brunswickers need a multitude of training options and experiences
to compete successfully in the new economy. So we have worked to
make those options available.
How did we start on this road? We started by identifying our
strengths—strengths which include a dedicated bilingual workforce, a
great quality of life and our magnificent geography with its wealth of nat-
ural and technological resources. Those assets were seldom emphasized,
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but all of us in New Brunswick had taken them for granted and had for-
gotten that they could be used to attract new investors looking for those
attributes.
Next, we identified our -weaknesses and tried to improve on them.
We are working with business and consumers to cut red tape and to
streamline the regulatory environment as much as possible. We're not
doing that to try to avoid responsibilities, but we are trying to make sure
every one of our regulations makes sense. We set up the new Service
New Brunswick concept, which took sixty government services from six-
teen departments and put them under one roof. Now, New
Brunswickers can pay phone bills, renew driver's licences, and apply for
student loans all in one convenient location. We were among the lead-
ers in setting up one-stop centres for businesses looking at New
Brunswick as a possible destination, so that all the paperwork they
needed would be available in one place. We are increasing our infor-
mation highway capabilities thanks to some two hundred community
access centres planned for the province.
But no amount of money can replace New Brunswick's biggest
asset: its population. If we have succeeded in attracting new invest-
ment, it has only been because our citizens have a reputation as hard-
working, loyal employees who put in an honest day's work for their
pay. That's why the province's latest initiative—the Service Quality
Initiative—has been so successful. It puts an emphasis, both in gov-
ernment and in the private sector, on improving our quality standards
by empowering our employees so they can bring better service to our
customers, the taxpayer.
We've done many things—including seeking partnerships with the
private sector to cut costs and improve service. Some of those partner-
ships were the first of their kind in Canada. We have just begun operat-
ing Canada's first privately built public school, the Evergreen Park
School, in Moncton. We have a contract with Wackenhut Corrections to
build, own and maintain our new youth detention centre in Miramichi,
and we have partnered with many private-sector firms as we try to find
the best ways to serve New Brunswickers. One of the most important of
those partnerships was with Andersen Consulting, as our Human
Resources Development department has transformed itself into a flexi-
ble, more client-centred department. The new program to be imple-
mented—NB Case—will alleviate the burden of paperwork and allow
staff more time to deal with clients, which is where we all believe their
energies should be focused.
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Helping clients by offering better service will also help our health
care system, since those in the lower-income bracket need more health
care services. And health care, after all, is the most important govern-
ment service to Canadians. Survey after survey has shown that medicare,
more than any other program, is one that Canadians hold sacred. But
these are not easy days for our health care system, particularly in New
Brunswick. We have an aging population in our province, and, unlike
Ontario or provinces west, we did not have an "echo boom" once the
baby-boom generation began having children, nor do we attract immi-
grants in the same percentages.
So we will face a situation, over the next quarter century, where the
pace of increasing health care costs may outpace the growth in our rev-
enues if we don't work hard at containing them. Consider this: in 1994,
there were 93,400 New Brunswickers aged sixty-five and older, repre-
senting about 12 percent of the population. In 2009, that number will
increase to 112,900, and it will stand at 179,300 by the year 2024. In
more blunt terms, there are 341,000 people in New Brunswick today
who make up the province's workforce, which means there are almost
four people working for every person sixty-five and older, a four-to-one
ratio. By the year 2024, if the size of the workforce does not increase,
there will be only two New Brunswickers in the workforce for each cit-
izen over sixty-five (though we're confident our workforce will increase
in size so that those numbers are resolved in the natural course of
human events).
We don't use those numbers to frighten people, but we need to be
honest with ourselves, as citizens and as policy makers, about what
those numbers mean. Otherwise, we may come to the point where
young New Brunswickers will leave the province not because they can't
find work but because they cannot afford the taxes to preserve our
social safety net.
What we have done so far is to restructure our province's hospital
system, replacing the fifty-one former boards which operated individual
hospitals and health service centres with eight regional hospital corpo-
rations in 1992. That change has allowed us to expand extra-mural hos-
pital services to the entire province, so that all New Brunswickers could
take advantage of a service which both saves taxpayers' money and
helps patients heal in their own homes.
These were difficult decisions, and there were many opposed to any
bed closures or to the creation of the hospital corporations. But to have
allowed the situation as it existed before 1992 to continue would have
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bankrupted the province without improving services to the population,
an option that simply was not considered.
Now we have placed our emphasis on prevention and on creating
a system that is more responsive to changing situations without so much
need for bricks and mortar. Many of our top success stories come from
the new mobility we have given such things as our MRI machine and
our nation-leading experiments with tele-medicine, where a specialist in
one area will offer a diagnosis for a patient in another doctor's office.
Individually, these things would not have worked, but when taken
together as a whole, the restructuring of our health care system is creat-
ing a viable system which will survive in the next century. The province
still spends one-third of its budget on health care, a proportion which
has steadily increased over the years since Medicare was introduced. But
now we spend that money where it is most needed: on patient care and
on services, not on administration or on a thousand new buildings.
That's not the end of the New Brunswick story. We are also estab-
lishing a new, integrated justice system, where courts and Crown pros-
ecutors will be on-line with police and corrections officials to deliver jus-
tice to New Brunswickers in the most efficient way possible. And we
hope to have social service providers in that electronic loop eventually.
We are downsizing our provincial corrections facilities as we move
toward a system of community corrections, in which non-violent offend-
ers will serve their sentences in the community rather than in jail. In so
doing, we are implementing a more rehabilitative philosophy while we
save money.
Inside government, we have restructured our public service. Since
1990, almost three thousand positions have been eliminated, with a fur-
ther reduction of 750 full-time equivalents by the end of fiscal 1996-97.
To achieve those reductions we relied in large part on our Workforce
Adjustment Program, which consisted of severance and early-retirement
incentives to encourage voluntary exit from the public service.
We didn't cut positions just to cut, but rather we made decisions
based on ways we could streamline the civil service. Efforts like the cre-
ation of Service New Brunswick helped by showing us we could find
new ways of performing the services our population expected. At the
same time, the changes let us save $560 million to date on administra-
tion costs.
We've done all that without having to issue many lay-off notices by
not filling vacant positions and by redeploying staff within the public sec-
tor. In addition, we are continuing to promote our voluntary work-time
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flexibility program, which allows people to work part time, job share,
take pre-retirement leave or work fewer hours per week in a very inno-
vative way.
The key to our success was that we didn't treat the public sector
workforce like the enemy. Instead, we sought their input and invited
them to participate in the task. Their professionalism has continually
impressed all those who work with our public sector employees.
What does all this mean for other governments, be they federal,
provincial, or municipal? Are there any lessons to be learned from the
New Brunswick experience that can guide other provinces down the
road? I can't say if these are lessons that can be applied to all situations,
but I can say that I have learned that a thoughtful, deliberate approach
is better than a short-term solution when it comes to restructuring any-
thing, whether it be government or a professional baseball team. I think
many people view restructuring as an evil without realizing that what we
call restructuring has always been called "life," "progress," "the inevitable
passage of time," or some other such manifesto of change. I have also
learned that community spirit is alive and well in Canada, and that pre-
sented with an opportunity, people will work together toward a com-
mon goal with ease. And finally, I have learned that the most ethical
stance there is puts the emphasis of a government, or of any organiza-
tion, on the job of improving the lives of its citizens, collectively and
individually.
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Community Health at
theWillett Hospital
Mary Sylver
Discussions of restructuring and new economic realities often focus on
large institutions in major urban centres. But they also affect small insti-
tutions in small communities. Across Ontario, small hospitals are an inte-
gral part of their communities. In addition to providing health care ser-
vices, they provide employment which stabilizes the economies of their
small towns and villages.
But the Ontario health care system is in flux. Its paradigm is shift-
ing, from a "focus on illness" to a "focus on wellness." Demographic
changes, new medical and information technology, and more informed
consumers are bringing about radical changes in the health care system.
Even if there was no financial imperative—and indeed there is—hospi-
tals would need to re-examine their roles in the face of these changes.
If we are to establish a health care system that promotes health and
well-being, what role will small hospitals play? If such hospitals do not
change, will we simply disappear? How can we re-invent ourselves to
do the right things for our community?
Just a few years ago, the Willett Hospital was planning for renova-
tion and redevelopment. It included a twenty-bed expansion of our
chronic care unit. A number of new positions were created to staff a
growing inventory of programs and services. The anxiety, which had
plagued the hospital since 1976 (when the government threatened to
close it), was diminishing. We were to become the major provider of
chronic and geriatric care for the county. The future looked bright.
How quickly things change. In 1991, the plans for redevelopment
were preempted by a planning process that looked at the county-wide
rationalization of hospital services. By the following year, the hospital
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experienced the impact of a recession that was felt throughout the health
care sector. For the first time in its seventy-year history, the hospital was
faced with a financial deficit as a result of increasing costs and declining
revenues.
Like many other hospitals across the province, the Willett embarked
on a process of deficit elimination and "downsizing."
Initial reductions were designed to have minimum impact on pro-
grams and services. Several management positions were eliminated, six
chronic beds were closed, and non-nursing duties performed by regis-
tered nurses were reassigned, resulting in a reduction in nursing staff. In
an organization of about two hundred employees, where staff often
referred to the "Willett family," these cuts were painful. Unfortunately,
the financial situation did not improve, and the next budget cycle
brought a further round of cuts. The Urgent Care Centre was reduced
from twenty-four to twelve-hour service. The Day Surgery Program was
reduced by 50 percent.
The workload of the remaining employees continued to escalate.
Staff were increasingly concerned about the future of their jobs.
Although it seemed that everyone was working longer and harder, signs
of uncertainty and frustration were evident throughout the organization.
The hospital would not survive if we continued to nibble away at the
organization by progressively closing beds, tinkering with service reduc-
tions, and laying staff off.
Continued "incremental downsizing" would eventually undermine
the hospital. Clearly, radical change was required if we were to contin-
ue to serve our community. The county-wide planning process had
called for the Willett to develop a "non-traditional role" serving Paris and
the surrounding community, but how would the new role be defined
and implemented?
To guide the hospital through these uncharted waters, we needed a
framework for decision making, a set of tools to ensure that we were
making the right choice.
The framework we developed has similarities to the one elaborated
by Yeo et al. in their contribution to this volume. It included six major
elements:
I. Guiding Principles
II. Creation of a Shared Vision
III. Clarification of Mission, Goals and Values
IV. Revitalization of Staff
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V. Developing the Infrastructure
VI. Transforming the Vision into a New Reality.
Each element of this process is described below.
I. Establishing Principles
As the hospital proceeded to develop a non-traditional role, the Board
adopted underlying goals for service provision, including: "person-
focused care"; quality and efficiency; enhanced primary care; strong
linkages to ensure access to secondary and tertiary care; close to home
service; a rural focus which serves the "natural community"; a willing-
ness to be flexible, collaborative, and cooperative; and links to physi-
cians.
II. Creating the Vision
Board members, physicians, and managerial staff worked together and
developed a shared vision for the hospital which stipulated "a non-tra-
ditional hospital role in a vertically integrated continuum of care, serv-
ing the natural community of Paris and the surrounding rural area." The
process included an examination of the needs of the community, the
external environment, the hospital's capabilities, and the gaps that must
be spanned to achieve the desired future.
III. Clarifying the Mission
Members of the corporation, governors, patients, staff, and representa-
tives of the municipality helped articulate a new mission for the hospi-
tal. A commitment to put the community first is evident in the new mis-
sion statement: "To provide quality and accessible services that meet the
changing health needs of the people within the community we serve."
IV. Energizing the Staff
As a first step in re-energizing staff, the board and management made a
commitment to empower employees throughout the organization.
A process of continuous quality improvement was developed, based
on William C. Byham's book: ZAPP! Empowerment in Health Care
(1993). After initial training, ZAPP teams involving staff from all levels of
the organization were formed to improve processes, solve problems,
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and promote interaction and communication. Through this process,
employees developed increased self-reliance and a mutual commitment
to work together to strengthen the organization.
The hospital also recognized the real stress and pain that employees
were experiencing, and introduced strategies to promote healing within
the organization. Straight talk, fairness, staff participation, and an honest
recognition of the feelings experienced by the "survivors" of the changes
were part of an intervention to help the staff through a difficult transi-
tion period. Too often, restructured organizations boast of being "mean
and lean." Instead the Willett has tried to be "streamlined and sensitive."
V. Developing the Infrastructure
Once the hospital refocused its vision and mission, we began a process
of internal restructuring and organizational redesign that would help the
organization to move toward the desired future. We identified core ser-
vices or programs, the needed support services and capabilities within
the organization. The result was a flatter organization structure, building
on a program management approach. The number of managers in the
hospital was reduced from twenty-four to thirteen, and reporting rela-
tionships were simplified. In program areas, a similar approach was used
to ensure that service is provided by the person with an appropriate
level of skill and expertise. The result of the internal restructuring is a
smaller and more responsive team which supports the core services and
addresses the needs of the community.
VI. Moving from Vision to Reality
Perhaps the greatest challenge in the restructuring process was creating
a model that would transform the vision into reality. The county-wide
planning process supported a "non-traditional" role for the Willett, but
the scope of that role was not clearly understood and needed definition.
A Willett Future Directions Committee "was formed, with representation
from the various towns and communities within our natural community.
The committee has developed an innovative model of an integrated sys-
tem for a rural community.
An integrated system is defined by Stephen Shortell as "a network of
organizations that provides or arranges to provide a continuum of services
to a defined population, and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally
accountable for the outcomes and health of the population served."
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Key elements of the model include a hub which integrates a range
of service networks, a process for facilitated access and coordination
teamwork, a rostered population, and a primary-care physician network.
The model is intended to provide members of the roster with improved
access to a broad continuum of health and health-related educational
and social services. The focus is on service and care, and not bricks and
mortar. The model is based on the notion that services are delivered at,
through or by the Willett. Integration—not ownership—is the funda-
mental issue.
As we move toward the implementation of the model, the Willett
will go through a further radical transformation. During the transition,
staff will need to continue to develop new and expanded skills. New
partnerships must be developed to ensure the appropriate range of ser-
vice to meet the unique needs of our community.
The Willett is ready to face the challenge of changing times. By
focusing on the well-being of the community rather than the survival of
the hospital, we have developed a model that truly will address the com-
munity's needs, will revitalize the Willett, and will ensure its ongoing rel-
evance in the health care system of the future.
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Alberta Education: Retooling
through Deschooling
J.L Kachur and Derek Briton
Until the recent election of Mike Harris's conservatives in Ontario, the
siege mentality of economic crisis in Canada was nowhere more apparent
than in Alberta. Haunted by the costly limitations of diversification strate-
gies undertaken during the 1980s, Alberta's Conservatives rejected the sta-
tist conservatism of the Lougheed and Getty years in favour of a new form
of neoliberal conservatism under premier Ralph Klein. This neoliberal
conservatism, otherwise known as New Right politics, combine laissez-
faire economics with cultural and political conservatism (King 1987, Laxer
and Harrison 1995). Alberta's Progressive Conservatives are, therefore,
committed to both a dismantling and restructuring of government. In
keeping with the tenets of neoliberalism, their call is for a smaller, nonin-
terventionist state when it comes to economic policy, but at the same time,
in keeping with the tenets of conservatism, they call for a stronger state
when it comes to issues of social control and cultural regulation.
Consequently, Klein and Alberta's new breed of conservatives have
committed themselves to a process of "reinventing government" in order
to establish an "Alberta Advantage" in the world market. The result:
a transformation of the province's public sector according to a logic
Osborne and Gaebler refer to as an American perestroika (1992). Klein's
initiatives have won praise from the Wall Street Journal and support
from the foremost promoters of neoliberal state policy in Canada: the
Fraser Institute and Canada West Foundation (Kachur 1995). But Klein's
predecessors—Peter Lougheed and Don Getty—have publicly criticized
Alberta's new breed of conservatives for divesting themselves of tradi-
tional Tory social obligations. Such criticisms are confirmed by more
comprehensive reviews that describe Klein's social and education reform
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in Alberta as a revolution, a deepening Americanization of Canada, and
a corporate assault on Canadian schools (Lisac 1995, Barlow and
Robertson 1994, Laxer and Harrison 1995).
Under the aegis of the New Right, the provision of schooling in
Alberta has been re-envisaged as a "quasi-market" delivery system that
unleashes the free-wheeling logic of the private sphere into the public
sphere of education. In abandoning the vision of providing education
through autonomous regional boards, Alberta's neoliberal conservatives
have chosen to restructure the province's schooling system around a cen-
tralized administration, but with the promise of increased parental auton-
omy and choice in the guise of alternative programming and school-
based management. It is within this socio-economic context that Alberta's
chartered schools were first legislated into existence. Charter schools are
part of the New Right's solution to the educational dilemma facing gov-
ernments throughout the Western world. The problem focuses attention
on how public schooling can help a nation develop a competitive edge
in the global market and provide—in a cost-effective and accountable
manner—educational services to an increasingly diverse group of
"clients" within an increasingly complex socio-economic system.
This paper attributes the restructuring of Alberta's education system
around market-based provision, and the subsequent emergence of char-
ter schools, to an overwhelming deference to neoliberal thought. The
rationalization of education services and the marketization of education
has resulted from the strategic choices of Klein's Conservatives, envoys
of privatization who have taken the leap of faith that will supposedly let
the market work its magic. The vision of charter schools promoted by
Klein's neoliberal Conservatives is part of a much larger picture drafted
by a New Right state committed to "retooling through deschooling"
Alberta's social contract in preparation for the province's entry into
untrammelled global competition.
Charter Schools in Alberta
Charter schools have proven to be the vehicle to introduce market com-
petition between diversified and specialized forms of educational provi-
sion to Alberta. They must be approved by the minister directly or in
conjunction with a school board. They are created and run by parents
or non-profit societies as registered companies or corporations. They
cannot deny access to any students, except on the basis of limited space
and resources. Unlike private, independent, or home schooling, charter
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schools are public institutions that the government funds on a per-pupil
basis. They are allowed to charge fees only if they are in keeping with
the fees charged by the public boards of education. Religious or denom-
inational schools are not permitted unless affiliated with already existing
Catholic districts (Alberta Education 1996).
It was through such a charter with the Elk Island Public School
Division that Alberta's minister of education established the province's first
charter school in September of 1995. The New Horizons School is oper-
ated by the Education for the Gifted Society of Strathcona County. The
school's eighty students initially occupied three rooms on the second floor
of an office building in Sherwood Park (a suburban community to the east
of Edmonton), recess took place in a park across the street, there were no
sports teams, and no school band; parents then, as now, dominate the
board, hire and fire teachers (who are certified but non-unionized), and
help run the school; the curriculum is certified by the education ministry.
Since New Horizons opened, seven other schools have been granted
charters to operate in the province by the fall of 1996. These schools
include (1) The Centre for Academic and Personal Excellence for gifted
students (grades 1—9) in Medicine Hat and chartered in conjunction with
the Medicine Hat Public School Board, (2) Action for Bright Children
(ABC) for gifted students grades one to three in Calgary and chartered in
conjunction with Calgary Public, (3) the Suzuki Elementary School spe-
cialized in music for grades K—4 in Edmonton and chartered directly by the
minister of education, (4) the Boyle Street Community Services Co-op for
inner-city students aged twelve to nineteen years in Edmonton and char-
tered directly by the minister of education, (5) Almadina school, special-
ized in English as a Second Language for grades 1-9 in Calgary and char-
tered directly by the minister of education, (6) the Aurora school, focusing
on high academic expectations for grades 1-8 in Edmonton, chartered
directly by the minister of education, and (7) the Global Learning
Academy, specialized in independent learning for grades 1-12 in Calgary,
and chartered in conjunction with the Calgary Public School Board.
In response to Alberta Education's charter school initiative, the
province's public school boards have committed themselves to compete
in the emerging quasi-market for education services. For example, the
Edmonton Public School Board (EPSB) has long promoted a variety of
programming choices to meet the diverse interests of parents and stu-
dents. In addition to their "regular" and "special" programs for students
with special learning needs, EPSB offers a menu of at least twenty-two
"alternative" programs. EPSB has responded to the appearance of charter
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schools by increasing its alternative programming in an effort to attract
clientele from the province's independent-, private-, and home-schooling
community.
EPSB developed its own form of "charter choice" in 1995 by offer-
ing three new alternative programs. This offering was increased by two
in 1996. These changes bring EPSB's charter-like programs to five. The
Nellie McClung Alternative Junior High Program is for girls. It is
premised on the belief that girls will achieve better academic results in
a single-sex environment, especially in mathematics and science. The
Edmonton Public Professional School of Ballet, for grades seven through
twelve, and the Sports Alternative Program, for grades four through
twelve, are each designed to provide flexible scheduling for students
involved in extensive training and competition. The Cogito Alternative
Program, for kindergarten through grade six, is defined according to
basic educational values and traditional approaches. Finally, the Logos
Program has opted to allow religious-based instruction.
Implementation of the Logos Program has resulted in strong resistance
from the Alberta Teachers' Association (ATA) and has proven to be the
most controversial program. Unlike charter schools, the Edmonton Logos
Society and a lay board of directors operate a program that is both pub-
licly funded and religious-based in what was a "non-denominational" sys-
tem. In the Logos alternative program, instruction is grounded in Christian
principles in a Christian environment. Teachers in the program are expect-
ed to establish a Christian viewpoint on issues and topics in the curricu-
lum. They are also expected to adhere to the curriculum prescribed by
Alberta Education and to respect the established standards of assessment
for each grade level. Parents are asked to sign a commitment of support
for the objectives of the program (Edmonton Logos Society 1996).
Along with Edmonton Public's foray into the public charter business,
other urban centres, Calgary in particular, have initiated similar respons-
es to the charter market. Rural communities, however, have expressed
some reservations about delivering any new programs, given the finan-
cial cost of maintaining existing programs and their declining student
population base.
Consequences of Charter Schooling in Alberta
The provision of education services through quasi-market mechanisms
in Alberta has had four consequences. First, it has introduced a new kind
of schooling based on parental choice and increased the differentiation
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and specialization of existing school practices. Second, public school
boards have responded by further increasing the permeability of their
school boundaries and intensifying the delivery of alternative program-
ming, including an accommodation to ethno-religious diversity. Third, it
has challenged the economic livelihood and professional status of teach-
ers. Finally, decentralization at the local level has been accomplished
through increased re-regulation at the provincial level as well as the cen-
tralization of financing and policy making at the ministerial level.
The quasi-market has increased the diversity of programming, and
by definition, further fragmented the possibility of a "common core cur-
riculum." The quasi-market has increased the differentiation and spe-
cialization of existing school practices and introduced new status dis-
tinctions among existing alternative programs. It is within public school-
ing, then, that a new kind of schooling has emerged. This new variant
of public schooling retains the marks of "state subsidization" but remains
in the shadow land of "privatized education." This private-like education
is not based on a voucher system as neoliberal theorists imagined, but
rather on "funding envelopes," or what is more properly termed "poli-
cy-based lending." Money follows the student and is tied to specific state
requirements and parental demands, thus fostering the expansion of the
most marketable programs.
The province's public school boards have responded to the emer-
gence of a quasi-market in education provision by further increasing
the permeability of their school boundaries and intensifying the deliv-
ery of alternative programming. They have embraced the competitive
model in a modified form in an attempt to temper the individuating,
competitive impulses of the charter school movement and to entice
parents traditionally interested in private schooling into the public sys-
tem. Public boards, engaged in more aggressive marketing of their
already diverse programming, have instituted new curricula that allow
them to compete directly with charter schools. Furthermore, the search
for market share has pushed public school boards to accommodate lay-
mediated denominational interests, and in so doing, to radicalize the
original Alberta charter regulations that prohibit the chartering of reli-
gious schools. In the non-Catholic public system, the resulting mix of
new denominational and non-denominational programming challenges
the principles of inclusive civic pluralism, threatening to reinforce the
development of separatist forms of ethno-religious pluralism. Although
Section 93 of the 1867 BNA Act does not discriminate against denomi
national schooling, the variants of religious programming emerging in
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Alberta sidestep normative regulation by the state via contractual oblig-
ations and consumer demand.
Teachers' organizations have reacted to what they perceive as a
threat to teachers' livelihood and status, and interpreted the minister's
sanctioning of charter schools as an attempt to directly challenge the
value of teacher labour. The use of non-union labour has created a
mechanism to weaken the collective bargaining process and to drive
teacher wages down. In terms of professional status, the introduction of
"charter-like" schools and schools committed to denominational interests
has reinforced ethno-religious splinter groups and established local con-
tent standards for "quality schooling" that challenge universalistic princi-
ples of civic-nationalism. For teachers, this challenge to civic-nationalism
is also a challenge to their gate-keeping function as transmitters of civic-
based morality. In addition to further fragmenting and politicizing teach-
ers' gate-keeping functions, the new provisions compel teachers to rede-
fine their role as professional public servants. In this case, professionals
no longer represent the public good but rather sell a product to the high-
est bidder. In this quasi-market, professional legitimacy is marketized
and professional status is constrained by the logic of educational entre-
preneurship, including the real possibility for the "McDonald's-ization"
of education services.
Finally, deregulation at the local level has been accomplished at the
cost of increased state regulation at the provincial level. As touched on
above, the government has changed its tactics for intervening in the
labour market. In 1994, the province's "anti-interventionist" government
orchestrated a 5 percent rollback of teachers' wages. In 1994 and 1995,
this same government established—again in a highly interventionist man-
ner—an educational market (Alberta Education 1995a). Ironically, it
seems that only such a political commitment to the expansion of charter
schools will allow the price mechanism of Adam Smith's "invisible hand"
to achieve the desired effect of moderating teachers' demands for wage
stability. By unleashing the logic of the marketplace into the public
sphere, charter schooling appears to decentralize educational regulation
and strengthen local control through charter societies. It also appears to
regulate the delivery of education provision through quasi-market mech-
anisms. But such fundamental restructuring has been accomplished
through the exercise of anti-democratic, managerial power.
We emphasize that the new charter market in education services has
required the interventions of a more powerful executive arm of govern-
ment to create the conditions for the possibility of charter schools. First,
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the government openly orchestrated the neoliberal and managerial dis-
course of reform. Don Getty initiated the reform strategy in 1991-92,
during the Toward 2000 Together round tables and conference, and
"contracted out " the coordination of the circuits of power of Alberta's
elites to the Banff Centre for Management. The business community was
treated as the universal stakeholder with expertise on all issues, espe-
cially education, and the consultations excluded all but a neoliberal
approach to educational service. Though eighty-seven of the 164 rec-
ommendations in the 1992 moderator's report focused on education, it
purported not to be about "economics" or "education." Toward 2000
Together was a carefully orchestrated public consultation process that
precluded the discussion of education reform that did not fall within nar-
rowly prescribed "economic" parameters (Barlow and Robertson 1994,
Lisac 1995, and Kachur 1995, Ch. 6, 7).
Second, the Klein government introduced various bills that have
concentrated the tools of governance in the hands of a select few con-
fidants appointed to publicly unaccountable advisory committees. The
School Amendment Act was given assent on May 25, 1994 and Alberta
Education thereafter released the Charter School Handbook and estab-
lished the target of fifteen charter schools for the fall of 1995- The School
Amendment Act also included legislation to regionalize school districts,
thus shifting power away from locally elected officials to provincial
bureaucrats. But even more controversial than the process of centraliza-
tion was legislation in Bills 41 and 57. Bill 57 was intended to allow
every minister to hand over power for government programs to private
corporations without parliamentary debate. After stirring up controversy
by prematurely tipping its hand to the opposition, the government with-
drew the bill and proceeded with Bill 41. This bill allowed for a similar
kind of transference of power, allowing the government to proceed to
contract out social services to private providers at the discretion of the
minister (Robertson et al. 1995, 103). The legislation effectively circum-
vented legislative debate on the issue of privatization.
Third, included in the rationalization of this anti-democratic trend
was the increasing use of policy-based lending to tie funding to the
implementation of specific programming and the initiation of a central-
ized program of school evaluation through standardized testing, polling,
and the publication of performance indicators.
The implication is clear. Once power is taken from citizens and given
to technical experts, an ethical debate about educational goals simply
cannot arise. Society is reduced to a collection of atomized consumers
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whose freedom consists in making consumer choices based on purchas-
ing power. The charter school market was facilitated by a plethora of new
laws, regulations, and state interventions. While implementation and
delivery of educational service remained at the local level, conception
and evaluation of those same services was shifted to the offices of a
smaller educational bureaucracy consolidated under ministerial control.
The government of Alberta and the ministry of education justify this
authoritarian necessity in the name of "effective internal administration of
the government of the province" (Alberta Education 1995b). This smaller
but more powerful state bypasses local- and school-based democratic
decision making mechanisms. Education delivery in Alberta has thus
been reconceptualized in terms of a "bottom line" that subordinates the
democratic decision-making processes of local citizens to the "quality
control" of "outputs." Consumer choice thus supersedes citizen choice,
and school administrators are compelled to perform as strategic managers
in search of market niches.
Retooling through Deschooling
What a closer inspection of the charter school phenomenon reveals, then,
is that under Ralph Klein a variant of conservative politics emerged—the
politics of the New Right—to orchestrate the delivery of education ser-
vices in Alberta through quasi-market mechanisms. This orientation is
readily identifiable in the writings of neoliberals such as Hayek (1944),
Friedman (1980), Douglas (1993), Lawton et al. (1995), and Osborne and
Gaebler (1992), theorists who call for the market provision of education
through vouchers or charter schooling. Klein's new breed of conserva-
tives has successfully articulated neoliberalism with at least three forms of
conservatism: (1) benevolent conservatism and managerial corporatism
(Berle and Means 1932, Drucker 1993), (2) authoritarian conservatism of
the religious Right, and (3) small-property populism. Klein's politics is a
hybrid of liberalism and conservatism, and its New Right bloodlines
remain incontestable. What holds the coalition together is resentment
expressed as populist antipathy for the welfare state.
In promoting charter schooling as a means to further rescue civil
society from the iron cage of state bureaucracy, Ralph Klein's neoliber-
al conservatives certainly appear to share some of the radical democra-
tic and left libertarian sentiments promoted by Ivan Illich in the 1970s in
Celebration of Awareness (1970), Deschooling Society (1971), and Tools
for Conviviality (1973). These texts had a major impact on thinking
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about education in the 1960s and 1970s. How, then, does the notion of
deschooling promoted by Alberta's New Right differ from that promoted
by Ivan Illich?
Illich's primary criticism of liberal reform measures is that welfare
state reforms deepen the state's power, allowing instrumental rationality
to penetrate the logic of everyday life and objectify students in terms of
system "outputs." Illich contends that in capitalist societies, the state's
rationalization of schooling is implicated in the reproduction and deep-
ening of class power. Consequently, Illich is critical of professional
monopolies, state and corporate bureaucracies, and the commodification
of schooling through the pursuit of credentials in a market economy. His
proposed solution to this perceived dependency is to "deschool society,"
that is, a process of deinstitutionalising major areas of social life, espe-
cially the mass public education systems. Illich's proposed disestablish-
ment of bureaucracies and construction of convivial education includes,
however, the transformation of all bureaucratized institutions, including
capitalist corporations (Morrow and Torres 1990, 17).
It cannot be denied that Alberta's right-wing populism bears a
remarkable resemblance not only to the left-wing populism of the 1960s
and 1970s but also the leftist critique of professional monopolies, state
bureaucracies, and instrumental rationality. Both variants of populism
also exhibit the same naivete regarding social transformation. They mis-
takenly reduce the capitalist economy (a set of property relationships) to
an industrial economy (a set of technical relationships). They also limit
the challenges of social transformation to changes in consciousness.
What most readily distinguishes Klein's right-wing populism from its
left-wing variants, however, is the content of its ideal future and its sig-
nificantly different critique of political and cultural liberalism. While the
New Left idealized the radical extension and deepening of political and
cultural freedom, Klein's vision, in keeping with the principles of the
New Right, idealizes traditional values, effective technologies, and eco-
nomic anarchy—under the direct supervision of a strong state. The pre-
sent crisis in governability is directly attributed to too much democracy
and free thought. According to proponents of the New Right, profes-
sional social service elites have taken control of society, used the state
and clients of the state to feather their own nests, monopolized creden-
tialing as a bulwark for a false professional status, and subverted the
truth of human nature through the myth of progressive morality.
On questions of power, both movements mobilize populist appeal
against educated elites: the left against business technocrats, the right
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against public servants. The New Left, based on a critique of the cen-
tralization of economic and political power, called for the empowerment
of the people, and disavowed the status and privilege accorded to pro-
fessionals and educated elites. It was especially critical of the organiza-
tion of capitalist corporations, the private ownership of the means of
production, the regulatory power of state bureaucracies, and the power
of the social engineers to subvert authenticity. While the New Right also
uses the language of empowerment, it employs it toward a markedly dif-
ferent end. The New Right mobilizes the resentment of the middle and
•working classes against state and professional power but without any
commitment to blunt the discretionary power of corporate executives
and strategic managers who shape the workplace and state policy.
The New Right came to power in Alberta on December 5, 1992,
when Ralph Klein defeated Nancy Betkowski for the PC leadership and
effectively shifted power to rural Alberta and Calgary. Under Klein's
command, old-time Tories, those who believe in communal solidarities
and paternalistic obligations, have found themselves set adrift in a sea of
neoliberalism. It is such traditional Tories who have both expressed pub-
lic concern about the negative consequences of Klein's socioeconomic
reforms and chosen to distance themselves from the neoliberal impera-
tives that have served to restructure the province's education and health
care systems. Consequently, given the extension of the capitalist market
and new production methods in the delivery of social services, given the
increasing partnerships between schooling and the corporate sectors,
given the deepening influence of the state controlling program delivery,
and given the ethno-religious fragmentation of national civic standards,
it would be a mistake to argue that education reform in Alberta exem-
plifies the deschooling of society.
We suggest, rather, that education reform in Alberta is more accurate-
ly a "retooling of society." The restructuring of social service provision in
Alberta, as exemplified by the introduction of charter schooling and quasi-
markets in education services, does not challenge the existing bureaucrat-
ic order, but rather complements and deepens its perpetuation. The inver-
sion of the New Left's deschooling thesis into its opposite may well serve
as a warning to contemporary ethical critiques of restructuring. Samuel
Bowles and Herbert Gintis offer an interesting critique of Illich's deschool-
ing thesis, and their thesis applies equally well to the New Right's "retool-
ing through deschooling" effort and the growing number of pragmatic eth-
ical adaptations to globalization that do not seriously consider the empir-
ical social forces that actually exist in contemporary society (1977, 260).
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Illich's formulation, the two argue, overlooks how instrumental and con-
sumer consciousness is grounded in the production process, and how any
strategy for change that does not recognize and address existing econom-
ic structures is doomed to failure. The promotion of market-based school-
ing is no exception.
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Bell Canada—from the Bottom Up:
An Employee's Perspective
Monica Collins
In debates about restructuring and the new economy, statistics, num-
bers, and the bottom line tend to render faceless the people affected by
downsizing or supposed "right"-sizing. The following is the story of two
long-term Bell employees and the effects of Bell Canada's restructuring
on them. It provides a glimpse of the lives behind the numbers and, in
the process, a vivid illustration of the ways in which individuals' attitudes
are changed, and the culminating effect of these changes on company
productivity, workplace cooperation, and community involvement.
George Brown38 has worked more than twenty-five years with Bell
Canada. He estimates that only two of the first ten years were spent at
home with his family. For the rest, he was on the road. But he was not
unduly concerned. He knew that the Bell family would take care of and
support his wife—who also became a Bell employee—and children in
his absence. As a worker, he felt significant, a pioneer, a proud ambas-
sador for his company. Some fifteen years later, he finds himself won-
dering whether his sacrifices for the company were worth it.
In March 1995, John McLennan, the president and chief executive
officer of Bell Canada, announced his plan to eliminate ten thousand jobs
by the end of 1997. He described this "slashing" as "inevitable" given
decreased revenues, declining profits (46 percent over three years), and
expenditures of twenty-three billion dollars on technical upgrading.
George recalls that this announcement changed the company
overnight. Bell employees felt betrayed, frustrated, and uncertain of their
future. Too many questions remained unanswered for too long and
Note to this chapter is on p. 307.
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rumours fuelled the fears of already disgruntled workers. Support sys-
tems like health departments were dismantled and significant changes
were made to maintenance departments, but few facts were shared with
employees and no strategy was unveiled. The long-awaited video
announcement by the CEO on the company future was postponed sev-
eral times.
Finally, in June 1995, McLennan advised employees of their options
over closed circuit-television. Workers could volunteer for an early retire-
ment package by September 30, 1995, or have the career action centre
find them other jobs somewhere in the company. After September 30,
1995, the value of buy-out deals would be halved and other "options,"
including lay-offs, would be examined.
Details remained unclear. The Browns and other employees
watched and waited helplessly as immediate supervisors communicated
front-line workers' questions to managers and received incomplete
answers weeks later. They - soon concluded that there was no well-
thought-out plan in place. Instead, the company's prime aim seemed to
be to alleviate investors' and shareholders' concerns about the compa-
ny's ability to compete globally.
Workers concluded that their union's hands were tied if they were
to save jobs. They read Globe and Mail reports of Bell's transfer of
assets, its moves to set up distribution subsidiaries, its planned services
spin off through the formation of two new companies, and its closure of
operators' offices. Some workers left voluntarily to join the new compa-
nies. One thousand inside-wire maintenance workers voluntarily left Bell
to join Entourage Technology Solutions Inc., a new company owned by
the Quebec Federation of Labour's Solidarity Fund. Bell now contracts
out its inside-wire maintenance work to Entourage. Then came critical
CRTC rulings which denied Bell permission to test a potpourri of new
services, a request which was hotly contested by the cable firms, and
opened up the doors for new phone-line firms. According to the
Browns, "The government gun had been pointed to the company head."
Workers could not get proper answers to their questions from man-
agement and were hard pressed to arrange for a chartered accountant to
advise them on their severance package or pension during the regular
work week. No on-site seminars were offered to explain the options,
and most workers would not risk taking a day off work to seek advice
they badly needed. Only those who accepted the severance package
were eventually offered any adjustment assistance (a three-month
resume writing/job search skills course).
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With only incomplete information, bewildered and frustrated work-
ers watched Bell diversify and create new companies. Front-line workers
were not consulted or asked for their opinions. In a period of six to eight
months, managers lost credibility as they frequently changed their minds,
repeated rumours, and proved incapable of interpreting the various
options which were offered to employees. Employees with long compa-
ny service, such as George, felt they had insights to offer directors who
had no hands-on experience, but their opinions were not taken serious-
ly. As the number of first-line managers decreased, communication wors-
ened. A family-like working environment quickly degenerated into one
of rivalry and uncooperative relationships. Colleagues who had worked
well together and thought of themselves as "ambassadors of the compa-
ny" now competed fiercely for the new jobs in newly formed companies.
Workers perceived the whole process of rehiring as suspect. It was
as though a few favoured employees had been hand-picked for choice
jobs while others were slotted into "bum jobs" in different departments
of Bell or, worse, laid off.
In order to keep a job with the company, employees were forced to
make difficult decisions concerning relocation (including costs, benefits,
their tolerance for extended absences from family, and their ability to
adapt to new cultures and environments). As local offices were closed
or their closures planned and work was centralized in major centres like
Toronto, more and more families were faced with such dilemmas.
The Browns' only real option was to sell their house in Thunder Bay
and move to the Toronto area. Leaving family and friends behind was
traumatic, as were the initial battles with their two teenagers, but the
Browns decided that Mary should take an option offered her. This meant
relocation to the Toronto Ontario Control Centre, where she would per-
form support work for the repair department and full billing for damages
or repairs for which customers were liable.
The family bought a house in Newmarket and have again assumed
a large mortgage, due to the much higher cost of housing in southern
Ontario. Every day, both Mary and George, who is now working shifts
on a temporary, ninety-day contract, commute to Toronto, adding
between two and four hours daily to their eight-hour work schedule.
The intangibles have been difficult to deal with. It has meant strug-
gling to adapt to the faster pace of life and to a new social situation. It has
meant rebuilding a social life, something difficult in a community where
people do not greet each other as a matter of course on the street. The
family has lost the joy they once experienced fishing after less than sixty
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minutes on the road in tranquil, relatively isolated northern lakes, which
cannot be replaced by the tension and long delays on major highways
needed to arrive at polluted lakes. George is trying to substitute wood-
working for his passion for fishing. Mary wonders why the Thunder Bay
office is still open, long after the date it was due to close. She wonders
•whether she made the right decision.
On the positive side, the children have adapted well. They enjoy the
wide choice of post-secondary educational institutions available to them
in southern Ontario. George believes he has more opportunities to work
with and to learn about advanced technology thanks to the move south.
He believes that he will consequently be in a better position to get new
\vork or to become self-employed when he retires in two years.
But financial concerns are taking their toll on the Browns. They now
have a high mortgage and two children to put through college and uni-
versity at a time when fees are increasing by leaps and bounds. Mary in
particular cannot reconcile the need to leave Thunder Bay and her
friends. She does not understand why the company did not offer a tech-
nologically feasible and less expensive work-at-home option. She is fed
up with the "forked tongues" of managers who espouse team work and
employee empowerment, but practise back stabbing, favouritism, and
despotism. She cannot see the savings in centralization given the drop
in employee productivity and constant technological breakdowns and
delays. She believes that commuting and relocation have left employees
bitter, without any sense of community, and exacerbated inefficiencies.
In the absence of a clearly understood restructuring strategy, voice-
less Bell employees who had taken pride in doing their best and who
had enjoyed their work, have adopted a "why should I bust my ass if
the company is going to shaft me again?" attitude. The work ethic has
changed dramatically and productivity has declined sharply. Workers'
interest in on-the-job training in new technology has also declined as
their sense of isolation has increased. They find it difficult to place
much confidence in the abilities of the new, younger, "book-trained"
managers with no "hands-on experience," and effective communication
has decreased in consequence. Rather than face long commutes, those
working overtime sleep at the office. In silent apprehension, they watch
for the company's next move, wondering where the justice is, given that
managers have been transferred to other close positions while techni-
cians and operators have been forced to make heavy personal sacrifices
to relocate to large centres like Toronto, or to take other jobs in new
companies.
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George is unwilling to sacrifice anything more for the company. He,
like many of his colleagues, feels spurned. Their input was only sought
after the fact, so what can they possibly offer now?
Management remains uncertain of labour and worker reaction and a
wait-and-see attitude prevails. "There is a big pendulum around the
•world," George says, "and in two years' time the whole communications
field will be revolutionized." In the meantime, nervous workers monitor
the press. In an August newspaper report, Bell's plan to contract out
3,500 operator jobs was reported and Ms. Koen, Bell spokeswoman, was
quoted as saying, "the company is reviewing operator services as part of
a larger, $1.7 billion program to restructure and cut costs in preparation
for full competition in local and long-distance telephone markets" (Globe
and Mail, 21/08/96, B5).
According to the Browns, the company has paid a heavy price for
the uncertainty of the last two years. It has lost employee commitment
and is losing potential customers daily because the company no longer
has the right personnel in the right jobs to provide responsive, quality
service to the customer. Whatever the future brings, it is hard to believe
that demoralizing workers in this way is the best way to build a solid
foundation for a secure future.
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The Banking Sector: Avoiding
the Pitfalls of Restructuring
Sylvia D. Chrominska
I've been asked to address the question of how downsizing and restruc-
turing are managed in the banking sector. To begin with, I'd like to make
an important distinction between these two terms. "Restructuring" means
employing your workforce in order to adapt to changing work.
"Downsizing" means unemploying your workforce because work has
changed.
The banking industry is facing huge challenges. Restructuring to
meet these challenges is simply good business. But how each organiza-
tion plans to respond to these challenges—or fails to plan—is the key
point. I'm going to talk about the issues impacting banking, about what's
happening in the industry as a whole. Then I'll touch on Scotiabank's
experience and its approach to managing these issues and the changing
needs of our workforce.
The banking sector has been undergoing tremendous change—
change that is revolutionizing the financial services workplace. And it's
largely driven by three things: technology, consumer demand, and new
sources of competition.
Technology has opened the doors for banks to deliver—and for cus-
tomers to demand—more convenient services: picking up the telephone
to pay a bill, using a debit card to pay for groceries, or accessing a com-
mercial account from your PC at work. In short, the traditional bank
branch is no longer the only place to do your banking.
Consumer habits and demands have changed, too. We now expect
convenient twenty-four hour access to services, we expect to check our
account balances over the phone or pay with a debit card over the
counter, and we expect more service. We want financial advice—such
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as mortgage advice or retirement planning advice—but we don't want
to stand in line to get it.
This combination of new technology and changing consumer habits
is dramatically shifting workloads. In Canada, between 1990 and 1994,
the number of automated banking machines (ABMs) increased from
about 7,400 to 12,700—a 72 percent increase—while the number of
branches increased by less than 9 percent. During this same period, elec-
tronic transactions more than doubled, to six hundred million transac-
tions per year. But the proportion of transactions handled by branches
is dropping substantially. An Ernst and Young 1996 study predicts that
retail banking transactions done at branches will decline from 38 percent
of all transactions in 1995 to 21 percent of all transactions in 1998.
Now that the computer is fast becoming a key access point to bank-
ing, we have a unique new breed of virtual bankers. These are the infor-
mation service providers, among them, Intuit and Microsoft, which use
networks like the World Wide Web to provide access to financial ser-
vices. These new players are joined by a 'wide variety of others: insur-
ance companies, private pension funds, mutual fund firms, and credit
unions. Each of these new competitors is finding ways to provide tradi-
tional banking services without the costs of a branch system. In fact,
technology allows them to circumvent the use of branches.
For instance, the Vancouver City Savings and Credit Union, popu-
larly known as VanCity, announced in 1996 that it is launching a com-
pletely branchless national bank, where all services will be offered over
the phone, by PC and ABM. Foreign banks, such as Citibank, are also
making more aggressive moves into the Canadian market. In August
1996, Citibank announced that it was joining forces with AGF Trust to
offer full banking services. Other "branch-less" financial services
include the financial arms of major manufacturers such as General
Motors and General Electric, which provide everything from car leasing
to credit cards.
This new competition, consumer demand and new technology all
represent major structural issues in Canada's banking system. At the cen-
tre of it all is the branch network, the place where most bank jobs reside.
Maintaining a branch infrastructure is an expensive proposition, and one
that new competitors don't have to contend with. This raises the funda-
mental question, how can we manage the changes due to increasing
competition and dramatically shifting service demands? How can we
manage to compete successfully with competitors who can reach our
customers via the Internet?
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One way—and I believe it's the wrong way—is downsizing.
A 1996 report by Deloitte and Touche states that the number of staff
in the Canadian banking industry will have to be cut by thirty-five thou-
sand within the next ten years. That's roughly 20 percent of the indus-
try workforce. They say deregulation, new technology, and more com-
petitors will force sweeping changes in how banks conduct business.
Undoubtedly, many jobs will change or disappear over the next few
years, but I think the Deloitte prediction is overstated. It assumes that
the competitive pressures now being identified are new and unantici-
pated, but they are not. These pressures have existed for the better part
of the past two decades, although they are speeding up today. The pre-
diction doesn't recognize that the loss of some jobs will be offset by the
creation of others. It doesn't account for the banking system's equipping
its current workforce with the new skills and knowledge necessary to
adapt to change.
Employment has declined in the banking industry. At their peak in
1991, the six major banks employed 173,000. Today, that number is
165,000—a 4 to 5 percent reduction. This reduction has been handled
not by downsizing, but primarily by attrition and by redeploying people
in new areas of business, such as telephone banking and trust services.
The main reason for this approach is that banking is a service busi-
ness—a people business which consists of mutually beneficial relation-
ships. Structural change always affects people—employees, employers,
and customers—and it affects behaviour. So, structural change only suc-
ceeds to the extent that people are able and willing to adapt. In other
words, it involves attitude and motivation.
Downsizing can hardly be called motivational. When a company
turns to downsizing as a restructuring technique, it's making a conscious
but short-sighted choice. Because there is little evidence to show down-
sizing improves performance, and much evidence to the contrary (see,
for example, the articles by Wayne Cascio and Todd Hostager et al. in
this volume).
Downsizing focuses very narrowly on costs, not people, skills or
performance. Costs and people are viewed as one and the same. When
this happens, restructuring becomes a quick financial fix, not a long-
term business plan.
Almost every organization talks about people being their most
important asset, but not every organization acts that way. In a service
business, like a bank, when downsizing is used to address business
problems, the negative impact is huge. It destroys the loyalty between
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the company and its employees. The emotional and psychological con-
tract is broken, and that affects behaviour.
Evidence shows that downsizing severely damages the employment
relationship and ultimately the customer service relationship. And when
service suffers, the business suffers. Research also shows that when the
employment relationship is healthy, employees are better motivated,
more committed, and generally have a better attitude. They provide
good service. And good service is profitable.
So what's the alternative to downsizing?
It's planning. A well-managed company manages the size and
needs of its workforce well. I'm not talking about an acquisition, where
duplication often leads to redundancies; I'm talking about the crucial
planning a company needs to do to determine what human, techno-
logical, and financial resources are needed to meet the needs of all its
stakeholders—customers, employees, shareholders, and suppliers.
Planning is key.
Companies that avoid downsizing do so because they are better
planners, and do five things well:
• They avoid one-time, short-sighted fixes. Business improvement is a
process—a continuous process—not a transaction.
• They know their core competencies or strengths and they build their
business decisions around them. They position and prepare their
workforce to deliver on those strengths. Change that flows from busi-
ness strategies is more acceptable to employees, because it makes
sense and isn't viewed as a knee-jerk reaction to short-term trends in
the marketplace.
• They support skills training. The impact of new technology I dis-
cussed earlier is not destroying jobs, it's changing work. Managing
change is really about managing changing work. Training must be
forward-looking, and it should help employees acquire skills that are
adaptable to the new work environment.
• They make a commitment to employment. Leading companies put
employee satisfaction on an equal footing with satisfying customers
and shareholders. At Scotiabank, for example, we don't guarantee
jobs, but we do everything possible to keep staff employed and to
provide a stable work environment. This is crucial to maintaining loy-
alty, which is one of our core values. Our goal is to provide quality
jobs with long-term career potential.
• They communicate. At Scotiabank, we make every effort to inform
employees about our bank's strategy and its strengths. Communica-
tion helps provide employees with a context for what is going on in
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their workplace. It helps cultivate a positive attitude toward change,
because employees understand the business reasons for what is
going on around them.
I think that if you use these five guidelines, you avoid mistaking
people for costs. You avoid the expedient "grow and shrink" approach
to business, where you add resources to handle increasing workloads,
then cut them back when work slows. Instead, you focus not only on
handling the immediate work, but on managing it in consideration of all
your stakeholders, with a longer-term view in mind.
We know this works. During the 1970s, Scotiabank's assets increased
by thirty-seven billion dollars, while our staffing increased by 9,500, or
68 percent. In the decade that followed, our assets grew by fifty-four bil-
lion dollars, but we required a net addition of only five hundred staff.
The difference was that although our bank was growing rapidly, we
were aggressively managing the work. We centralized functions. We cre-
ated new ways of doing things so staff could focus on the customer. Our
staff didn't stop working, but they did stop some of the work they were
doing in the past, and started doing different work.
During the nineties, we've continued with this approach. And we've
grown consistently, with no need for retrenchment. The result has been
a steady record of job stability, providing high-quality, high-value jobs.
In 1995, Scotiabank created four hundred positions in Canada. So far in
1996, we've added 875 employees. This is growth coming in new areas
of business, such as telephone banking and mutual funds, but also in the
traditional branch network.
Massive downsizing is not a legitimate means of managing over the
long term. It's irresponsible and it's damaging. It's short-term thinking for
short-term, and often questionable, gains. As the saying goes, no one
ever shrunk to greatness. Grow your business wisely, manage change
carefully day to day, and stay focused on the big picture.
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PART IX
Overview
In the final section of this book, Wesley Cragg, one of North America's lead-
ing ethicists, provides a summation and an overview of the ethical issues raised
by restructuring and by the other articles in this book. In his account of the
ethical dimension of restructuring and the restructuring economy, he identifies
the obstacles, opportunities, and challenges they present when they are con-
sidered from an ethical point of view.
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Ethics and Restructuring:
Obstacles, Challenges,
and Opportunities
Wesley Cragg
My assigned task in this concluding chapter is to provide an overview of
challenges and opportunities that the phenomenon of restructuring has
created for ethics. Before addressing that task directly, however, I pro-
pose to begin with an examination of two obstacles that need to be
overcome if ethics is to achieve a significant role in current debates.
First, consider a recent article from the Business section of the Globe and
Mail entitled "The big picture" by Donald Cox, a regular Globe and Mail
investment columnist and the chairman of Harris Investment
Management Incorporated of Chicago and Toronto-based Jones, Hourd
Investments Incorporated (Cox 1997). The column in question records
Cox's reaction to the news that the Dow Jones had just passed 6000 with
no end to a rising stock market in sight. At issue was whether the bull
market could be expected to continue, or whether stock prices then cur-
rent represented a speculative excess that was bound to end in a spec-
tacular stock market collapse of the sort experienced at the beginning of
the Great Depression. Cox comments:
The stagflationary 1970s brought three people to power who quite liter-
ally ushered in a new era. Paul Volker, who became the US Federal
Reserve board chairman in 1979, the year of Margaret Thatcher's first vic-
tory in Britain and Ronald Reagan, who first won in 1980. These people
insisted that central banks should follow US economist Milton Friedman's
approach: the goal was price stability, not manipulating the economy. As
for economic policy, they agreed with Austrian economist Joseph
Schumpeter, who said that the greatest extension of wealth creation in
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history was capitalism, a system based on creative destruction. He even
said that stable capitalism was a contradiction in terms. (Cox 1997, B21,
emphasis added)
These comments strike me as an intriguing place to begin my dis-
cussion of ethics and restructuring. Much of the discussion in this book
focuses on the destructive character of restructuring which, as the editor
notes in his introduction, has taken the form of downsizing, lay-offs,
government cutbacks, the closing and amalgamation of hospitals, boards
of education, schools and health services, and the "rationalization" of
higher education. Though some of the contributors to this volume advo-
cate particular kinds of restructuring (Chrominska, Cascio, Leo Groarke,
etc.), none of the contributors to this book endorse it in the same unre-
strained spirit as Donald Cox. The process of restructuring—and the
restructuring economy—has not, from their point of view, been partic-
ularly creative in the positive sense of that term.
The strongest supporters of restructuring—economists, politicians,
and their supporters in the electorate—are of a different view. For some
of them at least, creative destruction is what restructuring is all about.
"Working smarter," "providing more with less" and similar slogans are
commonplaces in private and public sector management circles. What is
equally important is that these slogans imply a hidden ethical justification
for the pain and dislocation involved. Capitalism is destructive. But what
it destroys is inefficiency in the form of feather-bedding, exploitation of
privilege or political favour, fatigue, and loss of initiative. The result is a
market able to provide goods and services efficiently, and at the lowest
possible price. Since we are all consumers, we all gain in the long run.
This is an economic justification of restructuring that rests on dis-
guised ethical foundations. It constitutes an obstacle to a systematic dis-
cussion of ethics and restructuring, however, because its ethical parame-
ters normally remain implicit and unaddressed. Nonetheless, the current
underlying justification of restructuring as carried out through most of this
decade is what is believed (implicitly) by its advocates to be its funda-
mentally creative character. It is an obstacle in the way of a discussion of
ethics and restructuring because, for the most part, those opposed to the
process rarely address this justification for restructuring directly, while
those who support restructuring that has an obviously destructive char-
acter rarely make the assumptions that underlie that support explicit.
The second example I want to mention by way of introduction cen-
tres on comments by Dr. Elaine Todres, deputy minister of the Solicitor
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General and Correctional Services, Ontario. The comments were made
at a conference entitled "Community Corrections: Making It Work in
Ontario," organized by the John Howard Society. Dr. Todres was a
keynote speaker. Various papers in this book discuss the growing impact
of restructuring on the nature and quality of social and health services
in the 1990s. The Honourable Edmond Blanchard specifically addresses
the implications of restructuring for corrections.
Prisons should be of special interest to those interested in ethics and
restructuring because the people who are allotted prison sentences are for
the most part the least privileged members of our society. The proportion
of people with disabilities of one kind or another is much higher in prison
populations than in the population at large. Most inmates are very poor
and badly educated. Their chances for succeeding under current eco-
nomic conditions are about as slim as any other group in our society.
Elaine Todres has a very distinguished record of achievement as a
public servant. She sits on the editorial committee of the Canadian
Institute for Public Administration; she was appointed editor-at-large of
the journal of the Agency for Instructional Technology, a non-profit,
US-Canadian organization, and her writings have been widely pub-
lished. They include an article on "Ethics and Government" in the
Journal of Canadian Public Administration.
In her address, Dr. Todres described the mandate of her ministry
and the mandate of the government. The first goal of the government of
Mike Harris and her ministry was to reinvent the justice system. The sec-
ond goal was "to deliver justice," particularly in the case of serious
crimes. (Note that in the Canadian justice system, the provincial solicitor
general is responsible only for people sentenced to less than two years.)
The third objective of her ministry, she said, was to restructure with a
view to reducing costs.
The impact of these priorities has been rather remarkable. Dr.
Todres was speaking to a room full of people involved in community
services. Many of them would likely lose their jobs because of the
restructuring aimed a cost reductions that the policy of the government
implied. For the inmates of provincial correctional institutions, the pic-
ture was even bleaker. Since the current government has taken office,
there has been a 45 percent reduction in temporary absences in Ontario,
all the provinces half-way houses have been closed, and the numbers of
inmates released on parole have been reduced by more than 50 percent.
I offer these developments as an example of "creative destruction" at
work in the public sector. It is clearly destructive, yet those responsible
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for making and implementing the policies in question profess to believe
that they are creative. Similar policies are at work in health and educa-
tion. Nor is Ontario an exception in this regard. Similar forces are at work
in Western liberal democracies around the world.
The gap between "creative destruction" and ethics might seem to be
enormous, but one thing that impressed me about Dr. Todres's presen-
tation was her absolute conviction that the Conservative government
was driven by a commitment to re-establish integrity in the political
process. The government had taken office absolutely determined they
were going to re-establish the public's perception of politicians as peo-
ple of integrity, she claimed. They were going to do so by demonstrat-
ing that politicians were capable of keeping their promises. And that, she
proposed, was exactly what Mike Harris, the premier of the province of
Ontario, was doing.
I mention this because the people whose actions and policies are so
much the focus of attention in a discussion of ethics and restructuring
believe that what they are doing is ethical. It is important not to over-
look this fact. For those who see the destruction and not the creativity,
the fact that restructuring is seen as ethically justifiable by those direct-
ing its course is an obstacle to communication. Yet, if it is true, both
sides should welcome a discussion of ethics and restructuring. These
two examples point to several obstacles to a discussion of ethics and
restructuring that must be addressed if progress is to be made and com-
munication, with or without consequent agreement, is to be achieved.
Obstacles
It is important that those of us who believe deeply that ethics has a role
to play in business and in public policy, should not overlook the obsta-
cles that stand in the way of injecting ethics into the economic debates
that are currently taking place. There are four of them that it is particu-
larly important to identify and discuss.
The first obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the ethics of restruc-
turing lies in the rhetoric of ethics itself. The problem with that rhetoric
is that in our society it is as easily used by people trying to disguise the
unethical character of what they are doing as it is by those whose
motives are more pristine. There are many examples that illustrate this
problem. Pyramid sales schemes are promoted for the benefit of their
participants. Tobacco companies have no trouble using ethical para-
digms—an appeal to individual freedoms, for example—in justifying
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their marketing activities. Politicians of all stripes use the vocabulary of
ethics to castigate their opponents while at the same time frequently
demonstrating a willingness to cut ethical corners when doing so seems
to their benefit. The most recent presidential election in the United States
is replete with examples of this phenomenon.
The ease with which people in public life appeal to ethics to justify
their activities or criticize their opponents has left many people sceptical
about the value of introducing ethical criteria into the examination of
public issues in any form. As a consequence, debates about ethics carry
a good deal of unwelcome baggage. For many, appeals to ethics have
strongly negative connotations.
Ironically, the rhetoric of ethics can create obstacles to the task of
examining restructuring from an ethical perspective even where ethics is
understood positively. The problem is that a commitment to ethics as
something potentially constructive and worthwhile is for people in the
business community and elsewhere a double-edged sword. Companies
and organizations that articulate clear ethical standards are often
exposed to severe criticism that questions both their motivation and their
conduct. Because of this, there is considerable risk in articulating high
standards against which your behaviour can then be evaluated. For these
standards can become weapons in the hands of opponents and com-
petitors who are frequently not reluctant to attack those espousing them
as hypocritical because of their failure to live up to their own standards
in all respects. It is not surprising, therefore, that many organizations,
both in the public and the private sector, set up codes of ethics which
are designed to govern their employees, or members, for example, but
refuse to reveal what those codes are. Thus, while the current prime
minister of Canada made ethics a cornerstone of his campaign for office
earlier this decade, the code of ethics he put in place to guide his min-
isters in the exercise of their responsibilities has never been made pub-
lic. The same is true of the code of ethics to which the Real Estate Board
of Toronto claims to hold its members responsible but which it also
refuses to make public. (Mark Schwartz, a business ethics PhD student
at York University, had enormous difficulties trying to obtain a copy of
that code.)
The irony in this state of affairs is obvious. By articulating ethical
standards, people expose themselves to criticism for failing to meet self-
imposed standards that others are not expected to meet just because
they have avoided espousing ethical commitments publicly. In
unscrupulous hands, this double standard can become a weapon that
292 The Ethics of the New Economy
can be used to achieve goals that are themselves frequently not in the
public interest. This then constitutes a second obstacle to attempts to
inject ethics into the debate on restructuring.
A third obstacle to useful discussion of the role of ethics in restruc-
turing is the realization that ethics is no panacea. In the heat of debate,
this fact is easily forgotten. Ethics, that is to say, has a limited reach in a
number of senses. Virtue is no guarantee of success. The fact that you
are well motivated ethically does not mean that you are going to be suc-
cessful in your business dealings, whether in the public or the private
sectors. There is more to business management and public and volun-
tary sector administration than ethics. Ethics is a component of effective
leadership; but it is only one such component. Many other skills are
required for success for which ethics is no substitute.
Another way of making this point is to observe that bad things do
happen to good people and good organizations. Equally, good things
sometimes happen to bad organizations. Hence, ethics is no panacea.
Those of us arguing for its importance must be careful not to suggest
otherwise.
The fourth obstacle faced by those wishing to advance the cause of
ethics in restructuring is perhaps the most important one. It is the wide-
ly shared belief that ethics in reality has only a peripheral place in guid-
ing and structuring economic activity, whether in business, health ser-
vices, or education. That is to say, while many people regard ethics as
something we should try to pay attention to if we can, ethical conduct
is not seen as essential, and may indeed constitute a significant obstacle
to success or the avoidance of failure. Often this view is accompanied
by a related view that ethics is one of the things that must go if impor-
tant financial issues, particularly survival, is at stake. Ethics is, on this
view, a luxury. Alternatively, it is easier to be ethical if you are doing
well than to be ethical if you are doing badly. These and similar views
are deeply engrained in our modern culture. They constitute a signifi-
cant obstacle to injecting ethics into current debates about the economy
in a serious way.
I do not think that these four obstacles to injecting ethics into
restructuring debates are insurmountable. Nevertheless, they are signifi-
cant and they should be kept in mind if we are to engage that debate in
a realistic fashion. The importance of so doing becomes even more
apparent in the kinds of economic environments in which restructuring
becomes a serious option. How then are these obstacles to be over-
come?
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Challenges
Two challenges face those who seek to evaluate restructuring and the
new economy from an ethical perspective. Ignoring them will only cre-
ate additional obstacles for those who believe that ethics should inform
and structure business activity, public policy debate, and administrative
procedures.
The first challenge is the relatively undeveloped state of business
ethics. The reasons for this state of affairs are not particularly obscure.
Until recently, the ethical values that people assume ought to guide busi-
ness activity have gone largely unarticulated in contrast, for example, to
law and economics.
The reason for this may lie in the fact that until recently shaping
character and ethical beliefs was thought to be the job of the family and
the school. In the world of business, this encouraged the idea that build-
ing an ethical business required simply hiring ethical employees. On this
account, a business will be unethical if it employs unethical employees
and ethical if it employs ethical employees. This view continues to dom-
inate the thinking of many of the older generation of business leaders,
which is one of the reasons why the study of business ethics and busi-
ness ethics education has had such a difficult time getting off the ground
in this country.
In deliberations about restructuring, the most explicit indication of
the undeveloped nature of ethics is the many references to what com-
mentators have described as the unwritten employment contract. Gary
Graham of the Canadian Manufacturer's Association (in a presentation to
the Laurier Conference on Ethics and Restructuring, 1996) described a
central but informal tenet of that contract as the commitment on the part
of an employer that "if you work hard and stay out of trouble, there will
be a job for you while we stay in business," or alternatively, "while we
remain profitable." David Drinkwalter identifies the same informal prin-
ciple as the expectation of job security on the part of employees
(Drinkwalter, 171).
Gary Graham suggests that this principle has played an important
role in the evolution of employer-employee relationships over the years
in countries like Canada. It's role in defining those relationships, how-
ever, has been largely informal. It is not enshrined in legislation in any
explicit way. Nor will you find it explicitly articulated in collective agree-
ments. For the most part and for most people, until recently, it was sim-
ply assumed and taken largely for granted.
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In his presentation, Graham pointed out that this informal principle
has become one of the significant casualties of an era of restructuring.
What is slowly taking its place, he suggested, is an "employability" prin-
ciple. A striking feature of the discussion that followed Graham's pre-
sentation was his reaction to a question asked by a member of the audi-
ence. Where and how, he was asked, should this implicit contract be
articulated in labour relations? He evinced considerable surprise at the
question and admitted he had no idea what the appropriate answer was.
This example illustrates how the ethical underpinnings of business
activity still lie unarticulated even when people are committed to an eth-
ical perspective. They provide foundations which, it is assumed, we
don't need to probe, presumably because everybody knows what they
are. On the other hand, if you listen carefully to the debate about ethics
and restructuring, you will hear that assumption increasingly challenged,
though only indirectly even by leaders who have been persuaded of the
importance of business ethics.
One of the challenges facing those who want our society to exam-
ine restructuring and similar phenomena from an ethical perspective is
to move the debate in the direction of an explicit evaluation of the need
for formally articulated ethical values for the workplace. Workplace
value frameworks need to be set out formally so that people can see
them, evaluate them, and base their actions on them.
The second challenge is appropriately directed more specifically to
the academic community. The challenge is to learn to balance "wrong
analysis," the search for and critical evaluation of moral errors, with
"right analysis," the search for and evaluation of sound ethical behaviour.
It is a challenge for academics because their natural inclination is that of
a critic. They look to see what is inadequate out there in the real world
and then attempt to work out how to correct it. The result is that, typi-
cally, business ethics texts or cases focus on examples of mistakes or
errors in judgment or moral wrongdoing. Hence, the attraction of cases
like Dow Corning, or the Exxon Valdez, or Bophal, or Baring Bank, and
so on. One of the favourite videos in current use in business schools is
a thoughtful and articulate examination of the Challenger disaster. This
video case study is a perfect example of wrong analysis, a particularly
dramatic example of something going seriously wrong with disastrous
consequences.
I am not suggesting that this type of analysis is inappropriate. What
I am suggesting, however, is that the challenge to the academic com-
munity is to realize that critical analysis is not of great value in the field
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of ethics if there are no models which can substitute for, or at least pro-
vide an alternative approach to, the kinds of problems typically
addressed in business ethics. Providing examples for study of com-
mendable responses to challenging problems is what I describe above
as "right analysis." We need to begin to look for those firms that have
been guided by ethical considerations in the direction of ethically cre-
ative and courageous outcomes to contrast with cases describing orga-
nizational behaviour gone awry. Equally important is diagnosis that
seeks to work out what was involved in getting it right.
One of the best examples of "right analysis" that I have seen recent-
ly is set out by Sylvia Chrominska in the previous chapter. It goes with-
out saying that some people may disagree with this example.
Nevertheless, it certainly is a very good example of an organization, or
at least a part of an organization, trying to work its way through restruc-
turing challenges from an ethical perspective with a view to getting
things right before they go wrong. The second challenge is to place
more emphasis on these kinds of examples.
I have suggested two challenges: the challenge of articulating those
values that have remained inchoate in our culture but which need to sur-
face and be examined, and the challenge of doing "right analysis" as
well as "wrong analysis." If these are the key challenges, then what are
the opportunities that these challenges present as we look at strategic
planning, management, administration, and public policy development?
Opportunities
Challenges generate opportunities, in this case the opportunity to make
clear what was previously unclear, and to set ethics on a solid footing
for the future. I would suggest that there are four examples of opportu-
nities that the challenges and obstacles discussed above give rise to.
The first opportunity, and in many respects the most fundamental,
is to establish that ethics has a central role to play in policy develop-
ment, strategic planning, and management. Central to accomplishing this
task is bringing people to the realization that ethics is not just about
rules. Ethics is about rules; that is undeniable. However, it is not just
about rules—it is also about vision and envisioning. Ethics invites peo-
ple to think about the future in creative ways.
Ethics brings into focus things that otherwise would go unnoticed.
People who do not introduce an explicitly ethical dimension into their
planning miss things that they ought to be paying attention to. That is
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to say, there are some things they are unlikely to see unless ethical val-
ues have an explicit and acknowledged role in strategic planning and
management. It is not that they are necessarily evil or uncaring; they
just don't see things that are important to what it is they are doing.
Ethics requires that people move outside of the circle of their own inter-
ests and look at what they are doing through the eyes of others. Ethics
also provides incentives and energy for the search for genuinely cre-
ative solutions.
Those who want to inject ethics into economic decision making
must identify models that illustrate the envisioning character of ethics
and its consequences. This is what makes right analysis so important to
this kind of work.
The envisioning character of ethics can be illustrated and explained
in many ways. One of those ways, in my view, is to convince people
that building ethics into corporate decision making will result in better
decisions from everyone's perspective, in the long run. That is not to say
that things never go badly for ethical people; it is to say, rather, that in
the long term, ethics can bring insight and understanding to manage-
ment, strategic planning, and policy formation. The result will normally
be a more sensitive and less damaging treatment of all those likely to be
affected by economic decision making.
The first opportunity that restructuring makes possible is the oppor-
tunity to broaden the sense of vision in play where restructuring is under
consideration. I have suggested that ethics is the key to this process.
Much of what is said in this book illustrates this conclusion.
The second opportunity that restructuring generates is the opportu-
nity to identify the values and principles that ought to guide ethical deci-
sion making in business, health, and education. Here, formally articulat-
ing the values by which an organization chooses to guide its operations
and activities becomes crucial. In their contribution to this collection,
Peggy Cunningham and Pamela Gushing illustrate the value of this activ-
ity for cause-related marketing. Cause-related marketing involves private
sector support for a "good" cause like cancer research or the environ-
mental protection of endangered species with a view to achieving a
competitive advantage through the publicity generated.
Cause-related marketing is a valuable source of funding for hard-
pressed, voluntary sector organizations. However, it also carries with it
the implicit endorsement of the firm doing the marketing by the vol-
untary sector organization that stands to gain from the marketing
arrangement. The same is true in the other direction; the firm engaged
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in cause-related marketing implies, by its partnership, endorsement of
the cause and the organization being supported.
The moral complexity which cause-related marketing generates lies
in the fact that both parties are entering the partnership for pecuniary
reasons, with the consequent danger of exploitation, manipulation, and
compromised principles. This makes cause-related marketing a good
example of a development that calls for careful articulation of the val-
ues, rules, and principles that will ensure that damaging compromises
are not made. In situations of this sort, creative ethical thinking is key if
partners are to avoid potentially very damaging developments while
opening the door to imaginative solutions to financially stressful pres-
sures resulting from cutbacks in government funding.
Restructuring provides a third opportunity for ethics to which intel-
lectually creative responses are needed if ethics is going to be taken
seriously by our decision makers. The opportunity I have in mind here
is the opportunity to bring empirical research into the service of ethi-
cal analysis. People from my particular background (I am a philoso-
pher by training) often disparage the role of empirical research in
applied ethics. This is perhaps not too surprising, given the quality of
much of the research conducted to date. In spite of this fact, however,
empirical research is vital, as a number of the contributions in this col-
lection illustrate. One reason is the importance of testing the empirical
dimensions of strategies which are justified by their advocates by ref-
erence to their anticipated beneficial consequences, much in the way
of ethical defence in the business, health, education, and government
communities has to do with outcomes. One of the tasks, then, of ethics
is to ensure that the empirical foundations of ethical judgments are fair
and balanced.
The role of empirical research in applied ethics is one of the themes
that dominates this book. Wayne Cascio, for example, shows how empir-
ical studies can test the claim that downsizing has beneficial, long-term
effects for corporations. One of his own studies looks at Fortune 500
returns and the effect of downsizing on the stock market values of com-
panies that have done so in dramatic ways. There is no doubt that an
enormous spike in stock value can be the result of downsizing. Indeed,
this can be the result of simply announcing a decision to downsize,
whether the announcement is followed through on or not. Perhaps that,
in itself, is enough to indicate that the downsizing itself does not have a
key role to play in the evaluation of stocks, except insofar as it effects
the psychology of short-term buying.
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Other articles, for example Dewey and Groarke's piece on evidence-
based decision making ("What Restructuring Can Learn from EBDM")
raise ethically important empirical questions about restructuring in all
sectors of the economy. An other example is Conrad Brunk's assessment
("Managing Risk in the Restructured Corporation") of the breast implant
controversy, an issue that has touched the lives of many thousands of
women and driven Dow Corning into bankruptcy.
There is a fourth opportunity that accompanies the challenges we
face in the context of ethics and restructuring on which I wish to com-
ment. That is the opportunity to test the ethical assumptions and rea-
soning underlying policies and strategies described by their advocates as
ethical or ethically justified. The opportunities that restructuring in our
economy provide in this regard are numerous, as illustrated throughout
this collection. What is required is not only critical appraisal of promised
or predicted outcomes, but also critical appraisal of the ethical coher-
ence of the strategies for achieving those outcomes, as well as of the
principles which underlie the proposals themselves. This is an extreme-
ly important work of a kind that ethicists are genuinely qualified to do.
We can engage people in this kind of analysis even if we disagree with
what they are proposing. If they are sincere in what it is they are trying
to achieve, then they will want to respond to the analyses arrived at. Of
course, not everyone who claims morally sound foundations for the
agenda being advanced is sincere or will turn out to be sincere.
However, in the end, sincerity can only be tested by inviting a dialogue,
and those who are genuinely concerned with the ethical parameters of
their proposals will respond. It is with these people that the discussion
of ethics, restructuring, and the economy will begin.
One of the central difficulties we face in this endeavour is the extent
to which debate can become polarized. Empirical claims are often seen
to be unfair or biased. Those who identify themselves as ethicists have
a special responsibility in this regard, if they are to encourage the best
use of the opportunities for ethical inquiry that the current impulse
toward restructuring makes possible. Once again, there are many exam-
ples of what is possible in this regard in this book. Barry Hoffmaster's
essay ("The Ethics of Restructuring") is an example; Todd Hostager's
account of corporate judo is similarly effective. A key element in all
these analyses is the observation that the policies under examination are
inconsistent with the stated goals of those who elaborate them.
We might apply this kind of analysis to the examples I began with
by asking what ethical assumptions are implicit in theories like that of
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creative destruction. How does one know that the destruction is going
to be creative? What kind of ethical parameters can one construct which
will allow the thesis to be tested? If it is not tested, then the theory itself
is seriously suspect, an expression of ideology or of intellectual fashion.
Those who use expressions like "creative destruction" have an obliga-
tion to define the ethical parameters of their theories and concepts so
that the public can discern what is creative and what is just destructive.
Ethicists in their turn have an obligation to submit those justifications to
careful examination. I think that this book (and the Wilfrid Laurier
University conference from which it sprang), have gone some distance
in that direction.
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Notes
Chapter 3
1 I thank Sylvie Lamer and Paddy Rodney for help in thinking about these mat-
ters.
2 I owe this distinction to Dr. John Dossetor.
3 The extreme of this approach is the pay package of Jerre L. Stead, the chief
executive of Ingram Micro Inc., a computer distributor, which gives Mr. Stead
nothing but stock options (Dobrzynski 1996, Cl).
4 Ip 1996, B4: "the evidence that companies benefit from downsizing is mixed.
There is little Canadian research, but the American Management Association
found in a survey that among seven hundred companies that had downsized
between 1989 and 1994, productivity rose in 34 percent of cases and fell in
30 percent, while profits rose in 51 percent of cases and declined in 30 per-
cent. In 83 percent of cases, employee morale declined." For empirical infor-
mation on the effects of restructuring, see the articles by Cascio and Hostager
et al. in this volume.
5 In response to mounting criticism, the rhetoric and euphemisms devised by
consultants are changing. The consulting industry now worries about "cor-
porate anorexia" and promotes the goal of "growing the revenue line"
(Uchitelle 1996, Cl).
6 Canadian hospitals recently participated in a benchmarking study that allows
hospital managers to compare how they are doing in hiring, firing, and man-
aging employees (Gibb-Clark 1996, B9).
7 The points in this paragraph are taken from Armstrong et al. 1996.
8 The pressure to reduce costs exerted by managed care on hospitals in the
United States also has led to smaller nursing staffs. In the New York area, for
example, 1,316 nursing jobs, 3 percent of the total, were lost between
February 1995 and February 1996 (Rosenthal, 1996 Al6).
9 Nurses in New York City have even taken out an advertisement in the New
York Times about the replacement of "RNs with unlicensed workers who
insert catheters, replace IVs, and treat seriously ill patients after just a few
weeks' training" and citing some "horrible results" of this "down skilling." ("Is
Quality Patient Care Your Hospital's Top Priority? Don't Bet On It," New York
Times, 12/06/96, A17). This was followed by an advertisement that raised
questions such as: "What would you think of a hospital that hired people off
the street, gave them three weeks training, and put them to work in the ER
and intensive care units, caring for the most seriously ill patients? What would
you think if that hospital allowed unlicensed workers to deliver care requir-
ing expertise, like suctioning your lungs, putting in your IV, or inserting your
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catheter?" (emphasis in original) ("Does Columbia-Presbyterian Put Patients'
Health First?" New York Times, 31/07/96, A15).
10 See "OR redesign to benefit patients," The Page (Newsletter for the Staff of
London Health Sciences Centre), Vol. 1, No. 7, 6 (August 1, 1996).
11 The introductory psychology "superclass" taught to 1,200 students at the
University of Western Ontario certainly contributes to this goal. Moreover, it
is said to be the "most popular" course at Western (Gait 1996, Al).
12 One hospital CEO agrees with that estimate, but he suspects that "perhaps
another 40 percent is effective" and he has "no idea about the rest" (Hassen
1993, 181).
13 For an argument that health care is special, is not simply another consumer
good, see Daniels 1985, ch. 1.
14 Another CEO agrees that TQM is a vehicle for preserving the health care sys-
tem of which Canadians are so proud (Hassen 1993, 187).
15 One symptom of this is the worry that medical ethics is becoming no more
than business ethics. See Douard 1996, 1, 5, 8.
Chapter 6
16 See R.A. Johnson 1996 for a useful three-way typology of restructuring forms:
(1) portfolio restructuring, which includes divestitures, spinoffs, mergers, and
acquisitions, (2) financial restructuring, which includes LBOs (leveraged
buyouts), ESOPs (employee stock ownership plans), etc., and (3) organiza-
tional restructuring, which includes reorganizations and downsizings. The
bottom line is that restructurings come in various forms and differ on numer-
ous dimensions.
17 The historical record indicates that some learning may indeed be warranted.
For instance, numerous studies have consistently shown that a significant
percentage of M&As fail to perform up to expectations. See, for instance,
Boyle and Jaynes 1972, Pritchett 1985, and Zweig et al. 1995.
18 In particular, Secretary R.B. Reich proposed a decrease or elimination of cor-
porate income taxes for firms meeting the minimum requirements in the fol-
lowing areas: (1) upgrading employee skills, (2) profit sharing, (3) pensions,
(4) health care, (5) retraining and placement of laid-off employees (Reich
1996).
Chapter 8
19 In personal conversation.
Chapter 9
20 This article is based on an earlier paper published by the three authors
(Williams et al. 1996).
21 Our focus on the Queens Regional Board in this paper is not intended to
convey the impression that it is the only regional body to deal explicitly with
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ethical issues. We are aware of related initiatives in two other provinces,
New Brunswick and Alberta, and a brief description of these will illustrate
their similarities and differences with the Queens Regional Board's
approach.
New Brunswick was one of the first Canadian provinces to regionalize
health care. Recognizing the importance of ethics in health care, the Board
of Trustees of the Region 3 established an Institutional Ethics Committee.
Committee membership includes one staff representative from each of the
major health care professions and an equal or greater number of community
representatives. It meets at least ten times a year.
In addition to its Institutional Ethics Committee, the Region 3 Hospital
Corporation has created a Bioethics Service. This is provided by a part-time
bioethics advisor/consultant with formal training and experience in the field.
His principal function is to implement, operate, and regularly review a
bioethics education program for the region, including formal ethics
rounds/seminars, staff development, and continuing education activities, and
various informal teaching sessions. He provides staff support for the
Institutional Ethics Committee, and undertakes clinical ethics consultations
upon request.
The use of an ethics committee to provide advice on ethical issues is the
favoured approach of one of Alberta's regional bodies, the Mistahia Regional
Health Authority (based in Grande Prairie). A pre-existing bioethics commit-
tee at the region's main hospital has been given an expanded mandate to
deal with ethical issues throughout the region.
22 Wayne Hooper was the founding CEO of the Queens Region Board. John
Williams and Michael Yeo were contracted by the Queens Region Board to
provide ethics education and advice.
Chapter 11
23 Smith 1995, 169: "Forms of evidence allowable in evidence based medicine,
while now extending beyond the randomised controlled trial, remain heavi-
ly numerate. This encourages emphasis on the quantifiable and physical
aspects of any clinical dilemma, which may be inappropriate. Denial of social
and psychological aspects may be detrimental, and ignoring the less readily
measured dimensions may be dangerous. Rich sources of evidence also
include the anecdotal, which are so often slated, and the qualitative, which
is not mentioned by this lobby yet has developed considerably and provides
illuminative results. The search for justification continues."
24 "Ontario's Bill 26...received third and final reading Monday with a vote of 77
to 47.... The bill is the companion legislation to the government's Nov. 29
mini-budget, bringing the total cuts the Harris government has implemented
to eight billion dollars, the largest in Ontario's history" (Vancouver Sun,
30/01/96).
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Chapter 13
25 "True equal opportunity is a progressive way of doing business. It reflects
excellence in human resource management and we are determined to con-
tinue our efforts in this area." (An official statement from The Royal Bank as
quoted in Human Resources and Development Canada 1994, 4.)
Chapter 14
26 Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., No. C-91-2132, 1991 US Dist. LEXIS 8580 (N.D.
Cal. May 27, 1992). Appellate court judgment (33 F. 3d 1116, 9th Cir. 1994).
27 The Supreme Court of Canada paved the way for liability claims against Dow
Corning by upholding an award of ninety-five thousand dollars by a British
Columbia court to Susan Hollis in Hollis v. Dow Corning Corporation. 4 S.C.R.
634, 1995. The Canadian court ruled that Dow Corning had a "duty to warn"
the medical community and consumers of the risks posed by the implants,
risks of which it had been aware. "Implant Makers Had 'Duty' to Warn,"
Globe and Mail, December 22, 1995, Al.
28 A second study at Brigham and Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School
by Sanchez-Guerrero (also published in the NEJM, 1995) examined the inci-
dence of rheumatic disease among 121,700 American registered nurses from
1976 to 1990. The use of breast implants among those with confirmed
rheumatic disease was compared to use in a randomly selected, age-matched
control group. The authors "found no association between silicone breast
implants and connective-tissue disease." Studies at the University of Michigan
(1994), John Hopkins Medical Institutions (1992), and the University of
Toronto also found no evidence of a connection between implants or silicone
and scleroderma. For a summary and analysis of these studies, see Angell
1996, pp. 100 ff.
29 The Dow Corning implant case has been written up as a case study of uneth-
ical conduct in many business schools across North America, including the
Harvard Business School. At a recent meeting of the Society of Business
Ethics in Quebec City, Quebec, several panelists in a discussion of the Dow
Corning case indicated that the scientific evidence brought forward in the
period since the 1995 bankruptcy declaration by the company requires a revi-
sion of this widespread ethical analysis of the case.
30 Recent examples include the $180 million Agent Orange settlement against
Dow Chemical, the $2.5 billion settlement against Johns-Manville for asbestos
related claims, and the $2.5 billion against A.H. Robbins for the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine birth control device.
31 Great Britain, for example, has not removed silicone implants from its mar-
ket. Its Department of Health issued its own report in 1993 stating that it
found no scientific reason for removing them, and it reiterated this conclu-
sion in 1994. France imposed bans, lifted them, and imposed them again,
seemingly unable to decide. Spain at first imposed a ban and then lifted it.
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Chapter 16
32 As Badillo 1996, 155 observes, "To provide equal pay for equal work is a
principle of all civilized humanity and should be particularly enforced with-
in a university setting, where promotion of such ideals is a veritable com-
monplace."
33 The term "new appointment" is ambiguous. In 1990-91 16 percent of new
appointees were hired at the two senior ranks, while 56 percent were hired
at the assistant professor level. The group "Other," which accounted for
5 percent of new appointments, includes special lecturers, ungraded staff
usually hired on a one-year contract basis, etc.
34 This is an actual remark from an interview with a part-timer.
35 Brehaut continues, "The effects of such a tenure policy are not likely to be
as deleterious in a period when universities and colleges are expanding in
number and size (e.g., in the 1960s in Canada) as in a period of limited
growth or retrenchment (1970s and 1980s). To counter these effects, some
people have supported the elimination of tenured positions and the intro-
duction of three or five year contracts open for free competition, charging
that because of the scarcity of academic jobs and the overbalance of quali-
fied candidates, the standards required of new candidates have steadily esca-
lated and tenure is denying the right to compete for jobs on the basis of
equality."
36 This letter was published in The South Carolina Post and Courier in 1995. It
was put on the Internet by the South Carolina Council of the American
Association of University Professors as part of a policy discussion in defence
of tenure.
Chapter 19
37 The following remarks are excerpted from a speech to the First Annual
Laurier Conference on Business and Professional Ethics in October, 1996.
Chapter 22
38 The names of the Bell workers interviewed for this case study have been
changed for the purposes of this article.
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